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Although their contribution in the Great War was limited, the use of armoured 
vehicles marked the commencement of significant changes in the nature of military 
operations. Late in the war, a report that was critical of Ministry management of tank 
production escaped the cloak of secrecy normally maintained by government 
departments. The report suggested Ministerial managerial standards fell well short of 
claims later made by Churchill. 
This raised the question of other possible failings and whether more might have 
been accomplished by Britain’s “secret weapon”. It therefore appeared appropriate to 
consider the development of armoured vehicles with a view to establishing whether 
there was any justification for the proposition that the nation might have allowed a 
greater war-time contribution by armoured vehicles to have escaped its grasp. 
Examination of military and Treasury files at the National Archives formed the core 
of the study. Transcripts of the hearings of the Royal Commission on Awards to 
Inventors, 1919/1920, were particularly relevant, these having received little attention 
in existing scholarship. 
Findings revealed poor management by Churchill’s Landships Committee in 1915 
and later by the Ministry. The most significant finding was that inadequate briefing of 
the designers led to inappropriate specification for the first tanks. Many of the 
breakdowns associated with tanks in training and action at the Somme were 
predictable, the result of “old age”, exceeding of design life. Poor management by the 
Landships Committee appointed by Churchill had firstly slowed the design effort then 
provided a specification inappropriate to army requirements. The consequences of 
delays and faults for operations in the war, notably for the Battles of the Somme, are 
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1 First Armoured Cars in Kohat Pass, NWFP, May 1915. 
2 S. W. Africa – Terrain/Port Problems, Landing via Raft. 
3 Early RNAS Open Rolls Royce Armoured Car 
4 Early Open-topped Belgian Armoured Car, 
5 RNAS Seabrook Armoured 
6 Simms War Car, April 1902 
7 Steam Road Train Trials, Leeds 1903 
8 Armoured Fowler, c. 1900 
9 French CGV 1902 
10 Automitrailleuse Peugeot 1914/1915 
11 Renault Model 1915 
12 WO Experimental Autocarrier, 1915 
13 AEC Experimental B-type, WO 1915. 
14 RNAS Rolls Royce 1915 
15 Erhardt Balloon Buster 1914. 
16 Erhardt E-V/4 1915 
17 Westmorland and Cumberland Isotta-Fraschini. 
18 W. Raleton Cartoon of Future Warfare 
19 Hornsby Caterpillar 1908 
20 Section of Bacon’s 15-inch Gun in Flanders 
21 Wheeled 15-inch Convoy leaving Lincoln for Embarkation 
22 Foster’s Wheeled Tractor on Test, December 1914 
23 Tritton Trench-Crosser, 1915 
24 Holt Tractor, Type tested, Shoeburyness, 1915 
25 Tank “Chartreuse”, ditched 15 September 1916 
26 Tank “Crème de Menthe”, 15 September 1916 
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27 Tank “Julian” at Glasgow. 
28 “Tank Bank” Advertisement and Event at Birmingham. 
29 Tank Bank Event at Luton. 
30 Tank Money Box Selection 
31 Brutinel, Partially Armoured Autocar, CMMG Brigade 
32 Brutinel Autocar, Victory Parade, Mons, 11 November 1918 
33 Brutinel Autocar – 1918 Spring Offensives casualty 
34 Crompton’s Articulated Machine, Summer 1915 
35 Model by Nesbitt or MacFie, 1915. 
36 Mother” at Hatfield Park 
37 “Mother” - trial at Lincoln, January 1916. 
38 St. Chamond inadequate track. 
39 Schneider, ditched in narrow trench. 
40 Little Willie, 1915. 
41 Four-Wheel Drive Austro-Daimler, 1904. 
42 French trials of Panzerautomobile 
43 Trials of Panzerautomobile. 
44 Inspection of Panzerautomobile by Archduke Ferdinand 
45 Bremer Marien Wagen Überpanzert 
46 LKII - June 1918, none built by Armistice 
47 German A7V/U Summer 1918 
48 Mark IV with Unditching Beam Deployed 
49 Road-Transportable Light Renault FT 
50 Newton Tractor, 1918 
51 Crossing Water (Flotation) 1918. 
52 Crossing Water - Inglis Bridge, 1918 
53 Speed into Action – German 7.62cm. Infanteriegeschütz 





The Meteorological Office recorded the weather in Britain during September 1916 
as generally dry and dull, the only notable adverse event being the mid-month passage 
of a depression across the country.1 However, the papers contained news of the war 
reflecting a contrasting, bluer colour in the emotional spectrum. The news was 
imprecise but sufficiently detailed to constitute a genuine basis for optimism: optimism 
that would build as the war progressed.2  Upon later reflection, many might have 
described the news as a shaft of light through a dark period of history in which the war 
had consistently failed to conform either to the initial spirit of optimism that, for some, 
had characterised Britain’s entry into the conflict, or to restrained acceptance that was 
perhaps the response of many others.3  
The newspapers of 16 September contained the first reports of a new British 
weapon.4 Censorship restricted descriptive details, thereby fuelling speculation:  
Nobody talked of anything else yesterday but the ‘tanks’….Every man has 
cherished dreams of wonderful mechanical contrivances that would be 
evolved in this war. The clangerous striding machines of Mr Wells’ Martians 
and their terrible heat-ray have teased many a citizen’s midnight 
imagination.5 
Journalists played on the embarrassment of the enemy, whetted the public appetite 
and sought to occupy the moral high ground: 
When the secrecy which rightly surrounds the construction and use of this 
most recent addition to our fighting machines can be lifted, we may perhaps 
be enabled to imagine the feelings of the German infantry in their shell-
battered trenches when, in the uncertain light of dawn, they saw advancing 
upon them an army of unearthly monsters, cased in steel, spitting fire, and 
crawling laboriously but ceaselessly over trench, barbed wire, and shell 
crater.6 
 
1 Meteorological Office, Monthly Weather Reports 1916, 
https://digital.nmla.metoffice.gov.uk/collection_75a68cd2-cabe-43a8-98bb-3919f51e59a9/, accessed 
5 June 2019. 
2 Basil Liddell Hart, History of the First World War (Trowbridge, Cassel, 1973), p. 332. 
3 ‘Great Ovation to the King and Queen: Crowds at Palace: Intense Enthusiasm’, Daily Telegraph, 5 
August 1914; Hew Strachan, The First World War, vol. I: To Arms (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2001), p. 162; Catriona Pennell, A Kingdom United: Popular Responses to the Outbreak of the First 
World War in Britain and Ireland, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012), passim. 
4 ‘The New British Attack’, The Times, 16 September 1916. 
5 ‘“Tank Talk”, Exciting Day for Theorists’, Daily Mail, 19 September 1916.  
6 ‘The Mysterious “Tanks” - Our Latest Military Weapon’, The Times, 16 September 1916. 
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Such reports touched upon what would become an important element in the tank’s 
armoury, namely psychological effects. According to Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, 
Commander-in-Chief of the BEF: 
So great has been the effect produced upon the German infantry by the 
appearance of British tanks that in more than one instance, when for various 
reasons real tanks were not available in sufficient numbers, valuable results 
have been obtained by the use of dummy tanks painted on frames of wood 
and canvas.7 
The British press rejected German accusations that tanks breached international rules 
of warfare, holding British inventiveness to be outsmarting the enemy. 8  Such 
accusations were unlikely to be taken seriously bearing in mind Germany had itself 
torn up the rulebook by the treatment of civilian populations in occupied territory and 
introduced chemical substances to the battlefield.9  
Yet journalists made more of events than was justified. They falsely described 
British tactics in terms envisaged by those responsible for the development of the new 
machines, namely concentrated attacks.10 GHQ had not adopted such tactics but had 
dispersed the machines into small groups. As will be shown, both in terms of tactics 
and degree of success, the reality differed considerably from journalistic hype. Most 
tanks ditched or broke down before reaching enemy trenches.11 It would be some time 
before equipment and tactics harmonised with early journalistic claims. 
Much more might have been achieved, and well before 1916.12 Opportunities for 
the development of mechanical warfare had surfaced many years earlier but had lain 
dormant owing to lack of vision and initiative. In December 1915, at the end of a two-
 
7 John Herbert Boraston (ed.) Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatches December 1915-April 1919 (London, J. 
M. Dent and Sons, 1919), Seventh Despatch, 21 December 1918, ‘Advance to Victory’. 
8 ‘Sir D. Haig wins at small cost: Dash of the Tanks’, Daily Mail, 18 September 1916. 
9 See for example, Jean Michel Veranneman, Belgium in the Great War (Barnsley, Pen and Sword, 
2018), pp. 33-43; John Keegan, The First World War (London, Hutchinson, 1998), pp. 91-93; John 
Horne and Alan Kramer, German Atrocities, 1914: A History of Denial (New Haven, Yale University 
Press, 2001), passim; Barbara W Tuchman, The Guns of August (London, Penguin, 2014), pp. 340-
356. The initial release of gas from cylinders was, technically, not a breach of international law, which 
specifically forbade asphyxiating gas projectiles, but such distinctions were unlikely to impress 
adversaries and soon proved to be the start of the general introduction of such methods of warfare, 
see Paul Strong and Sanders Marble, Artillery in the Great War (Barnsley, Pen and Sword, 2011), p. 
48; Ludwig Fritz Haber, The Poisonous Cloud: Chemical Warfare in the First World War (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2002), passim. 
10 National Archives, WO158/843, Robertson (on behalf of Lloyd George) to Haig, 25 July 1916. 
11 Chris McCarthy, The Somme: The Day-by-Day Account (London, Arms and Armour, 1993), pp. 
100-109. 
12 ‘Naval and Military Intelligence: The Simms Motor War Car’, The Times, 5 April 1902. 
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hour speech on achievements by the Ministry of Munitions, Lloyd George had criticised 
progress since August 1914: 
Ah! Two fatal words of this War! Too late in moving here. Too late in arriving 
there. Too late in coming to this decision. Too late in starting with 
enterprises. Too late in preparing. In this War the footsteps of the Allied 
forces have been dogged by the mocking spectre of “Too Late” and unless 
we quicken our movements damnation will fall on the sacred cause for which 
so much gallant blood has flowed. I beg employers and workmen not to have 
“Too Late” inscribed upon the portals of their workshops: that is my appeal.13  
His accusations were, in reality, aimed at the War Office and politicians.14 Additionally, 
it will be shown that Lloyd George’s remarks applied more widely than he may have 
appreciated. Firstly, he himself, along with other tank aficionados of 1915, was 
deserving of elements of the criticism he eloquently directed at others. Secondly, the 
period over which the criticism applied extended back for more than a decade, during 
the greater part of which his party had been in power and he had occupied senior 
Ministerial office. 
The historiography contains considerable justification for Lloyd George’s criticism. 
Later actions showed that the army and nation in general would raise its game to 
secure victory. However, the existing literature neglects several significant issues. By 
inadequately recognising the prospective impact of advances in technology on the 
nature of warfare, the government and Army Council failed to make appropriate 
preparations.15 Consequently, before the war, no provision was made in terms of 
motor traction for movement of artillery or supplies over difficult terrain and there was 
no experimentation with armoured fighting vehicles.16 On the eve of war, Crompton’s 
pleas for SP guns were rejected by the Army Council, “the matter has been carefully 
considered and it has been decided not to take up at the present time the question of 
designing a gun of this nature”.17 Indeed, minimal armoured protection was provided 
 
13 Hansard, HoC debates, statement by Mr. Lloyd George, 20 December 1915, 96-165. 
14 Richard Toye, ‘Lloyd George’s War Rhetoric, 1914-1918’, Journal of Liberal History, 77, Winter 
2012-13, pp. 24-29 (p. 27). 
15 Peter Simkins, Kitchener’s Army: The Raising of the New Armies 1914-1916 (Barnsley, Pen and 
Sword, 2007), pp. 5-9. 
16 Tank Museum, 0.69.01(41) Crompton, Crompton to Secretary War Office, 17 June 1914, 
Crompton, experienced in the problems of haulage over rough ground, had for some time been 
seeking the provision of military supply vehicles with 8ft. diameter wheels and the construction of 
mechanically propelled field guns. 
17 Tank Museum, 0.69.01(41) Crompton, Guthrie Smith to Crompton, 29 July 1914, the content of the 
letter extended to just seventy-seven words. Colonel Rookes Crompton had served with the Royal 
Engineers in the Boer War and was appointed Honorary Colonel of the London Engineers in 
1911(London Gazette 23 June 1911); National Archives, T173/34B, Royal Commission on Awards to 
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for any units on the 1914/1915 battlefield, leaving personnel vulnerable, with little 
alternative but to go to ground, or, in the case of artillery, to provide indirect fire 
support.18  
The government compounded errors associated with inadequate pre-war 
preparations by inefficient supply procedures and by adoption of inappropriate 
specifications. Scholarship fails to draw adequate attention to management 
weaknesses or to the degree to which Churchill, who was in part responsible for 
elements of the shortcomings in tank production during the war, later fought to inflate 
and burnish his personal role in developing tanks. The engineers and industrial 
managers, upon whose efforts the quality of new machinery/vehicles depended, 
appear neither to have been rewarded appropriately nor to have enjoyed the status 
warranted by their abilities and knowledge. Marder draws attention to Fisher’s reform 
programme which, to a degree, reduced efficiency penalties suffered by the navy 
through stigmatisation of engineering and engineer officers.19 There appears to have 
been no equivalent pre-war reform in the Edwardian army. Evidence of this is apparent 
from the lack of involvement of appropriate engineers in conferences to determine 
future tank design and development. This weakness was particularly significant when 
the BEF first came to use tanks, ignorant of engineering considerations adversely 
impacting reliability, a consideration which should have influenced tactics. 
Delay in taking advantage of the attributes of armoured vehicles seems likely to 
have increased the scale of casualties early in the war.20 Subsequent design and 
construction difficulties further restricted the contribution armoured vehicles were able 
to make towards the successful conclusion of the conflict. The firepower of tanks may 
have been marginal compared to that of artillery but tanks had the ability to target 
direct fire onto enemy strongpoints from forward positions with infantry. Edmonds 
 
Inventors, Crompton claimed that, in South Africa, Lord Roberts moved him from electrical 
engineering to “organise the mechanical transport”: he subsequently formed the Mechanical 
Transport Committee in London, later becoming consulting engineer to the Road Board. 
18 James E. Edmonds, History of the Great War, Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1914, vol. I 
(London, Macmillan, 1933), pp. 106-111 and 256-257; Strong and Marble, Artillery in the Great War, 
pp xviii-xxiii. 
19 Arthur Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, vol. I, The 
Road to War 1904-1914 (Barnsley, Seaforth Publishing, 2013), pp. 29-33. 
20 National Archives, WO32/11357, Director of Staff Duties to President, Reorganisation Committee, 
28 June 1919. 
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draws attention to many instances of tanks being called upon to keep the advance 
flowing during the Hundred Days: 
As soon as it became light many (tanks) fell victims to the enemy’s forward 
guns. Their effect was largely moral. They were only used in small packets 
to assist the infantry, and did good service in crushing machine-gun posts 
and in village fighting. The infantry liked to see them”.21 
In earlier wars, and at Le Cateau, infantry had valued having artillery fighting alongside 
them. However, in such positions tanks were excessively vulnerable to direct or 
observed and adjusted fire. Ministry suppliers and military commanders were slow to 
address this vulnerability.22 
Although press reports in September 1916 stirred public imagination, the events 
they described might easily have been misinterpreted as a minor change in battlefield 
tactics. However, the appearance of the first primitive and unreliable tanks 
represented a significant, tangible marker of forthcoming major changes in the conduct 
of warfare. Many in the army failed to recognise the importance of events that were 
unfolding, though, in an imprecise and emotive way, the significance of the first use of 
tanks seems to have been recognised by the enthusiastic response of the public. Army 
doubters did not include Haig, BEF Commander-in-Chief from December 1915. Under 
a Commander with less vision, the extent of unreliability might have resulted in 
withdrawal from the experimental project. It was however fortunate that Haig 
immediately saw the significance of the moment and the potential to reduce 
casualties.23 Within hours of their first use, he had asked for five times the original 
number of tanks.24 At a conference four days later Haig’s staff made an order for 1,000 
tanks.25 
 
21 James E. Edmonds, Military Operations France and Belgium, 1918, vol. V (London, Naval and 
Military Press, 1993), p. 577. 
22 National Archives, MUN4/5206, 15 October 1918, Armament Construction Officer to Controller MM, 
reporting unsatisfactory trials of 6-pdr smoke shell; Deputy DSD to Controller MM, 8 November 1918, 
specifying improved arrangements for production of smoke by chemical means from tank exhausts; 
WO158/832, 1 September 1918, Lawrence to First, Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Armies, advice on 
the “proper use” and protection of tanks, including copy of captured German document dated 23 July 
on “Organization of Anti-Tank Defence”. 
23 Livesay, Canada's Hundred Days: With the Canadian Corps from Amiens to Mons, Aug. 8-Nov. 11, 
1918 (Toronto, T. Allen, 1919), Livesay supports Haig’s assessment of the beneficial effect on 
casualty numbers, pp. 43-45, 54-55. 
24 Ernest D. Swinton, Eyewitness: Being Personal Reminiscences of Certain Phases of the Great War 
including the Genesis of the Tank (London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1932), p. 286. 
25 National Archives, WO158/836, Recommendations for the expansion of the Heavy Section (Tanks), 
Machine Gun Corps, put forward by Major-General Butler, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, GHQ, 
France, at a conference held on 19 and 20 September 1916, pp. 1-2. 
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Praise is due to the Commander-in-Chief for recognising the potential value of 
armoured vehicles but earlier lack of foresight by senior military personnel should not 
be overlooked. Along with other senior officers and politicians, Haig was many years 
“Too Late” in recognising the contribution that could be made to the efficiency of 
warfare through the combination of the new technologies of motor vehicles, machine-
guns and light artillery. Over the preceding two decades there had been many 
indicators of the likely human and financial costs of warfare in nineteenth century mode 
on a battlefield bristling with twentieth century weapons.26 Such indicators were to 
leave no mark in terms of mechanical and associated tactical progression. The 
potential for beneficial change provided by developing technologies was not generally 
appreciated.27 Yet there was much debate over the value and tactical use of machine-
guns in the pre-war period. Notably, on the eve of the First World War, Major-General 
Altham, drawing substantially from experiences in the Russo-Japanese War, provided 
a clear summary of advantages, disadvantages and tactics. However, his assessment 
was based on a more mobile form of warfare than would materialise on “The Western 
Front”. His book did not address response to entrenched stalemate along lines 
forecast by Jean De Bloch”.28 Similarly, he did not consider whether there might be a 
role for armoured cars such as sent by the Italian Army to Libya in 1912.29  
Shimshoni has drawn attention to this failure by national leaders to utilise the 
opportunities provided by new technologies, “Of the historical lessons, the ones most 
missed by the leaders of 1914 were those regarding the impact of evolving 
technologies”. He postulated that the “knowledge and basic technology to produce 
 
26 Michael Howard, ‘Men against Fire: Expectations of War in 1914’, International Security, 9, 1, 1984, 
pp. 41-57, (pp.42-43); T. H. E. Travers, “The Offensive and the Problem of Innovation in British 
Military Thought 1870-1915.” Journal of Contemporary History, 13, 3, 1978, pp. 531–553, (pp. 537-
538). 
27 Studies of the Russo-Japanese War suggested large-scale casualties would be sustained in 
crossing the fire-swept zone in front of entrenched enemy positions. See, for example, Tim Travers, 
The Killing Ground: the British Army, the Western Front, & the Emergence of Modern Warfare 1900-
1918 (Barnsley, Pen and Sword, 2009), pp. 43-46, 62-65 and 250-251 and ‘The Offensive and the 
Problem of Innovation in British Military Thought 1870-1915”, Journal of Contemporary History, 13, 3, 
1978, pp. 531–553, (pp. 534-537). 
28 E.A. Altham, The Principles of War, vol. I (London, Macmillan, 1914), pp. 309-331. It would appear 
Altham had intended to produce a second volume, but it seems likely the matter was allowed to rest 
after the experiences of the war had rendered volume I of value only as a historical snapshot of past 
procedures rather than a textbook to guide future operations; Tim Travers, “Technology, Tactics, and 
Morale: Jean De Bloch, The Boer War, and British Military Theory, 1900-1914”, Journal of Modern 
History, 51, 2, (1979), pp. 264–286, (pp. 264-267). 
29 W. H. Beehler, USN, The History of the Italian-Turkish War September 29, 1911 to October 18, 
1912 (Annapolis, The Advertiser Republican, 1913) pp. 94 and 105. 
 15 
tanks and armored cars was surely available to all by 1912”.30 Although his comments 
are substantially correct, the claim that the technology to develop tanks was available 
to “all” did overstate the pre-war spread of such technology. On the other hand, he 
understated the length of the period in which the technology to produce armoured cars 
had been available and in which the technology to produce tracked vehicles had been 
available to a more limited group of nations.31 
Reasoning behind the failure of the military profession to take greater advantage of 
developing technologies has exercised many minds. Grissom has pulled together 
earlier thoughts from the scholarship and categorised four ‘models’ against which 
military response to innovation has been examined. 32  He awards special 
acknowledgement to the work of Posen who had earlier concluded that “Militaries 
oppose innovation”, whereas civilian intervention “is often responsible for the level of 
innovation and integration achieved in a given military doctrine”. 33  Posen’s 
conclusions are supported by others, including Beard and Zisk.34  These analysts 
share Posen’s views of the importance of civilian involvement in innovative military 
progression. Being large bureaucracies, Posen concluded that military organisations 
are intrinsically inflexible therefore hard to change or that they are inflexible as 
between services.35 He judged, according to the major models, that “senior officers 
and/or civilians are the agents of innovation. They recognize the need for change, 
formulate a new way of warfare” and “manipulate the organization into compliance.”36 
Recent research is related primarily to Interwar or Cold War periods and the initial 
inclination is to devalue their relevance to earlier periods. However, elements correlate 
well with initial British experience with armoured vehicles, firstly the cold-shoulder to 
 
30 Jonathan Shimshoni, ‘Technology, Military Advantage, and World War I: A Case for Military 
Entrepreneurship’, International Security, 15, 3, (1990), pp. 187-215, (passim). 
31 E. Bartholomew, Early Armoured Cars (Princes Risborough, Shire, 1988), pp. 3-11; Tank Museum, 
623.437.425(41), Derrick Warren, The Hornsby Tractors: A Brief History of the chain-track 
“Caterpillars” from Grantham; Richard M Ogorkiewicz, Design and Development of Fighting Vehicles 
(London, MacDonald, 1968), pp. 25-26. 
32 Adam Grissom, The Future of Military Innovation Studies, Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 29, No. 
5, (2006), pp. 905-934 (p. 908). 
33 Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World 
Wars (Ithaca N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 227. 
34 Edmund Beard, Developing the ICBM: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics (New York, Columbia UP, 
1976), pp. 145-194 and Kimberly M. Zisk, Engaging the Enemy: Organization Theory and Soviet 
Military Innovation 1955–1991 (Princeton, Princeton UP, 1993), pp. 178-183. 
35 Adam Grissom, The Future of Military Innovation Studies, Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 29, No. 
5, (2006), pp. 905-934, (p. 919). 
36 Ibid, p. 920. 
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the armoured car, then the shelving of the tank concept in February 1915. However, 
the army could not restrict civilian thought. Churchill, Stern, d’Eyncourt, Crompton and 
Tritton were all civilians and Wilson was essentially a civilian, simply joining up in 1914, 
over-age, “to do his bit”. Additionally, Posen’s observation, that “innovation should 
occur mainly when the organization registers a large failure, or when civilians with 
legitimate authority intervene to promote innovation”, duly came to pass in 1915/16.37 
 Grissom acknowledges the need for more work to assimilate bottom-up innovation 
into models that are essentially top-down. 38  Past relevance of bottom-up 
developments with armoured vehicles is exhibited by Wilson and Tank Corps 
workshops in France and by the many units operating armoured cars in Asia and 
Africa, where climatic conditions gave additional impetus to localized 
modifications/innovations.39 
Some point to the achievements of the cavalry in modifying and enhancing its role 
during the early years of the century.40 This raises the question of whether armoured 
cars were necessary. However, cavalry and armoured cars had distinctive attributes, 
which in many circumstances could prove complementary.41  This was frequently 
demonstrated in the Palestine campaign, for example at the Musmus Pass where “it 
was undoubtedly largely due to their (armoured cars) effective support that our 
casualties were so negligible”.42 Whereas cavalry possessed the major advantage of 
speed over many forms of unmetalled countryside, armoured vehicles offered a 
degree of protection from shrapnel and small-arms fire, though could utilise speed only 
on roads or relatively hard-surfaced dry terrain. 43  Fletcher’s work is particularly 
 
37 Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine, pp. 224-225. 
38 Adam Grissom, The Future of Military Innovation Studies, Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 29, No. 
5, pp. 905-934, (p. 930). 
39 David Fletcher, War Cars: British Armoured Cars in the First World War (London, HMSO, 1987), 
passim. 
40 Spencer Jones, From Boer War to World War: Tactical Reform of the British Army, 1902-1914 
(Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 2012), pp. 185-190. 
41 David Kenyon, Horsemen in No Man’s Land: British Cavalry and Trench Warfare 1914-1918 
(Barnsley, Pen and Sword, 2011, pp.210-214; report by Kavanagh, 27 May 1915, reproduced in 
Murray Sueter, The Evolution of the Tank: A Record of Royal Naval Air Service Caterpillar 
Experiments (London, Hutchinson, 1937), pp. 35-37. 
42 George Alexander Weir, ‘With the Fourth Cavalry Division in Palestine’, The Cavalry Journal, July 
1920, pp. 189-206, (p. 202), Weir records the LAMB “afforded very great assistance both during the 
advance through the Musmus Pass….and during the action itself    their presence was found to add 
considerably to the confidence of the vanguard”. 
43 Sam Cottingham Rolls, Steel Chariots in the Desert: The Story of an Armoured-Car Driver with the 
Duke of Westminster in Libya and in Arabia with T. E. Lawrence (London, Jonathan Cape, 1937), pp. 
45-57; ‘Rescue of Tara Prisoners: Motor-Car Race across the Desert’, The Times, 22 April 1916 - the 
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instructive in revealing the variety and extent of interest in and use of armoured cars 
by all ranks in a number of army operational units once the lid was taken off military 
use of these innovative machines by Army Council acceptance in 1915 of elements of 
“Winston’s Circus”. 44  It is regrettable that this receptive reservoir of talent and 
operational capability was not tapped before 1915.45 
Bloch’s prediction of military stalemate had not been accepted in Britain or 
internationally.46 In these circumstances it is perhaps unsurprising that no item relating 
to armed or armoured vehicles appeared on the agenda of General Staff conferences 
held at the Staff College each January between 1906 and 1914.47 It is significant also 
that there were no items on armoured motorised firepower on the papers of the Army 
Council and its Committees over the period 1904-1913.48 The Army Council had been 
established to provide brains for the army.49 Esher had believed the army’s body could 
 
distance covered by the armoured cars/ambulances etc. was some 115-150 miles in conditions 
lacking the infrastructure of Western Europe. Armoured cars were also used, effectively, on the North-
West Frontier (see photograph 1 and, with difficulty, in Persia, German S.W. Africa (photograph 2) 
and East Africa - for details of Persia and S.W. Africa, see Bryan Perrett, British Armoured Car 
Operations in World War One, pp.103-117 and 75-88; Bartholomew, Early Armoured Cars, p. 29, 
describes the types of armoured cars used in India during the war for internal security and on the 
North-West Frontier, see https://www.tanks-encyclopedia.com/static/archives.php - an Indian-pattern 
armoured car was produced in 1921 (“Rolls Royces sent to India were modified prior to the 
manufacture of the 1921 Indian Pattern, featuring roomier, extended hull armor, and a redesigned 
domed turret with four machine-gun ball mount emplacements.”), https://tanks-encyclopedia.com/#, 
WW1, More, United Kingdom, accessed 21 January 2021. David Fletcher, War Cars: British 
Armoured Cars in the First World War (London, HMSO, 1987), pp. 91-95 provides a “comprehensive” 
illustrative rather than definitive schedule of armoured car units: it is included as Appendix A to 
illustrate the extent of interest and adoption of armoured cars by the army as soon as the value of 
armoured vehicles was accepted. 
44 Fletcher, War Cars, Although the BEF, EEF and MEF appear to have relied initially and primarily on 
vehicles from Winston’s Circus, there were insufficient to supply the Indian Government which was 
therefore required to arrange its own supply; T. A. Heathcote, The Afghan Wars 1839-1919 (London, 
Osprey, 1980), p. 177. Armoured cars were not used to a great extent on the Western Front. 
However, their value was appreciated by the Cavalry Corps and a limited number were attached to 
cavalry units, see for example National Archives, WO95/1104. The wide distribution of military 
engineering capability or access to civilian facilities enabled units to adapt vehicles to suit their own 
requirements and in consequence it is not always possible to make specific statements on the 
characteristics of vehicles operated by individual units. Fletcher, War Cars, pp. 91-95, contains an 
extensive summary of individual units, the models they used and changes made, though even 
Fletcher has been unable to categorise the complete extent of adjustments carried out on the 
Western Front, in Mesopotamia, India, Palestine and Africa. See Appendix A. 
45 Stephen Badsey, Doctrine and Reform in the British Cavalry: 1880-1919 (Abingdon, Routledge, 
2016), pp. 236-237. 
46 Grant Dawson, ‘Preventing “A Great Moral Evil”: Jean De Bloch's ‘The Future of War’ as Anti-
Revolutionary Pacifism’, Journal of Contemporary History, 37, 1, (2002), pp. 5-19, (pp. 15-17). 
47 Defence Academy of the UK, Joint Services Command and Staff College, Hobson Library, SC10-
18A, reports and verbatim records of proceedings at Annual January Conferences held under the 
Orders and Direction of the CIGS, 1906-1914. 
48 National Archives, WO163/8, Index of topics, Army Council, 1905-1913. 
49 Edmonds Military Operations, 1914, vol. I, p. 4. 
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not be fixed unless its brain was put right, but there was a dearth of suitable candidates 
for positions on the Council.50 The lack of interest in AFVs raises a basic question over 
the reorganisation of the army following the Boer War and over the calibre of senior 
personnel.51  
It is the contention of this thesis that, significant as the exploits of September 1916 
were, they did not represent the birthplace of armoured warfare either on the ground 
or in the mind. Progress towards armoured warfare should have been made much 
earlier by the British Army. The first chapter will therefore examine the period during 
which there was no significant interest in early AFVs and flawed trials were undertaken 
of a civilian tracked system. It will also examine Churchill’s false claim to have foreseen 
the need for tanks in 1914. This period is important since the lack of innovative plans 
and action resulted in lost opportunities during the early mobile phase of the war in the 
west and on more distant fronts. 
By contrast, the navy displayed innovation lacking in the army.52 The value of 
mobile firepower was recognised as soon as the navy assumed responsibility for 
limited military operations in August 1914. 53  The desirability of comprehensive 
armoured protection for the operatives of its vehicles was then recognised after initial 
experiences using armed cars accessorised by limited protective armour.54 The need 
for effective protection was felt more keenly upon the death of a member of one of 
Belgium’s most eminent families, Prince Louis de Baudouin, whose unit, equipped with 
open topped armoured cars, was ambushed in October 1914.55  Sueter, Head of 
Churchill’s RNAS, had recognised the need for overhead protection prior to the 
 
50 Ian F. W. Beckett, ‘Selection by Disparagement’: Lord Esher, the General Staff and the Politics of 
Command, 1904-1914, in The British General Staff: Reform and Innovation c.1890-1939, ed. by 
David French and Brian Holden Reid (London, Routledge, 2014) [2002], pp. 42-46. 
51 John Gooch, The Plans of War: The General Staff and British Military Strategy c.1900-1916 
(London, Routledge, 1974), pp. 46-59 and 111-112; Beckett Ian F W, ‘Selection by Disparagement: 
Lord Esher, the General Staff and the Politics of Command, 1904-1914’ in The British General Staff: 
Reform and Innovation c.1890-1939, ed. by David French and Brian Holden Reid (London, 
Routledge, 2014 [2002]), pp. 41-56, (pp. 50-56). 
52 Murray Sueter, The Evolution of the Tank: A Record of Royal Naval Air Service Caterpillar 
Experiments (London, Hutchinson, 1937), pp. 27-29; National Archives, MUN 210/1940/13, Scott-
Moncrieff to Bingham, 4 November 1918. 
53 Sueter, Evolution of the Tank, pp. 29-30. 
54 Ibid, pp. 30-33, See Photograph 3.  
55 ‘The Devil’s Car’, Daily Telegraph, 31 October 1914; Sueter, Evolution of the Tank, p. 32. See 
photograph 4: Belgian manufacturing facilities soon fell into German hands, but it is possible the cars 
shown on the 1917 photograph may have incorporated greater armoured protection than existed in 
1914. 
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ambush. By October, the Navy had devised and commissioned the production of an 
effective armoured car. Subject only to upgrading of its suspension, this would be used 
by British forces for more than two decades without major alteration.56 The navy’s cars 
were armed with machine-guns though they also had vehicles armed with 3-pounder 
guns.57  
The second chapter will examine the unsuccessful efforts of the navy to develop a 
tracked fighting vehicle between February and July 1915. It will contrast this with the 
successful work of Sir William Tritton and Walter Wilson, subsequently handed the 
development task by Eustace Tennyson d’Eyncourt, the Admiralty’s Director of Naval 
Construction, appointed by Churchill as president of his Landships Committee. Their 
work was undertaken in a limited period as demanded by circumstances on the 
Western Front: they were not “Too Late”. Having accepted a role for “landships”, the 
army passed the responsibility for preparations to receive the machines to Ernest 
Swinton, unwisely electing not to play any direct or pressurising role to secure 
development of tanks at the earliest date possible. 
Without naval contributions, the nation’s progress in designing, manufacturing and 
using armoured vehicles would have been further delayed. Thanks to the navy, an 
effective armoured car was available from approximately the start of 1915. So far as 
tanks are concerned, despite expeditious development work by Tritton and Wilson, it 
was not until mid-1918 that the army was equipped with a tank possessing a 
reasonable degree of reliability and capable of being driven by a single person. 
Hotblack considered it was not until the Mark V was produced that the tank was 
”beginning to be a real weapon”.58 Events during the early periods of the war are 
significant owing to their influence on progress throughout 1916-18.  
After the Armistice, no system was introduced to identify or reward appropriate 
individuals for advocating development of tracked or wheeled AFVs.59 However, a 
 
56 Rolls Royce Ltd., Rolls Royce and the Great Victory (Haworth, Brönte Hill, 1972), p. 19; Boyd 
Cable, Rolls Royce Cars in War (London, Rolls Royce, 1919), p. 12. 
57 See photograph 5, these vehicles also incorporated only limited armour protection. 
58 Captain “Boots” Hotblack, observations at a speech by Lt.-Colonel W. D. Croft, on The Influence of 
Tanks upon Tactics, 7 December 1921, reproduced in the Journal of the Royal United Services 
Institution, vol. 67, 1922, issue 465, pp. 39-52 (pp. 48-49). Hotblack joined the Heavy Section in 1916, 
rising to the rank of Major-General as Deputy DSD in 1937 and GOC 2nd Armoured Division in 1939. 
59 For the purposes of this thesis, a tank is defined as an armoured, armed and tracked vehicle. This 
definition therefore includes those Mark IV machines redesigned as supply rather than fighting “tanks” 
since they did retain a single machine-gun. 
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Royal Commission was established to consider claims for “inventions”, physical forms 
of new or improved ideas, and to recommend appropriate awards.60 From 1919, the 
Commission considered many claims, operating to compensate for losses caused by 
the government utilising inventions without incurring payments that would have been 
secured through patents in peacetime.61 The largest award relating to the first tanks 
was made to the engineers responsible for their design and construction, Tritton, 
managing director at Fosters of Lincoln and Wilson. 62  However, at £15,000, 
approximately £10/heavy tank, some 0.2% of the construction costs, the award 
perhaps reflected the nation’s dire financial situation in 1919 rather than the value of 
the machines to the Allies, particularly during the final months of the war.63  
Studies of tank development tend to concentrate on the origins of the concept and 
early design work. These factors are important but should not be allowed to dominate 
to the disadvantage of issues connected with manufacture and assembly. 
Manufacturing was located firmly on the critical path of armoured vehicle supply as 
the tank moved from prototype, late in 1915, to production in bulk. Industrial efficiency 
was not afforded the level of importance warranted and it was perhaps no coincidence 
that the Ministry of Munitions failed in 1916 and 1917 to meet its manufacturing 
forecasts. The Ministry also failed to modify tank design in accordance with military 
aspirations. The situation deteriorated further during 1918 as output lagged well 
behind forecasts and behind the aspirations not only of the British Army but also of 
allies and associates, who had been assured machines would be available for their 
use.64 The early stages of this situation will be considered in chapter three and the 
 
60 National Archives, ADM1/22825, Treasury to Admiralty, 27 March 1919, enclosing Royal Warrant 
for establishment of Commission “to enquire into and determine the Awards which may properly be 
made to inventors in respect of the user [sic] by Government Departments of their inventions during 
the present war”. 
61 See National Archives, MUN7/112, Ministry of Munitions Patents Advice Note – General Office 
Note No.111. Circulation dated 26 March 1917. 
62 National Archives, T173/34B, recommendations of Royal Commission on Awards to Inventors to 
the Treasury, 17 November 1919. A substantial percentage of the award would have been expended 
on legal charges: Tritton elected to share the remaining part of his award with the staff of Fosters. 
63 National Archives, T173/531, recommendation of the Royal Commission on Awards to Inventors to 
the Treasury, 2 December 1920, which rewarded Wilson with a further £2000 for a claim under the 
Commission’s examination of “Improvements to Tanks”, for “certain Gear and Mechanism used in 
Tanks” (essentially Wilson’s epicyclic gears first used in the Mark V). 
64 National Archives, MUN4/6400, minutes of conference at GHQ, 10 June 1918, MUN5/211, meeting 
between Churchill and Loucheur, 6 June 1918 and MUN4/2807, MM to War Office, 30 May 1918. 
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continuation and development of problems, together with the first use of tanks by 
France and Germany, in chapter four. 
Despite Churchill’s efforts during spring/early summer 1918, problems with tank 
production increased, a situation that will be considered in chapter five. Cumulatively, 
these manufacturing problems were significant since they restricted the availability of 
armoured vehicles and advancement in design. The mechanical efficiency of 
machines and operational efficiency of units were thereby adversely affected.65  
Chapter six assesses revelations consequent upon the appointment of Jack Seely 
as Deputy Minister and James Maclean as CMWS in July/August 1918. This marked 
the commencement of efforts to place tank production on a sound industrial footing 
and rectify problems that Ministers and Heads of Mechanical Warfare had failed to 
resolve. 66 Their efforts took place too late to influence remaining military operations 
but would have been vital to tank output had the war extended into 1919. This period 
is important in illuminating earlier Ministry inefficiency and the mismatch between 
Churchill’s advocated strategy and his ability to produce the volume of armoured 
hardware required to sustain the offensive effort he advocated. Churchill’s hostile 
reaction in September 1918 to expert criticism of tank production by his Ministry is 
evidence of the potential personal consequences had the Armistice not been signed 
in 1918. Lloyd George’s Tank meeting on 8 August 1918 figured prominently in the 
redirection of Ministry efforts. The chapter will also contrast explanations for poor 
performance made at this meeting with a report prepared by the new CMWS.67 These 
events during the final months of the war are significant since they demonstrate the 
scope that had existed for more efficient management of production and enhancement 
of fighting capabilities. Events are also significant in determining the balance sheet of 
advantages/disadvantages of Churchill’s role in the development of armoured vehicles 
and thereby defining his contribution to major changes in the conduct of military 
operations in the early decades of the century. 
 
65 Further observations by Hotblack following the speech by Croft on The Influence of Tanks upon 
Tactics. Interestingly, Hotblack recorded that he knew “personally of a great many cases in battle 
where the tank with its increased speed (it was only 5 mph then)-“did down” the gun; Goya, Flesh and 
Steel, p. 225, French experiences also show that their faster Renault tanks adjusted the combat 
balance between tanks and field artillery. 
66 Churchill Archives Cambridge, CHAR15/87, ‘Report on Condition of Mechanical Warfare Supply 
Department at 1918’. 
67 National Archives, CAB24/5/20, notes of Lloyd George meeting on Tanks, 8 August 1918. 
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Early historiography consists primarily of memoirs of politicians and senior officers 
together with some volumes of the Official Histories. Lloyd George, Churchill and 
others tended to advance criticisms alleging military myopia in respect of the potential 
of tanks to break the deadlock on the Western Front. They considered it represent 
tactical misuse to subdivide limited numbers into operational “penny packets”, rather 
than concentrations for massed attacks. They believed deployment of the small 
number of tanks used at Flers should have been held back until more were available.68 
The Official Histories and army personnel tended to defend the wider distribution of 
tanks across the battlefield to support infantry offensives, justifying such tactics by 
emphasising unreliability, difficulties of communication and navigation and limited 
numbers. These factors, GHQ believed, mitigated against the suitability of tanks to 
perform a largely independent role.69 
Later work, particularly by Glanfield, has enlarged the scope of the examination of 
tank production and usage and is particularly relevant, though certain sections provide 
limited information on his sources of information and he fails to deal adequately with 
the justification for claiming that Churchill was the father of the tank and “without his 
efforts, it would have remained on the back-burner until unveiled by the French during 
their 1917 Spring Offensive on the Chemin-des-Dames”. 70  Less convinced than 
Glanfield, David French considers Churchill to have been just one of the godfathers of 
the tank, a claim somewhat easier to justify.71 
Revisionists of the general approach to the history of the war demonstrate 
convincingly that the criticisms of tank tactics by Churchill, Lloyd George and others 
were unsound. However, they do not emphasise the failure of military and political 
leaders to respond to the first generation of armoured vehicles, models designed by 
Vickers, Charron and Fiat commencing in 1902. Investment in this early stage was 
limited, though there were efforts by Italy, France and Russia to investigate the military 
 
68 David Lloyd George, War Memoirs, pp. 381-388; Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis 1911-1918 
(New York, Free Press, 2005), p. 315; National Archives, WO95/91/6, Elles to Edmonds, 4 
September 1934. 
69 Clough Williams-Ellis and Amabel Williams-Ellis, The Tank Corps (New York, George H Doran, 
1919), introduction by Hugh Elles, pp. viii-ix, and p. 30 (tank navigation difficulties). 
70 John Glanfield, The Devil’s Chariots: The Birth and Secret Battles of the First Tanks (Stroud, Sutton 
Publishing, 2006), p. 268. 
71 David French, ‘The Mechanisation of the British Cavalry between the World Wars’, War in History, 
July 2003, 10, 3, pp. 296-320 (p. 296). 
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value of early models.72 Armoured cars were used in Libya, Morocco and Russia in 
actions that represented revolution, colonial unrest or a less intensive war than would 
later be waged against German forces. Yet in Britain there was no meaningful 
response to the early small waves of an unrecognised incoming tide of armoured 
warfare that would develop into mountainous breakers as the new century unfolded. 
It is claimed that in 1914 the Army’s Mechanical Transport Committee asked the 
General Staff whether they saw a role for armoured cars.73 Neither such an approach 
nor the response have been identified, though the reply cannot have been favourable 
bearing in mind the lack of any subsequent action. The scale of tank warfare at Kursk 
in 1943 demonstrates the accelerating pace of twentieth century military change. 
Though perhaps of doubtful reliability, estimates of tank numbers involved during the 
Battle of Kursk range from 5,000 to 10,000+ depending largely on the definition of the 
period of the battle under consideration.74  
Similarly, there is little mention in the scholarship of the lack of response by the 
British Army to initial pre-war developments. The design of Simms War Car in 1902 
may have been flawed, but there is no evidence the army explored whether it 
constituted technological advancement or military irrelevancy.75 As Edgerton’s work 
has shown, for the period through to the Second World War and beyond, capability 
was not a problem.76 Industrially and technologically, the country was capable of 
turning its hand to the development of sophisticated weaponry. The difficulty in 
preparing for the First World War appears rather to have been one of lack of 
importance attached to mental ability as compared to fighting abilities. In consequence 
the stalemate of entrenched warfare and the disadvantages of lack of protection on 
 
72 Brian Christopher Foss, Encyclopedia of Tanks and Armoured Fighting Vehicles (Staplehurst, 
Spellmount, 2002), p. 182; Bartholomew, Early Armoured Cars, pp. 5-6 and 11; Tank Encyclopedia, 
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16 January 2019. 
73 David Fletcher, War Cars: British Armoured Cars in the First World War (London, HMSO, 1987), p 
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74 David M Glanz and Jonathan M House, When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler 
The Battle of Kursk (Kansas, University Press, 2015), p. 217; Mark Healy, Kursk 1943: Battle Story 
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75 See photograph 6. 
76 David Edgerton, Science, Technology and the British Industrial ‘Decline’ 1870-1970 (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 29-32 and Britain’s War Machine: Weapons, Resources and 
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an increasingly hazardous battlefield were either unrecognised or simply accepted. 
Arguably, it is appropriate that Bidwell and Graham should consider this issue under 
the heading of “the Still and Mental Parts”.77  
The navy did recognise these values and developed armoured cars shortly after the 
declaration of war.78 Since wheeled vehicles were of limited use in the entrenched 
conditions that developed in France and Belgium from late 1914, such vehicles 
became available for the army on more distant, less entrenched fronts.79 Those slow 
or unable to grasp the potential of armoured vehicles had included both Kitchener and 
the initial Commander-in-Chief of the BEF, Sir John French.80 In these circumstances, 
valuable tactical opportunities had been lost. Furthermore, in 1915 some smooth-
talking was necessary to secure redirected use of naval vehicles to areas in which 
they could offer enhanced tactical opportunities compared to, or in conjunction with, 
cavalry.81 
Even recent additions to the scholarship do not acknowledge army failure to 
recognise the potential of armoured vehicles. In considering the influence of the Boer 
War on the tactical development of the army, Spencer Jones makes no reference to 
the “missing” assets of armoured vehicles notwithstanding the fact that armoured rail 
and road trains had been used in the Boer War.82 In terms of technology and tactical 
development it could be held that the army had taken a step backwards by 1914.  
Owing to its own unimaginative record, and the contrasting innovative work of the 
navy, senior officers were perhaps understandably reluctant to acknowledge the role 
armoured cars might have played in Belgium and France during 1914. Yet Holmes 
and Mallinson describe examples of gallant but costly cavalry screening in August 
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1914 to protect withdrawing infantry and to slow the southern advance of German 
forces.83 In close country and with only basic communications, against an enemy 
generously equipped with artillery and machine-guns, the screening of infantry 
withdrawal was a demanding operation. 84  There is general praise for the 
achievements of British cavalry in protecting the BEF during the retreat from Mons, 
but on the occasion that Allenby was unable to guarantee such protection, losses were 
heavy and it was perhaps fortunate that more serious losses were avoided.85 The cost 
of the one occasion, at Le Cateau, on which cavalry cover could not be guaranteed 
was significant.86 
As demonstrated by the respect shown by Uhlans for RNAS armoured cars, 
mechanised firepower might have stemmed British losses.87 Yet, in 1919, when faced 
by criticism of hi draft report, including comment by the DSD that armoured cars would 
have been invaluable in the retreat from Mons and at the Marne, the Chairman of the 
Reorganisation Committee dismissed armoured cars as of little benefit in operations 
against well-equipped forces.88  
Aimèe Fox’s recent work similarly contains no acknowledgement of the army’s 
failure to keep abreast of developments in armoured warfare. She states:  
the army promoted a culture of innovation across its operational theatres 
where individuals were given the opportunity to influence institutional 
behaviour. Fundamental to the army's learning effectiveness was the 
influence of its two-stranded pre-war ethos, comprising the social and the 
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intellectual. This proved an important and enduring framework throughout 
and beyond the First World War.”89 
Fox dismisses the idea that the army’s ethos and tradition acted as a brake on 
innovation believing that its ethos “provided the army with the ability to adequately 
examine new ideas and situations” and that it “enabled the army to respond fully to 
the need for adaptation and innovation.”90 In many aspects of the army’s learning 
experiences, before and during the war, Fox’s observations are well made and 
material, but she does not consider the learning process relating to armoured 
vehicles.91  Her views, as she recognises, are fundamentally at variance with the 
judgments of Williamson Murray and Paul Kennedy who respectively concluded that 
“the bureaucratic framework and the culture of the pre-war period ensured that 
learning took an inordinate amount of time” and that the army “did not encourage open 
discussion and reassessment”.92  
Though it would appear that elements of Fox’s criticism of conclusions by Murray 
and Kennedy are justified, in so far as the limited subject matter of this thesis is 
concerned, Murray’s comment is vindicated by experiences in the introduction of tanks 
and Kennedy’s argument rings true for armoured cars. Furthermore, it is difficult to 
envisage Swinton agreeing with Fox’s conclusions, since nine months elapsed and 
over 250,000 casualties were incurred before his observations on Western Front 
requirements were accepted by the War Office/GHQ.93 Even then, acceptance was 
limited and fragile.  
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Nevertheless, “innovation” is not a precise term. 94  Innovation is perhaps best 
considered on a sliding scale. At the lower end of the scale, those implementing a 
more beneficial use of an existing object, a way of improving the operation of a weapon 
or piece of equipment or more beneficial tactics, are certainly entitled to seek 
recognition for innovation. However, this is a luke-warm form of innovation. At the other 
end of the scale, perhaps in isolation, sit Oppenheimer/Groves et al, perhaps 
separated by some distance from other important figures such as unknown Chinese 
from the late Tang dynasty, who developed the first explosives, Wernher von Braun 
and other contributors to more momentous innovative advances in warfare.  
The scholarship appears to confirm that no senior member of the British military 
establishment recognised the military potential of armoured vehicles following Karl 
Benz production of the first motor vehicle towards the end of the 19th century. Within 
the context of the number and nature of enhancements taking place at this time to 
battlefield weaponry, particularly automatic small-arms and QF artillery, Badsey’s 
condemnation appears beyond dispute.95 It is a matter of judgment where armoured 
cars and tanks should be positioned on the sliding scale of innovative importance, but 
they are deserving of inclusion. Foley supports Lloyd George, believing the tank “was 
probably the most important technological innovation to emerge from the First World 
War”.96 Foley also touches upon the issue of categories of innovation, but his work 
concentrates upon the contrast between top-down and horizontal spread of 
innovation.97 Much of the scholarship deals with recent conflicts and future predictions 
and is not necessarily a good guide to explanations for pre-WWI failure to recognise 
the major innovation of AFVs.98 
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Cambrai and the Spring Offensives may have alerted the War Office and GHQ to 
pending restoration of mobile warfare. Future requirement for tanks was reassessed.99 
Also, separately, an order was made for additional armoured cars, though there was 
no comment about priority.100 It was not until October 1918 that a degree of urgency 
was expressed. 101  Only well after the Armistice did a senior War Office figure 
challenge the earlier lack of demand for armoured cars: 
There was an urgent demand for Motor Machine Gun units and Armoured 
Cars in all the most critical stages of the war, notably during the retreat from 
Mons and the battle of the Marne, the German offensive in the Spring of last 
year, and in the final stages of the campaign in France, while all our 
experience of other theatres such as India and Mesopotamia, Egypt and the 
Caucasus, proves there is a very great demand for Armoured Cars.102  
Dell, Director of Staff Duties, tactfully refrained from treading too heavily on War Office 
toes by omitting to mention that it was primarily thanks to Canadian and Russian 
initiatives that the army possessed a small number of poor-quality armoured cars for 
use on the Western Front from mid-1918.103 Similarly, much of the armoured support 
for forces operating in other parts of the world was the result of innovation and 
development by or on behalf of the navy. This exchange of views does not support the 
general contention of effective army learning on innovation by armour. Furthermore, 
dissemination of advice on the use of tanks was not undertaken efficiently. Elles gave 
evidence in 1919 that he did not see Swinton’s 1916 note on the use of the new 
machines until the war had ended.104  It would also appear that Army and Corps 
Commanders had not received copies, or had not read them, since Lieutenant-
General Sir William Pulteney, GOC III Corps, endeavoured to send tanks through the 
remains of High Wood in contravention of Swinton’s advice: Rawlinson, the Army 
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Commander, failed to correct Pulteney’s defective proposals.105 None of the four tanks 
allocated to penetrate High Wood reached their first objectives.106 
Particular attention is paid in this thesis to the role of Churchill in the development 
of armoured vehicles. This is not simply because he played a significant role, both for 
wheeled and tracked vehicles. He also appeared in different roles in many stages of 
the introduction of AFVs, namely in 1914-15 at the Admiralty, 1917-18 at the Ministry 
of Munitions and 1919 at the War Office. Churchill was also not averse to offering his 
advice in 1915-17 whilst serving in the army or as a backbench MP.107 From 1924-29, 
as Chancellor, he continued his association with armoured vehicles, though not 
always in a beneficial way. David French sums up the inconsistent nature of Churchill’s 
actions or objectives during the post-war period, “Churchill’s role was paradoxical. He 
was both a major stimulus towards mechanisation, and a major obstacle on the path 
to that goal.”108 French considers Churchill’s control of the purse strings to have been 
a significant factor in the loss of Britain’s lead in tank design/development and the 
failure to produce a competitive “medium tank” prior to, or during, the Second World 
War.109 It will be shown that these paradoxical characteristics were not dissimilar to 
those exhibited by Churchill in the First World War, notably beneficial advocacy of the 
principle of armoured warfare yet concurrent handicaps in respect of his views on 
detailed design and use. In these circumstances, it would be ill-advised to consider 
the early history of British armoured vehicles or the level of performance in their 
production without examining the form and significance of Churchill’s role. 
Bearing in mind his post-war efforts and the advances made under his leadership 
at the Admiralty, it may seem ungenerous to criticise Churchill’s advocacy of armoured 
vehicles. His support for armed then armoured vehicles at the Admiralty and his 
advocacy in the post-war period would prove of considerable, though under-
recognised, benefit to the army over many years.110 However, his ideas were indebted 
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to and triggered by observations and representations by others rather than his own 
vision. He would later deploy his literary ability and a generous level of 
misrepresentation to inflate or disguise his own role in the development of armoured 
vehicles.111 
As a result of wartime experiences, largely through bottom-up innovation, the 
army’s attitude would change and armoured vehicles would be welcomed.112 This may 
in part have been due to the fact that in 1919 Churchill transferred from Munitions to 
the War Office and those advocating the military value of the armoured car, in war or 
policing duties, had a powerful ally. Churchill soon found himself in conflict with the 
Treasury over armoured cars.113 By July 1919 the new Minister of War was ensuring 
his Cabinet colleagues were aware that the “need for armoured cars at the present 
time is urgent”.114 He reinforced his arguments with the War Diary of the 17th Tank 
(Armoured Car) Battalion and a minute of the General Staff. His concluding comment 
to his Cabinet colleagues “that the British Army was not equipped with many more of 
these units will be a problem which will doubtlessly perplex the minds of future military 
historians” has retained its ring of truth over the succeeding century.115 However, 
whilst Churchill’s comment is supported, he conveniently ignored self-criticism by 
omitting to record that it was not just the army but also politicians who, both before 
and during the war, failed to recognise the potential value of armoured cars as a 
means of exploitation, of undertaking or cooperating with cavalry tasks and the 
potential ability to move firepower to plug defensive weaknesses or support 
offensives.116 
Contrary to Churchill’s evidence to the Royal Commission, this thesis will show that 
he came forward with few practical novel ideas for armoured warfare. His contribution 
was restricted to advancing the ideas of others, though even in these circumstances 
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his interpretation of new ideas was not always in tune with originators’ intentions. 
Nevertheless, when claiming the laurels, Churchill positioned himself at the head of 
the queue of witnesses before the Royal Commission on Awards to Inventors, where, 
to the disadvantage of those to whom credit should have been awarded more liberally, 
he sought to inflate his own foresight, role and achievements. Prior recognises such 
tactics by Churchill.117 However, Prior’s work covers a range of issues with which 
Churchill was involved at different stages of the war. In consequence he does not 
investigate in depth Churchill’s actions in resisting appropriate recognition for Tritton 
and Wilson in developing the first tank. It will be shown that such resistance was 
sustained despite the recommendations of three separate Committees at Munitions. 
Earlier in this introduction, there is a quotation of the concluding remarks from Lloyd 
George’s speech in December 1915. It is the contention of this thesis that, in respect 
of the development of armoured vehicles, Lloyd George’s brief criticism, veiled in 
respect of those who represented his targets, was fully justified. Evidence to support 
that view will be produced in the following chapters. Had the various leading politicians 
and military figures responded more wisely and objectively to the dawn of armoured 
warfare, the nation might have avoided elements of the human and financial losses 
that were incurred over the course of the war. As Lloyd George appreciated, the 
employers and industrial workers, to whom, ostensibly, his plea was directed, had no 
control over development and adoption of military hardware, though there were 
undoubtedly examples of both groups profiting “excessively” from industrial 
opportunities provided by the wartime boom in military expenditure.118 In defence of 
the industrial community, it should be emphasised that some British firms had 
endeavoured to guide the pre-war army along the route of armoured, wheeled, fighting 
vehicles and tracked haulage vehicles: they were not among the parties who were 
“Too Late”. 
Lateness was not the only problem confronting the march of the tank in wartime 
Britain. There were two further notable though avoidable hurdles. Firstly, different 
views were held on issues of tank design. It is questionable whether all decisions on 
design were correct in the context of securing the most appropriate operational 
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performance of tanks. Secondly, it is also the case that some of the individuals 
involved in the management of design and production processes did not contribute 
the degree of skill and/or effort demanded by the nation’s critical position. This was 
most notably the case during the early stages of design and development in 1915 
when management failed to inform the design engineers of amended tasks for the 
machines. The unfortunate consequence was an inappropriate specification, leading 
to numerous track failures in 1916, when the machines were first used in the battles 
of the Somme.119 Management was also a major difficulty throughout the production 
phase from 1916 to August 1918 until, belatedly, a capable, experienced industrialist 
was appointed as Controller MWS.  
It is an objective of this thesis to examine the development path of armoured 
vehicles to determine whether their production might have been accelerated and 
enhanced by more capable management. The consequences of different development 
paths are a matter of conjecture. Each branch of the army had its particular 
development path against which the advantages of innovation may be judged. The 
Royal Artillery, which became the dominant arm, had its own development path. The 
artillery of 1914-1916 did not have the widespread capability and expertise of the 
artillery of 1918 and could at no time be described as fleet of foot. Owing to distance 
and/or poor communications, this often resulted in forward units being deprived of 
support when most needed.120  
The tank was initially viewed by enthusiasts as a breakthrough machine, capable 
of restoring battlefield mobility. However, there was little possibility of it fulfilling such 
a role. The time required for design and manufacture was likely to greatly exceed the 
rate at which German defensive systems would expand and the defence was always 
likely to be able to reinforce a  threatened sector of the Front more easily than an 
offensive force could progress over an active or recent battlefield. Nonetheless, whilst 
packing a minor punch compared to artillery, tanks did possess the advantage of 
presence at the sharp end. Even primitive communication between infantry and tanks 
was therefore on occasions able to indicate particular enemy strongpoints requiring 
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attention when artillery support was not available, with a potential bonus of accuracy 
of fire. 121 Perhaps through rose-tinted binoculars, Sergeant Walter Downing recalled, 
that when in trouble, “we signalled to the tanks, and they turned towards the 
obstacle….As their little toy guns spoke and their little, pointed shells flew, another 
German post was blown to pieces”.122 Simkins recognises the importance of tanks 
during the Hundred Days in combating enemy strongpoints and machine-guns.123 
However, it entailed exposure to considerable danger. Vulnerable forward locations 
had been avoided by field artillery since South Africa or Le Cateau, as “high risk”.124 
The summary in appendix D suggests that the assistance of tanks in overcoming 
obstacles in mobile warfare was valuable, though the cost in machines was high, 
sufficiently high for GHQ to attempt to limit their involvement in minor confrontations 
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Chapter One – Britain’s Late Start: Wasted Time, 1902 to March 1915 
 
In the years before the war, the Army Council had not recognised the potential 
tactical benefits from using armoured cars. Experiences early in the war did not 
change this position. Neither did the construction of continuous entrenchments result 
in fresh tactical vision at a senior level. What were the consequences and significance 
of delayed recognition of the value of developing technologies in surmounting the 
problems of static conditions and providing mobility of firepower? 
Similarly, should greater benefits have been extracted from the nation’s “invention” 
of tanks? Lloyd George certainly thought so:  
British in conception, design and manufacture, the Tank was the one 
outstanding and dramatic invention brought forth by the War in the sphere of 
mechanical aids to warfare. It was the ultimate British reply to the machine-
guns and heavily fortified trench systems of the German Army, and there is no 
doubt whatever that it played a very important part in helping the Allies to 
victory. It might have played a still greater part if it had been developed more 
promptly through a livelier display of sympathy and encouragement on the part 
of the War Office.1 
In December 1915 Lloyd George had not intended his “Too Late” allegations to apply 
to the pre-war period, a time when he and the Liberal Party had enjoyed a long 
unbroken period in office. Nevertheless, his remarks were applicable to all who held 
positions of responsibility for military policy in the years after the Boer War when petrol-
driven “war cars” were first designed in Britain and France and steam-driven armoured 
trains were run both on tracks and roads.2  
Some seek to justify the failure of the British Army to experiment with armoured 
cars by claims that they were ill-suited to the full range of worldwide locations in which 
battalions might be called upon to fight. It is certainly correct that they were of little or 
no value in jungle, mountains, mud or soft sand, but experiences during the war show 
that they well suited to operations in much of Asia and Africa and proved to be 
invaluable in the NWFP, a significant location for the Edwardian army: 
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Armoured cars had demonstrated their versatility in India during the First 
World War, when their mobility, firepower and relative invulnerability to rifle 
fire had made them ideal in the NWFP for reconnaissance, patrolling, the 
pursuit of raiding gangs, escort duties and the support of beleaguered 
outposts in areas where roads or open ground existed.3 
Lack of foresight thus applied both to the “traditional” Empire role and to the “new”, 
mobile continental role anticipated in the event of war with Germany.4 
Deficiencies in vision and military preparation came home to roost in August 1914. 
Kitchener despaired at aspects of lack of preparation, “did they remember when they 
went headlong into a war like that, they were without an army, and without any 
preparation to equip one.”5 He remarked as early as September 1914 that “our chief 
difficulty is one of material rather than of personnel”.6 The provision of equipment, 
munitions and training for a greatly enlarged army was a difficult, longer-term exercise 
that had to be undertaken as hostilities took place.7 The extent of supply problems for 
munitions and other military requirements was criticised both by Christopher Addison 
shortly after commencing his two-year spell at the newly-created Ministry of Munitions 
and by the Official History.8 Addison’s preliminary reports on munitions were made 
over ten months after war had been declared and were so disquieting that Lloyd 
George determined “they had better not be circulated”.9 Moreover, problems were 
accentuated by what was perceived as a "new" form of “static”, trench warfare, since 
this possessed a voracious appetite for a range of munitions, with which, in many 
cases, the army was poorly equipped or even totally unequipped. 
This chapter will examine events to March 1915, a period that could have generated 
military advantages from the combination of technological advances in automotive 
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engineering and armament. It will also consider the likely reasons and possible 
consequences of delays in grasping those opportunities and will examine the claims 
made by Churchill concerning his role in the development of armoured vehicles during 
this period. 
Inventors on both sides of the Atlantic had advanced the concept of AFVs little more 
than a decade after Karl Benz’s patent for the first petrol-driven vehicle in 1885.10 The 
first European armoured car, exhibited in Paris in April 1902, was a French CVG.11 
The extent of armoured protection on the vehicle was so limited that it might be more 
accurately described as armed rather than armoured.12 Despite admitting he did not 
know how they would be used or the form additional armour should take, the French 
Minister of War, General Louis André, supported the concept, venturing that it “would 
be absolutely imprudent to declare today that the automobile is not destined to become 
one of the instruments of the battlefield”.13 By 1904, CGV had amended its design and 
built a vehicle that was fully enclosed and turreted. Early CGVs were used to combat 
civil unrest in Russia and indigenous forces in Morocco.14 Other French companies 
became involved in the design and production of armoured cars and some French 
units had been issued with Peugeots by August 1914.15 Other units later received 
Renaults.16 Despite somewhat limited progress, France had demonstrated a degree 
of belief in the technology and formed armoured military units immediately after the 
commencement of war. 17  Production was then accelerated rapidly, Renault 
completing fifty 1914-model armoured cars by early 1915, though they suffered 
considerable design faults necessitating modification. The opening spell of mobile 
warfare, in which such vehicles might have thrived, terminated well before they were 
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available in substantial numbers.18 By July 1918 few remained in service with the 
result that, along with heavy tanks, British armoured cars were transferred to assist 
the French counter-attack at Soissons.19 
The first British ideas were by Frederick Simms.20 His vehicle was manufactured by 
Daimler, armoured by Vickers and unveiled at the Crystal Palace in April 1902, just 
days after the CGV was first exhibited in France.21 In addition to the Simms War Car, 
one further British-built armoured car was produced in the pre-war years.22 This was 
designed by Walter Wilson, who in 1906 worked for the Armstrong Company. Wilson 
later re-joined the forces and played a major role in the design and development of 
tanks. 
War Office experiments do not appear to have occurred until early in the war: they 
were not successful.23 Although Kitchener did not admit it, the navy spared the army 
further development work by providing armoured cars and other vehicles commencing 
late 1914 when entrenched conditions prevented continued use of naval armoured 
cars in support of RNAS operations.24 After Churchill left the Admiralty in May 1915, 
most military assets, known as “Winston’s Circus”, were formally transferred to the 
army.25 The army was not keen to reveal experimental work it had undertaken, as 
demonstrated by its approach to the RNAS in February 1915 when it simply sought 
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assistance on the use of armour plate.26 It was only after interview by Kitchener that 
Thomas Hetherington, a junior officer in the Navy’s Armoured Car Squadron, became 
aware that the armoured omnibus chassis he had been asked to inspect was an 
experimental armoured car.27 The army’s reticence was understandable bearing in 
mind the two machines they developed or commissioned were underpowered, lacked 
resistance to short-range small arms fire and failed to impress in terms of likely 
durability. 28  By the time Hetherington undertook his inspection, the navy’s more 
sophisticated Rolls Royce had already entered service.29 
In terms of technical awareness, the key point is that the Army Council declined to 
associate itself with early work on armoured cars undertaken in Britain or abroad. It 
showed no sign of having recognised the value of armoured cars either before the war 
or during the early weeks of mobile conflict in Belgium and France. It needs 
nevertheless to be borne in mind that an apparent lack of written evidence does not 
necessarily mean that some had not appreciated the error in neglecting armoured 
vehicles. Kitchener’s experimental vehicles betray an underlying awareness of earlier 
failure to tread a worthwhile path. In contrast to unpromising army experimental work, 
observations made by users of the navy’s favoured Rolls Royce model were invariably 
complimentary, as shown by the accolade awarded by T. E. Lawrence, “a Rolls in the 
Desert is above rubies”.30 
Kitchener’s attitude towards such innovation is illustrated by his reply to George V, 
who, impressed by Raymond Brutinel’s Canadian armoured motors, each 
incorporating two mounted machine-guns, commented that they “should be very 
useful”. Kitchener’s reply was “I don’t think so, Sir, it would unbalance the fire power 
of a Division.”31 His tactless and inapposite remark, made during a Royal inspection, 
illustrates a defect in character and was a source of dismay rather than 
encouragement to those who had foreseen the benefits of mobile firepower and 
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armoured protection.32 Some in Britain, France, Russia, Italy, Belgium and Canada 
showed initiative in advocating a traditional military technique, modified, in terms of 
cladding, source of power and armament, by developing technology. However, the 
British Army, as a major potential beneficiary, failed to reap any benefit from any form 
of armoured vehicle in 1914.33 Experiences in South Africa, that might have served as 
a foundation for progress, were not developed after the Boer War. 
Although it was relatively undeveloped industrially, Russia possessed more 
armoured cars in 1914 than any other nation.34 In other respects the plaudits belonged 
to Italy which had been first to deploy armoured cars for warfare, in Libya, in 1912.35 
By this time, the Belgian Army was pioneering patrol cars armed with machine guns 
and sharpshooters but did not begin installing armour plate until invaded.36  
Germany constructed no general-purpose armoured cars before late 1915. 
According to Bosanquet this was not because Germany had failed to experiment with 
armoured cars, but because it had failed to recognise their tactical value. 37 
Bosanquet’s view is supported by the fact that Germany had developed specialised 
armoured cars for use in combatting observation balloons.38 It is surprising that this 
one tactical use was acknowledged but other potential uses rejected. However, use of 
partly-armoured vehicles by the Belgian Army quickly led to German use of captured 
Belgian vehicles against their former owners and a reappraisal of German policy, 
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German armoured cars being constructed in relatively small numbers from late 1915.39 
Possibly owing to a shortage of manufacturing capacity, armoured vehicles did not 
become a major feature of German wartime armament.40 
Much is said in secondary literature about BEF shortages of 
arms/ammunition/equipment, such as quantity and type of artillery ammunition, lack 
of heavy artillery and hand grenades and number of machine-guns.41 Additionally, 
there is considerable criticism of Britain’s failure to identify the need for armoured 
vehicles early in the war. However, there is relatively little criticism of this same failure 
before the war.42 It is understandable that those in senior military or political posts 
would not wish to draw attention to their failure to advocate or experiment with such 
technology, but is difficult to explain the shortage of critical comment in the 
scholarship. There was a period of twelve years between construction of the Simms 
War Car and outbreak of the First World War, ample time in which to evaluate, and, if 
considered appropriate, to modify and develop armoured vehicles for deployment in a 
war that over this period loomed increasingly large on the horizon.43 Failure might be 
explained in part by the structure of the army and the division of responsibilities. 
Strachan highlights the limited role of the General Staff viz-a-viz commanders of 
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fighting units/formations.44 He notes the unsatisfactory division of staff responsibilities 
and the failure of the General Staff to secure acceptance of its continental approach: 
The continentalism of the General Staff not only failed to move laterally, to 
the adjutant general’s and quartermaster general’s departments, it also 
failed to percolate downward to the parts of the army that were responsible 
for the actual business of fighting.45 
It is tempting to explain the position by observing that the need for particular forms of 
equipment and armament would have been recognised more easily by closer working 
or integration of those responsible for the fighting, for the policy that would determine 
the location of the fighting and for the supply and development of weaponry. However, 
this is to an extent belied by the response of a number of individuals in Territorial 
forces who commissioned the construction of their own armoured cars.46 Free from 
what appears to have been an unappreciative response by the regular army, an 
obvious advantage was seen more clearly by some on the military periphery. This 
alignes with examination of the Edwardian Army by Connelly and Bowman, who record 
argument by some junior or middle-ranking officers about the lack of priority for a 
potential war against the world’s strongest military power and, notably from within 
artillery circles, about the need to concentrate on heavier guns and copious supplies 
of ammunition.47 
It cannot be determined why senior army personnel failed to embrace the attributes 
of the armoured car. It may have been due to lack of vision or bending the knee to 
controlling politicians intent on utilising available resources for social rather than 
military benefit. However, it is difficult to see how shortage of money can explain the 
situation since there appears to have been no debate on the matter either in military 
or financial circles.48 In general terms, preparations for the forthcoming war were not 
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assisted by post-Boer War reductions in expenditure.49 This may have had a bearing 
on the failure to adopt tracked vehicles for haulage and supply purposes and quantities 
and type of artillery ammunition but there is no evidence that it affected 
experimentation with armoured cars.50 Since armoured cars did not manage to jump 
the first hurdle (need or military value), they did not face the second hurdle (securing 
finance). Reorganisation does not appear to have succeeded in the objective of 
supplying the necessary quality of brains to the Army Council.51 
Despite failings in South Africa to generate enthusiasm for armoured vehicles, 
experiences did encourage interest in the development of motorised transport. In the 
early years of the century, standards were set for motorised military transport and 
experiments were pursued with a range of steam, paraffin and petrol-driven machines 
capable of hauling artillery and other heavy equipment. The army established a 
Mechanical Transport Committee but did not staff or finance the Committee sufficiently 
to enable it to appoint its own staff to undertake necessary research, experimentation 
and development. Innovative progress was reliant upon cooperation with civilian firms 
prepared to undertake research and development in anticipation of securing military 
contracts. 52  For over a decade the Committee encouraged the development of 
vehicles for haulage. This included tracked vehicles, but orders for such vehicles were 
not forthcoming. In consequence, Hornsby’s, the only firm experimenting with the use 
of tracked vehicles for military purposes, sold their patents to the American Holt 
company.53 Following the outbreak of war Britain then found it necessary to acquire or 
build under license over 2,000 Holt tractors for towing guns.54 Military interest during 
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this period was centred on towing and haulage, though it would not have required an 
inconceivable advance in thought to have graduated to a combat role for variants of 
such vehicles. Press cartoons and authors had pointed the way during the Boer War.55 
This was followed by The Ironclads, a short story by H. G. Wells.56  
By 1908, experimentation had reached the stage that enabled a tracked vehicle to 
appear at the Royal Review at Aldershot.57 Potential assistance was not limited to the 
press and continental motor industry. An engineer from Australia, Lancelot de Mole, 
forwarded plans of a caterpillar system to the War Office in 1912. His offer was 
declined since the War Office was “not further experimenting with chain rails”.58 
Events prior to the declaration of war do not paint the War Office as aware of the 
need to adapt to prospective changes in the nature of warfare or to changes in Britain’s 
role resulting from potential consequences of new alliances. The only consolation that 
can be drawn from failure to foresee future value in armoured vehicles is that the same 
blind-spot was exhibited to varying degrees by all participants in the forthcoming 
tragedy. Notably, the German Army, reliant upon a quick victory, must have reflected 
on the benefits that might have accrued from an advanced or flank screen of armoured 
cars and the provision of more mechanical transport generally. Armoured cars might 
have enabled the German Army to challenge the effectiveness of British cavalry in 
protecting the retreating BEF after Mons. Additionally, after several weeks of marching 
and fighting, many German units were in poor shape to take part in the key Battle of 
the Marne.59 
Having failed the first test of foreseeing armoured opportunities in a forthcoming 
war, the next question would be how rapidly the nation would respond as aspects of 
tactical reality were revealed through experience of conflict. Three stages of a process 
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needed to be surmounted before armoured vehicles could influence the scale of 
casualties and course of continental warfare, namely, recognition of need and 
benefits, design and construction of prototypes and manufacture in numbers. Whereas 
the potential value of armoured cars might have been detected and appreciated before 
the war, the need for tanks was not readily identifiable until a continuous front had 
been created, thereby preventing favoured flanking manouevres. Thereafter, the 
speed and skill with which tanks could be developed was capable of exerting a 
considerable influence on the remaining period of war and therefore on the final 
balance sheet. Recognition of need, resolution of mechanical difficulties and efficiency 
of construction were important to national wellbeing. Yet, as the country enjoyed the 
fine summer of 1914, it was unaware that failure to achieve even the first stage in 
developing weapons capable of combatting its enemies’ strengths had already sealed 
the fate of many thousands of its citizens. Edmonds, somewhat conservatively, 
described losses at Loos as “the price paid in flesh and blood for unpreparedness for 
war”.60 Failure to develop armoured cars was an element of that unpreparedness: this 
is inadequately recognised by the scholarship. 
Six overlapping wartime periods relating to off-road armoured vehicles will be 
examined in broad chronological sequence: three fall within this chapter. Firstly, claims 
by Churchill to have envisaged, between September 1914 and January 1915, the need 
for armoured vehicles and to have authorised initial work on a machine he described 
as a forerunner of the tank.61 Secondly, the vision and initial efforts of others, notably 
Ernest Swinton, between October 1914 and January 1915, to persuade the army to 
develop AFVs to assist in the attack on machine-gun and wire-protected entrenched 
positions. Thirdly, brief trials of caterpillar traction by the army in February 1915.  
Churchill did not dissent from the Liberal Party’s distaste for military expenditure, 
forcibly expressed, though perhaps exaggerated for political effect, by Campbell-
Bannerman. 62  Campbell-Bannerman outlined priorities for the incoming Liberal 
government in his first public speech as Prime Minister. His words did not suggest the 
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future army would be awash with money, “Militarism, extravagance, protection are 
weeds which grow in the same field, and if you want to clear the field for honest 
cultivation you must root them all out”. His government’s intentions so far as military 
expenditure and armaments were concerned were introduced by his view that “the 
growth of armaments is a great danger to the peace of the world”. Interspersed by the 
cheers of the capacity audience, he asked “What nobler role could this great country 
assume than at the fitting moment to place itself at the head of a league of peace….?” 
Although in the 1900’s Churchill campaigned energetically across the nation in support 
of increased taxation, his objective, primarily, was to advance living standards for the 
working man. His speeches, notably before the 1909 budget, emphasised the need 
for “social reconstruction and reorganisation”, since “the social conditions of the British 
people at the dawn of the twentieth century cannot be contemplated without deep 
anxiety”.63 
Randolph Churchill records “in 1911 faith in Germany’s good intentions was rudely 
shaken, and Churchill was among the first to see the need to change his views, and 
to seek policies consistent with the danger”.64 Randolph’s opinion, that Agadir figured 
prominently in Churchill’s change of tack, may well have been correct, but he was 
wrong to state that his father sought policies consistent with the danger. Certainly, 
naval planning belonged in that fold, but military policies do not appear to have figured 
in the changes he advocated. Churchill’s concerns over domestic social issues were 
well founded, but he misjudged “the German threat” and failed to recognise or admit 
the scale of the burden the nation might be called upon to bear. Initially Churchill’s 
view was based on the false premise that others would behave logically. Since there 
was no logical reason for Britain and Germany to go to war, therefore there would be 
no conflict. He stated that in terms of prosperity, regardless of the outcome, the cost 
and consequences of war would inevitably mean that both nations would be losers:  
I think it is greatly to be deprecated that persons should try to spread the 
belief that war between Great Britain and Germany is inevitable. It is all 
nonsense……while there is no danger of collision of material interests, there 
is no result which could be expected from any struggle between the two 
countries except a disaster of a most appalling and idiotic character….One 
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month of fighting would destroy more wealth than five years of trading could 
produce.65 
Some in Germany held similar views.66 
Churchill’s appreciation of the German naval threat preceded his transfer to the 
Admiralty in 1911. In 1908 he had made general statements in support of naval 
strength. At the Admiralty he fought hard for naval expenditure, making many 
speeches on naval developments, seeking, largely successfully, to increase British 
naval forces to maintain numerical superiority over the growing German and Austro-
Hungarian programmes.67 His aspirations were secured despite opposition from within 
his Party, notably from the Chancellor, Lloyd George.68 Nevertheless, at no stage did 
he take a sound, comprehensive view of the nation’s military preparedness in relation 
to its likely commitments in the event of war with Germany. In August 1911 Churchill 
had written a memorandum on the Military Aspect of the Continental Problem, a 
prophetic document in terms of features of the German invasion of France some three 
years later, but open to criticism through greatly understating British involvement in 
the event of war. He estimated maximum involvement of British forces on the continent 
at 296,000, with the possibility of elements of a levy of 500,000 for home defence 
being sent abroad at a later date.69 Over 5,700,000 served in the British Army between 
1914 and 1918.70 
Churchill’s association with the development of armoured vehicles commenced 
shortly after war was declared. In his evidence to the Royal Commission, Churchill 
recounted the success of his armoured cars prior to the establishment of a continuous 
trench line from Switzerland to the Channel.71 Unfortunately, naval armoured cars and 
 
65 Rhodes James, Complete Speeches, vol. II, speech at Swansea, 14 August 1908, Government 
Policy and the Foreign Situation, p. 1085. 
66 Richard Burdon Haldane, Before the War (London, Cassell, 1920), pp. 27-28. 
67 Rhodes James, Complete Speeches 1897-1963, vol. II, speech at The Guildhall, 9 November 1911, 
Naval Defence, pp. 1891-1893. 
68 John H Maurer, Churchill and Strategic Dilemmas Before the World Wars: Essays in Honor of 
Michael I Handel (London, Routledge, 2003), p. 6; Rhodes James (ed.), His Complete Speeches vol. 
II, pp. 1919-1941, 1970-2008, 2033-34, 2067-2109 and 2168-2184, but most significantly his speech 
on Navy Estimates of 17 March 1914 which proposed an increase of £4 million, received with some 
hostility by his colleagues, and upon which he judged it necessary to seek compromise, pp. 2233-
2262. 
69 Churchill Archives Cambridge, CHAR 24/3, memorandum by Mr. Churchill, 13 August 1911. 
70 War Office, Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire during the Great War (London, 
HMSO, 1922), p. 364. 
71 National Archives, T173/776, Royal Commission on Awards to Inventors, 7 October 1919, 
examination of Churchill by the Attorney-General, answer to question 6. 
 47 
other military activities with which Churchill became involved represented a source of 
friction between himself and Kitchener.72 This friction may have impacted adversely 
on the development of the tank through the secrecy imposed by Churchill on the 
commencement of his “Landship” project at the Admiralty early in 1915. 
Churchill also informed the Royal Commission that by October 1914, as armoured 
cars could no longer move round the trenches, it was obvious that “some method 
should be devised which would enable them to traverse and pass over the trenches 
themselves”.73  He claimed he sent for Admiral Bacon who was engaged in the 
production of 15-inch howitzers and asked him to design an armoured machine which 
would carry guns and fighting men and would be capable of crossing the trench lines.74 
According to Churchill’s evidence, Bacon designed a bridge-carrying machine for 
which an order was placed. This order was however subsequently cancelled since "a 
better design had been arrived at through an altogether different agency”. Churchill 
claimed that “no earlier effort to make a tank or trench crossing vehicle had been 
made”.75 He repeated this version of events in The World Crisis in which he attempted 
to render more plausible his question to Bacon about making versions of tractors that 
“could cross trenches and carry guns and fighting men”, by adding that the eight 
enormous caterpillar tractors towing Bacon’s 15-inch howitzers “were extremely 
suggestive”.76  
However, Churchill’s statement is not consistent with the evidence of others. He 
was correct to attribute work on the provision of heavy guns to Bacon who, following 
the successful action of German heavy artillery at Liege, foresaw the need for a heavy 
howitzer for the British Army.77 As rail transport would have been too inflexible for the 
transport of such a weapon, Bacon faced a double challenge in the movement of his 
new artillery pieces by road, firstly, the excessive weight of the gun in relation to the 
capabilities of towing vehicles and, secondly, the difficulty of movement in areas in 
which roads had been damaged. Having solved the problem of weight by designing 
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the howitzer as a two-piece armament, he approached the War Office but received a 
rebuff on the grounds that it was not the policy of the Army Council to employ heavy 
guns in the field.78 Regrettably, Bacon does not give dates, but, at this stage, he claims 
to have approached Churchill at the Admiralty where he “met with a very different 
reception”. An order for his proposed howitzers was secured.79  
During that period, Bacon referred neither to a suggestion or possible order from 
Churchill for the means of transporting the parts of the howitzer nor to the development 
of a bridge-laying vehicle. However, having designed the wagons on which the 
howitzer would be loaded, Bacon turned his attention to the means of traction, 
contacting Tritton at Messrs. Fosters of Lincoln “whom he was aware had been making 
120-H.P. tractors for ploughing in the Argentine”. 80  Bacon’s recollection of the 
sequence or timing of some events may be suspect, but Tritton supports his general 
outline: “it was to assist in the solution of a transport problem that the services of 
William Foster and Co. were first requisitioned by the government”.81 Furthermore it 
appears Tritton accompanied Bacon on his visit to the Admiralty late in September 
when an order for 105-H.P. tractors was secured. 82  This order was completed, 
seventy-seven vehicles being delivered to the Admiralty.83 Foster’s History includes 
photographs of the wheeled vehicles on test on 3 December 1914 and in convoy 
towing howitzer parts for embarkation.84  
However, whereas Churchill described these tractors as “enormous caterpillar 
tractors”, photographs and Tritton’s evidence to the Royal Commission prove they 
were wheeled.85  Eloquently, Churchill attempted to weave his role in the forward 
defence against Zeppelin attack into the chain of causation of the tank, “Thus the Air 
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was the first cause that took us to Dunkirk. The armoured car was the child of the air; 
and the tank its grandchild.”86 The development path of the bridge-layer and efforts to 
adapt it for use in combat conditions is far from clear, but the picture drawn by Churchill 
is entirely fictional. Additionally, Bacon does not support Churchill’s claim that, upon 
being shown pictures of these caterpillar tractors by Bacon, “I at once asked whether 
they would be able to cross trenches and carry guns and fighting men, or whether he 
could make any that would”. There is no evidence of a Foster’s caterpillar tractor either 
in October 1914 or any subsequent date during the war.87  
The Official History states that the bridge-laying vehicle was first brought to the 
attention of Churchill by Bacon in November 1914 and was officially submitted to 
Kitchener at Churchill’s suggestion.88 Furthermore it states that Churchill provisionally 
ordered a number of vehicles of this design at a date intimated to be early in January 
1915. Whilst the details in the Official History do not appear to be fully supported by 
surviving documents, there is no reason to doubt that the general picture is correct 
since Bacon and Stanley Von Donop, Master General of the Ordnance, refer to 
Kitchener’s knowledge of the matter.89  Churchill’s cancellation of the order on or 
shortly after 20 February 1915 appears not to have been a full cancellation since 
Fosters and Bacon continued to work on a prototype, trialled in June 1915.90 Mansell 
of the Coventry Ordnance Works confirmed that the prototype would shortly be ready 
for trial, but was unable to find any paperwork. He claimed to have been summoned 
by Churchill “one day” (most probably shortly after the Landships Committee was 
formed on 20 February 1915), stating that Churchill cancelled the order but “told me 
to go on with the one”.91 Mansell wished to know whether the machine was on order 
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from the War Office or Admiralty since the sub-contractor “is worried about his 
money”.92 
Tritton acknowledged a remark made by Bacon at the trial of the howitzer tractor 
that “it would be a good thing if a machine could be constructed capable of laying its 
own bridge, and which, being equipped with means of offence and defence, would be 
of assistance in trench warfare”.93 This, according to Fosters, set Tritton thinking and 
“at the urgent solicitation of the Admiral” built an experimental machine which 
succeeded in crossing an eight-foot wide trench by means of its wheels and portable 
bridge.94 Therefore, according to Bacon and Tritton, the decision to build a bridge-
layer did not originate with Churchill at all. Although Churchill claimed the order for the 
bridge-layers was cancelled owing to a better machine having been devised, comment 
made by Tritton’s Counsel to the Royal Commission was that Churchill’s verbal 
cancellation was on 20 February 1915, “Tritton saw him in bed somewhere about 9 or 
10 o’clock at night, and at that interview Mr. Churchill cancelled the order he had given 
for the 70 petrol driven tractors for hauling these guns [sic]”.95  
At this time there was no other “better solution” and the underlying reason must 
have been optimism that some alternative machine would quickly be built by the 
Committee he had established earlier that day. In any event it is clear that the bridge-
layer was not Churchill’s idea and was not a forerunner of the tank, being unarmoured, 
unarmed and wheeled.96 Additionally, Tritton and Bacon show that Churchill did not 
authorise or require the initial experimental work on the machine. Although Bacon 
claims to have toyed with the idea of an armoured bridge-laying tractor, Tritton 
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dismissed the idea that the tractor could have been armoured. He believed the weight 
of the machine, its bridge and armour were “fatal to its being able to travel over the 
quagmire the ground of Flanders and Belgium was fast becoming”.97 
The remarks and course of events outlined by Bacon and Tritton are considered 
sufficient for Churchill’s claims in respect of 1914 to be rejected. Rather, it seems likely 
Churchill was deliberately merging the separate issues of entrenched warfare and the 
practice of German Uhlans, during the brief spell of mobile warfare in August and 
September 1914, to dig ditches across roads to restrict or slow down movements of 
armoured cars. This practice was recognised in The World Crisis, in which Churchill 
claimed that the “enemy, harassed by the armoured cars, cut gaps in the roads, and I 
called immediately for means of bridging these gaps.”98  The bridge-layer did not 
become available for trials until June 1915, trials which it failed, amongst other 
reasons, owing to its inability to cross closely-spaced trenches.99 Owing to restricted 
speed and mobility, it would have been ill-suited for patrols distant from British bases. 
On a connected note, Churchill’s evidence to the Royal Commission, that it was 
obvious “some method should be devised which would enable them [armoured cars] 
to traverse and pass over the trenches themselves”, is illogical. His statement begs 
the question of how the bridge-layers would reach the first line of trenches and whether 
they would be able to advance further once they had crossed them. Critically, the 
enemy would need to be defeated in the locality of the crossing place before the 
bridge-layer could be deployed. The question which Churchill and the BEF should 
have addressed was that of inevitable problems associated with reaching and moving 
past enemy trenches, coping with adverse ground conditions and enemy weapons, 
rather than one limited element of the problem. There seems no doubt therefore that 
a significant part of Churchill’s evidence to the Royal Commission was manufactured 
in order to present himself in a favourable light. It is interesting to note that Bacon’s 
remarks, mentioned by Tritton, show how close his ideas were to that of the tank. 
Bacon envisaged an armed and armoured bridge-layer but made no effort to promote 
the design of such a vehicle. Tritton accepted the trench-crossing capabilities of 
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Bacon’s concept but considered the additional weight of armour would render the 
machine inoperable. 
The evidence therefore shows that Churchill, in common with most participants and 
observers of the Western Front, failed during 1914 to identify the key elements to be 
resolved if entrenched defences were to be overcome. Ernest Swinton, appointed on 
7 September as BEF war correspondent, did identify those key elements. He saw the 
need for armed and armoured vehicles, capable of moving across no-man’s-land, wire 
and trenches on tracked systems, tasked with destroying machine-guns, the main 
German defensive weapons.100 Well placed to observe events and assess potential 
improvements in equipment or tactics, Swinton connected the values of the armoured 
car with tracked movement across shelled ground and destruction of enemy defensive 
systems. He painted a vivid picture of the consequences of 8th Division’s attack on 9 
May 1915 when, following the cessation of the opening bombardment, mainly with 
shrapnel, the enemy emerged from their shelters relatively unharmed to inflict severe 
damage: 
in most cases our assault was stopped dead on the top of our own parapets 
or a few yards in front, where the ground was strewn with bodies. A feature 
of the defence was again the slaughter dealt out by machine guns.101 
The reality therefore is that the evolution of the tank cannot be traced through Churchill 
and Bacon to September 1914, but its complicated development path of some fifteen 
months, can be followed back to the officer appointed by Kitchener as “Eyewitness”. 
Swinton foresaw at an early stage the type of machine needed to break entrenched 
deadlock by destroying machine guns and protective wire. Belatedly, it was his 
specification that would determine the characteristics of the tank that would emerge 
from a slow, intermittent and uncoordinated development process, armoured, armed 
and tracked.102  
In formulating his proposals for assisting offensive operations on the Western Front, 
Swinton was deeply indebted to the vision of his friend Hugh Marriott in July 1914. A 
fellow engineer, working in mining in South Africa, Marriott saw in the Holt Caterpillar 
Tractor potential military usefulness. Marriott’s vision was, however, restricted to 
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haulage, for which purpose Holt Tractors were gradually adopted by the army.103 
Whilst others may have had similar ideas to those of Swinton, and at an earlier date, 
Swinton alone can claim to be the originator of the sequence of events leading to the 
development of the Mark I, which fulfilled his basic task specification. His judgment 
and ideas represent the commencement of tank development.104  
Swinton explained that he first associated the potential of chain traction as a means 
of overcoming entrenched defences as he was returning to London on 19 October 
1914.105 He sought to promote the concept of the “machine gun destroyer” by the 
planting of a series of “seeds”. Regrettably, these seeds were sown at a somewhat 
leisurely pace, since, despite the first two being sowed that same month, the fifth and 
final seed did not leave his hand until June the following year. Bearing in mind the 
scale of British casualties during this period, and in the following period required for 
design and manufacture, an earlier sowing might have been attempted. Some would 
claim that open warfare would shortly be resumed and that there was no need for an 
armoured machine. But how was a breach in the enemy defences to be created and 
did the means exist to support an advance at such a point? Heavy artillery was in short 
supply, appropriate ammunition scarce and supply vehicles capable of operating over 
difficult ground did not exist.106 
An earlier development of the tank could conceivably have resulted in a better 
coordination of fighting seasons and manufacturing runs than eventually resulted and 
might have saved a proportion of the casualties that continued to be incurred for little 
or no tangible benefit.107 In the event, in October 1914 Swinton was deprived by 
Kitchener’s busy diary of the opportunity to put his views direct to the Secretary of 
State.108 He nevertheless expounded those views to Hankey, Secretary to the War 
Cabinet, and to “Tri-Nitro Tom” Tulloch, an explosives expert and fellow advocate of 
mechanical warfare who had utilised his pre-war position as an employee of a 
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German-owned company to dabble in espionage and obtain information on German 
armaments.109 
Swinton described his discussions with Hankey on 20 October, 1914, as “the 
sowing of the first seed, the first constructive step in the conception and evolution of 
what came to be known as the Tank”.110 Swinton repremanded himself for failing to 
press more strongly against the cancellation of his arranged meeting with Kitchener 
on 22 October. He missed the opportunity to lobby a fellow engineer who possessed 
the authority to initiate experimentation in the development of armoured, tracked 
vehicles.111 
The division of tasks agreed on 21 October 1914 by Swinton, Hankey and Tulloch, 
obliged Swinton to sell the concept to GHQ. Tulloch would “follow up the technical side 
with a view to finding the right people for design and development” whilst Hankey 
would “try his hand with the War Office and Ministers”.112 In the event, Hankey had no 
success with Kitchener who made it plain he would not support such a scheme. On 
his return to St. Omer, Swinton sowed a second seed with Brigadier-General George 
Fowke, Engineer-in-Chief. Though personally unsympathetic, Swinton claims Fowke 
informed him that he had contacted the War Office on the subject. Just over two 
months later, Swinton sowed a third seed direct with the senior officer of the Royal 
Engineers, General Scott-Moncrieff, but found the concept was new to Scott-
Moncrieff, who, frustratingly, pointed out that it was War Office policy only to 
investigate matters specifically requested by GHQ.113 
Nevertheless, Scott-Moncrieff was interested and invited Swinton to visit him with 
Tulloch for further discussion. However, in talks with Tulloch at his club on the following 
morning, Swinton met Colonel Louis Jackson, responsible under Scott-Moncrieff for 
trench warfare. Swinton explained that Jackson suggested the matter should be left to 
him to discuss with Scott-Moncrieff: 
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This I did gladly for I was extremely busy; and I asked him to take Tulloch to 
the Director of Fortifications and Works, in the hope that the latter, with the 
collaboration of these two officers, would be able to effect something.114  
Swinton conceded that his failure to press for a meeting with Kitchener whilst in 
London in October 1914 had been an error, but made no apology for failing, 
personally, to press his efforts to interest the War Office in the concept of the tank, 
either as a follow-up to his approach made through Fowke, or that made direct to 
Scott-Moncrieff. On the contrary, he sought to defend his limited actions “I had done 
my utmost to get the idea taken up and translated into action; but strictly speaking, 
these activities were outside the scope of my official duties.”115 
Swinton’s claim to have done his “utmost” is at variance with his comments and the 
facts. His failure to press the matter with Kitchener followed by his willingness to allow 
Tulloch and Jackson to advance the cause at the arranged meeting with Scott-
Moncrieff suggest his confidence may have been less than he sought to portray. In 
the event, though unbeknown to Swinton for many months, the proposed meeting of 
Tulloch with Scott-Moncrieff did not take place.116 It is difficult to judge whether such 
a meeting would have had any effect on future decisions, but it is not beyond the 
realms of possibility that it could have stiffened the resolve of a sympathetic Scott-
Moncrieff to overcome the obstruction which would be posed by his ADMT, Colonel 
Holden, following trials of the Holt Tractor.  
So far as Tulloch was concerned, in January 1915 he submitted a report on the 
subject, but this failed to outweigh objections made before and following army trials of 
the Holt the following month.117 It is in any event unlikely Tulloch would have been as 
persuasive as Swinton since his concept of mechanical assistance was somewhat 
different. Whereas his concept incorporated tracks and armour, and he was prepared 
to consider a range of designs, his favoured machine would have been steam driven, 
weighing 500 tons.118 
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The conclusion cannot be avoided that Swinton lacked confidence, resulting in him 
falling short in advocating army adoption of the concept. Alternatively, or additionally, 
he may have been concerned his career would suffer had he pressed too hard for 
measures out of line with War Office thoughts or practice. In the light of his later 
treatment by higher command, and the similar fate of his assistant, Brough, the limited 
determination with which he pressed the matter is understandable.119 
In the meantime, Hankey was having no success in generating interest in tanks 
either in political or military circles. Asquith was appreciative and promised full support 
provided Hankey could “get W.O. to play”.120 However, Hankey found von Donop,”too 
overwhelmed with his own job to take it on” and Wolfe Murray, also a member of the 
Army Council, to be “not much use”.121 Although Kitchener heard Hankey out, he 
responded to the effect that “the armoured caterpillars would be shot up by guns.” 
Bearing in mind Hankey had become an administrator and had no direct experience 
of conditions facing the BEF, it is possible Kitchener may simply have given little 
credence to Hankey’s views. Although Kitchener might have taken a similar line had 
Swinton spoken to him personally, it is nevertheless possible that the views of a fellow 
engineer familiar with conditions at the front could have resulted in the commencement 
of a more thorough consideration of a “machine gun destroyer” during 1914. 
On Christmas Day, 1914, having failed to make progress in convincing others of 
the value of a mechanical solution to the stalemate at the Front, Hankey had “an 
uncontrollable urge to put on paper an appreciation of the war situation as a whole”.122 
Following a review of how similar deadlocks to the Western Front had been broken in 
previous wars by special apparatus or attack from a different direction, Hankey 
inserted into his writings a paragraph on an armed caterpillar roller. The Boxing Day 
Memorandum, as it became known, proved to be effective, not in military circles, but 
with Churchill, who, throughout his career showed an intense interest in the 
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introduction of new weapons.123 Churchill sent an appreciative minute to Asquith.124 
Additionally, either fearful that his political and military colleagues would lack the vision 
and resolve to see the matter to a conclusion, or scenting the potential for future 
personal recognition, or both, Churchill instructed Murray Sueter, his Director of Air 
Development, then, shortly afterwards, Eustace Tennyson d’Eyncourt, Director of 
Naval Construction, to design and build an armoured vehicle.125 It was the Boxing Day 
Memorandum that ignited Churchill’s advocacy of a non-wheeled solution to overcome 
German defensive tactics. His participation in the development of the tank stemmed 
from Swinton’s thoughts via Hankey’s pen rather than from his own ideas or 
instructions given to Bacon in 1914. 
By producing his Boxing Day Memorandum, Hankey had taken a significant step 
towards furthering the cause that was being advocated, albeit ineffectively, by 
Swinton. Unfortunately, comments made by Hankey in relation to special “apparatus” 
formed but a small section of his Memorandum.126 Furthermore, they did not represent 
an accurate picture of the role or design Swinton had in mind. Paragraphs 8-11 of the 
Memorandum dealt with the issue of special apparatus, but only paragraph 9(a) 
covered a device associated with the landship concept. Hankey strayed significantly 
from Swinton’s advocated path, describing numbers of large, heavy rollers themselves 
bullet proof, propelled from behind by motor engines, geared very low, the driving 
wheels fitted with ‘caterpillar’ driving gear to grip the ground…..The object of the device 
would be to roll down the barbed wire by sheer weight, give some cover to men 
creeping up behind, and support the advance with machine-guns.127 
Hankey’s observations would appear to have established a particular vision in 
Churchill’s mind, that would be amended and included in his instructions to Sueter and 
seemingly also in his discussions and guidance to d’Eyncourt. In this way, Swinton’s 
machine gun destroyer became for Sueter, d’Eyncourt and the Landships Committee, 
primarily, a trench-taking armoured personnel carrier rather than a means of 
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destroying or dominating the enemy’s main defensive weapon. Moreover, Churchill’s 
instructions to Sueter contained impractical and/or ineffective proposals and no 
reference to caterpillar tracks.128 Following Churchill’s letter to Asquith of 5 January 
1915, the development path of the tank became somewhat complicated. Two separate 
and, for six months, unconnected channels of trials and experimentation were 
conducted or commenced with a view to developing an armoured vehicle, i.e. by the 
army and navy respectively. However, Churchill’s failure to appreciate elements key 
to successful offensive operations in the conditions existing on the Western Front 
would effectively constitute a handicap for his Landships Committee.  
Although no request had been received from GHQ, Swinton's third seed to Scott-
Moncrieff did result in an agreement to examine the possibility of converting a Holt 
tractor or other machine to form an off-road armoured vehicle. Additionally, Hankey's 
ideas, via Churchill and Asquith, had been commended to Kitchener.129 This potential 
line of progress therefore also found its way to Scott-Moncrieff’s desk. It was thus 
doubly unfortunate that the test devised by Scott-Moncrieff’s “experts” and held at 
Shoeburyness on 17 February 1915, suffered both from inappropriate and 
unrealistically difficult test conditions, caused by a combination of the unreasonable 
design of obstacles and strongly adverse seasonal weather, together with poor 
preparation of the Holt machine.130 
The outcome of the trial was that the Holt Tractor failed to overcome the prepared 
obstacles. Hugh Marriott had witnessed a severe test of the tractor’s capabilities near 
Antwerp in June 1914.131 Having by 1915 joined GHQ in France, he also witnessed 
the trials at Shoeburyness. He recorded that at Shoeburyness he had seen the tractor 
driven through estuary marshland, consisting of sand under water and a top layer of 
slimy mud and rank grass, dragging a five-furrow plough frame set at maximum depth 
(c.2 ft). In places, having gathered up a tangled mass of grass and mud at the front, it 
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was nearly submerged, but “only stopped when the caterpillar got onto a ground where 
there was no rank grass. All the above was without mudlugs”.132 
Unsurprisingly, military requirements differed from and exceeded those of 
commercial industries for which the Holt had been designed and it was inappropriate 
for an existing off-the-peg commercial machine to be judged by military criteria on a 
pass or fail basis. Even Colonel Holden, who had strong reservations about developing 
caterpillar traction, was prepared to concede this fact in advance of the trials.133 
However Holden made no allowance for this factor in post-trials comments. Holden’s 
professional judgment on the disadvantages of the Holt Tractor, expressed to Scott-
Moncrieff, were the likelihood of excessive weight, vulnerability to enemy artillery and 
the length of time required to resolve problems. He considered the war would be over 
before a machine would be ready, unless “the war is going to last for many years”. He 
expressed support for experimentation with existing appliances, but was “afraid the 
designing and building of new engines specially for this work is quite out of the 
question in view of the time involved”. He felt the only possible useful action would be 
“to experiment with such engines as are available viz: the caterpillar type, and the 
Traction engine type, fitted with some means of bridging ditches, bridging trenches 
and other obstacles.”134 
Events would prove Holden’s judgment to be flawed. Notwithstanding that no 
significant progress was made by mid-1915, the first tank successfully completed trials 
at Hatfield eleven months after the Holt trials at Shoeburyness. Anyone can be 
excused poor judgment, but the comparison of Holden’s seemingly reasonable 
acceptance of the possibility of providing a suitable solution by means of modifications 
to an existing commercial machine with his post-trials comments raises the question 
of whether he misrepresented events and/or designed the tests to support 
professional concerns he had raised before the trials. 
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Holden described how both sides of a trench obstacle gave way, resulting in the 
front wheel of the Holt falling too far into the trench for it to be able to extricate itself. 
Yet, although he recorded that the slippery ground prevented “the Caterpillar tracks 
getting a proper hold”, he made no allowance for this failure to the non-attachment of 
mudlugs. Most significantly, no comparison was made of the basic consideration of 
length and position of the caterpillar tracks on the machine compared to width of the 
trench. The relevance of these considerations must have been obvious to a qualified 
engineer, yet Holden makes no reference to them in judging the performance of the 
Holt. The benefit of spuds (mudlugs) is acknowledged, but only to the extent that “If 
the ground had been dry and the tracks fitted with spuds this trial [crossing of two lines 
of trenches] might have been successful but even if it had been the other obstacles 
were quite impossible ones owing to their width and depth.” This observation is 
misleading on two counts. Firstly, the value of mudlugs is made in relation to dry rather 
than wet conditions. Secondly, the issue of failing these obstacles is raised as if they 
are different forms of test. Yet the note records that the Holt passed the first two of the 
four tests, wire crushing and the trous-de-loup. There is no record of it attempting the 
fourth obstacle, sunken wire, but the prospects of successful completion of this test 
would appear to be similar to those for plain trenches since it would have been 
dependent on the same factors.  
The lack of detail on the key issue of the length of tracks compared to width of the 
trench is most significant as Holden’s description of the tests as “quite impossible” 
suggests the rearward positioning of the tracks relative to the centre of gravity would 
inevitably result in the Holt’s front wheel dipping into the trenches thereby rendering 
forward movement impossible.135 From the observations of Marriott and Tritton, it 
would seem the lesson from the trial should have been that the tracked system had 
potential to be successful subject to appropriate modification.136 The performance 
would appear to have been sufficiently promising to justify such a conclusion and the 
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 61 
comments of some senior officers envisaged a programme involving modification or 
redesign into a machine capable of meeting military requirements. 
Register 121/Stores/2531, a circulating document for recording and distributing 
views of senior officers in different sections of the War Office, contains observations 
made between 20 January and 1 March 1915 on the Shoeburyness trials. Most 
observations showed considerable sympathy for the tracked concept prior to the trial. 
Afterwards, there was a general recognition that the Holt was not sufficiently powerful 
or designed appropriately for the tasks required of an armoured vehicle in the 
conditions on the Western Front. Nevertheless, there were a number of comments 
indicating support for a larger/more powerful machine capable of handling the required 
tonnage of armour and equipment. Von Donop is often criticised for lack of foresight.137 
Nevertheless, even he put forward a constructive proposal in addition to a range of 
criticisms of the tractor and its limitations, when he admitted “I may be wrong and 
perhaps I should be convinced otherwise were I to see the design which any 
competent person were prepared to submit.” He asked that Scott-Moncrieff should, in 
consultation with Holden, identify a competent designer to whom “the conditions could 
be submitted”. 138  However, neither Scott-Moncrieff nor Holden considered it 
appropriate to forward any ideas or proposals for the improvement of the machine or 
advancement of the project.139 
In November 1918, Scott-Moncrieff expressed the hope that, notwithstanding the 
likelihood most of the credit for the development of the tank would go to the navy, it 
"will not I hope be forgotten that some soldiers at least had a vision of possibilities."140 
He fails to acknowledge either that he himself did not belong to such a band of 
visionaries or that he commanded the Department that failed to support the 
development of a tracked machine possessing development potential, against the 
opposition of Holden. This weakness was magnified by leadership deficiencies at the 
very top of the political pyramid, since neither the new, although lukewarm and hands-
 
137 Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis, vol. II, 1915, (London, Thornton Butterworth, 1923), p. 72; 
Addison, Politics from Within, pp. 114 and 234; David Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd 
George (London, Odhams, 1938), pp. 97-102; Roskill, Man of Secrets, p. 147. 
138 National Archives, ADM116/1339, 121/Stores/2531, Scott-Moncrieff to Holden, entry no. 19, 1 
March 1915. 
139 National Archives, ADM116/1339, 121/Stores/2531, Holden to Scott-Moncrieff, entry no. 20, 1 
March 1915. 
140 National Archives, MUN 210/1940/13, Scott-Moncrieff to Bingham, 4 November 1918. 
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off convert, Asquith, nor the sceptical and equally hands-off Kitchener, took any steps 
to ensure that the concept received a fair trial by Scott-Moncrieff’s Department.141 Had 
they possessed the managerial attributes demanded by the posts they occupied, they 
would have been aware of Scott-Moncrieff’s strengths and weaknesses. Bearing in 
mind the losses and failings of offensive actions by the BEF before artillery and tank 
support were developed and applied in a sound tactical manner, Churchill's verdict, 
that "it was not those who learned the slowest who were made to suffer most", is 
exceedingly apt.142 
On 1 March 1915, Scott-Moncrieff, in accordance with Von Donop’s suggestion, 
asked Holden, a former President of the Institute of Civil Engineers, whether he could 
suggest someone “competent to design a land cruiser not too heavy that will cross any 
ordinary country and negotiate the usual fences”.143 Holden’s two-line reply said that 
he could not, and concluded, incorrectly and somewhat contradictorily, that the “only 
firm in this country who have had any experience in this line are Hornsbys of 
Grantham.”144 Such a curt, dismissive reply appears to confirm suspicions of prejudice 
by Holden, since it is inconceivable an engineer of his experience would have been 
unaware of other firms capable of attempting such a task. Indeed, observers at the 
trials included Tritton from Fosters, experienced in caterpillar traction and the eventual 
builders/joint designers of the first tank. 
However, any lingering doubt as to the presence of prejudice is effectively removed 
by comparison of Holden’s notes on register 121/Stores/2531 with entries on register 
121/Stores/1322 by Captain Haynes, who was responsible for organising and 
supervising the Shoeburyness trials.145  Many of Holden’s comments represent a 
reasonable match to those of Haynes, but exclude mention of any of the qualifying 
remarks in the final section of the report by Haynes and include one key factual 
difference. Holden misrepresented weather and ground conditions, stating that “the 
weather had been very wet and it was raining slightly during the trial, the ground was 
soft”. Haynes stated “the ground was saturated with water, the trenches were half full 
and heavy rain was falling most of the time.” Holden also omitted to mention that the 
 
141 Churchill, The World Crisis, vol. II, 1915, pp. 75-76. 
142 Ibid. p. 22. 
143 National Archives, T173/34B, Scott-Moncrieff to Holden, 1 March 1915. 
144 Ibid, Holden to Scott-Moncrieff, 1 March 1915. 
145 National Archives, T173/34B, report on trial of Holt tractor, 19 February 1915. 
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tractor engine was not running well during the trial, though before and after the trial it 
had been quite satisfactory, or that the missing mudlugs would have improved 
performance in wet conditions. The relative measurements of the width of the trench 
and positioning and length of the tracks were not specified. The care and diligence 
shown by Haynes and Holden in preparing and accepting the components of the circuit 
and preparation of the machine is perhaps best illustrated by the comment that “in 
their present form” the missing spuds “take a very long time to fit”.146 
Register/121Stores/2531 also includes a series of comments on whether Captain 
Tulloch, an advocate of tracked vehicles and former working colleague of Holden, 
should be invited to attend the trial. Tulloch had written a note early in 1915 in support 
of developing landships.147 The DA asked Scott-Moncrieff whether he wished Tulloch 
to attend. Scott-Moncrieff’s reply was favourable, but this was rapidly countered by a 
two-line intervention, unsigned but clearly from Holden, which ensured no invitation 
was sent to Tulloch.148 The result was that no further work on tractors was authorised 
and the Army’s cursory examination of chain traction was shelved. 
Had the following months been used effectively in the design and manufacture of a 
tank, it would not have been possible to spare the army the losses incurred during the 
depressing year of 1915. However, it is conceivable that, instead of making their debut 
at Flers during the middle stages of the Battles of the Somme, tanks could have 
appeared some eleven weeks earlier on 1 July. Additionally, there might have been 
sufficient time to construct a greater number of tanks than available for Flers and/or 
undertake more rigorous tests. Furthermore, greater training might have been possible 
and the Mark I might have been used when ground conditions were more favourable 
than more cratered conditions later in the year. 149  An advancement of initial 
experiences might also have enabled improved models to take part in the offensives 
at Arras in April 1917.150 
 
146 National Archives, T173/34B, report on trial of 17 February 1915 of Holt Caterpillar by Major 
Haynes and War Office Notes, January to July 1915, containing comments by Colonel Holden dated 
18 February 1915. 
147 National Archives, ADM116/1339, Tulloch to Jackson, 19 January 1915, attaching notes on Land 
Cruisers and Destroyers dated 15 January 1915. 
148 National Archives, T173/34B, internal War Office memoranda 25 January to 1 March 1915. 
149 National Archives, WO256/11-13, Haig Diary July-October 1916. See photographs 25 and 26. 
150 National Archives, T173/776, Royal Commission on Awards to Inventors, cross-examination of 
Johnson by Russell, answers to questions 3281-3283, concerning the effect of the condition of the 
terrain on the performance of the tanks at the Somme, Third Ypres and Cambrai. The unseasonable 
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The consequences of the mismanaged tractor trial might be debated at length but 
there can be no doubt that the episode cost the tank development process some five 
to six months. Scott-Moncrieff blamed Holden for missing the opportunity to kick-start 
army cooperation in the design and development process in February. 151  Scott-
Moncrieff’s criticism appears to be targeted at Holden’s professional judgment rather 
than his integrity, but the registers show Holden should have been taken to task over 
a broader range of issues.  
It is also relevant to draw attention to the failure to take advantage of the knowledge 
and abilities of “junior” officers. The problems of Swinton and Brough will be examined 
later. At the Shoeburyness trials military representatives included Marriott who had 
witnessed a test of the Holt Tractor some eight months earlier. Marriott was familiar 
with the technique for extricating the tractor from a stationary semi-submerged 
position, it having been demonstrated to him by Jules Schnerb of Vienna whilst he was 
seeking suitable machines to assist in extracting soda deposits from the Magadi Lake. 
Following its emergence from a water hole several feet deep with sloping slimy sides, 
Marriott described the Holt in glowing terms:  
the success of this test in demonstrating the immense capabilities of this 
machine in a position which would undoubtedly have been fatal to any other 
type of traction engine was so marvellous that in reporting the result 
subsequently in England I expressed the opinion that unbelief was 
pardonable in the case of anyone who had not observed the operation for 
themselves.152 
There is no evidence of Marriott or any other officer present at the trials being invited 
to contribute to the proceedings or the resultant judgment. Rather, the writings of 
Sueter and Swinton suggest that anyone putting forward views finding disfavour with 
senior officers risked being branded “difficult” with adverse career consequences.153 
Although it is clear that the army’s inappropriately designed trials were responsible 
for a significant delay, there can be no certainty about the consequences for the 
development of the tank. Savings in time might not have been used profitably and the 
 
weather affecting ground conditions at Arras is outlined in Military Operations, 1917, part II, p. 540 
and described more vividly in Jonathan Nicholls, Cheerful Sacrifice: The Battle of Arras 1917 
(Barnsley, Pen and Sword, 2010), pp. 69, 131-132, 135, 139-140 and 167. 
151 National Archives, MUN5/394, Scott-Moncrieff to Bingham, 4 November 1918. 
152 National Archives, MUN5/210, Marriott to Schnerb, 11 December 1918. The test observed by 
Marriot was the pushing of the tractor up a slope with no risk of the front wheel running into a vertical 
obstacle. 
153 Sueter, Evolution of the Tank, pp. 257-264; Swinton, Eyewitness, pp. 300-304. 
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talents of Wilson might not have been utilised.154 A delay of up to six months could, 
however, have been most significant and it is therefore appropriate to examine 
reasons and responsibilities for an avoidable and possibly costly delay inflicted by 
higher management. A combination of factors needs to be considered. 
Working downwards in terms of seniority of personnel, Asquith as Prime Minister 
lacked vision and drive.155 This is demonstrated by his comment to Hankey that he 
would support the development of tanks if the War Office were in agreement. This 
betrays a shortage of qualities required in a war-time leader. Moreover, arguably, it 
was neglectful of him to take no further interest in the matter following his discussion 
with Kitchener in support of the ideas of Churchill and Hankey.156 It is interesting to 
note that although Asquith mentions both Churchill’s note and Hankey’s Boxing Day 
Memorandum in diary form in Memories and Reflections, no reference is made to any 
discussion with Kitchener on the matter.157 Some years later Asquith wrote to Churchill 
reassuring him that he had indeed “sent for K. and made him read your letter, at the 
same time expressing my strong personal concurrence. He promised to set the 
experiments in train without delay, and I know that he did so”.158  
Even if Asquith passed on the message, there is no mention of any enquiry about 
the result of the “experiments”. For an indication of where Asquith’s particular interests 
 
154 In such circumstances the initial British design might simply have been the superimposition of an 
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155 National Archives, MUN4/5210, Notes of interview of Lord Lee on 19 December 1922, likely to 
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Lee with Mr. Lloyd George during preparations for change of Government. Mr. Lloyd George’s motive 
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opponent of Lloyd George.) 
156 Asquith’s approach to Kitchener is mentioned by Churchill in The World Crisis, p. 73, and by 
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confirmed by National Archives, MUN5/394, 12 January 1915, Von Donop to Scott-Moncrieff and 
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been concerned by the difference between his response to the concept of the tank in 1915 and their 
achievements on the Western Front in 1918 and particularly by the extent to which the electorate had 
taken the tank to its heart. See Photographs 27-30 and 54. 
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lay, contrast frequent, social references to the personalities of those with whom he 
was in contact.159 
Kitchener may have done much to secure the expansion of the army, but his 
personality, over-sensitivity to the suggestions of others and approach to technology 
and the changing nature of warfare appear to have demonstrated that Asquith was 
unwise to have encumbered him with such extensive responsibilities.160 The Secretary 
of State for War should have been interested in new developments, keen to keep a 
fatherly eye on events such as the trial of the Holt Tractor, and ready to intervene 
personally if he judged the performance of his staff to be insufficiently dynamic, 
imprudent, inappropriate or suspect in any significant way. Post-war interviews of 
senior appointees at the Ministry of Munitions, politicians and those serving other 
Ministries or branches of the armed forces, show a significant number critical of 
Kitchener’s abilities and of his receptivity to new technology. His qualities in these 
respects are compared unfavourably to those of Lloyd George.161 The observations of 
Melville Lee fit well with Kitchener’s failure to identify potential roles for armoured 
vehicles, “Agreed K. had personality, determination, industry and singleness of view, 
but lacked adaptability and imagination.”162  
Observations by others support Lee’s judgment. Firstly, Milman considered the War 
Office worked hard on munitions but “there were no big ideas”, “L.G’s spirit and 
temperament inspired and gingered up all those working under him”, and “if big views 
like Mr. L.G’s had not been introduced by someone….war would not have been 
won”.163 Secondly, Booth explained that Kitchener appreciated munitions tasks were 
beyond the capability of the War Office and sought a Supply Department in conjunction 
 
159 Asquith, Memories and Reflections, for example 5 January to 27 February 1915, pp. 54-64. It 
needs to be borne in mind that owing to Kitchener’s loss off Orkney with The Hampshire, Asquith’s 
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160 Addison, Politics from Within, p. 229; Glanfield, Devil’s Chariots, pp. 81-82; Swinton, Eyewitness, 
p. 196 and Churchill Archives Cambridge, CHAR/2/143-145, Brendon to Minister for War, 19 
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161 National Archives, MUN9/26(Lloyd George Papers), notes of interviews of Major Melville Lee, 25 
May 1923. 
162 Ibid, Notes show that Major Melville Lee, was interviewed on 30 November 1922 when he 
recorded Lloyd George’s dissatisfaction with soldiers’ forecasts of the outcome of operations 
compared to results actually achieved. Lee believed Lloyd George considered the professionals, from 
lack of activity of mind, “were inclined to go on barking up the same tree under which they had started 
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163 Ibid, interview, 7 June 1923, of Brigadier-General L. Milman (DDG Gun Ammunition Filling, 
September 1916 then Controller, November 1916-March 1919). 
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with BofT, but this scheme fell through owing to inertia of Asquith. Booth had great 
admiration for Kitchener but he was snowed under and badly served by MGO’s 
Department and felt, through loyalty, that he could not refuse to act by MGO’s advice. 
Booth considered “LG had “marvellous quickness at spotting where the shoe pinched” 
and when he became Minister of Munitions the whole thing, though hastily organised, 
was arranged on a big scale and “drive” put into it, he thought “the war might have 
collapsed if L.G. had not taken on munitions business”. 164   Thirdly, Bingham 
considered the War Office worked night and day and did its best but the size of the job 
was not then appreciated, “it was thought that the placing of orders was sufficient to 
insure production”, whereas “it was essential….to have control of raw material, 
machinery, labour, shipping etc. as L.G. did.”165 Finallly, “Having viewed the 'futile 
slaughter' on the front, Arthur Lee became increasingly frustrated with the conduct of 
the war by the Asquith government….Lee sought out his former political opponent 
David Lloyd George as the one member of the government who, he considered, had 
'sufficient courage and dynamic energy … to insist upon things being done'.166  
Kitchener’s failure to plan comprehensively for the large-scale munitions increase 
required and his intolerant attitude towards Churchill’s involvement in military matters 
raise questions over his suitability to operate at a senior level within a political 
environment.167 There is a general acceptance either that Kitchener misjudged the 
munition requirements or was unprepared to reorganise the War Office to deal with 
the matter. Suttie appears to accept Duncan Crow’s assessment: 
“Perhaps inefficiency (of the War Office) is entirely the wrong word: it implied 
the ill-working of a machine. In this case the machine was working fairly well 
- but it was the wrong machine. It was one which had been constructed for 
another scale of purpose. What had to be done was to create a new 
machine”.168  
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This accords generally with the assessments of interviewees summarised above. Only 
one interviewee, Captain Percy Creed, supported Kitchener and was critical of Lloyd 
George. Creed’s comments took the form of a rant against Lloyd George’s decisions 
and personality generally rather than an analytical summary of munitions policies.169  
A mature and statesmanlike response to trespassing by Churchill on army territory 
would have been to consider the value of each instance on its merits and to remain 
calm and unruffled. Yet Kitchener acted in the opposite way, writing irately to Asquith, 
drawing him into what he regarded as a dispute.170 Kitchener’s inappropriate and 
unseemly approach is but marginally offset by the fact that not all the letters he drafted 
appear to have been sent. In response to Churchill’s offer of various elements of 
Winston’s Circus, Kitchener stated that armoured cars “are, or can be, provided by the 
War Office when required”. The assistance sought from Hetherington shortly 
afterwards shows this statement to have been false.171 Events appear to demonstrate, 
albeit perhaps thoughtlessly, a willingness to place pride ahead of the wellbeing of his 
command, a trait reinforced by his failure to agree with the King’s comment on the 
value of Brutinel’s armoured motors.172  Their value would later be demonstrated, 
particularly during the 1918 Spring Offensives and Hundred Days.173 
Scott-Moncrieff appears not to have been antagonistic to the development of the 
tank.174 In 1918 he would become a member of Churchill’s Tank Awards Committee. 
However, his lack of a forceful response to a dismissive reply by Holden to Von 
Donop’s suggestion for further action on caterpillar traction, demonstrates unsuitability 
for occupation of a senior military position. It would be difficult to argue with Swinton’s 
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assessment of him as “sympathetic, but ineffectual”.175 His relative inactivity, which 
would be modified some months later, seemingly by external pressures and fear of 
criticism, was tantamount to subservience to the views of subordinate staff and 
disregard of the lack of foresight and performance of an important section of his 
command. Tulloch supports Swinton’s assessment of Scott-Moncrieff’s limitations as 
a senior manager.176 
Holden and his staff were given an important task in organising the trials of the Holt 
tractor. As “the technical expert”, Holden had the opportunity to compensate for the 
lack of knowledge and understanding of mechanical matters by more senior 
officers.177 However, his actions and conclusions were such as to draw criticism from 
two fellow engineers present at the trials. Firstly, Marriott found the Holt not properly 
prepared for the conditions: he also criticised the selection of the tractor driver, 
remarking “You must have mudlugs and a clever driver on the clutch.”178 Secondly, 
Tritton, who restricted himself to the sarcastic yet damning comment that the machine 
had not been designed to plough its way through the English Channel.179 Furthermore, 
it is relevant to note that the performance of the Holt Tractor did nothing to shake the 
faith of the young members of Churchill’s armoured car unit, observers at the trials, 
since their interest and involvement in the development of a landship continued 
unabated. Later trials of a Holt tractor by the French Army resulted in an order for 400 
adaptations of that machine, Tracteurs Estiennes, early in 1916.180 
Tulloch commented to the Ministry of Munitions in 1918 that he advised Swinton 
not to consult a “certain official” as he would “certainly ‘crab’ the whole idea and throw 
difficulties in the way”.181 It is difficult to see how Swinton could have prevented the 
involvement of the ADMT. Accordingly, Holden was consulted. His unjustified 
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criticisms, unfair representation of the trials, design of the circuit and failure to consider 
potential, rather than simply the results of an existing commercial machine, were 
undoubtedly the cause of the obstacle Tulloch had predicted. Tulloch’s assessment of 
the consequence of Holden’s involvement was “Six months at least have been wasted 
because one man said it would be a year before a special design could be got out and 
a machine built”.182 
Scott-Moncrieff later criticised Holden by stating that he had missed a great 
opportunity in declining the idea.183 Yet Holden was in Scott-Moncrieff’s command and 
was responsible for giving advice rather than orders. Tulloch, who had previously 
worked with Holden, considered the ADMT possessed a formidable reputation in the 
world of military transport and this view proved to be sound since Holden’s opposition, 
regardless of its merits, appears to have been decisive in closing the army’s file on the 
development of tanks.184  
By way of contrast, support was forthcoming for the ideas of Swinton and Tulloch 
from Colonel Louis Jackson.185 Jackson recorded that “it is only a question of time 
before some such war machine appears and the nation which produces it will have a 
great advantage.” 186  Notwithstanding the fact that Ludendorff and other enemy 
generals might have had a vested interest in allocating an excessive share of the 
responsibility for their defeat upon a factor not directly under their control, their later 
comments on tanks, together with those of their Allied counterparts, support Jackson’s 
prediction.187 At the key time, however, his vision was unable to counter the critical 
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and prejudiced observations of Holden since he was unqualified to contribute any 
specialised input and had to admit that he could give no opinion on “how long it would 
take to design and build it”.188  
Between August/October 1914, the navy demonstrated that it was possible to 
construct an effective and reliable armoured car within a relatively short period.189 Yet 
as Lloyd George later confessed:  
the outbreak of war found this country totally unprepared for land hostilities 
on a Continental scale…..our Army, mainly used for policing our widely 
scattered Empire, was a small highly trained force of professional 
soldiers…..lacking both the numbers and the equipment for large-scale 
fighting against European armies.190 
In view of the unbroken length of Liberal government before the war, it is reasonable 
to conclude that Lloyd George’s summary represented his genuine belief. The Second 
Boer War had administered a severe jolt to the Victorian army.191 However, the re-
organisation of military forces failed to march in step with the strategic choice of 
alignment with France following the Entente Cordiale.192 This failure of alignment of 
policy and military means could be judged to have had significant consequences in 
1914. It is most unlikely that more extensive preparations for continental warfare in 
terms of numbers and equipment would have resulted in the adoption of any armoured 
vehicles, particularly if Glanfield is correct in his judgment that “In the higher reaches 
of the British and most other armies in 1914 the prevailing mindset was deeply 
suspicious of innovation, technical or otherwise”193. Glanfield’s remarks have some 
validity though are excessive. Indeed, Spencer Jones commends the response of the 
army to elements of equipment and tactical reassessment following the Boer War.194 
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However the army emerges as less successful when judged against the recognition 
of the more profound form of innovation stemming from motorised armoured vehicles 
and necessary adjustment of tactics. British pre-war and “early-war” response to 
armoured cars failed to match even the somewhat limited pre-war acceptance by Italy, 
France, Russia, Turkey and America or the early wartime response of Belgium and 
Canada and of the Royal Navy.195  The key fact is that the army possessed no 
operational armoured cars until presented with a range of Churchill’s squadrons in 
1915. By this time, owing to entrenchment, such vehicles were of limited value in 
France. 
The preceding sections of this chapter have demonstrated that Lloyd George’s 
assessments were substantially correct. Britain did not heed pre-war developments of 
armoured vehicles by others. Development work on motorised transport did not 
penetrate the mental Chinese wall which separated haulage from fighting vehicles and 
the originality and insight of one of its relatively junior officers had not overcome 
traditionalism, lack of vision and insufficient innovation at the key senior level. 
Furthermore, it has been shown that Churchill’s claims in respect of his vision in 1914 
were fabricated. 
Politically and militarily, advisors and policymakers do not emerge creditably from 
the examination of events prior to March 1915. Furthermore, as the spring of 1915 
arrived there was an absence of any official recognition of the value of motorised 
armoured warfare to offer the prospect of a more competitive future national response 
to a depressing military picture. Fortunately, however, there was one spark of light. 
Protected from prying political, military and Treasury eyes, in the confines of the 
Admiralty, Churchill, had recognised the value of armoured vehicles. Although his 
military, management and engineering talents would prove inadequate for the task of 
securing the design and production of the first tank, he was nevertheless deploying a 
section of his formidable range of attributes, self-confidence, determination and 
obstinacy, by clandestinely setting up a group within the navy to undertake the army’s 
work.196  Churchill’s claim to “greatness” rests largely on his achievements in the 
Second World War, but what better confirmation could there be from an earlier period 
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of his life for Best’s conclusion to his biography of Churchill, “I am persuaded that….we 
are diminished if, admitting Churchill’s failings and failures, we can no longer 
appreciate his virtues and victories”.197 
The flame had not expired but Britain could ill afford the time that had been wasted. 
A large new army was being formed and logic suggests the key objective should have 
been to provide maximum possible assistance for this army when first committed to 
the offensive. However, by March 1915, ideas for a “machine-gun destroyer” had been 
rejected and progress in providing adequate and effective artillery support was 
insufficiently advanced.198 Time was of the essence in limiting future losses. The next 
chapter will examine how the introduction of two gifted and experienced engineers 
would succeed in removing the obstructions of complicated design and inadequate 
efforts that were blocking progress. In the light of the critical national situation, the 
chapter will pay particular regard to the urgency with which this innovative work was 
undertaken. 
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Chapter Two - Progress in 1915 - Slow and Quick 
 
This chapter reviews the main issues associated with development of tracked 
fighting vehicles in 1915 prior to formal acceptance by the Army Council early in 1916. 
As in most walks of life, much depends upon having the right people in the right places 
at key moments in time. Particular regard will therefore be paid to the contributions of 
those associated with the development of armoured vehicles, either in facilitating, or 
delaying, the introduction of a technologically advanced form of warfare. At this time 
of national crisis, obstacles were capable of rendering the Landship project “Too Late” 
to aid British participation in the war. Furthermore, difficulties were increasing for all 
parties involved, since the elements and conduct of warfare were changing rapidly. 
Operational characteristics in 1914/15, when Swinton first advanced the theory of 
armoured operations and Churchill set up the Landship Committee, differed greatly 
from the warfare within which armoured vehicles would operate in 1918.  
Marble points out:  
In previous wars, when tactical movement had been stymied by firepower, 
generals had been able to maneuver strategically…..But by 1914, 
demographics and the willingness of politicians to put very large percentages 
of their nations' young men in uniform produced armies so large that battle-
lines reached across continents.1  
It might have been anticipated that these unexpected conditions would have 
stimulated new ideas. Yet, in March 1915, Churchill became the only active player in 
the quest for armoured vehicles capable of untying the knot of the Western Front. 
Britain’s small professional army had in large measure been destroyed during four 
months of fighting in a traditional manner.2 A new, mechanised approach was needed 
to enable an emerging, inexperienced, larger army to avoid similar experiences. His 
enthusiasm ignited by Hankey’s Boxing Day Memorandum, Churchill had recognised 
the potential value of armoured vehicles but his understanding of their optimum military 
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role and therefore the design that was needed would be shown to be at variance with 
army requirements when these were adopted mid-1915.3 Churchill told Asquith: 
the power of the rifle is so great that 100 yards is held sufficient to stop any 
rush, and in order to avoid the severity of the artillery fire, trenches are often 
dug on the reverse slope of positions, or a short distance in the rear of 
villages, woods or other obstacles. The consequence is that the war has 
become a short range instead of a long range as was expected [sic] and 
opposing trenches get ever closer for mutual safety from each other’s 
artillery fire. The question to be solved is not therefore the long attack over 
a carefully prepared glacis of former times, but the actual getting across of 
100 or 200 yards of open space and wire entanglements.4 
Churchill’s note contained a number of impractical suggestions. He recognised the 
problem of wire, which accentuated the risk of losses from artillery and small-arms fire 
but did not identify the machine-gun as one of the greatest threats.5  
 Terraine’s articles on war myths portray artillery as the greatest threat to troops 
during the war. Taking the war as a single entity, it is beyond doubt that artillery was 
“the grimest reaper”, but Terraine pays insufficient regard to circumstances in different 
tactical phases. The threat from the machine-gun increased dramatically as soldiers 
emerged from their “bullet-secure” trenches in order to close with the enemy. On such 
occasions the threat of artillery also increased, but artillery was able to keep its score 
ticking over in all phases throughout every day: even deep trenches were no 
guarantee against high-explosive shells. For BEF offensives in the earlier stages of 
the war, the machine-gun is recognised by many as the greatest threat.6 It may also 
be able to claim first place in later offensives when the BEF had to a large degree 
mastered the techniques for effective counter-battery fire. Circumstances varied along 
the front, but many who witnessed 1915 offensives judged the machine-gun as the 
backbone of enemy defence. At Aubers Ridge, Swinton refers to the assault, “in most 
cases” being “stopped dead on the top of our own parapets or a few yards in front, 
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where the ground was strewn with bodies. A feature of the defence was the slaughter 
dealt out by the machine-guns firing directly and obliquely across No Man’s Land.”7 
Lee was so convinced of the need for change that he returned to England during the 
Battle of Loos, “Went down to Walton Heath, had long talk with Mr. Lloyd George, 
showed him photos of dead in rows opposite machine-gun emplacements.” Lee 
understood that the situation had not been appreciated by Lloyd George before his 
visit.8 
The consequences of emerging from the relative safety of trenches into the field of 
machine-gun fire is well recounted in the scholarship.9 Holmes points out “Unusually 
in a war in which artillery was the major killer, about 60 percent of these casualties (1 
July 1916) were caused by machine-gun fire.” 10  From German records, Duffy 
concludes that machine-gun fire: 
was beyond doubt the main strength of the German defence, against which 
the attackers stood ‘no chance’….the destructive power of the machine-gun 
is the cause of the enormous losses they sustained, and the first impetus of 
the attack was on many occasions broken just by the fire of the machine 
guns in the first German line. The machine gunners were magnificent, and 
so was the way their weapons were sited. All the prisoners, including the 
officers, are unanimous on that point.11  
Coppard further endorses the threat of machine-guns during British offensives and 
highlights difficulties in determining cause of death.12  Terraine acknowledges the 
nuanced nature of the machine-gun/artillery “myth” by his comment, ”Soldiers in trench 
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warfare were only exposed to machine-gun fire from time to time-when carrying out 
attacks or daylight raids, or working in the open: they were exposed to artillery fire the 
whole time they were in the front zone”.13 Terraine chose to elaborate neither on the 
relative killing record of different weapons during different phases of the war nor upon 
statistical methodology, a stance apparently not varied by subsequent scholarship.14 
Churchill had recognised the potential of armoured vehicles to contribute to the 
unlocking of trench stalemate. Early in 1915, the Battle of Neuve Chapelle would 
reveal to the BEF the extent and inter-relationship of difficulties in undertaking 
offensive operations. The experience would also reveal to the German Army the need 
for greater sophistication of defensive entrenchments since British operational tactics 
increased German respect for the capabilities of the BEF.15 Future offensives would 
not become any easier. Similarly, the role of the tank would become more complex 
than envisaged by Churchill in January 1915. The consequences of this change for 
the design of the tank would not be recognised fully and would lead to a less 
satisfactory debut on the battlefield than should have been the case. 
Churchill’s view of the BEF’s difficulties did not represent a sound basis for 
specifying appropriate forms of mechanical assistance for offensive operations. He 
envisaged: 
forty or fifty of these engines prepared secretly and brought into position at 
nightfall could advance quite certainly into the enemy’s trenches smashing 
away all the obstructions and sweeping the trenches with their machine-gun 
fire and with grenades thrown out of the top.16 
He also advocated the use of both wheeled or “portable” personnel shields and smoke. 
Churchill had not foreseen the difficulties that would be faced by tank 
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drivers/commanders in navigating from an enclosed vehicle, the difficulties of avoiding 
multiple ditching hazards or the potential unreliability of complex new machinery. 
Similarly, he did not appreciate the impracticality of infantry carrying or pushing 
wheeled metal shields. 17  Furthermore, many of the limited supply of grenades 
available in January 1915 were of a primitive design.18  
It may appear harsh to criticise the one member of the senior political and military 
establishment to have recognised the value of armoured vehicles, but Churchill’s 
comments and subsequent actions did not provide the best start for designing the first 
tank. Churchill later stated that he took steps to design landships at the Admiralty 
because he was not convinced the army would be persuaded of their value.19 He 
referred to the landship as “a tank or armoured trench-crossing vehicle.” These 
vehicles were intended for military tasks, yet, initially, the army had no involvement in 
his clandestine project.20 He did not mention that, before instructing two groups at the 
Admiralty to construct a “landship”, he had made no effort to check the response of 
Kitchener to the Boxing Day Memorandum and had not added his support to Asquith’s 
endorsement of Hankey’s memorandum to Kitchener. 21  Admiralty efforts were 
underway before trials of the Holt tractor at Shoeburyness.22 Politics or personality 
clashes might well have rendered impossible even the partial integration of the army 
into Churchill’s project. Nevertheless, it should perhaps have been attempted. At a 
later stage, the army would pay a price for problems that earlier involvement might 
have forestalled. 
Churchill’s letter to Asquith describes his thoughts on over-riding strategy, tactical 
problems and ways in which offensives on the Western Front might be assisted by 
technology.23 He considered a committee of experts ought to be sitting continually at 
the War Office to formulate schemes and examine suggestions. Churchill judged the 
matter so urgent that it would not be possible in most cases to have lengthy 
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experiments beforehand and therefore made the astute point that “If the devices are 
to be ready by the time they are required it is indispensable that manufacture should 
proceed simultaneously with experiment”. It is notable that Churchill did not mention 
this in his evidence to the Royal Commission.24 Clearly, the reason for this omission 
was that Churchill did not wish to draw attention to the shortcomings of the Committee 
he had appointed, which had experimented for nearly six months without producing a 
working machine, or to his and d’Eyncourt’s failure, as managers, to press for 
construction concurrent or overlapping with design. The relative simplicity of producing 
a purely experimental machine would be demonstrated in August 1915 by Tritton who, 
following about a week on design work and preparations, commenced construction of 
Little Willie on 11 August, completing it by 8 September.25 
Churchill’s first instructions were issued to Murray Sueter, Head of his RNAS.26 In 
evidence to the Royal Commission, Churchill was at pains to emphasise his lack of 
mechanical qualifications. This represented a get-out-of-jail card, frequently used to 
avoid awkward cross-examination that might reveal the negligeable contribution his 
Committee had made to the design of the first tank.27 Some four years earlier he had 
harboured no reservations about sending Sueter a detailed though flawed instruction 
on how to conduct experimentation.28 
In his note to Asquith, Churchill had included a frustrating mix of sound comment 
and advice on strategy and administration but unsound detail and tactics. 
Unfortunately, Churchill was not in a position to put into practice the sound parts of his 
advice, since Kitchener had responsibility for such matters. By contrast, he was able 
to instruct Sueter on the way unsound details should be engineered and tested. His 
instructions to Sueter required trials in which two steamrollers were fastened together 
side-by-side so they were to all intents and purposes one roller at least 12-14 feet 
wide. This was to be run along trenches to ascertain the weight necessary to smash 
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in the trenches. Elementary considerations such as the varying nature of the soil/sub-
strata in different areas, the traction of a steamroller under different conditions and the 
form of trench construction do not appear to have occurred to him. It seems unlikely 
Churchill’s concluding remark to Sueter was written in jest, “the only difficulty you have 
got to surmount is to prevent the steamrollers from breaking apart”.29 Churchill gave 
Sueter two weeks to carry out his instructions, a task which would determine the nature 
of Sueter’s future participation in the project.30  
Sueter was experienced in dealing with technical issues. 31  Presented with a 
problem on a clean sheet and given a longer innings he might have produced a 
workable solution.32 He endeavoured to divert the project onto more practical lines by 
commencing investigations into the provision of a tracked vehicle.33 However, the 
specific requirements of the First Lord could not be ignored, with the result that his 
obligation to provide what Churchill later described as a “trench-roller” inevitably 
resulted in failure.34 Churchill’s use in The World Crisis of the term “trench-roller” itself 
represented a shift of his position, a veiled admission that the machine described to 
Sueter in January 1915 in no way resembled the eventual “tank”. However, whereas 
in 1923 such a term could safely be used, in 1919 Churchill felt it necessary and 
advantageous to his reputation to avoid any mention of ways in which he might have 
acted more beneficially. Consequently, Churchill falsely assured the Royal 
Commission that his efforts from September 1914 represented early attempts to 
secure the provision of a tank or trench-crossing vehicle.35 Churchill later appreciated 
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the shortcomings of his 1915 instructions to Sueter and endeavoured to protect himself 
against cross-examination by down-grading his instructions to Sueter to “ideas of a 
suggestive character”, by off-loading the responsibility for the “trench-roller” onto 
Hankey, yet nevertheless by claiming some benefit from the idea since: 
I had, of course, no expert knowledge of mechanics….This particular variant 
[the steamroller] broken down [sic] through its mechanical defects but there 
is no doubt that it played its part in forming opinions among the armoured-
car officers and experts connected with the armoured-car squadrons and in 
setting imagination to work for other and more helpful solutions.36 
Churchill’s statements concerning events in 1915 were proving as unreliable as those 
of 1914, since the armoured car squadrons did not design or build the first tank and 
Fosters was not connected to them in any direct way. 
Sueter dutifully carried out Churchill’s instructions with the result that in each of four 
tests the steamrollers broke apart as soon as the engines were started. Tests were 
then attempted with a single roller, but this would not climb the slightest incline.37 
Consequently, on 20 February 1915, dissatisfied with the progress being made by 
Sueter, Churchill set up the Landships Committee, under the chairmanship of 
d’Eyncourt. The Committee was answerable direct to himself as First Lord.38 
Showing no repentance for having specified inappropriate tests, Churchill later 
blamed Sueter for failing to resolve the problems of the landship in a fortnight: “I was 
not altogether satisfied that the subject was being handled by strong enough elements, 
and by strong enough personalities in the Armoured Car Division.”39 The irony of this 
statement will become clear when d’Eyncourt’s management of the Landships 
Committee is examined together with the efforts of Sueter to stiffen d’Eyncourt’s 
resolve and shepherd him towards greener pastures. 
Churchill’s observations to the Royal Commission do not fully explain why he should 
have passed the reins from Sueter to d’Eyncourt, but the decision may have been 
triggered by discussions at a dinner party given by the Duke of Westminster, 
commander of one of Churchill’s Armoured Car Squadrons. The dinner party was held 
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to afford members of the squadrons the opportunity to put their ideas to Churchill on 
the future of armoured vehicles following the establishment of continuous entrenched 
defences from Switzerland to the English Channel. The ploy was successful in that 
their discussions, particularly about a wheeled land battleship, inspired Churchill and 
resulted in his establishment of the Landships Committee the following week: 
He [Hetherington] advocated the creation of land battleships on a scale far 
larger than had ever been practicable, and rather on the lines of those 
suggested by Mr. H. G. Wells. As a result,….I went home determined that I 
would give imperative orders without delay to secure the carrying forward in 
one form or another of this project in which I had for so long believed.40 
Churchill reacted badly to Sueter’s failure “altogether to solve the mechanical 
difficulties” or to “find anyone who could solve them”, since, apparently spitefully, he 
gave evidence to the Royal Commission that Sueter was “not even summoned to the 
meeting in my sick-room on the 20th February at which the [Landships] Committee was 
appointed”.41 Similarly, it would appear Sueter was not invited to Westminster’s dinner 
party. The Attorney-General, acting on behalf of Churchill, chose not to mention these 
matters during his introductory examination of his witness, presumably because 
Sueter’s approach was more practical than that of Churchill and because he was more 
committed to the project than d’Eyncourt and less tolerant of delays. As early as April, 
Sueter was complaining about the slowness of d’Eyncourt’s Committee.42 
Churchill’s claim, to have “long” believed in armoured vehicles, represented part of 
his deception: such a belief had been held for about a fortnight. The main point was 
that Churchill had not simply failed to recognise the attack on machine-guns as an 
important role for armoured vehicles, but had failed to keep abreast of thoughts within 
his Armoured Car unit in the period between the solidification of the Western Front in 
October 1914 and the Boxing Day Memorandum.43 Furthermore, although Churchill’s 
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interest in armoured vehicles had been stirred by Hankey, it still required initiative by 
members of his Armoured Car unit to boost that interest. Unfortunately, neither of 
these stimuli set Churchill on course for the holy grail of the tank. His false testimony 
to the Royal Commission continued as he explained issues in 1915. When asked 
whether the idea in March 1915 “was to have a machine which would carry a number 
of men into the enemy’s trenches?”, Churchill replied:  
That was not my original idea. I essentially dwelt upon it as an engine of war 
which was to fight, to roll down the wire, and to sweep the trenches with 
Machine-gun fire, and which the troops were to use as a point d’appui to 
manœuvre with rather than using it as a carrier to carry a definite body of 
troops into the enemy lines.”44 
This evidence ran counter to his answer to an earlier question.45 It would also be 
contradicted by later witnesses.46  Most significantly however it is contradicted by 
documentary evidence: 
Two months ago the First Lord sent for me and then put me on a Committee 
of Engineers to report on the possibility of building large armoured self-
propelled platforms on which a strong storming party of from 50 to 70 men 
could safely be transported across the fire-swept zone….47 
Progress was reported regularly to the Landships Committee.48 However, perhaps the 
most telling contribution in refuting Churchill’s claim to have sought a fighting tank 
came from Crompton who confirmed showing plans of proposed “men-carrying 
machines” to Churchill in March 1915.49 Crompton’s version of events is confirmed by 
Stern: 
These Landships were at first designed to transport a trench-taking storming 
party of fifty men with machine-guns and ammunition: the men standing in 
two ranks at each side, and protected by side armour of 8mm. thickness 
and roof armour of 6mm.50 
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Though Churchill did not foresee the value of AFVs before receiving Hankey’s Boxing 
Day Memorandum, evidence to the Royal Commission shows that members of his 
Armoured Car unit did consider the use of tracked vehicles and armour protection at 
an earlier date, though they do not appear to have linked tracks, armour and armament 
into a single vehicle. Prominent among such officers were Lieutenant Robert MacFie 
and Major Thomas Hetherington. MacFie joined the armoured car unit with experience 
of tracked vehicles in agriculture in America. There is no evidence that MacFie’s 
advocacy of tracked vehicles extended beyond their use for haulage purposes until 
well after the establishment of the Landships Committee.51 Hetherington on the other 
hand did associate the combination of armament and armour, though, as outlined to 
Churchill at Westminster’s party, he envisaged this on large diameter wheeled 
vehicles.52 
The most significant point to emerge from the evidence of Hetherington, MacFie, 
Sueter and other RNAS personnel is that Churchill was not sufficiently in touch with 
thoughts within the lower echelons of the RNAS in 1914. Although he later claimed it 
was obvious, nothing from 1914 suggests Churchill had addressed the issue of 
restoring mobility to military operations. Nevertheless, evidence given by his 
Engineering Officers in the Armoured Car unit shows they had been considering, albeit 
in an uncoordinated way, the use of more powerful armoured vehicles to overcome 
the barrier of trenches and wire. It must be recognised that some witnesses before the 
Royal Commission were seeking financial awards and their evidence may have been 
skewed to suit their claims, but no such accusations can be made against non-
claimants such as Briggs, the Unit’s Chief Engineering Officer: 
It is rather difficult to assign a definite date of first knowing about it 
[Hetherington’s scheme] but I am able to assign a definite date to the time 
when we had thoroughly considered it, and very considerably modified it. 
That date I am definitely able to assign as the last week in January, and I am 
certain we must have heard of it at least three weeks before that, and 
probably a little longer, to investigate certain issues….we were all thinking of 
some vehicle that would go across country and do over the land what the 
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armoured motor cars would do on the roads. The Hetherington proposal gave 
us the opportunity of crystallising our thoughts on that vehicle.53 
In response to the further question “The first definite proposal that was brought to your 
mind by anybody was the Hetherington scheme which consisted, among other things, 
of using large wheels?”. The simple reply of “Yes” confirms that these early RNAS 
ideas were not directly related to the development path of the tank.54 Tantalisingly, 
MacFie and Hetherington, both within the Armoured Car Unit, were advocating 
caterpillar traction and self-propelled armament, though the two were not being linked 
together. Early in 1915 the water was further muddied by the instructions of the First 
Lord who envisaged trench-taking and safe transportation of troops across no-man’s-
land as the main roles of the landship.55 The armament of Churchill’s landship was the 
machine-gun to clear trenches rather than an artillery piece to destroy machine-gun 
emplacements. 
The importance of management issues stands out prominently at many stages of 
the development of the tank. The value of innovative ideas and technical expertise 
could too easily be diminished by poor management decisions. Churchill might have 
established a Landships Committee in 1914 had he enjoyed a closer managerial 
relationship with his Armoured Car unit. As it was, members of the unit would appear 
to have found it necessary to arrange a party in order to communicate with him on a 
matter of operational significance. 
Nevertheless, as would be revealed by events later in the war, and later in the 
century, Churchill’s action in establishing the Landships Committee was appropriate 
and far-sighted. The problem was that the Committee needed to secure a rapid 
solution of mechanical and manufacturing problems in order to maximise the beneficial 
effect of technological advance during the remainder of the war. For several reasons, 
Churchill’s actions did not secure the speed of development so badly required. 
The misspecification of Churchill’s landship by the inclusion of a troop-carrying 
requirement and inadequate aggressive capability should not have delayed the 
production of the first tracked, armoured vehicle. Other factors were also at play, 
particularly the calibre of senior staff, a factor that may have been particularly 
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significant bearing in mind Churchill’s pressurised involvement with other 
responsibilities. The time he could devote to thought, liaison and management of the 
landship project would have been limited severely by the Dardanelles venture.  
However, the Dardenelles cannot entirely absolve Churchill from responsibility for 
the largely wasted period of the first six months of 1915. Churchill’s own management 
skills were found wanting. In appointing d’Eyncourt, Churchill had selected a man who 
did not possess the leadership qualities required. Neither d’Eyncourt nor Crompton 
was capable of the drive and pragmatism necessary to secure the timely construction 
of an experimental prototype let alone a practical working model. Even allowing for the 
heavy workload of his main job, d’Eyncourt did not contribute the effort required. 
Having appointed an experienced consultant, Colonel Rooks Crompton, and 
automotive engineer, Lucien Le Gros, d’Eyncourt appeared to delegate progress to 
them without himself contributing a sufficient degree of supervision. In consequence 
the project was allowed to drift.56 Several months passed by with no tangible progress 
and no cracking of the managerial whip. Other members of the attached RNAS support 
team could see the problems, largely self-inflicted, that were faced by Crompton.57 
The principal obstacle was Crompton’s belief that an articulated solution was required 
to achieve certain climbing manoeuvres, to navigate narrow, twisting, French roads 
and to cross weight-restricted bridges.58 In the event, as Le Gros would later be forced 
to admit, it was by rail that tanks would complete their journey to positions close to the 
Front.59 
The role of Sueter in supporting and guiding d’Eyncourt as delay increased and as 
Swinton succeeded in reviving army interest in AFVs deserves special mention and 
throws light on a key period in the passing of responsibility for progress to Fosters. It 
is reasonable to assume that Gordon Wilson’s recognition of the value of Sueter, “a 
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colourful and enterprising figure”, stems from comments made by his father.60  In 
evidence to the Royal Commission, Sueter recounted that in July: 
d’Eyncourt came to see me and said he wanted to resign from the 
Presidency of the Land Ship Committee….then said he did not think there 
was much future for land ships, and he wanted to give it up….I asked….if he 
could not get out a machine …. and he said he thought the Land Ship 
Committee should do something, and he thought he would turn down the 
less promising designs….I persuaded him to go on as President…He said: 
“I will only do it if you remove Commander Boothby from the Committee”.61  
Sueter’s comments confirm the later portrayal of d’Eyncourt as irresolute and an 
unreliable witness.62 It is not possible to provide evidence to corroborate Sueter’s 
comments since they were made during a one-to-one conversation. However, while 
acknowledging that Sueter was seeking to persuade the Commission of his own 
importance in securing an armoured vehicle, his remarks ring true. D’Eyncourt had not 
sought involvement with landships but had been consulted by Sueter and Churchill 
and then “invited” by Churchill to lead the project.63 By the time of his discussions with 
Sueter in July he had nothing to show for the efforts of his Committee which had 
suddenly become the focus of attention following the army’s revived interest in 
armoured vehicles. Furthermore, Crompton and Le Gros were experiencing criticism 
for their unsuccessful efforts to design a complex articulated machine.64 This had 
resulted in Sueter inserting Boothby onto the Committee in order to turn up the heat 
on d’Eyncourt and encourage the diversion of efforts along more practical lines.65 
D’Eyncourt was finally under pressure. However, he would have been aware that his 
resignation, though a convenient way to relieve one form of pressure, could have 
attracted criticism and generated other pressures.  
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A key stage in the development of the tank had arrived. Probing by the army could 
only be put off for a limited period.66 It was important for d’Eyncourt’s prestige that he 
should produce some form of hardware.67 There was a general recognition that a 
machine, any machine, was needed. Tritton met Stern and d’Eyncourt towards the 
end of July when he was told “The complaint was, nothing was happening, and would 
I take on the job and build something. They wanted something to show for propaganda 
in order to keep the Tank scheme alive.68 The credit for teasing out positive progress 
from a hive of inactivity belongs to Albert Stern, a banker who, following the outbreak 
of war, had volunteered his services to Churchill together with finance for an armoured 
car.69  By mid-1915 he was Secretary to the Landships Committee.70  Stern freely 
admitted to being “very much against Colonel Crompton”.71 In June, Stern appears to 
have assumed the role of progress enforcer.72 The failure of Crompton to produce 
results, together with a general realisation that his proposed articulated machine was 
impractical, had undoubtedly led to a lowering of respect for his ability and would have 
made him a primary target for Stern.73 It was likely however that the determining issue 
so far as Crompton’s future with the Committee was concerned was d’Eyncourt’s 
desperation for something to be built in order to conceal his lack of progress.74 This 
brought to light the fact that Crompton had prepared no detailed plans from which a 
manufacturer could undertake the construction of part of his proposed articulated 
machine. This was revealed when, in view of their commitment to other munitions 
contracts, Metropolitan were released from their contract to build Crompton’s machine. 
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D’Eyncourt and Stern had then turned to Fosters to undertake the construction of “half” 
the articulated landship.  
Tritton recounted that on 15 July, only three days after Fosters had agreed to 
undertake the job, d’Eyncourt enquired whether Tritton had made a good start. On 
being told that no start had been made as no plans had been received from Crompton, 
an answer which appeared to contradict Crompton’s assurances some weeks earlier, 
d’Eyncourt, Stern and Tritton took a taxi to Crompton’s office.75 On 5 June Crompton 
had stated that Metropolitan who had at that time only recently taken over as the main 
contractors from Fodens: 
have the work of the main frames, the details of armouring and all the 
principal features of the design well in hand; they sent a leading 
draughtsman, Mr. Cartwright to Colonel Crompton’s office, he 
returned….taking with him the general designs in a sufficiently complete 
form to enable all the detail work to be carried to completion in their own 
offices. The final drawings as settled by Colonel Crompton on behalf of the 
Admiralty have been sent up and will be checked forthwith.”76 
Tritton explained to the Tank Awards Committee and Royal Commission that the only 
“plans” available were sketches, nothing from which the machining of parts could be 
undertaken. There “was not a single drawing of any kind”.77 Tritton explained that 
d’Eyncourt “had an interview with Colonel Crompton at the other end of the room. “He 
did not know what passed”.78 The immediate outcome was that Tritton sent Rigby, his 
senior draughtsman, to Crompton for a week to work under his requirements. Rigby 
was under strict written instructions to do anything Crompton wanted but to take no 
“responsibility in initiating”. These instructions were reinforced by a further telegram 
“We must take no responsibility for design”.79 Tritton had no intention of providing 
Crompton with an opportunity to involve Fosters in disputes over responsibility for 
delay or error. 
Rigby’s work yielded a single blueprint but was not adequate for the construction of 
the machine and in consequence of almost daily calls from Stern, Tritton wired him on 
 
75 Ibid, answer to question 2521. 
76 National Archives, T173/34B, Crompton Progress Report, 5 June 1915. 
77 National Archives, MUN5/394, Tank Awards Committee, 1 November 1918, evidence of Tritton, p. 
14. 
78 National Archives, Royal Commission on Awards to Inventors, 21 October 1919, examination of 
Tritton by Russell, answer to question 2521. 
79 Ibid., answers to questions 2525-2530. 
 90 
27 July to explain why matters were at a standstill.80 The outcome was a meeting 
between d’Eyncourt and Tritton at which the whole job was handed to Fosters with 
Wilson nominated as overseer. Crompton was to be retired.81 
Stern’s role in the events in June/July was significant and led eventually to a 
landship being designed and constructed by Fosters. In undated draft evidence, 
prepared by Wilson for the Royal Commission, reference is made to a probing 
discussion in which Stern asked Wilson whether he would prefer to work with Tritton 
or Crompton. Wilson informed Stern that if Tritton and he were put on the job “we 
would soon produce a machine that would do something.”82 Stern did not appear 
before the Royal Commission as he was not a claimant. He did, however, give 
evidence to Churchill’s Tank Awards Committee in 1918 and this confirmed his lack of 
respect for Crompton.83  After the war Stern wrote of his experiences as a “tank 
pioneer” but his style of writing does not lend itself to the determination of reliable 
detail and his discussion with Wilson, which presumably took place early in July 1915, 
is not mentioned.84 Therefore while Tritton’s evidence is not verified by Stern, it would 
appear Stern was seeking ammunition from Wilson to use against Crompton. His 
probing was successful and assisted the case for excluding Crompton from the 
development process and appointing Tritton and Wilson to produce an experimental 
machine.  
Stern therefore played a vital role in the fortunate combination of factors leading to 
the development of the tank. By contrast, events also emphasise the poor 
management of the process by d’Eyncourt who failed lamentably to check the illusory 
progress claimed by Crompton. As late as 12 June d’Eyncourt had written to Crompton 
thanking him for his Progress Report which “is very clear and gives an excellent 
account of the present position”.85 With misplaced confidence, d’Eyncourt sent a copy 
 
80 Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, Stern Papers, Stern1/6/33, Tritton to d’Eyncourt, 27 July 
1915. 
81 National Archives, Royal Commission on Awards to Inventors, 21 October 1919, examination of 
Tritton by Russell, answer to question 2550. 
82 National Archives, T173/776 Royal Commission on Awards to Inventors, 21 October 1919, 
comments by Russell, Wilson’s Counsel, to Chairman of Commission, p. 138; Tank Museum, Walter 
Wilson Papers, draft proof of evidence for Royal Commission (not included in introductory 
examination by his barrister on 21 October 1919). 
83 National Archives, MUN5/394 Tank Awards Committee, 10 October 1918, evidence of Stern, p. 6. 
84 Stern, Tanks, passim. 
85 Tank Museum, 069.01(41) Crompton, d’Eyncourt to Crompton, 12 June 1915. 
 91 
of the Progress Report to Churchill. The previous week d’Eyncourt had written to the 
Admiralty Secretary stating: 
construction of these “Landships” has been in the development stage, but 
the design has now practically been settled. Considerable progress has 
been made and the matter was recently explained by D.N.C. to the present 
First Lord who approved verbally of the work being continued on the lines 
already approved.86 
D’Eyncourt was not in control of events. Pressure from Sueter, Stern and later from 
Tritton, eventually convinced him that fundamental change was required if exposure 
of his lack of progress was to be avoided. His ambition for an in-house solution had 
failed: external assistance was required. 
Probing and directing by Sueter and Stern thus led to the appointment of an 
experienced engineering company to design and construct a tracked armoured 
vehicle. Fortunately, an experienced and talented engineer was given the 
responsibility of overseeing their work, though Stern would undoubtedly have been 
aware that Wilson’s role would be more extensive than supervision. There is little 
doubt that Stern played a major contribution in pulling d’Eyncourt’s project out of the 
fire. However, the first seven months of 1915 had yielded no significant progress in 
securing the machine-gun destroyer so badly needed. Up to that time, 9 May, at 
Aubers Ridge, was the costliest day in terms of casualties for the British Army.87 The 
ill-planned or under-equipped spring offensives emphasised the need for innovation 
or limited activity. French allies sought unreserved aggression.88 
The first task facing Tritton as he returned to Lincoln early in August was not to 
produce a war-winning machine, rather a face-saving machine. The face to be saved 
was not his own but that of d’Eyncourt, a man who had allowed the sands of time to 
slip through his fingers and would, a bare thirteen months later, unscrupulously deprive 
Wilson and himself of the tributes they so richly deserved for producing not just an 
experimental machine for show, but, in addition, a model capable of undertaking the 
tasks notified to them by the Landships Committee. As such, they made a major 
contribution to the strengthening of offensive operations and to demoralising elements 
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of the German army.89 The questions were, however, how long would design take and 
when would it be possible to put the machine into production and train prospective 
crews. Furthermore, how successfully would it undertake the envisaged roles? Clearly 
no machines could be produced in time to help scale down casualties in any remaining 
autumn offensives in 1915, but was it possible to provide an effective antidote to 
machine-guns for the start of the 1916 fighting season? It should be borne in mind that 
the greater the delay, the greater the sophistication of German defensive 
arrangements. Realistically, there was no possibility of a machine being designed and 
developed within the lifespan of the elementary defences existing at the time the 
landship was envisaged. In these circumstances, the alternative approach of blasting 
a way through with artillery was understandable and appropriate. However, artillery 
was on its own development path and by July 1916 had not reached the necessary 
level of quantity, type and reliability of ammunition and degree of sophistication of 
operational techniques required to destroy or neutralise defences in order to render 
success possible.90 
As Tritton prepared Foster’s staff to undertake the new job and Wilson endeavoured 
to clear up outstanding work in order to join Tritton, Swinton was making preparations 
for resolving staff and organisational issues necessary to accompany a successful 
outcome to the design work at Lincoln and subsequent manufacture. He must have 
reflected on the pace exhibited by the project since his letter to GHQ some three 
months earlier. In May he had become aware that the handling of press reporting was 
to be changed and assumed, correctly, that his role as Eyewitness was coming to an 
end.91 Since the confirmation of his assumption and his approach to GHQ occurred 
on the same day it seems likely that the two issues were connected.92 His final seed 
took the form of a memorandum to Sir John French, on “The Necessity for Machine-
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gun Destroyers”.93 The BEF had set up an Inventions Committee and when this body 
supported Swinton’s proposal, French addressed an appropriate memorandum to the 
War Office.94  
Most probably as a result of the loosening of tongues following Churchill’s departure 
from the Admiralty, or confusion between the trial of the bridge-layer and the work of 
the Landships Committee, the involvement of the Admiralty in armoured vehicle 
experimentation had become known at the War Office before receipt of French’s 
memorandum late in June. The origin of the “leak” is not known, though “Winston’s 
Circus” was not popular at the Admiralty and there is therefore no shortage of 
suspects. Major-General Charles Callwell, Director of Military Operations, heard of 
“the caterpillars” through a member of his staff whom he discreetly calls Z. Apparently 
in May 1915, Z told Callwell “I’ve been hearing about the caterpillars, sir”.95 Callwell 
later claimed that the General Staff had been unaware of Swinton’s proposals in late 
1914/early 1915 and that his projects had been turned down by “a technical branch to 
which he had unfortunately, referred them”. Callwell described the value of the 
caterpillars as “incontestable ever since trench warfare became the order of the day”.96 
There is no reason to doubt Callwell’s claim of ignorance concerning the test of the 
Holt Tractor and associated matters, but knowledge had not been limited to some 
small technical branch. Kitchener and Von Donop were involved. Callwell’s excuse 
simply painted the Army Council in an even less satisfactory light, since it said little for 
organisation or management that a proposal, later described as of great importance, 
was unknown by all at a senior level.  
By the time Swinton returned to London, wheels were already beginning to turn. 
The issue was no longer one simply of the merits of a scheme put forward by relatively 
junior officers. It had acquired the additional spice of inter-service rivalry. The Third 
Sea Lord, Tudor-Tudor, replied to a probing approach from Scott-Moncrieff on 30 May, 
informing the General that they had eighteen landships on order, the first likely to “be 
ready in about a month”. D’Eyncourt would have been delighted had this timing been 
realistic, but it is likely Tudor’s exaggeration served to increase concern that the army 
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hierarchy might be seen in an even poorer light compared to their sea-faring 
colleagues. Tudor sprinkled further salt on the General’s tail by pointing out, somewhat 
more truthfully, that “this is essentially a war of machines and machines and armour 
protection hardly appear to have been utilised to any great extent on shore as yet.”97 
The Sea Lords and new First Lord, Arthur Balfour, were undoubtedly pleased by 
the army’s involvement since it would further the ambitions of most of the Sea Lords 
to off-load the range of non-naval projects developed under Churchill.98 For their part, 
the War Office was prepared to accept various elements of “Winston’s Circus”. It was 
also anxious to retain the services of Admiralty personnel engaged on the Landships 
Committee. With the agreement of the Admiralty, a new Joint Committee was formed 
chaired by Scott-Moncrieff. The former Landships Committee was retained as a 
Working Party for the Joint Committee and for practical purposes therefore continued 
much as when under Admiralty “control”. 
The early advantage of army participation was the provision of elements of the 
military specification for the machine. It could be argued that only at this stage was the 
misdirection of Hankey’s Boxing Day Memorandum and Churchill’s notes to Asquith 
and Sueter largely eliminated. With the pending expiry of Crompton’s contract and the 
coupling of Stern to d’Eyncourt as an enforcer, the project was provided with the drive 
previously in short supply. By July the pieces were beginning to fall into place in a way 
that promised more rapid and genuine progress in the development of fighting 
vehicles.  
Matters were assisted considerably by the success of Hankey in securing the 
temporary appointment of Swinton as cover at the CID during his visit to Gallipoli.99 
Swinton’s occupation of the influential position of Secretary to the Dardanelles 
Committee provided a key to most doors and he lost no time in visiting d’Eyncourt to 
ascertain the exact position at the Admiralty. Leaving d’Eyncourt to resolve the 
engineering difficulties, Swinton addressed “the vexed subject of Departmental 
responsibilities”, obtaining the agreement of Asquith to call an Inter-Departmental 
Conference.100  
 
97 National Archives, T173/34B, Tudor-Tudor to Scott-Moncrieff, 30 May 1915. 
98 Sueter, Evolution of the Tank, pp. 244-245; National Archives, ADM1/8530/230, passim. 
99 Stephen Roskill, Hankey: Man of Secrets (London, Collins, 1970) p. 205. 
100 Swinton, Eyewitness, pp. 169-170. 
 95 
The role of the ad-hoc Conference was significant, since it established the relative 
roles of the Admiralty, War Office and Ministry of Munitions in the development of 
armoured vehicles. The War Office was to convey its requirements for armament, type 
of machine and protection required to the Landships Committee which would continue 
its experimental work of design and construction, “as far as is desirable”, following 
which it would hand over the work to the Ministry of Munitions. A naval unit, 20 
Squadron, would be retained and expanded under the Landships Committee and 
Trench Warfare Department of the Ministry to provide necessary labour and logistical 
support.101  
Swinton is to be commended for the work he undertook during the period following 
his return to the CID, though, as will later be shown, he failed to attempt the cutting of 
corners that might have made the new machines available for the commencement of 
the 1916 Somme offensives. It was not appreciated at the time, but the 
compartmentalisation of work between the army, navy and Ministry failed to address 
one particular set of engineering and design issues that would impact significantly on 
early operations by tanks. 
The first half of 1915 passed with no tangible progress in the development of an off-
road fighting vehicle. Militarily, the position on the Western Front remained 
unsatisfactory. Throughout 1915, chinks of success from operations were outweighed 
by failures, particularly at Aubers Ridge and Loos.102  The position was no more 
satisfactory at Gallipoli, where initial naval and military assaults had failed. On the 
home front, security was threatened from the air, Zeppelins targeting London from 
May 1915. 103  Conscription was on the political agenda, a preparatory National 
Registration Bill being laid before Parliament on 5 July.104 
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The Landships Committee’s slumbers were about to be disturbed. The army’s 
interest in armoured vehicles would result in an expectation that the Committee would 
play a meaningful role in the war. The disturbance was magnified by the activities of 
Swinton, Sueter and Stern. Swinton’s contribution was passive, his arrival in 
d’Eyncourt’s office simply underlined the military and political interest in what hitherto 
had been a secret, exclusively naval project.105  Upon the departure of Churchill, 
d’Eyncourt might have expected the project to be wound up. Yet, within a few weeks, 
the situation had changed from a part-time project, involving little effort or concern on 
d’Eyncourt’s part, to a significant source of activity and point of military and political 
interest. Bearing in mind his Committee’s lack of progress, this was deeply concerning 
to d’Eyncourt. Stern was directly under d’Eyncourt’s control, his determination and 
insight were valuable compensation for the lack of such qualities in d’Eyncourt and he 
posed no threat of criticism that could reveal the ineffective management of the 
Committee. Sueter on the other hand occupied a senior position and was not 
answerable to d’Eyncourt: he and his staff, particularly Boothby, did pose a threat to 
the spread of information on under-achievement beyond the confines of the 
Committee. As established by cross-examination of Churchill in 1919, by June 1915 
all avenues that the Landships Committee had been exploring had been 
abandoned.106 
On 1 July Sueter had reached an agreement with d’Eyncourt that work on the 
articulated landship would be discontinued in favour of a single unit. However, shortly 
thereafter it was established that Crompton’s work comprised little more than 
sketches. Conditions were therefore favourable for the receipt by d’Eyncourt of advice 
from Stern that the design and development of the landship should be passed to 
Fosters. 
Stern’s important influence on events had commenced with the circulation of the 
agenda for the Landships Committee on 8 June. This included a paper under 
d’Eyncourt’s name, though almost certainly written by Stern, aimed at putting the 
Committee on “a sound business footing”.107 The paper listed Crompton’s duties as 
preparation of reports, keeping of minutes, expenditure of money and taking of 
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decisions on new ideas/inventions “before they are put before the Committee”. These 
responsibilities were reduced to the single task of working on the prototype, with Stern 
appointed as Secretary and given the responsibility of presenting any suggested ideas 
by other parties direct to the Committee, by-passing Crompton. Crompton was far from 
happy with such changes, disputed some of Stern’s statements and sought 
clarification of the roles of different parties.108 Events were shortly to show that he was 
unable to take any steps to change the unsatisfactory state of the project and the 
termination of his involvement in it. He and Le Gros would later spend much time 
seeking to persuade the Royal Commission of the value of their work, but the 
Commission would tactfully conclude that they were employed for six months as 
consulting engineers: 
In discharge of their duties they worked loyally and very hard, and no doubt 
supplied the Committee with useful data and sound advice. But they did not, 
in the result, invent or discover the special features subsequently 
incorporated in the Tanks”.109 
In consequence, no award was made to Crompton or Le Gros, but they might 
nevertheless have felt satisfied with the verdict as a less diplomatic body might have 
concluded that they were far from the dynamic duo urgently required to produce a 
machine capable of raising national morale and that, not only did they fail to discover 
any special features, but spent valuable time exploring the false trail of articulation for 
a machine which, if constructed, would have been more akin to an armoured personnel 
carrier than a tank.  
Stern’s meeting with Wilson represented an important step in the outsourcing of 
design work to Fosters. It is recorded that Wilson had commented to Stern along the 
lines of “If you leave the matter to Tritton and myself we can produce a machine pretty 
quickly”.110 Such a comment would have been manna from heaven for a secretary 
keen to draw a line under Crompton and his articulated machine. Nevertheless, the 
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decision rested with d’Eyncourt. Initially, d’Eyncourt attempted to contain Foster’s 
involvement to that of contractor. It took another fortnight and conclusive proof, in the 
form of Crompton’s failure to prepare drawings for even one section of his articulated 
units, for d’Eyncourt to appreciate that he had no option but to pass both design and 
construction to Fosters.111 It seems likely that the threat of failure outweighed any 
aspirations by d’Eyncourt to maintain operations in-house, a tactic, had it been 
successful, that would have enabled him to construct a defensible case for claiming 
substantial credit.  
The passing of design and construction responsibilities to Tritton and Wilson 
marked a transformation in the Landship project. Little Willie was constructed over the 
next two months and the more difficult task was completed of progressing from a 
flawed machine, having unreliable tracks, poor climbing ability and high centre of 
gravity, to a machine capable of undertaking the tasks specified. Limited military 
operational requirements were notified to Fosters on 26 August.112 It would have been 
during the processes leading up to the test of Little Willie that Tritton and Wilson 
demonstrated their practical inventiveness.113 Most significantly, an improved track 
was designed by 22 September. The commencement of the second task had not 
awaited the completion of the first but started on 24 August when d’Eyncourt had given 
the clearance for Tritton and Wilson to proceed with their design concept. Churchill’s 
requirement that design and construction should take place concurrently was at last 
being observed. On 21 September the general outline of a different model was 
presented to d’Eyncourt for authority to commence construction. On 29 September, a 
wooden mock-up was displayed at the Inter-Departmental Conference, which granted 
authority for construction.114 Problems in securing materials caused a month’s delay, 
construction commencing on 28 October.115 The machine was ready to run under its 
own power on 6 January 1916. Trials were conducted, firstly, close to Lincoln, then, 
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on 29 January and 2 February, “national” trials at Hatfield. These were held to be 
successful. 
To summarise, the most significant events in the quest by Churchill to develop a 
landship occurred at the beginning and end of the period. In January 1915, Churchill 
became an advocate of armoured warfare, but failed to recognise the main military 
requirement, to stem infantry casualties and assist in overcoming defence by machine-
guns and wire. In June 1915, the army’s interest in armoured machines was revived 
by Swinton’s advocacy and the “leak” of information concerning naval activity in such 
matters.  
Despite the fact that Churchill did not make a claim for financial reward, nor was he 
entitled to do so, the Royal Commission felt it proper to record him a tribute: 
In the first place the Committee desire to record their view that it was 
primarily due to the receptivity, courage and driving force of the Rt. 
Honourable Winston Spencer Churchill that the general idea of the user of 
such an instrument of warfare as the ‘Tank’ was converted into a practical 
shape.116  
Yet was Churchill deserving of such a generous tribute? His efforts were praiseworthy, 
but to what degree were those efforts directly responsible for the emergence of the 
tank? Several authors have expressed reservations on the matter, notably Prior in 
Churchill’s World Crisis as History. A less generous, though more accurate, 
assessment of events would surely credit Churchill for recognition of the value of 
armoured vehicles and for setting up an organisation to secure their development. 
However, Churchill’s “team” did not succeed. Success was secured by an external 
company, “overseen” by a member of his team, whose talents had neither been 
recognised nor properly utilised under d’Eyncourt’s management.117  
Throughout the time the tank was being designed and constructed Churchill was 
no longer involved in the project, having firstly moved to the Duchy of Lancaster then 
to the BEF.118 This course of events was to prove problematic for Churchill when he 
eventually gained readmittance to government in 1917 and would lead him into a 
somewhat reprehensible series of actions designed to distort events and to inflate and 
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misrepresent his role and that of d’Eyncourt and his Committee. This had the inevitable 
consequence of denying or minimising the part played by Tritton and Wilson. There 
appears to be no recognition in the scholarship of Churchill’s prolonged and 
censurable campaign, which represented an extension of earlier efforts by d’Eyncourt, 
commenced in September 1916, with the same objectives. The benefit to Churchill 
and d’Eyncourt is plain, the enhancement of their reputations by basking directly in the 
glory of a new iconic weapon that was believed to have made a significant contribution 
to winning the war and had become a national talisman during dark, mid-war days.119 
Churchill’s behaviour is perhaps more understandable, though still inexcusable. He 
would have been sensitive to the possibility of accusations of mismanagement 
following hard on the heels of the Dardanelles episode, in which he may at times have 
been judged too harshly. 120  On the other hand d’Eyncourt’s misrepresentations 
possess no mitigating considerations, indeed, his record is tainted by financial 
objectives.121 
Prior hints at Churchill’s deception in claiming a degree of vision in 1914 and early 
1915 that he had not possessed. Examination of the evidence presented to the Royal 
Commission, the correspondence of Tritton and Bacon and Churchill’s preparation for 
the Inquiry in 1919 show conclusively that Prior’s suspicions were justified. 
Furthermore, examination shows that the duration and intensity of Churchill’s 
perjurious “campaign” was greater than Prior or others appear to have realised. 
Churchill’s determination to direct an unjustified proportion of the credit for the concept 
and development of the tank onto himself and the Committee he established, 
seemingly knew no bounds. 
Tritton and Wilson posed a threat to Churchill’s aspirations in the sense that the 
greater the recognition of their inventiveness, the more likely it was that questions 
might be asked along the lines of “exactly what did d’Eyncourt and the Landships 
Committee achieve?” Churchill’s awareness of this threat is shown by his visit to the 
Commission about a fortnight before the start of its proceedings. Churchill pointed out: 
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in the case of Sir Eustace Tennyson d’Eyncourt, he was an official, who as 
Chief Naval Designer, was called upon to supervise the design and 
construction of the Tanks when it had been determined that some instrument 
of war of this kind should be used, and that if the Commission, without any 
explanation of their action, were merely to make some very small award to 
him, or to refuse to make him an award at all on the ground there was no 
user of any invention of his, and at the same time were to award, say, ten or 
twenty thousand pounds to Tritton and Wilson, the public would undoubtedly 
be ready to believe that Sir Eustace D’Eyncourt, when called upon to design 
a tank had failed to do so, and had been forced to have resource to an 
outsider and his previous reputation would undoubtedly suffer very severely. 
I said I would put this point before the Chairman.122  
Ostensibly, the reason for Churchill’s visit to the Commission was to determine 
whether the Commission wished him to attend to present evidence he had earlier 
submitted as a statement.123 The nature of his discussion shows, however, that he 
had an underlying reason for speaking as he did, namely a political message for the 
Commission to the effect that the situation he outlined, a reasonable representation of 
the truth, could be embarrassing for the government. In the event, in spite of the lack 
of any inventive contribution by d’Eyncourt and his blatant, unsuccessful efforts to 
purloin the inventive achievements of others, the Commission did award him 
£1,000.124 In framing their recommendations the Commissioners stated: 
This is a claim with regard to which we have found much difficulty. This 
claimant undoubtedly rendered exceptional services as Chairman of….the 
DNC Committee in the selection and elimination of the various forms of 
design proposed….particularly with armament; and he was acting outside his 
duties as Director of Naval Construction. On the other hand he was acting 
within his duties as Chairman of the Committee in question, and further it was 
mobility rather than armament which formed the principal inventive feature of 
the Tanks. On the whole we recommend the award of a sum of £1,000.125 
The Commission was less inclined to repeat its generosity in 1920 when d’Eyncourt 
attempted a second bite of the cherry in conjunction with Skeens.126 Skeens received 
an award, but d’Eyncourt did not “The Commission are not prepared to recommend 
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that any remuneration should be allowed to Sir Eustace Tennyson d’Eyncourt”.127 
Throughout both Inquiries, the Chairman exhibited a sound understanding of the 
issues and motivation of claimants. The only criticisms that might be made of 
Commission recommendations are that the sum awarded to Tritton and Wilson was 
inadequate, that no sum should have been awarded to d’Eyncourt and that the 
question mark raised over the possibility of Wilson benefitting from observation of work 
by Nesfield and MacFie should have been exposed as failing to fit a comparison 
between their respective designs. 128  It seems likely that underlying political 
considerations explain the first two aberrations. 
The Royal Commission invited criticism of its objectivity by placing Churchill, a non-
claimant, in the vanguard of its report. The wording of the Commission’s 
recommendations suggests members of the Commission were split over whether or 
how much to award d’Eyncourt. Perhaps the excessive praise for Churchill 
represented a form of sop, compensation for not being able to comply to a greater 
degree with his wishes. To some extent Churchill may have shot himself in the foot by 
the nature of his evidence, since at times it was clear he was not telling the truth. 
Notably, for matters that were inconvenient, Churchill was inclined to have no memory 
of people or events or to have no technical or mechanical knowledge. The outstanding 
example of this was his denial of having met Tritton early in the war, when he had in 
fact met him twice, one in memorable circumstances, late on 20 February 1915 whilst 
Churchill was in his sickbed.129 It was difficult to maintain a false stance in the face of 
sustained cross-examination by a range of KCs representing a variety of different 
interests and Churchill made one slip that would not have gone unnoticed by the 
Commissioners. In response to cross-examination about Little Willie and the design of 
the all-round track Churchill was asked and replied:  
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Did Sir Tennyson d’Eyncourt tell you that the difficulty had been overcome 
by the device of Sir William Tritton and Major Wilson of the All Round Track?- 
No, he did not tell me that, and I do not believe it is true anyhow.130 
Delighted by Churchill’s faux-pas, Russell dismantled the flimsy defence Churchill had 
maintained over the bulk of the day’s hearing by the simple comment “You are now 
posing as an expert”.131 
Yet, notwithstanding the lack of any evidence of inventiveness on the part of 
d’Eyncourt, the Commission made an award to him that complied to a degree with 
Churchill’s representations in advance of the Inquiry. More significantly, the 
Commission did partially rectify the injustice to Tritton and Wilson of the downgrading 
of their design role caused by misleading notices in the press shortly after 15 
September 1916: 
It is to these two claimants that we attribute the credit of designing and 
producing in a concrete practical shape the novel and efficient engine of 
warfare known as the “Tank”; and it is to them that in our judgment by far the 
largest award should be made, though allowance has to be made for the 
special opportunities afforded to Major Wilson by his official position.132 
In their tributes to Wilson the Commissioners appear to have been restrained either 
by representations of the Attorney-General for economy or those of other claimants, 
Nesfield and MacFie, whose ideas incorporated a projecting track which they alleged 
Wilson might have observed on a model they had prepared and found useful in his 
design.133 It is not possible to tell to what degree these factors may have devalued the 
award to Wilson.134 It is significant that the Commission gives no indication of what 
“the special opportunities” were. Initially, much of Wilson’s time was spent attaching 
3-pounder guns to RNAS vehicles. Later he worked at Burton-on-Trent where, under 
his supervision, singly or coupled together, “Bullock tractors were being tested in a 
borrowed field”. 135  It is difficult to see how this work could have provided any 
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assistance to Wilson in designing the Mark I tank. The experiments being undertaken 
on behalf of Crompton represented an experimental ‘cul-de-sac’, work which did not 
impress Wilson.136 Similarly, from their observations on Crompton’s claim, the work at 
Burton did not impress the Commissioners and it is difficult to accept that this was a 
genuine reason for scaling down Wilson’s award.  
Bearing in mind Wilson’s talent had not been recognised by d’Eyncourt and that he 
had been attached to Fosters merely as overseer rather than designer, there would 
appear to have been a stronger case for rewarding his initiative and cooperation for 
work beyond the terms of his “job description” rather than penalising him for a spurious 
advantage. There is no doubt that in relation to the cost of the tanks and value of 
contracts, the sum awarded to the inventors was small. It formed only some 30% of 
that recommended by the Tank Awards Committee some eleven months earlier.137  
The Commissioners concluded that Nesfield and MacFie’s ideas “were of 
considerable value” but there was “no conclusive proof that they were brought to the 
notice of or communicated either directly or indirectly to the actual designers of the 
tank”.138 They were awarded £500 each. This seems to resolve the matter rather 
unsatisfactorily. Wilson’s solution was fundamentally different to Nesfield’s model, on 
which the track did not wrap round the body to provide support and prevent track sag, 
relying instead on specially constructed supports to either side.139 Nesfield’s form of 
construction would have increased the width of the machine considerably, a fact 
disguised by narrow tracks on the model. In order to achieve an overall 9ft. rail 
transportation width, the internal space of Nesfield’s tank would have been little more 
than half that of the Mark I.140 Furthermore, though Wilson was a member of the armed 
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forces and was paid for his services, he was not a career soldier. He signed up in 
response to encouragement by his brother, Percy, for patriotic reasons and/or the 
search for adventure.141 He had been in private industry for the preceding sixteen 
years.  
Without doubt, Tritton and Wilson had transformed the quest for an armoured 
vehicle, fully accomplishing their set task in five months. They not only succeeded 
where d’Eyncourt’s efforts had failed, they did so in a shorter period and achieved a 
more efficient machine than would later be designed by Germany or France, whose 
unimaginatively designed heavy/medium tanks were similar to Little Willie, armoured 
boxes on tracks. Subject to efficiency of administrative, manufacturing and personnel 
issues, the project that had started so slowly was, by late 1915, in a position to provide 
an additional dimension to offensive military tactics. Participation by Wilson and Tritton 
was by no means over, they would retain major roles in the design and manufacture 
of armoured vehicles for the remainder of the war. However, for the next few months 
the baton would pass to others to prepare the machines and personnel for introducing 
tanks to the battlefield. 
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Chapter Three – 1916: Limited Awareness of the March of Time 
 
In 1916, the issues of greatest national significance as the tank moved from 
experimental model to accepted weapons system were the speed with which it 
could be made available to assist offensives and the effectiveness of design work 
and preparations in providing machines capable of operating reliably and 
effectively. Time would be no less important in 1916 than in 1915. Indeed, time 
would be more important, since the anticipated “grand offensive” by the nation’s 
greatly enlarged army was much closer. The German attack at Verdun increased 
pressure on Britain for early action.1 
Neither the army nor Landships Committee would prove capable of inserting 
the burst of pace required for tanks to participate at the outset of 1916 offensives. 
This was not for want of opportunities. Delays reflected the nature of society, 
excessive respect for seniority and an absence of a targeted programme. Thus, 
there was no pressure on or delegation of responsibilities to Scott-Moncrieff, 
Swinton or the Joint Committee, no identification of critical dates for progress: 
key decisions would follow “correct” procedures. No measures were taken to cut 
corners. It was left to Haig to associate the progress of the tank with the start of 
the summer offensives.2 By then it was “Too Late” for such a connection to be 
effective. 
Swinton was aware of the importance of time but, as with the sowing of his five 
seeds, once again failed to secure a rate of progress fully reflecting the gravity of 
the BEF’s situation. In writing to Scott-Moncrieff to arrange the final Inter-
Departmental Conference of 1915, Swinton had foreshadowed the dire need for 
tanks to counter German defences, “The time factor is even of more importance 
than I thought, and I think it might not be long before the caterpillars may be 
required badly.”3 Later, perhaps emboldened by the success of the Hatfield trials, 
he reminded the War Office of the importance of a “quick” decision: 
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War, Military Operations France and Belgium, 1916, vol. I (London, Macmillan, 1932), pp. 41-
51; J. P. Harris, Douglas Haig and the First World War (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2008), pp. 208-210. 
2 Sheffield and Bourne (eds.), Douglas Haig: War Diaries, 14 April 1916, p. 184. 
3 National Archives, CAB17/120B, Swinton to Scott-Moncrieff, 18 December 1915. 
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the essence of the matter now appears to lie in speed of production….it 
is eight days since members of the Army Council and representative 
officers from France witnessed the trial of the machine, and that this 
period, translated into out-put of machines….would correspond to an 
outturn of something like 20 machines.4 
Swinton’s warning was to the point, advancement of the order might have 
enabled additional tanks to have been fielded on 15 September.5 However, his 
selection of this period was inappropriate, since it was thirty-six days from the 
date that Mother had first run under her own steam, forty-nine days since the 
December Inter-Departmental Conference and seventy days since Tritton’s 
modified track had been tested on ‘Little Willie’. This largely successful test 
marked the point at which the landship project moved from a position of 
confidence in design to possession of significant evidence of success.6 This was 
a transitional point at which the cutting of corners became justified. Indeed, given 
the contextual circumstances, it was the point at which the nation might 
reasonably have expected enterprising moves to advance the project. As 
Churchill had said to Asquith in January 1915, “the worst that can happen is the 
loss of a small amount of money”.7 
 Documents show d’Eyncourt also became aware of potential consequences 
of the ticking clock, though not as early as he later sought to portray. In letters to 
Churchill and Kitchener and in a report to the Admiralty Board he claimed to have 
advocated the placing of an order for machines for training purposes to prevent 
delay, “I begged them to order ten for training purposes two months ago”.8 
D’Eyncourt’s observations cannot be relied upon. There is no evidence of a 
written appeal and the only opportunity for a verbal appeal would have been at 
the Inter-Departmental Conference on 24 December 1915. Neither the minutes 
of that conference nor Swinton’s extensive notes refer to such a plea.9 D’Eyncourt 
did later write to Kitchener offering beguiling benefits of early supply and, 
thereafter, modifications to provide improved machines: 
 
4 National Archives, MUN5/394, Swinton to War Office, 11 February 1916. 
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7 National Archives, MUN5/394, Churchill to Asquith, 5 January 1915.  
8 National Archives, ADM116/1339, d’Eyncourt to Churchill, 14 February 1916. 
9 National Archives, MUN4/4979, Swinton notes of Inter-Departmental Conference on 24 
December 1915 and MUN5/394, agenda and minutes of Inter-Departmental Conference, 24 
December 1915, passim. 
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it will take 3 or 4 months to produce them in sufficient numbers…. While 
these are being manufactured we could proceed with the design and 
production of more formidable machines of improved type with such 
modifications as your Lordship might approve.10  
Since mid-1915 the army had accepted landships as potentially useful. It was 
moreover particularly helpful that French had requested such technology be 
examined.11 Nevertheless, the caution of those on or directly answerable to the 
Army Council negated the value of the speed with which Tritton and Wilson 
undertook their work. The respect for rank and “correct” procedure is illustrated 
by the minutes of the Inter-Departmental Conference: 
That if and when the Army Council, after inspection of the final 
experimental Land Cruiser decide that such machines are required for 
the army….the provision of these machines shall be entrusted to a 
small Executive Supply Committee….and shall come into existence as 
soon as the decision of the Army Council is made.12 
Wedded to justifying or protecting its own position, the hierarchy was failing to 
apply the principle underlying its formation a decade earlier. The Army Council 
was not providing brains, rather it was placing progress on a leash. To use a 
tactical analogy, the decision to advance should have been delegated to the man 
on the spot. Although the calibre of the two principal forward “commanders”, 
Scott-Moncrieff and d’Eyncourt, does not inspire confidence, if forced to make a 
decision, they would in all probability have been guided by the engineers. Tritton 
and Wilson were best placed to judge both the readiness of their “invention” and 
steps necessary to secure rapid production. Scott-Moncrieff should have had the 
engineers in his pocket, enabling him to launch production as soon as they 
advised it was opportune to do so. 
Between August 1914 and December 1915, the BEF incurred some 375,000 
battle casualties. So far as experimentation with armoured vehicles was 
concerned, the army was “on-side” by the second half of 1915. It says little for 
senior management that, following this development of policy, no steps were 
 
10 National Maritime Museum, d’Eyncourt Papers, DEY42, d’Eyncourt to Kitchener, 30 January 
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taken to expedite the production of a machine that might have stemmed 
prospective casualties in 1916.13  
D’Eyncourt’s sycophantic intervention with Kitchener did not assist the 
Ministry, Swinton or BEF. Firstly, delivery of tanks took twice as long as 
d’Eyncourt had forecast to Kitchener and, secondly, the Ministry would prove 
sensitive to losing its exclusive right to modify design. 14  Following an April 
meeting with Haig, Swinton set out Ministry and tank erectors’ stalls. He 
anticipated the output of some “practically finished machines” by 1 July. These 
would enable a meaningful level of driver training to be commenced. All 150 
machines would become available by 1 August by which time some would 
already have been shipped to France and seventy-five crews would have been 
fully trained.15 He concluded, unwisely, “I am afraid this letter does not contain 
what you would have liked to hear, but it is the cold truth and shows the real 
situation.”16 His letter did not contain the cold truth but an optimistic timetable 
from Stern. Two months later he was forced to adjust his position and explain to 
GHQ that only one new tank had been delivered to Elvedon since his earlier letter. 
Without explanation, he still forecast that the full 150 tanks in the extended first 
order would be delivered, approximately, by the “beginning of September”.17 
Predictably, on 1 July he found it necessary to explain the reasons for a further 
delay of about a fortnight.18 On 16 August yet a further delay was reported, this 
time owing to problems with shipping.19  
The underlying difficulty was that manufacturing forecasts were not realistic. A 
general problem existed nationally as firms vied for contracts. In this instance, no 
specific reasons are given but an explanation would almost certainly have 
included delays in delivery of components to the two tank-erecting companies. 
All problems would not necessarily have come to light, but Swinton’s reference 
to “substantially completed machines” was undoubtedly a veiled reference to 
delays in the arrival of sponsons.20  This delay led to the use of incomplete 
 
13 James E. Edmonds, Military Operations France and Belgium, 1915, vol. II (London, 
Macmillan, 1936), pp. 391-393. 
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15 National Archives, MUN4/2806, Swinton to Butler, 26 April 1916. 
16 Ibid.  
17 National Archives, MUN4/2806, Swinton to Butler, 14 June 1916. 
18 National Archives, WO158/833, Swinton to Burnett-Stuart, 1 July 1916. 
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20 National Archives, MUN4/2806, 6 June 1916, schedule of forecast delivery dates without 
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machines for driver and other training, a practice which caused unforeseen 
problems since stresses incurred during training led to slight contortions and 
therefore misalignment of the bolt holes on the frames of the tanks with those 
pre-positioned on the sponsons.21 
The third occasion on which d’Eyncourt claimed to have forewarned of the 
need for early manufacture for training purposes was in a report requested by the 
Admiralty following press coverage immediately after commencement of the 
Battle of Flers/Courcelette:  
as the design developed I had two or three months before strongly 
recommended at a meeting held at the Imperial Defence Committee’s 
rooms under the presidency of Sir G. Scott-Moncrieff, that 10 or 20 
machines should be ordered. It was, however, decided to wait results 
of complete trials of the first machine.22 
Press coverage of the tanks heralded a scramble for prestige, honours and cash 
rewards that was pursued most energetically between September 1916 and 
November 1920. It should be noted that in the seven months between his letters 
to Churchill and Kitchener and his report to the Board of Admiralty, d’Eyncourt 
doubled the number of training tanks he professed to have sought in advance of 
the army’s formal acceptance of the machine. His claimed prescience was also 
advanced by one/two months. The Inter-Departmental Committee met only twice 
under the chairmanship of Scott-Moncrieff, in August and December 1915. The 
design of Mother had not been completed by August so it could only have been 
on Christmas Eve that d’Eyncourt could have made such a plea. His claim was 
made in his letter to Kitchener, 30 January 1916. It is therefore clear that he was 
inflating a period of one month six days to “two or three months”. The likelihood 
is that d’Eyncourt’s claim was fabricated, that he had not foreseen the problem of 
training and construction in relation to 1916 offensives and that he had failed to 
comply with Churchill’s advice to act “with all despatch”.23 He also failed to follow 
the spirit of Churchill’s advice to Asquith following receipt of the Boxing Day 
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Memorandum, to conduct experimentation and manufacture “concurrently”.24 
Though impractical, it was the principle of the advice rather than the detail that 
should have been observed, by overlapping of activities. The time for d’Eyncourt 
to have sought early construction was after the successful testing of Tritton’s new 
track on 3 December or at the Inter-Departmental Conference on Christmas Eve 
1915. 
So far as Lloyd George was concerned, he ensured, following a demonstration 
of wire cutting by a Killen-Strait tractor in June 1915, that tank construction would 
come under his wing at Munitions rather than that of Kitchener.25 The transfer of 
the Landships Committee from the Admiralty to the Ministry was to take place 
upon the success of the Landships Committee in producing a satisfactory 
armoured vehicle. Lloyd George played his ownership card on 12 February 
1916.26 Arguably, this was too late for tanks and crews to be ready for summer’s 
“Big Push”. It seems inconceivable that in December 1915 Lloyd George 
remained unaware of the pending successful conclusion of the Landship 
Committee’s work: this was the time when his energies should have been 
deployed to force the pace of production and preparations for renewed offensives 
in 1916. 27  In addition to political connections, Lloyd George and Frances 
Stevenson were associated with Stern socially. Although the first reference to 
Stern comes in Stevenson’s diary entry for 26 July 1916, it is likely their 
association started earlier, perhaps resulting from their shared involvement in the 
early moves towards construction of landships, notably the demonstration of the 
Killen-Strait tractor and Stokes mortar arranged by Stern for 30 June 1915.28 
Unwittingly, come 1 July 1916, Lloyd George’s inactivity ensured his place with 
those he branded “Too Late”. 
In considering the Mark I, it needs to be borne in mind that the initial 
specification stemmed from Churchill’s early 1915 ideas of requirements and 
tactics. From June 1915, when the army joined the project, military requirements 
were outlined tentatively by Scott-Moncrieff to d’Eyncourt. Churchill’s early vision 
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was largely replaced. 29  The recommendations of the Inter-Departmental 
Conferences called by Swinton between August and December 1915 further 
amended and enlarged the changes.30 Nevertheless, Churchill’s influence was 
not entirely purged.31 In compliance with Churchill’s original intentions, aspects 
of the tank’s specification continued to be based on a limited role as a trench-
taking machine. Churchill had envisaged the landship simply breaching enemy 
defences, which were generally shallow and unsophisticated late in 1914. By 
taking and crossing enemy trenches, the landships would pave the way for 
traditional methods of army manoeuvre to be restored. 
This single-use purpose was displaced by the army’s vision of a continuing 
role for tanks as machine-gun destroyers, active amid enemy defences 
strengthened and deepened in the six months following Churchill’s note to 
Asquith.32 However, although the internal space and armament of the proposed 
machines were changed, management did not address the possibility of there 
being consequences for track specification. The explanation for this appears to 
lie in the allocation of a restricted role for the designers in the on-going tank 
project. In the light of later events, it was unfortunate that Tritton and Wilson were 
not present at the first Inter-Departmental Conference.33  
Wilson’s biography and other papers show that Stern had an unfortunate habit 
of taking decisions unsupported by those having the technical knowledge and 
understanding on which decisions should have been based.34 This aspect of his 
management of tank production would impact significantly on the form of 
armoured support provided to the BEF. Stern’s approach was that “any tank is 
better than no tank.”35 Stern would have considered Haig’s comments after Flers 
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to support the priority of numbers over quality.36 Wilson was less doctrinaire, 
allocating greater importance to improvements. Wilson’s son identified this as 
“the point at contention between Stern and my Father.”37 The absence of the 
design engineers from the Inter-Departmental Conference in August 1915 may 
have been an early example of Stern’s inexpert, authoritarian management. 
The performance of the tanks on 15 September 1916 would show that the 
consequences of professional or inter-organisational rivalries could be serious, 
since client and designers were pursuing different paths.38 The initial requirement 
for the machine to travel just fifty miles would result in the specification of tracks 
insufficiently durable to undertake the more demanding usage associated with 
more extensive operations required by the army. It would appear that this issue 
was not sufficiently obvious to d’Eyncourt, a naval architect, for it to have been 
the subject of instruction to Fosters or for it to be covered by any of the subject 
headings at Inter-Departmental Conferences.39  
No justification can be seen for Stern’s lack of respect for Wilson. The problem 
lay in a form of power struggle and perhaps also of social class. The struggle had 
its roots in the hallowed ground of benefit to the nation rather than the customary 
medium of personal advantage. Unfortunately for the army as beneficiary of the 
end product, Stern had the advantage of rank, in the face of which Wilson’s 
outstanding engineering abilities faced an insurmountable obstacle. Wilson was 
responsible for the design of most British tanks during the war, seven of the eight 
models that saw service, estimated at 2545 of the 2745 tanks that were built.40 
He also undertook additional tasks as resident consultant to Metropolitan who 
manufactured over 70% of British wartime tanks.41 Clashes over professional 
issues tend to frequent the pages of memoirs on military or political issues, but 
clashes may surface in other fields and can adversely affect national wellbeing in 
equal measure.  
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As Chairman of the Landships Committee, and coming from a technical 
background, d’Eyncourt bore the greatest responsibility for failing to provide a 
comprehensive, up-to-date briefing for the design engineers. This would have 
significant implications for the army on 15 September, resulting in numerous 
breakdowns before and during the battle, thereby contributing to the lack, or 
limited success, of elements of XIV and III Corps.42 Breakdowns are recorded in 
unit combat reports but they also occurred during training in England and France 
and during movement from ports to forward areas. Swinton does not provide 
details of the problems in England, recording simply that progress “was 
hampered in every direction by the frequent failure of the machines, owing to 
minor defects”.43 In the light of evidence given to the Royal Commission and 
examination of experiences on the Somme, it is reasonable to assume that a 
proportion of these breakdowns were caused by track failure resulting from the 
use of the machines beyond their 50-mile design life.44 
Though not recorded formally in print, the designers’ evidence on the adopted 
50-mile life is consistent with the observations and actions of Stern, who in 
February 1916 was elevated from Secretary of the Landships Committee to Head 
of the Tank Supply Department at the Ministry. Stern’s view was that a tank was 
a one-shot weapon, not to be maintained as permanent equipment but once used 
to be replaced by another tank.45 This point is covered in secondary literature but 
is not examined in sufficient depth, with the result that responsibility for the 
unreliability of the Mark I is neither apportioned appropriately nor explained 
thoroughly. Problems occurred or proliferated because the machines had been 
designed for a “limited operational mileage”.46 These problems were aggravated 
by the fact that no thought was given to the effect on longevity of training mileage, 
before and after shipment to France.47 To make matters worse, odometers were 
not fitted to British tanks until late in the war and therefore no-one could tell 
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exactly what mileage had been undertaken by any particular tank.48 Wilson later 
clarified events by confirming that when the tanks were released for action in 
August/September 1916: 
it was regarded that if the machine once went into action that was all 
that was required of it. There was no attempt in the first machine at 
longevity, but what none of us had our minds on was training….when 
they went overseas ….everything looked all right and I think we were 
all very pleased that we were getting a great deal longer life than what 
we had anticipated. But what in fact happened was, that the rollers had 
cold rolled out.…I think the biggest measurement was 5/8ths of an inch 
longer than when they were originally passed.”49 
Moreover, the mechanical robustness of the initial batch of tanks was not 
threatened simply by the effects of training. In June 1916 Swinton sought to 
convince GHQ that they should place additional orders to prevent the dispersal 
of key workers from Metropolitan and Fosters once the initial tanks had been 
completed. 50  GHQ was not convinced: it sought evidence of suitability for 
participation in mobile exercises before taking such a decision. 51  In 
consequence, Swinton was obliged to arrange an exercise to judge suitability of 
machines through a mock offensive.52 Swinton was less than pleased with this 
requirement which came at a time when he was under pressure to send machines 
to France. The exercise also posed a threat to mechanical condition, though this 
was not fully appreciated by those requiring, organising, participating in or 
observing the manoeuvres. The exercise at Elvedon was eventually held on 21 
July and involved twenty-five tanks.53 Thanks to a special effort by Stern and 
workers from Metropolitan, Swinton would have believed that any damage 
caused by this exercise had been rectified.54 However, evidence given by Wilson 
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and Johnson to the Royal Commission showed this was not the case since 
consequences for the rollers could not have been reversed other than by 
replacement of worn components. 55  It seems inevitable therefore that 
maintenance, conscientiously and enterprisingly arranged by Stern, was, in at 
least one vital respect, superficial. The exercise had robbed the machines of a 
proportion of their limited mileage, a further consequence of senior officers 
“protecting” their positions in the hierarchy and failing to secure appropriate 
engineering advice. 
The shipment of tanks to France commenced less than four weeks after the 
Elvedon exercise. Pressure on the first machines continued on the far side of the 
Channel. In addition to further training, it is widely recorded that they were treated 
akin to a circus act for the benefit of army spectators.56 The first twenty-five 
machines used in the exercise on 21 July would also have been used intensively 
for training at Elvedon/Thetford during late June/August. Furthermore, they would 
have constituted the bulk, probably the entire contingent, shipped to France 
between 20/26 August for C Company.  
Two machines were damaged during unloading at Havre on 26 August and 
two broke down on route to their camp, likely to have been due to track failure, 
though no reasons were recorded. The remainder of C Company’s machines 
were at that time on-board at Avonmouth.57 The machines would have been 
available for increased wear and misuse for about a fortnight. Brough, in charge 
of the tanks in France, sought, unsuccessfully, to protect them from misuse and 
also, unwisely, spoke in favour of delaying their participation in offensives until 
available in substantial numbers. The reward for his efforts was to be declared 
unacceptable to GHQ and to be returned to England as “difficult”.58 Whereas 
some of the first shipment of D Company’s machines were also used for training 
exercise, in the shorter time available they almost certainly operated within their 
design limitations. The second shipment of D Company’s machines had little 
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opportunity for training and were almost immediately sent forward to The Loop, a 
rail hub close to start locations for the battle: usage would not have eaten into 
their planned life cycle to any significant extent.59 Swinton was critical of the 
shortage of time for training, but this may well have protected D Company 
machines from risk of track failure. Pidgeon records that on 1 September the 
Prince of Wales watched C Company tanks training with 56 Division.60 The Prince 
and others were unimpressed that “two of the tanks broke down”. On 8 
September Asquith observed the final D Company exercises before departure to 
The Loop: no breakdowns are mentioned. It is surprising that neither at the time 
nor since has the preponderance of breakdowns been linked with the unit or age 
of the machines. By 14 September all new reserve tanks at GHQ had been 
exchanged for broken-down machines.61 
In view of the scale of failings, the generally critical response to their first action 
on 15 September is understandable and justified. However, a fair allocation of 
responsibility for the failings is absent both from official publications and 
scholarship. The History records: 
Initially, forty-nine were employed, but only thirty-two reached their 
starting point. Five of these were ditched and nine broke down from 
mechanical trouble, while of the remaining eighteen, nine did not catch 
up with the infantry.62 
Campbell provides a similar comment.63 Sheffield believes a lesser number took 
to the field, “Of forty-eight tanks that were ‘runners’ on 15 September, only about 
twenty-one actually got into action”. 64  Johnson explained to the Royal 
Commission that he regarded the 1916 Mark I as a failure and that the future of 
tanks was in the balance as a result of its limited achievements in 1916 and early 
1917.65 Johnson claimed it was generally accepted that operations at Cambrai in 
November 1917 saved the tanks.66  
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Numbers and the nature of problems may vary slightly but the verdict, a serious 
problem of reliability, was clear. This issue was to exercise minds both in France 
and England in September and October and solutions to the problems would be 
addressed both by the modification of components and changes to the design of 
later tanks. It should be borne in mind that Johnson was appearing before the 
Royal Commission not as a claimant but as expert witness for the Treasury, his 
task was to devalue the Mark I tank in the eyes of the Commission and thereby 
encourage Commissioners to recommend a low financial award for inventors. 
Johnson’s evidence, though not incorrect in basic content, was slanted towards 
negativity. Like Wilson, Johnson was not in France on 15 September and 
therefore may not have appreciated the influence of drier conditions on the 
fortunes of tanks on the first day of the Battle of Flers: “I went out five days after 
the First Battle of the Somme on 20th September [sic]”.67  
It should also be borne in mind that Johnson was a 2nd Lieutenant at the time 
and that, regardless of views at lower levels, the tank enjoyed support at the level 
that counted most, namely Commander-in-Chief. Haig received Swinton “very 
cordially” on 16 September: 
He thanked me for what I had done, and said that though the tanks had 
not achieved all that had been hoped, they had saved many lives and 
had fully justified themselves; that he wanted five times as many; that 
he wished the existing arrangements to go on; and that I should go 
home and continue to command, raise and train the force”.68 
Stern confirms the thanks expressed by Haig to Swinton and himself “Go back 
and make as many more Tanks as you can. We thank you.”69 
Bearing in mind the serious consequences of weak rollers on the performance 
of tanks at the Somme, it is surprising that the reasons for this problem, have not 
been addressed in detail. This lack of examination also unjustly influences any 
apportionment of responsibility for a situation that might so easily have been 
avoided. D’Eyncourt, his Committee, the War Office and Ministry escape their 
just share of criticism, whereas the designers’ work is devalued inappropriately.  
 
67 Ibid, answer to question 3225. Johnson’s comment was clearly intended to be “five days after 
the first use of the tanks in the Battles of the Somme”. 
68 Swinton, Eyewitness, p. 286. 
69 Stern, Tanks, p. 96. 
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In order to examine this issue thoroughly it is considered advantageous to 
examine tank by tank the problems experienced on 15 September.70 In the light 
of the 50-mile life factor, it is particularly instructive to compare experiences of C 
Company, the first to be shipped to France and therefore, in general, equipped 
with the oldest tanks, with D Company, whose arrival in their forward areas was 
completed only two days before the battle commenced.71  Complications can 
arise in defining the cause of certain tanks being eliminated from the battle and 
by the use of the reserve pool of tanks that was brought into play owing to losses 
occurred during training. Fuller confirms Pidgeon’s understanding on the use of 
the reserve tanks, noting there were ten tanks in GHQ reserve “all mechanically 
unfit”.72 The reserve, a special delivery arranged by Swinton, did not arrive until 
about the second week in September.73  
There had been ambitions to form an additional part-company to assist III 
Corps operations, but this idea was abandoned. Fuller’s note suggests the 
reason was that all the reserve tanks had been used to replace faulty machines. 
D Company’s War Diary shows only one broken-down machine. Therefore, even 
with nine reserve tanks being issued to C Company, some sixteen C Company 
tanks were old, over-used output. 74 No comprehensive record has been found to 
show the age of each tank used on 15 September but the delivery number 
provides a rough guide and it appears possible to determine which tanks are 
replacements as opposed to originals by the magnitude of their army numbers.75 
Thus it is likely that Vincent and Henriques in C21/22 commanded replacements 
for machines languishing as break-downs in GHQ reserve since their numbers 
 
70 Pidgeon, Tanks at Flers, pp. 59-179. 
71 Swinton, Eyewitness, p. 280. 
72 J. F. C. Fuller, Tanks in the Great War 1914-1918 (New York, E. P. Dutton and Company, 
1920), p. 54. 
73 Pidgeon, Tanks at Flers, p. 43; National Archives, MUN4/2806, Swinton to Bird, 4 September 
1916. Initially, Swinton specified eight tanks, “8 spare Tanks with a consignment of accessories 
for “C” and “D” Companies Heavy Section entrained on the night of the 3rd aaa these Tanks will 
reach Havre without drivers as they are spare machines aaa a party under an officer will 
therefore have to be detailed from the Heavy Section to entrain these 8 Tanks and the 
accessories which are part of the equipment of “C” and “D” Companies aaa Q M.G.” The 
reserve was later increased to ten (MUN4/2806, Swinton to DSD, 6 September 1916). 
74 National Archives, WO95/110, War Diary for D Company, records against only 1 “D” 
Company tank that it was a “new” tank (“New D4”): ergo the remaining nine reserve tanks were 
almost certainly drawn by “C” Company, whose diarist made no comment on whether individual 
tanks were originals or replacements. 
75 See Appendix B. 
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were 740 and 533. Tull(741), Clarke(746), Elliot(760) and Ambrose(554) 
supporting The Guards also have numbers suggesting they were replacements.76 
The key point is that no replacement machine suffered track failure whereas 
the older machines of Dashwood(716), Murphy(513) and Bates(714) failed for 
this reason. Although not mentioned in his published book, Fuller’s draft script 
describes the faults of machines in GHQ reserve, “Of the 10 with Headquarters 
none were fit for action on the 15th. September the majority owing to mechanical 
trouble due principally to defects in the rollers.”77 
Statistics can be further complicated through individual tanks suffering multiple 
experiences. Track faults or damage to the steering mechanism might for 
example have been responsible for ditching: other faults affecting mobility, 
particularly ditching and track failure, might have increased loss from gunfire.78  
Before examining experiences on the day, it is necessary to refute part of 
Johnson’s evidence to the Commission on the distribution of tanks arriving in 
France. When asked whether he knew if the tanks that went into action on the 
Somme had been previously used in training, he replied: 
Some had not been used at all; others had been used to a certain 
extent; some had been used to a further extent. They were all mixed up 
together. The Tanks were continually being delivered the whole time 
we were at Thetford. Those that were delivered first had the most 
running and those that were delivered just prior to being sent to France 
had none at all.79 
 
76 Army numbering of male tanks started at 700, female at 500. The Guards system was letter 
based, but it is known their support was from C Company. Highlighted comments in the right-
hand column of Appendix A to this thesis show the six machines which suffered track failure 
were early models within the numerical range 3-23. The highlighted numbers in the Company 
No. column are likely replacement machines. The recorded information does not enable three of 
these machines to be identified, probably because of errors in numbering (four Army numbers 
are duplicated). 
77 National Archives, CAB45/200-Undated and Unattributed Observations on Tank Actions. 
However, it can be seen that certain sections are an identical match to text in Fuller’s Tanks in 
the Great War. 
78 Pidgeon, Tanks at Flers, p. 107. Problems in determining the reason for the loss of some of 
the tanks is well illustrated by C23 attached to 47 Division. It is recorded that the tank attempted 
to cross a trench at an excessively acute angle resulting in it falling into the trench and thereby 
breaking a track. Yet it seems unlikely that the crew or observers would know whether a 
defective, loose track played a part In the ditching of the tank, i.e., whether the damage resulted 
entirely from the force or angle of the ditching or whether the damage was in part or whole the 
consequence of the worn state of the rollers and track. C24 was destroyed by shellfire a few 
days later.  
79 National Archives, T173/776, Royal Commission on Awards to Inventors, 21 October 1919, 
examination of Johnson by Watson, answer to question 3229. 
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Although most of Johnson’s answer is unexceptional, the comment that they were 
“all mixed up together” is incorrect. Individuality of units is apparent from rivalry 
within Heavy Section between the first tank companies, evidenced by Captain 
Harold Mortimore, the first man to command a tank in battle: 
There had always been a bit of rivalry at Thetford between A, B, C and 
D Companies as to which would be the first in action, Naturally I was 
delighted when it turned out to be D, but I didn’t think my tank would be 
first in the company - and I suppose in the world – to fire a shot in 
anger.80 
In so far as it could be accommodated by their tactical plans, GHQ and Army 
Commanders did not mix tanks from the two Companies within Divisions. It was 
incorrect of Johnson to say that tanks were “all mixed up”. The splitting of two 
companies of tanks between three Army Corps resulted in a proportion of tanks 
in III Corps being a mixture of C and D Company machines, but, with only one 
exception, a mix of the machines of the two Companies below Corps level was 
avoided.81 
The most notable element in this analysis is that none of the newer tanks from 
D Company or, so far as can be determined, replacement machines with C 
Company, suffered track failure. This category of fault was considered by Hugh 
Elles, appointed to command the tank arm in France in September 1916, as the 
most significant weakness of the Mark I.82 The fact that six machines suffered 
track failure in moving to battle positions or during action on 15 September and 
that the reserve pool was comprised mainly of older machines that had broken 
down prior to the battle is significant and accords with the explanation about 
limited-life rollers given by Wilson to the Royal Commission:  
They [rollers] had become hollow and had commenced to get loose on 
their spindles and that sort of thing. The result was that really they were 
on their last legs before they went to France….. It was put down to soft 
material but I do not think that was it. I have here a report showing that 
No.708 had run from 4th July to about 20th of August, and must have 
done 300 hours run. She was then rather worn out, but I considered 
that running good.83  
 
80 Pidgeon, Tanks at Flers, p. 148, Mortimore’s comment is wrongly attributed to John Foley. 
Foley’s comment in The Boilerplate War (London, Frederick Muller, 1963), p.17, is that “A place 
in history has surely been reserved for Captain Mortimore and his seven men for they were the 
first tank crew ever to go into action”. 
81 See Appendix B. 
82 National Archives, WO158/836, Elles to GHQ, 30 September 1916. 
83 National Archives, T173/776, Royal Commission on Awards to Inventors, 21 October 1919, 
examination of Wilson by Russell, answer to question 3102. 
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The evidence presented to the Royal Commission and the examination of the 
fortunes of C and D Company tanks on 15 September are considered to be 
compatible and sufficiently reliable to absolve the designers from responsibility 
for track problems. Wilson commented that it was not just mileage but also 
loading that mattered since the combination of these two factors determined the 
life of the rollers.84 Wear would be most severe and breakdown most likely when 
tanks were fully loaded for battle.  
The track problem had its roots in the management of the project. Tank tasks 
should have been specified during d’Eyncourt’s briefing of Tritton in July 1915.85 
The briefing was verbal and incomplete. Even at the eleventh hour it might still 
have been possible to identify the weakness of the rollers, but the shortcomings 
of management again triumphed and the tanks were shipped to France without a 
thorough examination. Excessive secrecy over their move left Wilson uninformed 
about their departure.86 Had the tanks been subjected to a thorough examination 
before shipment, it might have been possible, stocks permitting, for new rollers 
to be fitted. If not, knowledge of the weakness might have encouraged 
IV/Reserve Armies to reconsider whether lanes should have been left free of 
artillery support.87 
Before examining other Mark I faults, it is perhaps an opportune point at which 
to comment upon how the situation could have arisen that defective machines 
were despatched to take part in an important battle and upon the impact of 
unreliability on the level of satisfaction with tanks. It seems most unlikely today 
that a similar situation would arise since consultation and liaison between 
different groups appears to take place to a thorough, even excessive, degree. 
Yet this was clearly not the case in Edwardian society. The stratification of society 
in general and of the army in particular appears to have been responsible for the 
tank project having been conducted in compartments which, though not water-
tight, were nevertheless self-contained to a significant degree. When the army 
became involved in the project in July 1915 it did so at a distance. Scott-Moncrieff 
 
84 National Archives, T173/776, Royal Commission on Awards to Inventors, 21 October 1919, 
cross-examination of Wilson by Gray, answers to questions 3118-3119. 
85 National Archives, CAB17/120B, Tritton to William Foster and Co., 1 August 1915. 
86 National Archives, T173/776, Royal Commission on Awards to Inventors, 21 October 1919, 
examination of Wilson by Russell, answer to question 3102. 
87 Edmonds, Military Operations France and Belgium, 1916, vol. II (London, Macmillan, 1938), 
pp. 363-365. 
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was appointed chairman both of the Joint Committee and the Inter-Departmental 
Committee of the CID, but there is no evidence that he did more than notify 
d’Eyncourt’s Committee by letter of broad army requirements. He would have 
been involved with Swinton, d’Eyncourt and other representatives at the Inter-
Departmental Committee meetings, attending two of the three meetings held 
between August and December 1915, but there is no evidence of a “working 
relationship” and a memorandum of 25 August shows he was not at that time well 
informed about the Landships Committee: 
I then went to see the Chief Constructor of the Navy [d’Eyncourt] and 
he tells me that the trials on a machine made on Colonel Crompton’s 
principle have proved unsuccessful, but that there is another machine 
(on a different principle, as far as I could gather – I asked him to let me 
have a diagrammatic sketch) which is arriving in component parts from 
America and will be put together by Messrs Foster of Lincoln in about 
ten days time.88 
It should be noted that d’Eyncourt gave Scott-Moncrieff the false impression that 
Crompton’s machine had been built and subjected to tests which it had failed. In 
reality Crompton had not built a machine. D’Eyncourt succeeded, however, in 
hiding the fact that he had achieved nothing significant over the previous six 
months. Since Scott-Moncrieff found it convenient for the trial of the machine to 
be held about 10-11 September, to enable him to “inspect the Coast Works of 
Defence” in Scotland, d’Eyncourt secured an additional period for Tritton and 
Wilson to produce some face-saving hardware.89 Scott-Moncrieff’s behaviour is 
entirely consistent with Swinton’s judgment of him as ineffectual. 90 
Notwithstanding the army’s failures in a series of offensives earlier in the year, 
his allocation of time between a low priority defence project in Scotland and one 
potentially of great benefit on the Western Front demonstrated that his 
mishandling of the Holt trial six months earlier was not a one-off, idiosyncratic 
occurrence. The prospect of Scott-Moncrieff dropping in on Swinton or the 
designers for an informal chat about the project, the use of the new machines 
and ways in which they might be improved can only be described as fanciful. 
Swinton visited d’Eyncourt and Stern to ascertain the facts about naval 
involvement in designing an armoured vehicle but appears, after those visits, to 
 
88 National Archives, ADM116/1339, Scott-Moncrieff to Holden, Wheeler and Bird, 25 August 
1915. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Swinton, Eyewitness, pp. 134-135. 
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have left the matter entirely to the naval committee while he endeavoured to 
formulate proposals for the incorporation of tanks into the army. 91  Swinton 
recorded, somewhat complacently and trustingly, that, about 31 July/1 August, 
Stern “turned up again with some drawings. I was too busy to examine them, and 
was content to leave matters of mechanical design in the hands of experts who 
were working on what I regarded as the right lines.”92 As a banker undertaking a 
senior management role, Stern was not the most appropriate person for 
discussion with Swinton either on the role or design of landships. Yet d’Eyncourt 
had referred Swinton to Stern a day or two earlier: 
He gave me a brief outline of the position, and informed me that a fresh 
design for a landship was being prepared in accordance with a 
specification recently received from the War Office, but that apart from 
design the question of departmental responsibility was in the air. For 
further details he referred me to the Secretary of the Committee - 
Lieutenant Stern.93 
Swinton’s visit occurred just after d’Eyncourt had learned of Crompton’s failure to 
produce the drawings necessary to enable one section of an articulated machine 
to be constructed and had awarded the landship contract to Fosters.94 It seems 
likely d’Eyncourt would have been keen to screen prying eyes from the 
unproductive work of his Committee, particularly eyes belonging to an officer from 
the influential CID. Referral of Swinton to Stern rather than to Fosters had the 
advantage for d’Eyncourt of rendering it unlikely that Swinton would ascertain the 
true position of the project within the immediate future, thereby safeguarding the 
period for Tritton to produce some form of hardware to mask lack of progress 
over the preceding six months. Albeit unintentionally, the redirection of Swinton 
to Stern rather than to Tritton and Wilson also ensured that no discussion on the 
role or design of the landship took place between the three key figures involved 
in the development and role of the landship. Swinton’s ability to unearth 
shortcomings in the specification of the tank was effectively muzzled. Thanks to 
Scott-Moncrieff’s accommodating diary and the work and innovation of Tritton 
and Wilson, the curtain d’Eyncourt drew around the project did its job and by the 
time the curtain was drawn it was to reveal not only the token Little Willie but also 
 
91 Ibid, p. 161. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid; National Archives, ADM116/1339, Scott-Moncrieff to Holden, Wheeler and Bird, 25 
August 1915, confirms Moir’s decision to play no role in the development of the landship until an 
acceptable prototype had been produced by d’Eyncourt’s naval Committee. 
94 National Archives, ADM116/1339, Tritton to William Foster and Co., 1 August 1915. 
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a glimpse, albeit in wood, of an effective machine. At some point late in 1915 
Lloyd George instructed Sir Ernest Moir to “find out and get busy with the pushing 
on of the landship project”, but “Moir found the Admiralty Committee working and 
decided to leave them alone”.95  Unfortunately, neither the Minister nor Moir 
pursued the matter.96 
There are varying assessments of tank, artillery and infantry actions on 15 
September. The essential, valid point is that the reliability of the tanks allocated 
to The Guards and to XIV Corps as a whole did not reflect well on tank 
construction. Many were unfit for duty, a fact unknown to Heavy Section or the 
army generally. In ignorance, Rawlinson adopted intricate tactical plans for the 
use of the tanks, including lanes free from artillery bombardment to avoid tanks 
being struck by friendly fire.97 The result was that instances occurred when no 
tanks, or a token number, arrived to support infantry units that had been allocated 
limited supporting artillery fire prior to assaulting strong defences.98 The reality 
was that a lottery existed whereby the prospects of success by particular units 
depended in part on whether tanks from C or D Company were allocated for their 
support. Furthermore, it is clear that Rawlinson and his staff had no idea of the 
difficulties of navigation from inside a closed-down Mark I and it is thought that 
two of the tanks on 15 September were put out of action by friendly fire when 
straying from the 100yd. corridors.99 
Some comment is appropriate on the relationship of events on 15 September 
to tactical theories. Fourth Army sought to achieve an advance based on 
penetration by small groups of tanks. Swinton’s concept had been a concurrent 
advance of tanks regularly spaced, at intervals not exceeding 150 yards.100 
 
95 National Archives, MUN9/26, notes of second interview of Sir Ernest Moir, 11 June 1923, this 
provides a further example of a missed opportunity to provide assistance in the task of design 
and/or construction of the first tank through an inclination to leave the conduct of work to the 
group undertaking the job without an examination of whether assistance was required. 
96 Sir Ernest Moir was Controller of Munitions Inventions at the Ministry from August to 
December 1915, following which he became Ministry Representative in the US. In August 1917 
he was appointed to Churchill’s Munitions Council as “M”, though, prosaically, this reflected his 
responsibilities for “materials” rather than matters associated with espionage. 
97 Miles, Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1916, vol. II, pp. 294-295 and Military 
Operations, France and Belgium, 2nd July 1916 to the End of the Battles of The Somme, 
Appendices, pp. 79-84, Appendix 25, Battle of Flers-Courcelette, XV Corps Artillery Operation 
Order No. 47, 13 September 1916; Pidgeon, Tanks at Flers, p. 53. 
98 Ibid, pp. 94-95, The Guards Division; Trevor Pidgeon, Tanks on The Somme: From Morval to 
Beaumont Hamel (Barnsley, Pen and Sword, 2010), p. 10. 
99 See Appendix B. 
100 Swinton, Eyewitness, p. 204. 
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Churchill’s ideas were similar to those of Swinton.101 GHQ had initially favoured 
this form of assault. 102  When considering the percentage of losses due to 
breakdowns, ditching and artillery fire, it can readily be seen that, on the basis of 
experience at Flers, Swinton’s tactical dispositions would not have worked. The 
gaps due to losses would have greatly exceeded coverage by surviving machines 
- by a ratio of 4 to 1. Even allowing for the success of some machines before 
being lost later in the battle, it appears likely that half the active front would have 
lacked an operational machine only a short distance in front of the start line. 
On 15 September, over much of the front, advances were severely limited, but 
Pidgeon correctly observed that 41 Division’s advance in penetrating groups 
enjoyed most success.103 Having recognised this fact, Pidgeon did not proceed 
to the next question by enquiring whether there might be an explanation for this. 
Had he done so, the significance of the fact that 41 Division was equipped wholly 
with relatively new machines might have emerged. The Division suffered its share 
of losses to artillery fire, ditching and tail damage, but this left sufficient machines 
to complete much of their task. Little wonder Haig was pleased with the result: 
his losses were greater than he appeared to realise or to be prepared to admit, 
but progress had improved compared to earlier phases of the Somme. He would 
have been pleased by the recognition of this in the press. 104  Haig did not 
appreciate the fact at the time, but results might have been considerably better 
had the tank project been managed more effectively thereby enabling 
breakdowns to be reduced and additional tanks to be deployed. The nature of the 
problem with the track was identified late in October but not resolved until January 
1917 by fitting heavier rollers.105  
In addition to track weaknesses, ditching, was a major problem. On 15 
September, fifteen were lost for this reason alone and a number of others were 
 
101 Churchill Archives Cambridge, CHAR68/52-59, Churchill memorandum on ‘Variants of the 
Offensive’, December 1915. 
102 Edmonds, Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1916, 2nd July 1916 to the End of the 
Battles of The Somme, Appendices (London, Macmillan, 1938), pp. 39-45, Appendix 15, GHQ 
Instruction to Fourth and Reserve Armies Regarding the Employment of Tanks (OAD 111), 16 
August 1916, item 4c. 
103 Pidgeon, Tanks at Flers, p. 163; Edmonds, Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1916, 
2nd July 1916 to the End of the Battles of the Somme, Appendices, pp. 92-95, Appendix 27, The 
Somme 1916 - Battle of Flers-Courcelette - Orders regarding Tanks issued by 41st Division. 
104 Stern, Tanks 1914-1918, p. 96; ‘Sir Douglas Haig’s Great Victory’, Daily Mail, 18 September 
1916. 
105 National Archives, WO158/836, Burnett-Stuart to War Office, 2 November 1916 and 
WO158/844, Elles to General Staff, 20 October 1916. 
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stranded temporarily.106 Ditching could result from deep mud or from slipping into 
entrenchments or steep shell craters in wet or dry conditions. Wilson visited the 
Somme on 24 September and appears to have assumed that conditions on 15 
September had been the muddy ones he witnessed. This was not so, there had 
been heavy rain in the days after tanks were first used.107 Ross of Bladensburg, 
historian to the Coldstream Guards, recorded: 
Few of the men had had an opportunity of seeing beforehand the terrain 
on which they were about to operate. There was, however, perhaps 
less to be learnt from it than usual even if they had seen it; for the whole 
country looked like a wide expanse of storm swept water agitated into 
waves of great depth, that had become suddenly solidified….108 
No doubt conditions varied in different parts of the area according to gradients, 
drainage and the effect of previous military usage, but on 15 September it was 
clearly not the uniform sea of mud that Wilson might have imagined. Oblivious to 
the significance of his comments to delays in the supply of tanks to the BEF, Ross 
of Bladensburg further recorded: 
As long as summer lasted the ground was fairly hard and firm: but when 
the autumn was ushered in with a deluge of rain the soil was converted 
into a sea of mud, and movement, unless by pack animals, became 
almost impossible.109  
Combat reports suggest the problem, extent and location of heavily cratered 
surfaces was the main battlefield hazard for tanks on 15 September and, at that 
stage, mud was not a major issue.110 The greatest risk was that drivers would slip 
into trenches or shell craters owing to lack of driving experience, damaged tracks 
or tail units or the sheer proliferation of hazards. The tail steering/climbing unit, 
capable of causing problems even on relative billiard-table conditions around 
Lincoln and East Anglia, was particularly vulnerable to mechanical breakdown in 
conditions which imposed greater pressures on the structure. The tail units also 
slowed manoeuvring, represented deadweight for an under-powered engine to 
 
106 Pidgeon, Tanks at Flers, pp. 59-179. 
107 National Archives, T173/776, Royal Commission on Awards to Inventors, 21 October 1919, 
cross-examination of Wilson by Gray, answer to question 3143. 
108 Ross of Bladensburg, The Coldstream Guards 1914-1918, vol. I (London, Oxford University 
Press, Henry Milford, 1928), pp. 483-484, describes conditions on 15 September; McCarthy, 
Somme Day by Day, pp. 109-115 describes the daily rainfall on the following days, with over 
half an inch falling on Monday 18 September. 
109 Ibid, p. 502; Foley, Boilerplate War, p. 12. 
110 Pidgeon, Tanks at Flers, pp. 127-128, descriptions of ditching appear to be consistent with 
problems of depth of mud in only one case, C1, supporting 2 Canadian Division, though even in 
this case the description is not conclusive. 
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drag around the battlefield, increased the size of the machine and thereby its 
vulnerability to shell damage and represented, through damage and resultant 
friction, a potential anchor slowing further the already snail-like pace of the 
machines.111 Glanfield records that Wilson was aware of the weakness of the tail 
units and decided “to replace the lot with a sturdier version to be built by 
Metropolitan”.112 When Stern discovered this, he cancelled the order. It is not 
possible to assess the effect of this on performance on 15 September but it is 
likely to have been significant. 
In his memoirs, Lloyd George praised British invention of the tank as “the one 
and outstanding dramatic innovation brought forth by the War in the sphere of 
mechanical aids to warfare” 113  It is regrettable that civilian and military 
management accompanying this inventiveness was not of an equivalent 
standard. For the reasons explained earlier, managers were unable to bring tanks 
into service for the start of summer offensives on 1 July. Upon featuring in battle, 
tanks were then found to suffer several significant faults, ones that should have 
been resolved by competent management, debate or consultation before 
deployment. 
Ill-considered, pointless and uncooperative behaviour by its personnel 
ensured the army contributed to its own problems on 15 September and in the 
following weeks. Wilson gave evidence to the fact that his requests to examine 
conditions at the front had been denied.114 He did not visit the area until 24 
September, twelve months too late to influence design measures to combat mud 
or to highlight the risk to fragile tail steering units.115 It is not possible to say for 
certain that visits to the front in 1915 would have resulted in the adoption of more 
effective measures for operating in the conditions to be found on the Western 
Front, but it is difficult to see what the army had to lose by facilitating such a visit.  
 
111 Ibid, pp. 59-175, for example Colle in D25 supporting 50 Div. and Enoch in D7 supporting 41 
Div.; National Archives, T173/776, Royal Commission on Awards to Inventors, 21 October 
1919, examination of Johnson by Gray, answers to questions 3232-3234, Johnson confirmed 
that the additional climbing ability provided by the tail was unnecessary in the area in which the 
tanks were operating, that it rendered the tanks relatively immobile, was vulnerable and badly 
designed. 
112 Glanfield, Devil’s Chariots, p. 148. 
113 David Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George (London, Odhams, 1938), p. 381. 
114 National Archives, T173/776, Royal Commission on Awards to Inventors, 21 October 1919, 
cross-examination of Wilson by Gray, answer to question 3143. 
115 Ibid. 
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In a similar vein, no attempt appears to have been made to prepare sufficiently 
challenging conditions in Britain for the testing and practice of tanks and crews. 
The army’s relatively undemanding circuit at Hatfield Park failed to provide a 
realistic test of Mother’s ability to operate effectively in conditions tanks would 
encounter in France. The Hatfield circuit was as benign as the trials for the Holt 
Tractor at Shoeburyness had been hostile.116  The main difference was that 
ground conditions at Hatfield, Elvedon and Lincoln were devoid of shell craters 
or deep mud.117  Nevertheless, Mother still found it difficult to negotiate one 
muddy patch that had been provided at Hatfield. This incident does not appear 
to have set alarm bells ringing. There would for most of the time be no shortage 
of mud and difficult terrain in the later battles on the Somme, at Arras or Ypres.118 
The result was that machines, supposedly capable of nearly 4mph in flat, dry 
conditions were, in combat conditions, normally restricted to 0.2-1 mph – a bonus 
for German artillery.119 This also affected the radius of operation of the tanks, 
reducing it to as little as five miles when restricted to first gear and to steering 
methods reliant on brakes. 120  Of the limited number of tanks that fought 
successfully on 15 September, three found it necessary to retire for refuelling, a 
hazardous trip that wasted time and was not always uneventful. 121  Tritton 
endorsed criticisms by Archie Holford-Walker, commander of C Company, of the 
tame training conditions in England when, in rebutting criticisms of the ditching of 
tanks in muddy ground, he replied that the tanks “got through the ground which 
the government considered was suitable as a test at Hatfield Park”.122 Pidgeon 
supports Tritton’s comment:  
The routes they were forced to follow lay over ground which had already 
been churned up during the violent bombardments of previous weeks; 
 
116 National Archives, T173/776, this shortcoming was recognized though not examined in detail 
at the meeting of the Royal Commission, 21 October 1919, see cross-examination of Tritton by 
Gray, answers to questions 2998-3004 and Chairman’s comments following question 3003. 
117 See for example, photograph 36, understood to be the only photograph of “Mother” at 
Hatfield Park for the January/February 1916 trials and photograph 37 of “Mother” during trials at 
Lincoln in January 1916. 
118 Pidgeon, Tanks at Flers, photographs at pages 129 (Crème de Menthe) and 128 
(Chartreuse) show the state of some of the ground over which tanks had to advance on 15 
September 1916. See photographs 25 and 26. 
119 National Archives, T173/776, Royal Commission on Awards to Inventors, 21 October 1919, 
cross-examination of Wilson by Gray, answers to questions 3134-3145 and MUN4/4979, notes 
by Swinton for the forthcoming Tank Trial at Hatfield, p 3, 17 December 1915. 
120 W M Rossiter, Driving a Mark I Tank, in Pidgeon, Tanks at Flers, Appendix 4. 
121 Pidgeon, Tanks at Flers, pp. 94 (Clarke), 98 (Elliot) and 115 (Colle), Elliot is thought to have 
run out of fuel before he could return to safety.  
122 National Archives, T173/776, Royal Commission on Awards to Inventors, 21 October 1919, 
cross-examination of Tritton by Gray, answer to question 2998. 
 130 
now it was churned up yet again and resembled a storm-tossed sea, a 
fearful place for men who had trained on the gentler fields of Elvedon.123 
The results of inadequate consultation or joint preparation were drivers and 
machines unprepared either for the relatively dry cratered conditions of parts of 
the area on 15 September or the sea of mud into which it was mostly transformed 
following the advent of wet conditions a few days later.124 Tank crews were not 
unaware of the lack of realistic training conditions, but representations for a first-
hand view of conditions at the front met the same fate as those of Wilson. 
Unsuccessfully, Allen Holford-Walker sought assistance through familiarisation: 
One of the greatest trials we were up against was the fact that none of 
us had seen badly shelled ground of the type we were asked to meet in 
these battles. This had always worried me, even when in training at 
Thetford, and I remember asking that the officers at least should be sent 
for even three weeks in the part of the line where typical terrain could 
be found, but this apparently could not be arranged. Our training at 
home was of the parade ground type which was of little value when we 
met the real article. It was a very creditable effort on the part of my lads 
that they were able to function at all.125 
In consequence, drivers were ill-prepared and weaknesses in their machines 
were not identified. Crews had neither been provided with training facilities that 
remotely resembled conditions on the Somme nor had they been briefed 
adequately since they did not appreciate that their tanks might operate 
successfully provided damaged tail units were simply disconnected.126  
It is considered the above paragraphs demonstrate that the limited 
achievement of tanks on 15 September was due to a combination of 
circumstances, many of which were avoidable. Firstly, the Landships Committee 
had failed to brief the designers on the army’s requirements for the machines. 
Secondly, tail units of known weakness had been incorporated despite the efforts 
of the leading designer to replace them with stronger units. Thirdly, the limited 
height of trench breastworks in the battle area rendered tail units unnecessary. 
Fourthly, army preparation and briefing for the nature of the terrain on which 
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continuing after simply disconnecting the tail unit. 
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fighting would take place was inadequate. The army also failed, in the summer of 
1915, to embed itself within the design process or to apply pressure for 
advancement of the project in keeping with pending operational requirements in 
1916. 
Owing to limited achievements on 15 September, the designers received 
considerable criticism during the hearings of the Royal Commission.127 However, 
examination of the individual experiences of tanks provides support for the 
explanation given by Wilson that many of the tanks were worn out before the 
battle.128 Following their first action, Elles ranked overcoming track trouble as the 
most important alteration required for future tanks.129 Despite this, it does not 
appear to have been noted that the newer machines of D Company or those used 
as replacements in C Company did not suffer track failure.130 
In addition to tank design and battlefield tactics, the achievements of tank units 
also relied on the Ministry and industry to deliver soundly constructed tanks in a 
timely fashion. In December 1915, Bird, DSD at the War Office, had notified 
Swinton that he had been chosen to raise and command the new tank unit on 
home soil.131 Swinton did not receive this news without reservation since he 
would be leaving a position of some influence for one exposed to opposition that 
he was aware existed within the army. Nevertheless, he considered it his duty to 
accept the post, to which he was appointed in March 1916.132 The new arm 
changed name several times over the following eighteen months. During most of 
the period the subject of this chapter, it was, for security reasons known as Heavy 
Section, MGC. 
Following the Hatfield trials, Swinton and members of the Landships 
Committee awaited the response of the Army Council. A conditional order for 30-
40 tanks was received, scarcely appropriate to a moment that heralded a 
fundamental change in the conduct of warfare.133 The order provided insufficient 
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machines for tactical use in operations or to offset expenses of a novel form of 
manufacture. The order was described by Swinton as “quite inadequate” and he 
suggested it should be raised to at least 100, the number then decided upon.134 
The first French tank order made after trials the following week was for 400 
machines.135  
Both Stern and Swinton refer to preparations having already been made for 
bulk production prior to the initial order.136  Stern stated that on Saturday 12 
February “all preparations having already been made, orders were telephoned 
and telegraphed” to Fosters and Metropolitan to “start production of 100 
machines”.137 The order set in motion the manufacture of the first batch of tanks. 
Though the precise date for the commencement of the BEF’s 1916 offensive was 
not known at that stage, the loss of eleven to fifteen days for the placing of the 
order after the Hatfield trials may have been significant. Kitchener, Robertson 
(CIGS) and Butler (Haig’s representative), were all present at the trials and it does 
not seem unreasonable to suggest that, within an army organised for efficiency, 
arrangements should have been made for such senior officers to take a decision 
on the spot.138 
Of the hundred tanks in this order, twenty-five were to be constructed by 
Fosters and seventy-five by the larger Metropolitan Company in Birmingham.139 
Both firms expressed their eagerness to start, though Metropolitan were in need 
of engineering drawings from Fosters and personal supervision and advice from 
Wilson, a role that provided him with a strong base from which to influence design 
issues as time passed.140  Stern’s claim to have prepared for construction in 
anticipation of the order is not consistent with Tritton’s letter of 13 February which 
simply refers to “news from London that a considerable order will be placed….and 
I can assure you that no effort will be lacking on the part of myself and my Staff 
to carry out the desires of your Committee”. 141  The letter, addressed to 
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d’Eyncourt, contained no suggestion that news from London had initiated any 
activity. Taken in isolation, this might not justify suspicion that preparations in 
advance of and following the army’s order were conducted less expeditiously 
than Stern claimed. However, the speed with which Fosters could respond would 
inevitably have been constrained, since shortly after the war the company 
recorded that to: 
comply with the Government’s requirements, it was necessary to 
expand the works by building a new Erecting Shop and extending the 
Boiler Shop, while other Departments had to be dismantled and re-
equipped with the tools requisite for the new class of work.142  
A period for re-equipment was unavoidable but the delay in undertaking building 
works was likely to have been more significant and provides an explanation for a 
progress report in May showing production forecasts for Lincoln lagging over a 
month behind Birmingham.143  
Metropolitan may also have been slow out of the blocks. It was not until 28 
February that they confirmed financial and other arrangements agreed at a 
conference on 15 February.144 It follows that neither firm was in a position to 
commence construction until well after the army’s first order was received, though 
it is not known when they commenced preparations for undertaking the new work. 
Stern’s dynamism and ability to cut through red tape is widely acknowledged, 
as for example by Fosters and Swinton. 145  However, his comment that all 
preparations were made in advance of the order from the War Office is clearly 
incorrect. It is difficult to envisage a valid reason why the contractual matters at 
Metropolitan should not have been resolved in advance of the army’s order. 
Similarly, delays in Lincoln might have been avoided by undertaking construction 
works in advance of the certainty of requirement. A form of guarantee should not 
have presented an insuperable problem bearing in mind the importance of the 
project. Notwithstanding delays in the commencement of construction and 
assembly, the timescale actually achieved for the delivery of the first machine 
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was close to that forecast by Metropolitan, mid-June.146 However, thereafter, 
deliveries do not appear to have been at the rate of ten per week that the 
company had forecast. It is not possible to tell whether this was the fault of the 
company, the result of optimistic forecasting, or attributable to delays 
experienced in the provision by others of necessary armament and components 
or, perhaps, a combination of these reasons.  
Prior to Stern’s appointment as Head of the Supply Department at the Ministry, 
Kitchener had asked him to go to the War Office as Head of the Department 
recommended by the Inter-Departmental Conference. However, Lloyd George 
also sent for Stern informing him that, in accordance with his agreement with 
Balfour, Churchill’s replacement as First Lord at the Admiralty, production was 
the responsibility of his Ministry. No doubt emboldened by the demand for his 
services, Stern was not slow to take advantage, telling Lloyd George that he was  
“willing to undertake the production of tanks in quantity within six months, but 
could only do so if given special powers”.147 Stern drafted a “Charter” which Lloyd 
George signed on 12 February.148 It will later be seen that this charter was most 
significant for the design and production of tanks since it gave Stern’s Committee 
“the final decision in all matters connected with the manufacture and inspection 
of these machines”. These events also underline the lack of requirement in the 
society of the time for professional qualifications and relevant experience. Stern 
had been of great service in recognising in Wilson and Tritton the abilities needed 
to design and construct “Mother”, but he possessed no relevant qualifications or 
experience in industrial production or management and no knowledge or 
understanding of the engineering principles involved in the new machine or 
possible future upgrades. It was unwise of Lloyd George to grant such powers to 
Stern’s Committee. 
Stern’s claim in the report of the Tank Supply Committee on 28 February that 
“the construction of 100 tanks has begun” was misleading. Stern does not explain 
or even acknowledge problems mentioned in Swinton’s letters to the War Office 
or GHQ. The only problem mentioned within his first report was one that fell 
beyond his responsibilities, namely the supply of armament. The Admiralty was 
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apparently able to supply only 100 six-pounder guns, with the result that a further 
hundred needed to be ordered. However, despite an early increase of the army’s 
order to 150 tanks, there is no evidence that shortage of main armament would 
have caused any delay in production.149  Indeed, in the interests of defence 
against possible massed infantry attack against tanks, the decision was also 
taken early in April, to omit guns from half the tanks and substitute additional 
machine guns. The supply of main armament should therefore have been less 
challenging than originally envisaged. 150  It is notable that Stern makes no 
mention of the first meeting of the Tank Supply Committee on 12 February. This, 
presumably, was because he did not wish to broadcast the content of the 
minutes, which envisaged contract terms with Metropolitan being “discussed and 
settled” on 15 February and that, after ten weeks, the rate of tank supply would 
be, “Messrs. Foster & Co., 5 machines per week. Metropolitan Co., 15 machines 
per week”.151 Supply commenced well after this late April forecast and proceeded 
at a slower rate.152 
After the war, The History failed to provide an accurate representation of 
events in the commencement and completion of the contract for the first tank 
order. It dealt at length with business methods, coordination with the production 
of other munitions and qualities required, but lacked conviction, leaving the 
reader suspecting that the authors, in common with the Head of the Supply 
Committee, had no background in industrial production and no interest in 
objectivity. The History did, however, unintentionally identify a significant 
shortcoming in the structure of the Department. With the exception of armament 
arrangements and inspection of armour plate and engines, it recorded “there was 
no clear-cut division of duties nor allocation of responsibilities”. Thus the “removal 
of any difficulties experienced was the joint responsibility of all members of the 
Department”. 153  The History sought to portray this flexible arrangement as 
advantageous. However, an issue not allocated to a particular individual or group 
is no-one’s responsibility. The History’s verdict that this “elastic system served its 
purpose well while production was proceeding on a small scale with 
comparatively few firms involved” does not sit comfortably with the succession of 
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letters Swinton was required to write to the War Office and GHQ pushing back 
the delivery date of the first batch of tanks.154  
Ministry staff needed to maintain close contact with the tank-erecting 
companies and their suppliers to ensure components on which the erectors relied 
would arrive in good time. Glanfield lists a substantial range of monitoring tasks 
undertaken by Stern’s Department, but provides no citation and no identification 
of monitoring methods or explanation of whether efforts were made to take action 
in respect of components likely to be delayed.155 It is clear from Swinton’s letters 
to the War Office and from Eyewitness that late delivery of sponsons was a 
significant problem but the two sources that might be expected to provide an 
insight into the matter, Tanks 1914-1918 and The History, make no reference to 
this issue. According to Swinton, those matters causing delay in output were the 
delivery of sponsons, telescopic gun sight brackets, Hotchkiss guns and spare 
parts, defects in the tails (discovered during practice) and distortion of the 
structure of machines owing to use for training without sponsons.156 Only two of 
these points, spare parts and Hotchkiss guns, are mentioned by Stern.157 The 
History records that the MWSD “confidently expected an early output of the 100 
tanks which had been ordered” and that, following the increase in the order, Stern 
“undertook that the 150 craft would be ready for transportation to France by the 
end of July”.158 Tank supply at this time was ranked as one of the army’s three 
most urgent tasks and The History stated that this was “given corresponding 
priority”.159  It claims the difficulties that arose were “unforeseen”, particularly 
those relating to personnel, spare parts and equipment.  
The picture painted by The History is misleading since it claims the problem of 
supplying spare parts was intensified by a difference of view between the Supply 
Department and military authorities. The differences are described as, firstly, the 
length of life of tanks and therefore for the need for spare parts, secondly, that 
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liaison between the MWSD and army, conducted through Swinton, was 
insufficient to give the Department a knowledge of army requirements in detail 
and, thirdly, that provision of spares and associated repair units caused 
considerable delays that were aggravated by the slowness with which Hotchkiss 
guns became available as they were withdrawn from anti-aircraft service.160  
The History is open to criticism on a number of these points. The key issue in 
assessing the performance of management is not whether problems were 
unforeseen, but whether they were unforeseeable. The question of spare parts 
was entirely foreseeable but appears to have received no attention until Stern 
wrote to the new Minister, Edwin Montagu, early in August, well after the date he 
had forecast the order for the first 150 machines would have been completed.161 
He admitted the original order included spares but claimed to have been under 
the impression that tanks would not be used before delivery of the full 150. He 
stated that, from more recent discussions, he believed it was “intended to send 
small numbers of these machines out at the earliest possible date”. He did not 
believe the machines could “be equipped to my satisfaction before the 1st 
September”, adding that he had “made arrangements that 100 machines shall be 
completed in every detail, together with the necessary spares, by the 1st 
September”. Stern shared the view held by d’Eyncourt, Hankey, Churchill and 
others that the tank should be kept secret until a substantial number had been 
gathered for a mass assault.162 The possibility cannot be ruled out that he used 
the spares issue to discourage early use of a small number of tanks.163 Moreover, 
spares were a sensitive subject, since the withholding of scarce components from 
the production line would further reduce output, already well below forecasts.  
Delays in undertaking training would have a significant effect on performance 
on 15 September. The History states that a limited number of training machines 
similar to Mother Tank, but with boilerplate instead of hardened steel armour, 
arrived at Thetford early in June and it was anticipated that crews for seventy-five 
tanks would in any case be fully trained by the end of July.164 This is contradicted 
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by Swinton who recounts that he was forced to start driver training in June with 
just the original Mother Tank stripped of her guns as these were required for 
gunnery training.165 He does not give dates for the arrival of additional machines, 
but simply confirms there were sufficient for training on a larger scale by the end 
of June.166 References to machines made of boilerplate occur elsewhere. This is 
not confirmed by Swinton, though is used as the title of Foley’s book.167 At this 
stage it is relevant simply to flag up the fact that documents do not support the 
claim in The History that delivery of additional machines took place “early in 
June”, rather that it did not commence until mid-June and that perhaps only eight 
machines were released by manufacturers before July.168 
Sufficient records do not appear to exist to explain the reasons for delays in 
manufacture. It seems likely that by 1916, national industrial resources were fully 
engaged, that the ability of engineering firms to switch rapidly to new products 
was constrained by existing commitments and that firms may have been taking 
on more orders than they could process efficiently. Problems had been apparent 
in 1915 when both Fodens and Metropolitan asked to be relieved of the 
obligations in their contracts with the Admiralty on prototypes for a landship.169 
Undoubtedly companies preferred to manufacture armaments that were more 
traditional and for which they had previous experience, but it seems likely the 
delay by Metropolitan in February 1916 in formally agreeing terms for 
construction of tanks may be explained in part by the completion of other on-
going military contracts. Further evidence of difficulties are provided by Vickers, 
whose records show that, “By the time that tanks went into production the 
company’s capacity could be stretched no further”.170 This situation represented 
a severe test of the resolve of those tasked with the supply of tanks. It would not 
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have been possible for a firm such as Metropolitan to prepare for large-scale 
production until they were assured of such work being allocated to them.  
Stern was in charge of the Supply Department at the Ministry from early 1916 
until October 1917. His management of the Department was significant since it 
was within this period that the first tanks were prepared for use, their design was 
amended and further tanks and other armoured vehicles were devised for later 
use. Shortcomings in design have already been outlined, but it is appropriate to 
consider the issue further in relation to the problems inherent in appointing non-
professionals to important management posts. A relationship exists between the 
quality of a new machine and the time taken to bring that machine into service. 
Stern was not an engineer and for that reason was not well placed to adjudicate 
on engineering issues or to judge the merits of different engineering concepts. 
His enthusiasm may have been beyond question, but his professional 
background bore no direct relationship to his tasks as head of MWSD.  
There are no records of Stern being responsible for delays during the spring 
and summer of 1916 but his only reference to a personal role in assisting tank 
supply is in the run-up to the departure of tanks for France in July/August 1916. 
At that time he enlisted the assistance of workers from Metropolitan to undertake 
the repair or maintenance of tanks involved in the Elveden demonstration on 21 
July to enable them to be embarked for France the following month. 171  In 
recruiting volunteers to work on worn or damaged tanks at Elvedon, Stern 
showed initiative and energy, but he was responsible for supply and it speaks 
volumes for his role that he could find no other worthwhile observation to include 
within his book to explain his contribution to the supply process during this period. 
Bearing in mind his ambitious forecasts for output of 150 tanks by the end of July, 
a more robust defence might have been expected of the fact that the first 
machines were not embarked for France until mid-August and that the order was 
not completed until late October.172 Stern appeared to possess attributes that 
would have made him a good “number two” but his lack of technical knowledge, 
harmonious personal qualities and sound management abilities, essential for the 
Head of the Supply Department, represented a severe handicap: he would 
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nevertheless survive a further year before being moved on when Churchill 
became Minister of Munitions.173  
Neither The History nor Tanks 1914-1918 provide explanations for the delays 
in production over the period from February to September, but it is clear there 
was a significant delay in the commencement of work and an unexplained delay 
in the manufacture of sponsons and other components. However, it seems 
unlikely that the elimination of these delays could have provided a saving of 
eleven weeks, the period that might have enabled the supply to Haig for use on 
1 July of the numbers available on 15 September. So far as the full completion of 
the extended first order of 150 tanks is concerned, this would have necessitated 
a saving of at least eighteen weeks, surely quite unachievable without looking 
further back to the early months of 1915 and an earlier start on design by Tritton 
and Wilson. It would seem realistic, however, given an earlier start both to 
preparations and construction by Fosters and Metropolitan, coupled to more 
thorough monitoring of the construction programme, for a significant number of 
tanks to have taken part in the initial phases of the Battles of the Somme, a period 
when ground conditions may have been considerably less challenging for tanks 
than in the period from mid-September to November. 
 It is easy, and normally correct, to blame those at the top for deficiencies in 
the performance of their organisations since they enjoy the greatest powers or 
most advantageous positions to secure or advocate change. Comments by 
Hankey suggest the army was no exception to the general rule. The summary of 
discussions between Hankey and Seely indicates a widespread appreciation in 
the army that the methods of higher command would prove unsuccessful in the 
forthcoming summer offensive.174 Seely’s observation on the caterpillars was to 
the point but he would have been unaware of the stage reached in their 
manufacture and had not held high office since his resignation over the Curragh 
incident in March 1914. On 29 April it would in any case have been too late for 
the manufacture of tanks to be accelerated to meet a 1 July deadline.  
In May 1916, reorganisation provided Churchill with an opportunity to resign 
his commission and return to England with minimum scope for criticism by his 
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political adversaries. Churchill’s aspirations for the fall of Asquith’s coalition and 
his own return to a position of responsibility in government was clear from his 
letters both before and after that date. 175  However, by the time of the first 
operational use of tanks at Flers neither aspiration had been achieved. Rather, 
the national situation had developed largely along the lines he feared, the 
sacrifice of thousands of lives in a manner widely expected to result in failure. 
Commentators would later identify the Battles of the Somme as an important 
period in the wearing down of the German Army.176 However, it is not clear 
whether they secured the minimum standard sought by Churchill, namely a life 
for a life, and might perhaps be seen more appropriately in terms of his pre-war 
prediction that there would be no winner in a war with Germany.177  
As the last few days prior to the first use of tanks passed in a flurry of activity, 
those who had been instrumental in guiding the project through invention and 
manufacture in quantity must have felt disappointment that more had not been 
achieved. Significant progress had been made since Churchill had adopted and 
developed the idea he mistakenly thought had emanated from Hankey. However, 
for most of that period progress had been uninspiring or painfully slow, the 
exception being mid-August to December 1915 when Tritton and Wilson had 
designed and developed Mother. Even during this period there is no evidence 
that the Joint Committee had taken all measures an influential military body might 
reasonably have invoked to minimise delay in assembling material required to 
progress from design to development of the prototype.178  
1916 was not an eventful year for Churchill’s involvement with tanks. While he 
was out of office, the development of the tank progressed steadily rather than 
spectacularly. Whether judged against the efficiency of production or its efficiency 
in action, the tank was not an outstanding success. However, its limited 
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achievements were sufficient to convince the Commander-in-Chief that tanks had 
the potential to play a significant role on the battlefield.179 Unfortunately for the 
management of tank production, issues were becoming increasingly complex. 
This was due to ambitions, both in the army and on the part of the Ministry and 
enthusiasts, for greatly expanded production and a wider range of tank types and 
to the acquisition of skills and experience within the BEF that would lead to 
Ministry views on design being challenged. These issues would generate friction 
and disputes that would be fought within a national context of increasing 
competition for limited available means of production. 
In 1916, Lloyd George’s plea against being “Too Late” failed in a manner he 
had neither specified nor expected. There is no evidence of avoidable delay on 
the part of Metropolitan, Fosters or their workforce in assembling the first tanks, 
though events did not occur in the timely fashion required. Rather, delay appears 
to have occurred in placing orders and in ensuring priority for works or 
components required to enable tanks to be assembled in time for use during the 
1916 offensives. Bureaucracy in the military and public services and lack of 
knowledge of industrial production by senior staff appear to explain delays rather 
than lack of urgency by industry. The result of the shortcomings of all parties was 
that tanks were not involved in the first two and a half months of fighting at the 
Somme. The army must accept a significant share of the responsibility for this, 
since it failed to provide any assistance to or pressure on the Landships 
Committee between June 1915 and April 1916. In the Army Council’s defence, 
d’Eyncourt’s unnecessary and erroneous letter to Kitchener in January 1916 may 
have given the impression that acceleration of effort was not necessary.180 
Swinton is critical of GHQ for the “naïve question of whether any tanks could be 
ready, with crews trained, by the middle of June”. Clearly, he was unaware 
d’Eyncourt had said that they could be ready by April/May!181 
However, it was not just speed, but also quality that mattered. Problems were 
perhaps inevitable in producing complex new machines. Nevertheless, serious 
errors occurred that could easily have been avoided by sound management, 
utilising basic measures of consultation and cooperation. It is difficult to 
understand how the Landships Committee could have instructed Fosters to build 
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a machine based on tactical usage that was out-of-date, how Stern could have 
cancelled Wilson’s order for stronger tail units and how the army could have 
judged the adequacy of the first machine by tests in conditions that bore no 
relationship to those awaiting tanks in France.  
Answers appear to lie in the absence of meaningful debate within military and 
government bodies. Swinton records how it was necessary for him to address the 
Inter-Departmental Conference on 29 September on the proposed machine 
displayed to full-scale in wood. D’Eyncourt, the Chairman for this meeting, is let 
off lightly by Swinton: 
Among so large a gathering of professional soldiers Mr. d’Eyncourt was 
reluctant to take the lead in the deliberations. Since it was urgently 
necessary to ascertain official opinion on certain vital matters at that 
meeting, I mounted a convenient packing case, and with the chairman’s 
permission put the points for consideration to those present. The 
principal questions were the main and secondary armaments.182 
It is easy to understand that a military assembly would concur with Swinton’s 
identification of the “principal questions”. It was unfortunate, however, that there 
was no introduction to the proceedings, a measure that would inevitably have 
referred to the purpose of the machines and a summary of tactical use and 
design. A significant opportunity for the “light roller” issue to be revealed and 
debated was therefore missed. The conference had been called to afford the 
Landships Committee the opportunity to bring all interested parties up-to-date 
and obtain authority to advance to the construction of Mother. It is considered 
reasonable to expect in a period of rapid development of a new weapon that a 
Chairman of a developing body should prepare a brief introduction, running 
through the thoughts underlying the development and concluding with decisions 
sought from the conference. It seems likely d’Eyncourt’s reluctance to play such 
a role stemmed not simply from a shyness to talk about military matters to a 
military audience, but also to a lack of knowledge of the engineering underlying 
the design. It is understandable that on this occasion, with Tritton and Wilson 
present, d’Eyncourt would have been reluctant to take the lead in a discussion 
on the design as a whole. He must have been relieved that the meeting debated 
armament, on which his knowledge would have been no less than that of Tritton 
and Wilson, rather than traction and design generally.  
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Tritton later claimed that d’Eyncourt “did not give five hours consideration to 
the whole job”.183 D’Eyncourt’s failure to prepare a short introductory speech to 
the conference on 29 September lends support to Tritton’s over-simplified 
comment. It would be exaggerating to claim that this shortcoming in d’Eyncourt’s 
approach and personality was decisive in restricting the scope of debate at the 
conference, but it does represent an example of ways in which his personal 
objectives and management weaknesses contributed to flaws in the design of 
Mother. He deserves severe criticism for the breakdown of so many of the first 
sixty tanks that were produced. It is not possible to provide an exact figure, but 
by failing to brief the designers on the army’s requirements for the landships he 
was responsible for the failure of some seven machines in the period of and 
immediately before the first day of Flers, for the majority of those lying in GHQ 
Reserve awaiting repair, and, probably, for most of those that suffered tail failure.  
 “C” and “D” Companies went to France late in August 1916 but, by no stretch 
of the imagination, were they fit for action. Personnel were only partly trained and 
many vehicles had been or would become worn out by training and 
demonstrations at Thetford and in France.184 So far as Lloyd George’s “Too Late” 
plea was concerned, despite the capable efforts of designers and valiant efforts 
of somewhat scratch crews, the tank did not explode onto the battlefield as early 
or in the manner that Churchill and other tank enthusiasts had envisaged. The 
reasons for this are complex, involving the state of equipment, individual 
characteristics of the crews and their training and the standard of management 
of the project. It should also be mentioned that the management of the new 
machines by senior army personnel left much to be desired, since Swinton’s 
advice note did not percolate down to those who should have received it, 
including Elles. However, even those receiving it either failed to read it or did not 
heed its advice, which, according to Cuthbert Headlam, was not unusual.185 
Therefore, when called upon to arbitrate between Pulteney’s intention to send 
tanks through High Wood and reservations by Elles, Rawlinson simply 
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commented “This is a matter for consideration. You had better settle whether it is 
worth going through the wood or whether it is better to ignore it and go round 
it.”186 
An end of term report on the first, relatively small-scale British introduction of 
armoured vehicles, might comment “exhibits sound technical ability but lacks 
organisational qualities needed to ensure a more decisive impact”. The most 
fundamental issues were linked problems of management and personnel. The 
abilities and qualities of personnel were of fundamental importance. Churchill had 
contributed the requisite initial vision, confidence and determination but lacked 
judgment and detailed understanding of military requirements and production for 
progressing design and development. It was particularly significant that 
Churchill’s judgment of others led him to appoint an inappropriate manager to 
carry the project forward. D’Eyncourt was not from the required mould. 
Consequently, for design, he relied excessively on Crompton who lacked the 
ability to produce a practical design in a reasonable period. It was somewhat 
fortunate that the judgment and determination of Stern resulted in two most 
capable engineers producing a working model from the limited resources 
available.  
Yet Stern could not pull all d’Eyncourt’s chestnuts from the fire and the first 
tanks therefore went into action built to a specification not matching the role the 
army required and with known tail weaknesses. In consequence, full advantage 
was not taken of the rapid innovation of Tritton and Wilson and the sound 
preparations by Swinton. Furthermore, the speed with which Tritton and Wilson 
undertook their work did not result in a supply of tanks for the opening of the 1916 
offensive. Time wasted by a combination of drift, allowed by d’Eyncourt and 
Crompton, lack of meaningful involvement by Scott-Moncrieff and the Army 
Council and an apparent failure by Stern’s MWSD to arrange the timely supply of 
components, resulted in the undertaking of operations on the Somme without the 
support of tanks for two and a half months. Failings could have resulted in the 
abandonment of the tank project.187 In the event, isolated actions along the lines 
that Churchill, Swinton and others had visualised as the norm, notably by Hastie 
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at Flers and Storey at Gird Trench, coupled to the vision of Haig, ensured that it 
survived.188 
In 1917 the “countryside” around Arras and the Chemin-des-Dames would 
reveal the extent to which Britain had benefitted from its experiences with tanks 
on the Somme and whether France would be successful in preparing for and 
conducting an armoured offensive in terms of design, reliability and tactical use 
of armoured vehicles. The next chapter will study the ways in which the army and 
Ministry sought to resolve flaws revealed on the Somme, the degree of success 
they achieved, the extent to which their efforts assisted the BEF’s spring 
operations in 1917 and the entry of French tanks onto the stage.  
A competition between tank design and all-arms tactics and German defensive 
measures was about to begin. On the opening day of the Somme offensive BEF 
casualties numbered almost 60,000. Swinton would not have been surprised that 
some 60% of these casualties were caused by machine-guns.189 Despite French 
representations, the BEF had (prematurely?) let the armoured cat out of the bag. 
The intelligence spotlight was therefore alerted to identify defensive measures 
that might be used by the German Army to counter the Allies’ new weapon and 
whether Germany might itself construct tanks. Moreover, fighting would no longer 
be restricted to competition with the enemy. Skirmishes on policy would also 
break out within British lines as first-hand military experience of tanks gave rise 
to challenges to Ministry supply
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Chapter Four – From Flers to Churchill’s Recall to Government: The 
Importance of Starting in the Right Direction. 
 
The preceding chapters reveal a belated, stuttering national effort to design 
and develop armoured vehicles suitable for operating in conditions inherently 
disadvantageous to traditional infantry or cavalry operations. In September 1916, 
the BEF had witnessed the first use of its tanks and was therefore able to judge 
from practice, rather than theory, ways in which they might evolve to contribute 
most effectively to future military operations. As in most fields of human 
endeavour there were different views on how to proceed and strongly held views 
on the “best” course of action.  
It was important that the army should set off in the right direction. The design 
and development of heavy military equipment was not a nimble process readily 
responsive to adjustment. It was not known at the time, but Flers represented the 
mid-point of the war: there would be limited opportunities to compensate for or 
correct further false steps or delays. The important issues in this chapter, which 
covers the period from September 1916 to Churchill’s appointment as Minister of 
Munitions in July 1917, are, firstly, improvements to the heavy tank, the original 
specification for which had been severely constrained by initial need to use 
available industrial components and, secondly, the approach to new 
technological and tactical problems, determined in part by the response of 
German defensive doctrine.1 Consideration of these issues would include the 
identification of additional roles for different types of armoured, tracked machines.  
Official and secondary literature tend to concentrate on numbers, but quality 
was also important. After Flers, Rawlinson noted “A great battle. We nearly did a 
big thing.”2 It was not a time for generals to harvest congratulations, rather to 
ensure that subsequent decisions best fitted the prospective future situation, 
thereby yielding a bountiful harvest at a later date. Elementary management 
errors had constrained achievements at Flers. Speed, agility, effectiveness of 
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armour plate and, most importantly, mechanical reliability needed to be improved 
if tanks were to contribute to the achievement of “big things”.  
In the light of the shortage of time before the first 1917 offensives and the 
limited availability of assets required for manufacture of munitions; it was 
important that decisions should be taken quickly. It was likely that trade-offs would 
be required between enhanced quality and numbers of vehicles produced. 
Common sense suggests the army should have had a substantial say in such 
aspects of the development of the tank. Unfortunately, like the bridge player who 
sacrifices any chance of making his contract by the play of the “obvious” card to 
the first trick, the army would forfeit early achievement of the changes it most 
needed by a false move at the outset. By its comments and 1,000-tank order, the 
army over-prioritised continuity of supply and under-prioritised technical 
advancement. In a benign, cooperative atmosphere such an error might have 
been of little consequence. However, earlier struggles over control of the supply 
of munitions, the mishandling and army rejection of the concept of armoured 
vehicles in 1914/1915 and the personalities of principal Ministry and military 
players had resulted in a competitive rather than cooperative atmosphere.  
It was no coincidence that Stern should entitle chapters in his book “Fighting 
the War Office” and “The War Office gets its Way”.3 This theme is evident in The 
Devil’s Chariots, one chapter of which is entitled “The Production Battlefield”.4 
Inter-departmental disagreement and criticism are evident in many memoirs, 
secondary literature and other sources.5 There were also clashes within the same 
camps, notably, Wilson and Swinton suffering at the hands of Stern and GHQ 
respectively.6 In terms of progress, this unsatisfactory state of affairs did not exist 
without penalty. This chapter will examine, in greater depth than attempted by the 
existing scholarship, the consequences, after Flers, of the army’s hastily 
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determined priority for tank numbers without satisfactorily resolving policy for 
model enhancement.  
Conference minutes of 19/20 September 1916 show the course of tank 
production was, in certain respects, determined at this early stage. Attendees 
skated over an issue that would bedevil army/Ministry relations over the following 
two years, namely striking a balance between competing objectives of improving 
the new machine and avoiding disruption to the continuity of production. To the 
wider army, the jury was out, but for GHQ, driven by Haig’s visionary welcome 
for tanks, there was no scope for indecision or delay. Flers represented the bell 
announcing the first round of a fresh bout. The new machines had revealed 
untrodden avenues of design, development and tactical considerations for the 
army to explore in the planning of future offensives.7 Despite their unreliability, 
the original machines had shown sufficient capability to suggest they would 
become increasingly influential as the contest progressed: control of their 
development path was important. Spurred by Haig’s aspirations, GHQ sprang 
into action. Only four days after the tank’s debut, Haig’s representative, Major-
General Butler, led the GHQ contingent at a conference with representatives of 
the War Office and Ministry.8 Having appreciated in a number of instances that 
the tank had been responsible for improved performance in the offensive, Haig 
sought a greatly increased number: “they had saved many lives and had fully 
justified themselves”.9 At the conference Butler placed the seemingly impressive 
order for 1,000 tanks. Minutes show that certain improvements in design were to 
be introduced, but, at that time, the GHQ contingent required that these should 
take place only “as and when possible so as not to delay the present rate of 
output.”10 
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A few days after the conference, Elles was appointed in charge of the Heavy 
Section in France, though his command did not include operational 
responsibilities. Shortly after his appointment, Elles notified GHQ of 
improvements that should be sought to the Mark I.11 Elles favoured a different 
tank design, but understood the decision for improvement to Mark I had been 
taken by Haig.12 It cannot be ascertained whether the decision was that of Haig 
alone or whether Butler and others around him shared that view, but it was 
apparently undertaken without consultation with the officer who was to command 
tanks in France.13 In these circumstances and based on limited battle experience, 
Elles sought changes to provide a more reliable track, reduced vulnerability to 
bellying/sponson jamming, greater engine power and more effective armour. 
Various other issues were also recognised as requiring attention.14 
It would have been better had Elles been appointed before the conference with 
the Ministry and the placing of such a large order. Additionally, in the interests of 
reducing the risk of later misunderstanding or misrepresentation, army 
representatives should have made a written order rather than relying on note-
takers’ minutes at conference. Butler later claimed the minutes did not represent 
an accurate record of decisions.15 He informed Elles that the first paragraph of 
the minutes was “not quite correct”, claiming the actual position was that the 
remainder of the first orders for 150 machines would be completed and a 
“hundred more are on order”, these would: 
be the same design as the present tank with certain modifications to the 
armour, to the roof and to mechanisms, which have been arrived at by 
the experience of the recent fighting. A ‘continuation order’ is to be 
given for these, not necessarily 1,000 and they will go on being turned 
out until the new designed tank can be turned out to take their place, 
i.e. in 4 to 5 months’ time. An order for a thousand of the new design 
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tank, which is the object of the present conference in Paris, is to be 
given when designed.16 
Butler’s objective appears to have been that, after 250 machines had been 
constructed, the Mark I family would be replaced by a redesigned machine, 
eliminating significant shortcomings: this would be available in time for 
operations by the following spring. The Ministry did not cast doubt on the 
practicality of such a programme.17  
Over the following weeks, the slowness, vulnerability and tactical limitations of 
the Mark I would become better appreciated. Elles soon concluded that the “any-
tank-is-better than-no-tank” policy had failed. 18  Unbeknown to Elles, Wilson 
agreed with his assessment and in the winter of 1916/1917 completed much of 
the design work for the Mark V.19 However, Stern was a major obstacle to the 
rapid introduction of enhancements. As Wilson pointed out, Stern could not bring 
himself to mention “design” without a generous preamble of expletives. In part 
the problem was an extension of that experienced in 1915, the designers lacked 
a seat in the tent in which key decisions were taken. Haig’s comments about the 
need for the maximum possible number of tanks for the 1917 Spring Offensives 
was made without an adequate industrial briefing. Further information might not 
have changed his requirements for the immediate future but might have enabled 
him to provide wider comments that could have assisted in defining a timetable 
to secure the qualitative aspirations of Elles and Wilson. 
A continuation order (100 Marks II/III), constructed early in 1917, incorporated 
a number of relatively minor modifications. The purpose of such an order was 
seen by Stern as the protection of the industrial workforce from conscription or 
dispersal and assistance in training tank crews, “On October 16th a further 100 
tanks were ordered to keep the factories going until the design for the 1,000 had 
been settled.”20  
Further modifications would be incorporated later (Mark IV), though it would 
remain in its essential characteristics an unmistakeable descendant of Mark I, 
possessing the major disadvantage of cumbersome procedures involving 
stopping and combined actions by at least the driver and two gears men to 
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change gear or change direction significantly.21 Elles claimed some 90% of tank 
losses occurred when the machines were stationary through ditching or changing 
direction. 22  In these circumstances, improvements to provide a more 
straightforward driving system should have been near the top of the army’s wish 
list rather than below some 600-1,000 machines “of same type” as the 
rudimentary first design.  
The army’s precipitate action resulted in delay obtaining modifications 
necessary to meet tactical requirements. For reasons which no-one made clear, 
though which may in part be explained by the consequences of production 
changes to accommodate three new models, they would also find that Stern and 
manufacturers were again unable to adhere to forecast delivery schedules. The 
defence by the Ministry to claims of delay were based on the effect of changes 
to tank specification.23 Stern claimed that the length of time taken by the army in 
reaching decisions on modifications to the Mark I and shortage of labour were 
responsible for delays in producing Marks II-IV.24 The required specification was 
confirmed by the army in November 1916 at which time Stern adjusted his 
forecast for commencement of Mark IV deliveries from 1 January to 7 February 
1917.25 When production failed to meet this forecast, Stern blamed problems of 
labour supply. This was not supported by Addison when under pressure at the 
War Cabinet and was the subject of a complaint by Taylor of the Ministry’s Labour 
Department that Stern was manufacturing or exaggerating labour difficulties.26 
The army had taken two months to finalise its requirements for changes to the 
Mark I. This may have been a contributory factor in causing delay, but no 
explanation was offered for the construction of fifty Mark III, an experimental 
model. The transition from Mark I to IV involved three sets of changes requiring 
variations in the manufacture of a number of components and in construction 
procedures. It seems likely that the Ministry bit off more than the manufacturers 
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could chew in the relatively short period available before Allied 1917 Spring 
Offensives. Stern’s initial forecast had been in line with Butler’s aspirations and 
his note to Elles.27 Delivery of the first Mark IV was forecast for 1 January 1917 
“working up to 40 a week.” 28  This forecast was varied significantly on 23 
November, when Stern stated that “From February 7th to 31st May, Mark IV 
machines would be produced starting at the rate of 20 per week, production to 
be continued until design is altered. 300 will be ready by end of May.”29 The 
revised forecast may have remained acceptable to the army but, as the launch of 
the spring offensive approached, it became clear that the revised production 
forecast was also unreliable: measures were required to assemble a force for the 
offensives utilising Mark II training machines from France and England and 
surviving Mark I machines.30  
The view at GHQ, that fighting should be left to soldiers, may well have been 
astute and correct.31 Equally there was a case for negotiations to be undertaken 
and requirements to be expressed by those more skilled in visualising progress 
and in expressing themselves in ways appropriate to securing those 
requirements. In the light of GHQ’s reservations about the design of the Mark I, 
Butler’s way-marking at the conference on 19/20 September was entirely 
inappropriate.32  Orders should have been conditional upon, or more closely 
related to, specific changes in design. It is not clear who wrote the conference 
minutes. There is nothing to suggest Swinton was responsible or that any other 
person deemed them to be inaccurate and it may be significant that Butler himself 
did not seek to have them “rectified”. Butler’s explanatory but poorly drafted letter 
to Elles may itself indicate that the case he endeavoured to portray was based 
upon subsequent more careful thoughts rather than any fundamental error in the 
remarks attributed to him by the minutes.  
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In any event, shortly afterwards GHQ attempted to wriggle out of the situation 
by cancelling the 1,000-tank order.33  The charter granted to Stern by Lloyd 
George vested the key control of tank design with the Ministry.34 Nevertheless, 
the army’s ability to influence design through placement of orders was an 
important card at the negotiating table. Following Flers, the Army Council was 
singing from the same hymn sheet as key politicians. In those circumstances it 
should have played its high-ranking card more astutely, maximising its value by 
placing limited orders for machines incorporating only minor changes and 
indicating its intention to place further orders when additional specified 
enhancements had been made. Too late did the Army Council and GHQ realise 
the implications of their actions and attempt to undo the damage by cancelling 
the 1,000 machines referred to in conference minutes as “of same type”.35 When 
informed of the cancellation Stern played his trump card, an appeal to Lloyd 
George. It may have appeared to Lloyd George that the army had reverted to its 
former stance of hostility towards tanks since, by rescinding the order, they were 
casting aside the protection of conformity. Furthermore, the letter was poorly 
drafted, bluntly seeking cancellation of the order rather than stressing 
amendment or clarification, with the objective of improving design, and 
aspirations to seek even greater numbers of an improved product. In the political 
circumstances of the time, the letter could so easily be seen as a red rag and 
would have ensured that Stern’s appeal to Lloyd George, at that time 
conveniently positioned as Minister of War, achieved reinstatement of the original 
order.36 
It would be difficult to overstate the significance of this decision. Production of 
Mark IV would continue as a fighting or supply tank for the remainder of the war.37 
The decision represented a victory for Stern by ensuring continuity of production, 
but represented a setback for Heavy Branch, which sought a more mobile heavy 
 
33 National Archives, MUN4/2790, War Office to MM, 30 September 1916. 
34 National Archives, T173/34B, minute by Lloyd George, 12 February 1916. 
35 National Archives, WO158/836, notes of conference at GHQ, 19 and 20 September 1916. 
36 David Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George (London, Odhams, 1938), p. 385.  
37 National Archives, MUN4/837, Statistics, Tanks, Allies - Position in the Field, November 1918; 
Glanfield, Devil’s Chariots, Appendix 4. The manner in which statistics were kept makes it 
difficult to give a precise date for the output of tanks. The date will vary according to whether it 
is taken as the date of acceptance by/delivery to the Ministry by the tank erecting companies, 
delivery by the Ministry to workshops in France or release from the workshops to Tank units. In 
general terms, the bulk of the order for the Mark IV, as fighting or supply tank, was completed 
by the spring of 1918, though a small number continued to be supplied in the second, third and 
fourth quarters of 1918. 
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tank, and for Walter Wilson who was keen to make improvements.38 Although it 
is not possible to judge with certainty the extent to which the decision delayed the 
production of an enhanced model (Mark V), it clearly facilitated Stern’s drive to 
provide numbers at the expense of the changes that Elles and Wilson wished to 
achieve.39  The existence of such a large order, controversially exceeded by 
Stern, would condemn the army to fight until summer 1918 with a machine 
needing the services of up to four crew members to drive it.40  Continuity of 
production of an existing model may have helped retain elements of the industrial 
workforce, but a price would be paid by the BEF operationally. 
Glanfield recounts the incident of the 1,000-tank order in some detail but does 
not challenge the wisdom of Lloyd George’s decision.41 Harris and Liddell Hart 
do not mention the matter and The History erroneously introduces matters that 
did not influence decisions.42 The general view appears to be that reinstatement 
of the order was advantageous so far as the development of armoured vehicles 
was concerned. Lloyd George anticipated praise for reinstatement, since he 
expressed regret at not having “organised at the outset for a larger supply than 
the War Office demanded”.43 Yet he dealt with the matter without consideration 
of quality and in disregard of the developing technology of the period. When 
acquiring objets d’art it may be advantageous to enter the market as early as 
possible. However, except in special circumstances, for vehicles or weapons the 
advantage is more likely to be found in the purchaser biding time, investing only 
in short-term requirements. The risk otherwise is to become encumbered by 
yesterday’s model. 
So far as British heavy tanks were concerned, the period from late-1916 to 
mid-1918 witnessed two unfulfilled promises/delays that impacted adversely on 
army operations. Firstly, there was a delay in securing a range of enhancements 
 
38 Gordon Wilson, Portrait, p. 52. The Heavy Section MGC became Heavy Branch MGC in 
November 1916. 
39 Ibid, p. 54; National Archives, WO158/845, Elles to GHQ, 30 March 1917. 
40 Williams-Ellis, The Tank Corps, p. 49. 
41 Glanfield, Devil’s Chariots, pp. 160-162. 
42 Ministry of Munitions, History, vol. XII, part 3, p. 37. It is stated that the 1,000-tank order was 
cancelled since the Army Council’s request for supply by 1 March 1917 could not be met. This 
factor is not mentioned in the letter of cancellation of 30 September 1916, which considers 
issues of design and offers the prospect of a continuation order to keep production moving. The 
size and timing of that order are not specified and do not appear to have been explored by 
Stern or Lloyd George with Robertson or the Army Council. 
43 Lloyd George, War Memoirs, pp. 387-388. 
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to form the Mark IV. Certain enhancements were necessary, particularly 
increasing the effectiveness of armour.44 No Mark IVs emerged from workshops 
until April 1917.45 Improvements represented useful advances but they did not 
transform the machines into the next generation of tanks. It must have been 
frustrating for Heavy Branch to fight the Battles of Arras using machines with 
serious defects, yet aware that improvements to be incorporated in replacement 
machines would still not address fundamental changes required to meet tactical 
requirements. Although it may not have been the finished article, a more 
significant advance in quality awaited via the introduction of the Mark V.46 Mark 
V possessed advantages not just in terms of versatility and mechanical reliability, 
but also in ease of maintenance. Williams-Ellis quotes the views of mechanics in 
tank workshops to illustrate the scale of the differences, “Drivers and mechanics 
who have handled both machines seem to regard the running of a Mark V. as 
child’s-play after struggling with the caprices of ‘Mother’.”47 With the 1917 Spring 
Offensives approaching, Haig may have been right that almost any tank was 
better than no tank, but, since the early tanks were decidedly rudimentary, the 
line advocated by Elles to introduce enhanced models as quickly as possible, 
was surely in the best interests of fighting capabilities.48 
In Wilson, Britain had a gifted and energetic engineer who, under astute 
management, would have advanced the supply of improved tanks earlier than 
achieved under Stern’s imperative for numbers over quality.49 It is difficult to find 
a description that does justice to advantages the Mark V eventually bestowed on 
the army, though the Official Historian to the 13th Tank Battalion stated: 
The old Mark IV had serious disadvantages. Its engine power on bad 
ground was insufficient, and the clumsy secondary gears made turning 
slow and difficult…. This, in battle, became a heavy handicap on the 
fighting powers of the Tank. The officer was hampered by the need to 
attend to brakes, and a gunner called upon suddenly to attend to gears 
 
44 Stern, Tanks, pp.113-114. 
45 National Archives, MUN4/774, Weekly Review of Statistics of Output. It should be borne in 
mind that the date of “output” of a tank did not represent the time it became available for use by 
the army. The inspection of the machine, its transport to Avonmouth, Havre and The Loop could 
take several weeks. 
46 National Archives, WO32/5754, Stern to Layton, 10 October 1916. 
47 Williams-Ellis, The Tank Corps, pp. 49-50. 
48 National Archives, WO158/845, Elles to GHQ, 30 March 1917: cf. conclusions at conference 
attended by Haig at War Office, 23 November 1916, “It is very important to consider and adopt 
improvements in design from time to time, but almost any design now is likely to be better than 
no tank.”  
49 National Archives, WO32/5754, Stern to Layton, 10 October 1916. 
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would lose the fleeting chance of firing at favourable targets. In the new 
Mark V. Tank these troubles largely disappeared. An engine of new 
design gave both greater speed and greater turning power, while a 
system of epicyclic gears made turning easy and under the sole control 
of the driver…. an immense advance in type had been secured.50 
Moreover, the justification by Lloyd George for his decision to reinstate the 1,000-
tank order and Stern’s description of events do not appear to be entirely accurate. 
Both Lloyd George and Stern rely in part on the fact that orders had been made 
before the War Office cancellation and could not therefore reasonably be 
stopped.51 Yet the attempt by the War Office to cancel the order was dated 30 
September, some 10 days before Stern claims to have become aware of its 
existence, “on October 10th, I received an official instruction from the Army 
Council cancelling the order”.52 Stern’s memorandum to Layton is significant in 
underlining his tunnel vision: 
the essential point to consider is the continual flow of tanks. I have given 
instructions for the construction of 600 tanks, incorporating the 
improvements suggested by the G.H.Q. both verbally and by letter. 
Delivery of these, will, I hope start on January 1st, working up to 40 a 
week. I hope that a Tank incorporating all the improvements required 
may be ready for manufacture to follow these 600 The design has been 
left to my Department. The requirements and suggestions made by 
G.H.Q. the War Office and Heavy Section, M.G.C. will be incorporated 
at the earliest opportunity.53 
Stern was uncompromising in seeking continuity of construction and in 
emphasising his authority to determine design. Based upon the rate of production 
he envisaged, 600 tanks should have been constructed by April, yet drawings for 
the new machine had not been completed. Gordon Wilson believes his father 
started designing Marks V and VI in “the winter of 1916-17” and observed, mid-
1917, that Stern “was losing sight of the essential task which, in my father’s view 
was the introduction of the Mark V tank at the earliest possible moment”.54 
Furthermore, what happened to the War Office letter between 30 September 
and 10 October? There was no delay in receipt by the Ministry, as witnessed by 
Layton’s memorandum to Stern’s Department, attaching a copy, summarising the 
letter and enquiring “what output you anticipate being able to work to of the 
 
50 Williams-Ellis, The Tank Corps, pp. 193-194. 
51 Stern, Tanks, p. 108; Lloyd George, War Memoirs, p. 385.  
52 Stern, Tanks, pp. 107-108. 
53 National Archives, WO32/5754, Stern to Layton, 10 October 1916. 
54 David Fletcher, The British Tanks 1915-19 (Marlborough, Crowood, 2001), p. 31; Tank 
Museum, A. Gordon Wilson, Draft Biography of Walter Wilson, p. 120. 
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present design and whether a continuation order is likely to be necessary”.55 The 
memorandum also asked, “when the new design is likely to be ready”? It thus 
seems most unlikely Stern was unaware of the cancellation until 10 October. Yet 
there appears to be no record of Stern responding to Layton’s memorandum 
earlier than that date, indeed no record apparent on Ministry files of any 
correspondence emanating from Stern between 30 September and 10 October. 
However, in Stern’s papers there is a copy of a note to Montagu dated 6 October 
giving production estimates for tanks and stating “we are producing 1,000 tanks 
with the least possible delay. This design will be the same as the present ‘Tank’ 
with slight improvements, until we have evolved the new design. The supply will 
be continuous”.56 
Stern had returned from France on 28 September.57 He spent some part of the 
following week escorting H. G. Wells around Metropolitan’s works. He appears to 
have been active at the Ministry during part of the first week of October so must 
have known of the cancellation before 10 October. The wording of his note to 
Montagu suggests that, notwithstanding reassurances about introducing the 
Mark V after 600 Mark IV had been constructed, his intention was that the full 
1,000 should be built. His note to the sympathetic Montagu was less guarded 
than his note to the communicative Layton since he would have been aware that 
the latter was likely to distribute content externally. It appears he may have 
chosen to ignore the letter for some four to ten days. The History provides no 
information material to the timing of Stern’s knowledge of the cancellation, simply 
stating that an order was placed for 600 machines “to enable the full output to be 
maintained until machines of the new types were ready to take their place.”58 In 
the event, production figures show no output of Mark IV until April and no release 
of mechanically acceptable Mark IV to units in France until May.59 This was 
four/five months later than the date initially quoted by Stern.60 The appearance of 
 
55 National Archives, WO158/836, DMRS to TSD, 2 October 1916. 
56 Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, Stern Papers, Stern 1/2/2, Stern to Montagu, 6 
October 1916. 
57 Stern, Tanks, p.105. 
58 Ministry of Munitions, History, vol. XII, part III, p. 37. 
59 National Archives, WO158/814, Elles to Anley, 6 May 1917; WO95-91-1, War Diary of HQ 
Heavy Branch records Mark IV tanks arriving from 20 April, but none being issued till 9 May. 
60 Ministry of Munitions, History, vol. XII, part III, p. 50. It is recorded that some nineteen Mark IV 
machines were “shipped to France by the middle of April”, but a Board reported they were “unfit 
for fighting and the whole position pointed to lack of adequate inspection at home”. The 
timeframe and numbers are roughly in line with the War Diary of Heavy Branch HQ. A list of 
complaints dated 7 May 1917 was received by the Ministry from the Army Council following 
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a replacement model incorporating modifications the Tank Corps was so anxious 
to receive (Mark V) failed to materialise until 1918, some seven months later than 
Stern had forecast.61 
It is quite clear someone was being less than straightforward about events 
early in October 1916. The finger of suspicion points towards Stern, who would 
appear to have ignored the cancellation of the 1,000-tank order, probably 
enabling him to render it more difficult or embarrassing for cancellation to be 
achieved. Stern had form in displacing facts less than supportive of his approach 
by ones more agreeable. This was made clear by Taylor of the Ministry’s Labour 
Department, since, following Stern’s comments at the Minister’s meeting on 27 
February 1917, Taylor informed Kellaway, the Ministry’s Parliamentary Secretary, 
of the facts concerning the labour position at Metropolitan and Daimler. He 
thought it desirable that “such misleading statements as those made by Colonel 
Stern, ought not to pass unchallenged.”62 Taylor was concerned that Stern’s 
comments would reflect badly on the Labour Department, but the reason for 
Stern’s exaggeration or invention of difficulties of labour supply is likely to have 
been to establish this in the minds of those present as the reason for delays in 
the output of tanks. Stern was a forceful character, deeply committed to his role 
in spearheading the production of tanks, proud to disregard the views of others 
and the limitations of his own authority and convinced of the rectitude of his case. 
There seems little doubt that to Stern the ends would justify the means. This is 
well illustrated by his comments at a conference on engine supply.63  Stern 
recorded: 
General Henderson asked that I should be prevented from employing 
five special firms in making 700 Ricardo engines, in anticipation of tanks 
that had not yet been ordered. I said that I had ordered these engines 
with foresight to prevent the shortage of engines for tanks such as they 
were now experiencing with aircraft. In spite of this the Committee 
approved his resolution. However, I took no notice of it. We continued 
 
inspection in France, see National Archives, MUN4/2791, Stern to Layton, undated but 
responding to each of the complaints. The complaints were generally of a minor nature, many 
relating to the introduction of the Lewis Gun into the Mark IV contrary to the advice of the 
Ministry, which claimed it was not suited to the space and openings within the tank and was 
more prone to external damage than the Hotchkiss or Vickers. HB’s infatuation with the Lewis 
gun lasted a mere five months, following which they sought the reintroduction of the Hotchkiss, 
see, MUN4/2791, 6 May 1917, ‘Report on Machine Gun for Tanks’ by Special Committee 
chaired by Lt.-Colonel Lannowe. 
61 National Archives, WO32/5754, Stern to Layton, 10 October 1916. 
62 National Archives, MUN4/2791, Taylor to Kellaway, 27 February 1917. 
63 Ibid, Minutes of ‘Conference on Supply of Petrol Engines’, 5 February 1917. 
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the building of the 700 engines, and in order not to stop the continuity 
of manufacture, I gave an order for another 700.”64  
Stern fails to mention that following discussions at the conference on 5 February, 
Haig wrote to the War Office supporting views expressed on his behalf by Butler, 
namely that in respect of engine production the “essential requirements for the 
air service in France must have priority.” A copy of this letter was sent to Colonel 
Stern.65 It may be significant that Stern does not confirm whether his moves were 
successful in enabling tanks to bypass national priorities since other documents 
suggest the priority for aircraft was enforced. The nation’s industrial resources 
were stretched and Stern was not exhibiting the responsible approach warranted, 
particularly as the “first of the initial 700 [engines] had not yet been tested, but we 
believed in them.”66  In this instance Stern had taken expert advice and the 
development of the Ricardo engine he organised was successful.67 However, his 
faith in his judgment did not always reap dividends, a fact which he acknowledged 
in respect of the petrol-electric transmission he had admired on a visit to France. 
The system performed so poorly in tests in January 1917 that “all orders were 
cancelled”.68  
The electric drive wasted too much of the already inadequate 
horsepower. This ‘improvement’ thus turned out to be a failure. By then, 
however, Stern, in his impetuous way, had ordered 600 sets of these 
electric drives without consulting Wilson who, reasonably enough felt 
Stern had trespassed on his preserves.69 
Aware of the army’s requirement for an easier system for driving the machines, 
Stern rejected the option of implementing Wilson’s solution, he preferred instead 
to organise an event at Oldbury at which a range of companies demonstrated the 
capabilities of alternative future machines. Stern would have been embarrassed 
by the fact that Wilson’s epicyclic system was the clear winner of the Oldbury 
event. It would appear that at no stage was Stern able to recognise, admit or take 
full advantage of Wilson’s ability.70 
In terms of numbers produced, the value of the Mark IV cannot be disputed 
since it accounted for approximately 50% of British heavy tanks constructed 
 
64 Stern, Tanks, pp. 124-125. 
65 National Archives, WO158/804, Haig to War Office, 11 February 1917. 
66 Stern, Tanks 1914-1918, p. 125. 
67 Ministry of Munitions, History, vol. XII, pp. 42-43; Stern, Tanks, pp. 123-125. 
68 Stern, Tanks, pp. 120-121. 
69 Gordon Wilson, Portrait, p. 53. 
70 Ibid. 
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before the Armistice.71 On the other hand, it is difficult to challenge the assertion 
that much of the nation’s resource for the manufacture of armoured vehicles was 
tied up for a significant period in the production of a model that did not meet 
operational needs effectively. Elles led the call for progress as early as 
September 1916.72 Mark IV incorporated a number of the improvements sought 
by Elles and GHQ but most significantly did not provide one-man control or 
increased engine power. By March 1917 Elles was describing the Mark IV, which 
at that time still existed only on the drawing board or production lines, as 
“rudimentary and possesses defects which make it very expensive as regards 
personnel and material and very difficult to use tactically”.73 By April 1917 Elles 
had concluded the “Mark IV machine will not do what we want”.74  
Stern would claim on a number of occasions that completion of the 1,000-tank 
order would not delay commencement of an improved model. These claims were 
not confirmed by events. The output of Mark IV exceeded 1,100 before any Mark 
V was assembled.75 Stern also claimed the 1,000-tank order would be completed 
by 30 June 1917, yet this output was not achieved until December 1917.76 It 
would appear Stern did not forego any opportunity to stress the problems of the 
tank erectors in switching production from an existing manufacturing run to a new 
product.77 No reason is seen to dispute the comments of Stern or Metropolitan 
on manufacturers’ preferred timescales for completion of orders. However, the 
question that should have been addressed was whether economy in the use of 
stockpiles of materials and subservience to manufacturers’ timescales paid 
sufficient regard to military circumstances. How should the balance sheet weigh 
the advantage to the BEF of delayed delivery of machines capable of greater 
speed and manoeuvrability under the control of one driver against earlier delivery 
of a greater number of less efficient machines? It seems unlikely that, given 
sufficiently attractive financial terms, tank erectors and their labour force would 
 
71 Glanfield, Devil’s Chariots, Appendices 3 and 4. 
72 National Archives, WO158/836, Elles to GHQ, 30 September 1916. 
73 National Archives, WO158/805, Elles to GHQ, 30 March 1917. 
74 National Archives, MUN4/700, Elles to Anley, 23 April 1917. For a description of the difficulty 
in steering Marks I to IV see Williams-Ellis, The Tank Corps, p. 194. 
75 National Archives, MUN4/774 and MUN4/775, Weekly Review of Output Statistics. 
76 Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, Stern Papers, Stern to Montagu, 6 October 1916; 
National Archives, MUN4/5168, MUN4/774 and MUN4/775, Weekly Review of Output Statistics. 
77 National Archives. See for example, MUN5/210, minutes of meeting at MM, 8 October 1917, 
note of comment by Stern to the effect that manufacturers sought a 20-week run; Liddell Hart 
Centre for Military Archives, Stern Papers, Stern1/2/3, minutes of meeting at MWD, 3 October 
1917, at which Stern made a similar comment. 
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have declined to vary what Stern regarded as inevitable or desirable industrial 
practices. 
There appears to have been no meaningful debate on this subject at any of 
the many conferences held between the army and Ministry or at internal Ministry 
meetings. Yet construction could be varied, albeit subject to inconvenience and, 
possibly, financial consequences, since this was achieved by the curtailment of 
production on the Mark V in the summer of 1918 in favour of the longer Mark V*, 
held to be needed to cross wider German trenches.78  
Stern may not have grasped the full intention of Haig’s approach. In November 
1916 Haig was recorded as stating “It is very important to consider and adopt 
improvements in design from time to time, but almost any design now is likely to 
be better than no tank.”79 Haig’s immediate intention, undoubtedly governed by 
anticipated requirements for 1917 spring offensives, which could have been little 
more than three months ahead, was therefore clear. Yet, it was inappropriate for 
Stern to interpret short-term requirements as advocacy of long-term abstinence 
from change. Rather, approaching circumstances always needed to be borne in 
mind to judge the right time to make improvements. In all cases plans were 
needed in order that changes could be implemented at the least inopportune 
moment. Stern failed to do this, preferring in 1917 to redirect work from the 
preparations for the Mark V by switching efforts to other tracked models sought 
by the army but which might be seen as lower priorities than the main battle tank. 
In the fullness of time those other models were produced too late to impact on 
the war.80  
The army also does not appear to have approached supply in the correct 
manner, showing excessive irritation at the lack of change. This reaction was 
based on failure to appreciate the reasons why the achievement of the changes 
they desired, and production in general, took so long. It was not until August 1918 
that a body was established that promised to approach supply from a more 
comprehensive understanding of problems. The key issue to be determined was 
that of the least disadvantageous time at which to incur penalties of supply from 
 
78 National Archives, MUN5/211, Duckham to Churchill, 4 October 1917. 
79 National Archives, WO158/845, minutes of conference attended by Haig at War Office, 23 
November 1916, 
80 Gordon Wilson, Portrait, p. 54; National Archives, MUN4/851, Tanks (Position in the Field) 
records that there were no Medium B and just 3 Mark IX in France by w/e 17 November 1918. 
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interruption of output necessary to introduce improvements. Such decisions 
needed to be taken in the light of the tactical situation, seasonal conditions, 
manufacturing capabilities, lost production that might be anticipated from the 
implementation of change and the value of improvements that could be 
introduced. However, not all shortcomings can be laid at the door of Stern and 
the Ministry, since the army had little understanding of the time taken to translate 
the means of securing benefits from design changes onto production lines. The 
MWSD were either in a similar position or chose not to reveal the true position to 
the army or wider Ministry.81 
During preparations for the Battle of Flers, the failure of the Ministry and 
industry to meet predicted output levels did not assist the establishment of 
harmonious relations.82 Stern’s allocation of priority to the production of tanks in 
quantity coupled to unrealistic production forecasts and unprofessional standards 
of inspection, fuelled friction and discontent.83 Tank supply involved difficulties in 
reconciling problems of industrial production and military tactics in an atmosphere 
of personal sensitivities and rivalries. Late in 1916 the situation was about to 
become more complex owing to the extension of tactical objectives beyond the 
initial aims of neutralising enemy defences by destroying machine-guns, 
flattening wire and crossing and enfilading trenches. The additional dimensions 
centred on a growing appreciation of the benefits of armoured caterpillar vehicles 
to fulfil a variety of other roles on the battlefield. Such roles included assistance 
in the consolidation of territorial gains through the supply of ammunition, food and 
equipment to forward units. They also included exploitation by lighter, faster tanks 
of any initial breakthrough secured through assistance to infantry by artillery and 
heavy tanks. Enhanced mobility was also required for forward movement of 
artillery and personnel to consolidate gains against counter-attack and support 
further advances.84 In terms of experience, qualifications and inclination Stern, 
was ill-equipped to fulfil this complex managerial role. 
 
81 National Archives, MUN5191, Wilson to Maclean, 31 October 1918, Wilson’s internal 
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82 National Archives, WO158/816, Elles to Capper, 1 March 1918. 
83 National Archives, WO158/814, Elles to Anley, 23 April 1917. 
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Furthermore, difficulties in developing tactics for offensives were accentuated 
by an enemy efficient in honing countermeasures. The relatively primitive, 
shallow defences facing the BEF at Neuve Chapelle in the spring of 1915 had, 
by 1917, increased vertically, horizontally and in quality. 85  This had been 
discovered and appreciated by some assault troops before the fateful 1 July 
1916, though was not acknowledged appropriately in terms of tactical planning: 
General Snow [VII Corps commander] and his staff…[tell] us that we 
shall have practically no casualties, because all the Germans will have 
been killed by our artillery barrage…We know however that the 
Germans have dugouts 40 feet deep….”.86 
The defensive system had also spread horizontally comprising several lines and 
tactical deployment stretching back in places for many miles. By 1917 German 
tactics envisaged the first 1-1.5 miles being lightly manned, with counter-attack 
forces held further back thereby less vulnerable to the growing power of Allied 
artillery.87 
There was no fundamental disagreement between BEF and Ministry over an 
expanded role for armoured vehicles. Despite claims by Stern, it is fair to say 
there is greater evidence of forward thinking in France, notably through Elles and 
the Tank Corps, than at the Ministry.88 This more advanced thought is most 
notable in relation to the Supply Tank. Speed of movement of supplies was an 
important factor either as a basis for further forward movement, before the enemy 
could deploy reserves to reform its lines to contain a potential breakthrough, or 
to resist counter-attack. This problem was appreciated not only at GHQ, but also 
by units that found much of their effort and manpower being expended on forward 
movement of supplies and ammunition. Rackham records in a report for the 
Ministry in August 1917 “It is everywhere agreed that it is of the utmost 
importance that Supply Tanks are sent out as soon as possible, and I believe 
every effort should be made to have the first experimental machine completed by 
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Christmas”.89 Rackham’s report is significant in two respects. Firstly, it shows 
Ministry experimental facilities in a particularly unfavourable light, well behind 
forward thinking in France, since an experimental model less than eleven months 
before the end of the war was scarcely setting the bar at an ambitious level and, 
secondly, owing to remarks about the Drawing Office “it is essential that we get 
as many draughtsmen on the job as possible”. Some twelve months later, with 
an experienced industrialist in charge of the Supply Department, the confused 
state of the Drawing Office would be identified as a key defect.  
So far as the logistical importance of Supply Tanks is concerned, Fuller 
illustrated this by recalling how, at Hamel in 1918, Supply Tanks delivered some 
20-25 tons of engineering stores to a point only a few hundred yards to the rear 
of the captured objective within half an hour of it being taken. He calculated 1200 
men would have been needed to deliver this quantity of stores.90 Unfortunately 
for the army, in the hands of poor management, the Ministry’s role authorised by 
Lloyd George prior to the development of tanks represented a potential obstacle 
to military design aspirations.91 It could be used by those not directly involved in 
the use of the machines to the frustration of a BEF anxious to redirect design and 
manufacturing effort into line with its own developing ideas on the form of 
armoured assistance it required. In reality it is likely the BEF/War Office had 
insufficient understanding of the time taken to design and put into production 
machines incorporating the amendments sought. Their objectives were 
unachievable within the aspired timescale. Nevertheless, the situation called for 
compromise. Despite the value of his enthusiasm and drive, Stern failed to 
resolve conflicting priorities satisfactorily. In part this appears to have been the 
result both of excessive consideration for the aspirations of industrialists 
concerning methods of production and of his inability to assess the appropriate 
weight to give to military comment and aspirations. Standing at the junction of 
technological, military and industrial expertise, Stern lacked the qualities 
essential for successful management and the understanding of the elements 
required to operate most efficiently. 
 
89 Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, Stern Papers, Stern 1/10/9, report by Rackham 
dated 22 August 1917 following his visit to France from 7 to 21 August. 
90 Fuller, Tanks, p. 168. 
91 National Archives, ADM116/1339, minute by Lloyd George, approved by Director of Finance 
at the Ministry of Munitions, 12 February 1916. 
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Decisions and achievements by the Ministry during the first eighteen months 
of its responsibility for tank production suggest that by mid-1917 the army was 
deserving of a more influential position at the munitions “High Table”. In terms of 
procedures and responsibilities it was paying the penalty both for its earlier 
inability to predict and embrace change and technology in advance of emerging 
or developing military circumstances and for lack of political priority for army 
funding. The response of politicians to a laggard army had been to strip it of the 
ability to control its own supply of weaponry.92 The moves to gather into civilian 
control the responsibilities for the supply of munitions may have been justified in 
1914-1915, but politicians should have responded earlier, or in a more thoughtful 
way, to changes within the army, and to its unique position as end-user. In the 
interests of national efficiency, the army should have been assigned a more 
effective representation on tank design. However, benefitting perhaps from his 
military credentials, it was not until Seely took charge of tank production at the 
Ministry that the heat was apparently taken out of the “power struggle” over 
design and supply of armoured vehicles. By that time just three/four months 
remained of a fifty-one-month war, too little time for changes to have an effect. 
The army would not regain greater control over the design of weaponry until 1919. 
There were four Ministers of Munitions during the Ministry’s wartime existence. 
They played an important role in the ways in which they supervised and became 
involved in the supply of armoured vehicles. Lloyd George as the first Minister 
had added tanks to the Ministry’s responsibilities but became Secretary of State 
for War before any tanks were delivered to the BEF. Montagu was in office from 
July to December 1916 during which time the Mark I was supplied to the BEF and 
used in later Battles of the Somme. However, for the greater part of the period 
covered by this chapter Addison occupied the position. Both Montagu and 
Addison experienced pressure from the army for greater involvement in decisions 
about tank supply. 
Montagu’s attitude towards army representations is well illustrated by a 
handwritten note in November 1916 as GHQ began to appreciate from 
 
92 R. J. Q. Adams, Arms and the Wizard: Lloyd George and the Ministry of Munitions 1915-
1916, pp. 19-27 and 42-43; John Alfred Spender and Cyril Asquith, Life of Herbert Henry 
Asquith, Lord Oxford and Asquith (London, Hutchinson, 1932), pp. 136-140. 
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experience at Flers that the tank would progressively become more significant in 
future operations: 
I do not want a row with the WO if one can be avoided but I am inclined 
to observe (1) that surely the arrangements made here as to who is to 
have charge of tank construction and who is to inspect them are matters 
for me to decide.93  
The kernel of Montagu’s response was polite but uncompromising resistance, 
since the War Office was informed that the Minister “has already made 
arrangements for the design, supply, and inspection of the Tanks asked for by 
the War Office”. 94  The slow rate of enhancement to the tank, low rate of 
manufacture and failure to meet forecast delivery dates fuelled army frustrations, 
which had their roots both in the unfulfilled supply forecasts prior to Flers and in 
dissatisfaction with the quality of the Mark I.95 Montagu’s reply to further War 
Office advances for greater influence or control over design was polite rejection, 
offering simply that “any suggestion as to alteration in pattern and design…..will 
receive the fullest consideration.”96  No agreement was reached but the War 
Office would appear to have allowed sleeping dogs to lie over the winter. During 
his relatively brief spell as Minister, Montagu was supportive of Stern’s efforts to 
build tanks.97 However, his tenure of the office should have been marked by a 
willingness to concede a greater role for the army in determining tank design. 
Neither he nor Stern appears to have possessed appropriate qualities to achieve 
a harmonious and beneficial relationship with the War Office. 
In December 1916, when Lloyd George became Prime Minister, Montagu was 
replaced by Addison who had little time for Stern’s single-minded approach to the 
problems of armoured vehicles. Addison had occupied high office at the Ministry 
since its formation and should have been well placed to judge how best to include 
the army in decisions on the supply and design of tanks and how to handle a 
difficult member of staff such as Stern. Since the tank was no longer an 
experimental machine, he removed the protection of Lloyd George’s Charter from 
Stern’s Department but did not resolve problems associated with tank supply. 
 
93 National Archives, MUN4/2796, Montagu handwritten note on circulating memorandum from 
Layton to Phipps following receipt from the War Office of a request for consultation on tank 
specification, 16 October 1916. 
94 National Archives, MUN5/210, Phipps to War Office, 17 November 1916. 
95 National Archives, WO158/814, Elles to Anley, 4 May 1917 and WO158/845, Elles to GHQ, 
30 March 1917. 
96 National Archives, MUN5/210, Phipps to WO, 17 November 1916. 
97 Stern, Tanks, p. 113. 
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During Addison’s period as Minister, the MWSD failed to ensure the supply of 
Mark IV tanks for use during the 1917 Spring Offensives and failed to complete 
the design and preparations for the introduction of the Mark V.98 The inspection 
system also failed to prevent output of sub-standard work, resulting in an 
increased corrective burden for engineering workshops in France.99 
Those involved gave many reasons for delays in production. The problem in 
attempting to identify the limiting factors at any particular time lies in the range of 
manufacturing circumstances and the number of components required to achieve 
the finished article within a particular timescale. Shortage or delay in the 
availability of almost any single component was capable of delaying output, even 
the availability of appropriate screws.100 Explanations for delays fell into three 
broad categories, managerial weaknesses, shortage of the sinews of production, 
i.e. materials, components, labour, facilities and finance and competing priorities 
for production necessities.101  
Managerial efforts were not assisted by the fact that Stern was neither an 
engineer nor industrialist. 102  He may therefore have sought shelter in the 
acceptance of practices advocated by others when the merits of their views 
should have been debated. Shortages, particularly of labour, are frequently 
advanced to explain delays in production, but there appear to be no cases of 
conclusive evidence justifying claims. This issue will be examined more closely 
in the chapter dealing with the final months of the war when an experienced 
industrialist prepared a report dealing with the organisation of the MWSD. 
Upon the failure of Addison, the new and perhaps weaker Minister, to deliver 
the Mark IV in time for the Arras offensives, the War Office may well have scented 
they were pursuing a wounded animal. The attempt to increase army influence 
 
98 Wilson, Portrait, pp. 51-54. 
99 National Archives, MUN4/2790, Stern to Layton, in response to War Office letter to MM, 7 
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102 Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, Stern Papers, Stern 1/2/3, Duckham to Churchill, 4 
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was therefore renewed.103 Lloyd George, as new PM, was made fully aware of 
poor performance by his former Ministry in tank production.104 Addison endured 
an embarrassing time at the War Cabinet on 22 March 1917.105 Nevertheless, 
the War Office failed to secure the controls they sought and settled in May for a 
Tank Committee that, in respect of design, was advisory. Stern and d’Eyncourt 
were the representatives of the Ministry on this Committee, which was assigned 
the role of formulating specifications, which the MWSD should put into effect, 
approving designs before manufacture and directing field trials. 106  The 
Committee did not work smoothly. It lacked representation from Heavy Branch, 
the most knowledgeable unit on the use of tanks in action. It also endeavoured 
to expand its role. Numerical representation on the Committee invariably led to 
Stern and d’Eyncourt being outvoted.107 The consequence of this was that they 
refused to attend Committee meetings.108  
Although he stops short of direct criticism, it is clear Stern did not consider the 
fire of armoured warfare to burn within Addison. Later in the year, in response to 
Churchill’s questions on experimentation, Stern claimed “I have had the greatest 
trouble to get anything, because we have been an experimental department. I 
have had practically no assistance to carry on my business at all. We can get 
neither officers nor engineers”.109 The History describes how “projects for further 
development of experimental facilities met with little support”, resulting in Addison 
rejecting a scheme for the utilisation of Foster’s workshops at Lincoln for 
experimental purposes on the grounds that “the future of tanks was still too 
uncertain”.110 The History seeks to justify this decision on grounds of prematurity, 
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but it was later overturned by Churchill.111 Since the Army Council had seen fit to 
order 1,000 additional heavy machines and was also considering other forms of 
tanks for additional specialised purposes, it appears quite incorrect to use this 
argument to reject proposals for expanding experimentation. Rather, the 
enlargement of experimental facilities might more appropriately have been 
viewed as a means whereby the Ministry might influence debate within the army. 
It could be argued that tangible evidence in the form of efficient prototypes serving 
a wider range of functions would have represented the most effective way to 
tempt the army along the path of armoured warfare.  
Addison’s decision on experimentation at Lincoln was not untypical of his 
approach to his Ministerial responsibilities. He failed during his period in office to 
resolve the wider organisational problems caused by rapid expansion of the 
Ministry and failed specifically to address poor performance on tank 
production.112 In March 1917 Addison was called upon to explain to the War 
Cabinet why so few tanks were supplied to support actions designed to assist 
later large-scale French offensives. Hankey’s minutes are brief but reveal a 
number of issues of interest by comparison with the memoirs of Stern and The 
History.113  
The explanations/excuses advanced by Addison were numerous, vague and 
confused. He argued that the original estimate for tank output contained 
miscalculations. Though tanks had first been used in September 1916, final 
design had not been approved till 23 November: drawings were not ready until 7 
January. The latest estimates envisaged a delay of a month or six weeks in arrear 
of the original estimate and “everything” was being done to speed supply “as 
much as possible”. He was dissatisfied with tank organisation and was taking 
steps to improve it. Total deliveries at that time were 250 machines, though, if 
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requirements for spares for the 1,000-tank order were of the same magnitude as 
for tanks already supplied, it would be impossible to keep anything like 1,000 
tanks available for service. 
It is not clear which estimate was considered by Addison to represent “the 
original”.114 Since the report is concerned about delays in the production of the 
Mark IV, it would be anticipated that all comments should relate to the production 
process for that model. However, a number of comments clearly pre-date the 
commencement or specification and design of the Mark IV and could also or 
alternatively relate to Marks II and/or III. If Addison was referring to Mark IV, the 
relevant forecast appears to be that given by Stern, when, with a misplaced sense 
of precision, he adjusted his original forecast for production of Mark IV to 20/week 
from 7 February increasing to provide 300 by 31 May 1917: production would 
then continue till the design was altered. Arrival of the Mark V was anticipated 
about August/September 1917.115 This date was later put back to October: none 
were delivered until 1918.116 
Contradicting Addison’s figures, the MGO informed the War Cabinet that there 
were only sixty tanks in France or in transit that were fit for service: Addison’s 250 
included those destroyed during the battles of the Somme, those out of 
commission through want of spare parts and wastage during training. The War 
Cabinet “observed with concern that the number of Tanks available in the 
immediate future….is less than the number available last September.” However, 
there is no record of a more coordinated explanation being sought from the 
somewhat jumbled facts advanced by Addison. There is also no record of 
Addison being challenged on his comments about spares, yet he appears to have 
had no regard to the possibility of the demand being reduced by adjustment of 
design or upgrading of components.117 Bearing in mind the seriousness of the 
military position, Addison appears to have been insufficiently contrite and to have 
been let off lightly. In his diary, Addison’s comments on the issue are short and 
superficial. He criticises Stern’s Department for “a far too sanguine estimate of 
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immediate deliveries and has let us down badly”.118 He acknowledges that Mark 
IV tanks “will certainly be a month late, although from the military point of view it 
may be a good thing, as it will mean the tanks will not be used in bad weather.”119 
Bearing in mind the first Mark IVs were many months late, the daily level of British 
casualties for the battles were higher than for other major battles during the war, 
the Mark I-II tanks forced into use were not resistant to AP bullets and poor 
mechanical condition had required the return of the first Mark IV deliveries to 
England for remedial works, Addison’s injudicious comments were unlikely to 
have been well received in post-war military circles.  
Only three months earlier Lloyd George had received considerable support 
from Addison when rising to the premiership.120 Addison’s subsequent elevation 
to Minister and survival in the face of the War Cabinet’s concern may therefore 
not have been based entirely on merit. Following a brief period, that would have 
served to disassociate his departure from Munitions from criticisms of his 
performance, and with, perhaps, the face-saving feature of departing at his own 
request, Addison would leave the Ministry for a new position as Minister of 
Reconstruction. Had he departed shortly after the rebuke by the War Cabinet, 
Lloyd George might have been tainted by association. However, the most 
important consideration was the extraordinary weakness of his paper to Cabinet. 
Addison failed to explain the nature of and responsibility for alleged 
miscalculations, did not properly explain the design issue and appeared to 
muddle four different Marks of tank. He gave no detail of his reasons for 
dissatisfaction with the organisation or the steps being taken to improve it and did 
not elaborate on his depressing comment about the future of the proposed 
additional 1,000 tanks and why their reliability should not be improved in order to 
reduce wear and demand for spares. 121  However, perhaps the most 
disconcerting element of his report was his comment that the delay might only be 
four to six weeks. This revealed the absence of appropriate recognition of the 
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importance of complying with the scheduling of the major spring offensive and 
insensitivity to the well-being of those whom he was serving.  
For Heavy Branch recruits, tasked, in certain phases of the forthcoming 
battles, with leading the advance on enemy positions, and to the infantry being 
supported, safety within the tank and the number of tanks available to take part 
in the initial advance were of fundamental importance. Addison’s dismissive 
reference to delays as “only four to six weeks”, was ill-advised: this would prove 
to be the difference between availability for Arras and missing participation in the 
battles altogether. Tank supply for Arras was even less satisfactory than for Flers 
in 1916.122  
Addison’s comment concerning spare parts touched upon an issue that 
generated much debate in the Ministry and BEF and could have had a bearing 
on the rate of production, though the extent and nature of records do not provide 
any conclusive data on the issue. At the commencement of production in bulk in 
1916 it had been the practice of firms engaged in the assembly of tanks to place 
contracts for small components with other firms. The History states that, in 
consequence, overlapping resulted and the limited facilities for production were 
overtaxed. In 1917 the Department undertook to provide contractors with a range 
of components. The inspection staff also undertook duties associated with 
advising contractors how best to obtain parts, labour or higher priority for their 
war work. This reorganisation appears sound in principle but required the 
arrangement of inspection of components and supervision of progress at the 
premises of both contractors and sub-contractors during manufacture. Such a 
system should have been more efficient but may have resulted in the creation of 
a sizeable, complex role for a group insufficiently diligent or capable of 
undertaking it. This possibility is consistent with the non-specific conclusion in 
 
122 Various predictions were made for the delivery of the Mark IV to the BEF, dates becoming 
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The History that this “combination of the duties of inspection with responsibility 
for progress did not prove entirely satisfactory in its results”.123 
A further unsatisfactory element of Ministry operations centred on 
responsibility for tank supply and final inspection before release for military use. 
The objectives of production and inspection staff clashed since the producers 
wished to accelerate supply whereas inspection should have been concerned to 
ensure that all tanks leaving for France were fit for action.124 The History muddies 
the water in relation to the nature of the problem since it did not result from the 
work of inspectors advising contractors on how best to secure parts, labour etc, 
but from the conflicting requirements of accelerating output to meet Ministry and 
military pressures whilst ensuring quality of the “finished” product. Consequences 
of allowing sub-standard work to pass through the inspection process were 
calculated by the receiving workshops in France to amount to some two/three 
weeks being added to rectify faults before clearance of machines for combat.125 
Difficulties were appreciated both in the Ministry and Heavy Branch in England, 
but there appears to have been a lack of willingness to resolve the problem. 
Brigadier-General Anley, Swinton’s successor, informed Elles in May 1917: 
almost directly I took over this job [replacing Swinton] I represented as 
strongly as I could how unsatisfactory it was that the producer should 
also be the examiner…..It is not very much use tackling Stern: he 
always agrees, but the result is generally nothing.126  
Problems with inspection had been identified by Swinton as early as August 
1916. He downplayed the seriousness but proposed a system of inspection for 
all tanks at a new testing ground at Oldbury to be supervised by Heavy Section.127 
No doubt it was for “diplomatic” reasons that Swinton chose not to ruffle feathers 
by criticism which he would have regarded as unproductive, but in the event his 
 
123 Ministry of Munitions, History of the Ministry of Munitions, vol. XII, part 3, Tanks, pp. 46-47. 
124 National Archives, the complaint about faults on newly delivered machines and the failure of 
the Ministry to separate functions is made on numerous occasions, e.g., WO158/814, Anley to 
Elles, 4 May 1917, MUN5/211, War Office to Ministry of Munitions, 3 July 1917 and DMRS to 
DGIM, 28 June 1917; WO2791, War Office to Ministry of Munitions, 26 June 1917 and Findings 
of Board of Enquiry, 26 April 1917.  
125 Ministry of Munitions, History, vol. XII, part 3, p. 63. 
126 National Archives, WO158/814, Anley to Elles, 4 May 1917. For a different view of the 
inspection issue see MUN4/2790, notes of Sixth Meeting of the Tank Committee, 22 June 1917, 
when the Committee, despite its concerns about inspection, accepted the representations of 
Stern and d’Eyncourt that “there would be great danger of delay in the delivery of tanks should 
any change be made” and put the matter off till the end of the year, though with a strong request 
that “a high official with great experience in the Inspection Department of the Ministry of 
Munitions should be lent to the Mechanical Warfare Supply Department”.  
127 National Archives, MUN4/2790, Swinton to Bird, 29 August 1916.  
 175 
proposals were overtaken by unexpected termination of his command of tanks in 
England.128 
Stern’s approach to inspection is difficult to excuse. Officers in France 
explained how delay in rectifying faults could lead to accelerated wear of parts, 
spares for which were “so difficult to obtain”. 129  Heavy Branch made 
unsatisfactory tank quality even worse by requiring the replacement of the original 
Hotchkiss machine-guns in tanks by Lewis guns. This was a decision they would 
reverse only five months later following formation of a Special Committee to 
consider the make of machine-gun to be used. Reporting in May 1917, its main 
findings were that Mark IV tanks being delivered to France were not in an efficient 
fighting condition as regards Lewis Gun Mountings, that no date could be 
estimated for rendering them efficient and that the position pointed to a lack of 
adequate inspection in England. Though outside its terms of reference, the Board 
noted sixteen other problems resulting from faulty design, inadequate inspection 
or showing a lack of consideration and professionalism. 130  For example, 
inspection at Oldbury returned six of a batch of twenty-five machines owing to 
broken differential locks, thought to be due to insufficient clearance allowed for 
engagement of the gears.131 Comment by officers commanding the workshops 
include one noting “the condition of the Machines and the spare parts, which they 
brought with them, was lamentable”.132 Elles went further, pointing out:  
I wish you could talk to him [Stern] on the question of the Sprocket 
Pinions now being sent out to us. I don’t know whose fault it is, the 
designer, the manufacturer or the Inspector, but I do consider it is 
monstrous that the machines should be delivered to us in a condition 
which makes them fundamentally unfit to take the field without the 
expenditure of a great deal of labour and that after having been officially 
inspected and passed by the Ministry of Munitions”.133  
Elles continued by explaining that the arming of 4th Battalion had been delayed 
by about a week entirely due to this cause, since: 
 
128 Swinton, Eyewitness, p. 300. It was only five weeks later that Swinton was first informed, 
confidentially, that he “was to be superseded.” 
129 National Archives, MUN4/2791, Glasgow to HQ Heavy Branch, 28 April 1917. 
130 Ibid, report dated 6 May 1917 by Lieutenant-Colonel Lannowe. 
131 National Archives, MUN5/211, Ministry Inspection Department at Oldbury (Metropolitan) to 
Lt. Robertson at MM, London, 18 January 1917. 
132 National Archives, WO158/805. History and organization of central workshops and stores, 
Heavy Branch, Machine Gun Corps (Tank Corps). 4 December 1916 to 31 December 1916, 
compiled by Lt.-Colonel. J.G. Brockbank. 
133 National Archives, WO158/816, Elles to Capper, 15 June 1918. 
 176 
every sprocket pinion spare that we are receiving has got to be 
laboriously trundled into the shop to be fitted with new bolts and to be 
properly bored out. I hope somebody will be hanged for this. Somebody 
certainly deserves to be”.134 
Stern’s detailed response to some twenty-seven headings of complaint suggests 
that not all were justified, even that some of the issues the subject of complaint 
had been requested by workshops in France or by GHQ.135  This applied in 
particular to complaints associated with Lewis Guns.136 Stern’s memorandum 
summarised and answered sixteen varied complaints plus a further twelve related 
specifically to the Lewis Gun.  
The Special Committee advised that the Lewis Gun “should be discarded at 
once” and considered the Hotchkiss best met requirements. It was easy to 
manipulate within the confined space of the tank turret, was fixed rigidly with 
minimum vulnerability outside the turret, was capable of accurate fire with one 
hand and was subject to few stoppages. Lewis Gun problems originated in 
France, but sound management by the Ministry could have saved the BEF from 
its own flawed proposal. Ministry management generally, and the inspection 
process specifically, lacked sound authoritative qualities. There is little doubt that 
the inspection process should have been separated from manufacture and that 
successive Ministers failed to grasp this particular nettle. Since the above 
comments by Elles were made only five months before the Armistice, it is difficult 
to reconcile this with The History’s verdict that changes undertaken to the 
inspection process in 1917 could reasonably be described as falling within the 
ambit of the Ministry “putting its house in order”.137 
The question of decentralisation was also relevant to efficiency of production. 
The History states that the branches of the Department dealing with design, 
supply and inspection all reported direct to the DG and were interdependent. The 
supply branch dealt with negotiation and administration of contracts but had no 
external staff and was entirely dependent on the Inspection Branch for 
information on progress and sources of supply. Standard parts were ordered in 
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large quantities and stored centrally at Leicester or at erectors’ factories. Armour 
plate and optical stores were similarly acquired and stored at Birmingham or 
Glasgow and Leicester respectively. With the exception of armament, the 
responsibility for providing tank equipment and accessories, initially undertaken 
by four different Departments, was allocated solely to the MWSD. Although The 
History does not say so, and Stern makes no reference to the matter, it appears 
possible that the inflexibility displayed by Stern in switching work to upgraded 
models was partly due to the introduction of this system, since the Ministry would 
be reluctant to switch to later models at the cost of writing off the stock of parts 
accumulated for earlier contracts. This applied principally to the Mark IV, under 
production for nearly two years, a source of great frustration to Elles and the army 
generally, since for much of this period they regarded it as an obsolete model. 
Elles made his views plain in April 1917 at which time some 300 Mark IV tanks 
had been completed or were nearing completion:138  
Mark IV machine will not do what we want: this has become quite plain 
from the Arras Battle. Our casualties in Tanks have been….ninety 
percent due to the Tank being hit while stationary, either because it was 
bellied or in difficulties, or because it had to stop to swing or turn. I am 
very strongly of opinion that we must have something faster and handier 
which can be driven by one man instead of by four, and will not stop in 
heavily shelled ground. The wear and tear on men in digging out tanks 
has been very great, and there has been a large percentage of 
casualties caused to men outside Tanks.”139  
Yet over five months later, at a conference called by Churchill to consider the 
tank programme, some 775 Mark IVs had been delivered to the Ministry’s 
transport offices, weekly completions in the four weeks ending on the date of that 
conference being 134 machines. The notes of the conference show that Elles 
and his colleagues from the War Office and GHQ repeated the view that “GHQ 
did not want any more of that type”, but records show deliveries of the main 
components of hulls, engines and sponsons, were adequate to sustain 
production at the recently achieved rates for well over a month.140 A handful of 
deliveries were still being made in the last week of the war.141 
 
138 National Archives, MUN4/5168, Weekly Review of Output Statistics. 
139 National Archives, MUN4/700, Elles to Anley, 23 April 1917. 
140 National Archives, MUN4/5168, Weekly Review of Output Statistics. 
141 National Archives, MUN4/837, Statistics, Tanks, Allies - Position in the Field, November 
1918. 
 178 
Mark II/III tanks were completed by the end of February 1917.142 The tail was 
omitted from both models, which had cast iron rollers and spuds on the track 
plates (Mark II) and thicker armour (Mark III).143 Although it was envisaged that 
many of these tanks would be used for training purposes in England, the failure 
of the Ministry to provide any Mark IV tanks for the Battles of Arras in April 1917 
resulted in Mark II training tanks being hastily collected in France to take part in 
the forthcoming battle.144 Since the armour of these tanks was vulnerable to 
penetration by the German K bullet, this was the source of some disagreement 
between Stern and those advocating their deployment. Claims have been made 
that some of the tanks used at Arras were even less resistant to armour-piercing 
bullets than the Mark I at Flers in that they had been constructed of mild steel. 
Glanfield relies upon an entry in Tanks 1914-1918 to conclude that some of the 
training tanks used at Arras were made of mild steel.145 The evidence is not 
conclusive in respect of all relevant parts of all the tanks. It would appear Stern 
may have been mistaken or was exaggerating in order to emphasise what he 
regarded as an unwise decision to use tanks in combat before full modifications 
had been incorporated in accordance with combat experience. Nevertheless, his 
reservations and allegations were sufficient to stir Anley into action and he visited 
Wool to assure himself that tanks to be sent to France were constructed of armour 
plate. Anley explained: 
information that only 15 Tanks at Wool had bullet-proof Front plates 
was based on a minute from the M.W.S. Dept. I proceeded to Wool to 
verify by testing plates with a chisel and the minute from the 
M.W.S.Dept. was found to be incorrect: this was confirmed by another 
minute from the M.W.S.Dept.146 
Stern’s letter of objection to Addison did not mention mild steel, yet this, had it 
been true, would surely have formed a significant element in the case he was 
endeavouring to develop against the use of practice tanks at Arras.147 Remarks 
by Watson, a tank commander, hint at a solution to the armour/mild steel issue, 
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since he records that on some Supply Tanks sponsons were constructed of mild 
steel.148 
Those involved in producing Mark IV tanks early in 1917 advanced a range of 
explanations for delay. Observations by Stern, Addison and the Ministry’s 
Historians can readily be seen as unreliable. The reasons given by Stern included 
scarcity of raw material, shortage of labour, delays in transit and difficulty in 
obtaining tools.149 These were, conveniently, matters for which he could not be 
held responsible: his claims relating to labour were disputed by Taylor.150  
Harris claims the tanks involved at Arras “were Marks I, II and III”.151 The 
History states that Mark III, being experimental, was not supplied and that none 
left England.152 Falls, Fletcher and Fuller support the statement in The History 
that no Mark III was sent to France.153 However, apart from the comment that the 
Mark III was experimental, no explanation is given for the retention of all Mark III 
tanks in England and the dispatch only of Mark II to France to join surviving Mark 
I machines. One of the enhancements incorporated in the Mark III was thicker 
armour, which would have been beneficial in combat but of no value for training 
at Wool. These factors suggest the Mark III was constructed of mild steel. 
Criticism of British tank actions during the war tend to emphasise the tactical use 
of the new machines and problems associated with their design. It is clear 
however that the manner in which the Ministry performed its role in organising 
and controlling tank supply also had a bearing on numbers and effectiveness of 
tanks in combat. 
The principal role in the Spring Offensives was to be undertaken by the French 
Army. The British attack, commencing a week earlier, was intended to tie down 
enemy Divisions and attract reserves.154 Haig would have been disappointed that 
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more tanks were not available and that the sixty that were passed fit for duty 
comprised surviving Mark I tanks from The Somme and Mark II training tanks.155 
It was decided to divide these among the three Armies involved in the offensive 
rather than concentrating the force in an attempt to secure a break-through at a 
single point.156 The concern of the War Cabinet was justified.157 For a major 
series of offensives, the BEF’s tank force fell short of acceptability, numerically 
and in quality. 
It is not possible to attribute specific consequences to the shortage of 
machines but it is fair to draw attention to tactical and structural limitations, to 
possible consequences upon the level of casualties for the army generally and 
for Heavy Branch specifically.158 The British average daily casualty rate for the 
Battles of Arras exceeded those for all other major offensives undertaken by Haig 
during the war.159 Casualties for tank crew were increased by the inability of 
armour, particularly on the flanks, to resist AP rounds.160  The problem was 
accentuated by the capture of tanks at Bullecourt and consequent enemy 
discovery of this weakness, resulting in the general issue of AP bullets to all 
German infantry units.161 Whereas the consequences of failure to produce more 
tanks for the offensives or to deploy them differently are open to debate, the 
consequences of loss of tanks or crew members to AP rounds can be identified 
as a direct consequence of the failure of the Ministry to provide tanks possessing 
the level of protection required following experiences on the Somme. Effective 
armour protection had been one of the major enhancements requested by Elles 
in September 1916.162 The importance of this factor at Arras was more significant 
than on the Somme, where AP ammunition had not been widely available to 
German units. Losses resulting from this factor were therefore more severe: 
On 23 April eleven [tanks]….were employed in operations around 
Monchy, Gavrelle, and the Chemical Works at Rœux; excellent results 
were obtained, but no fewer than five out of the eleven machines 
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sustained serious casualties from armour-piercing bullets, which had 
now become the backbone of the enemy’s anti-tank defence.163 
Tank 716 would appear to have been one of the victims of AP rounds, all four 
crew casualties having been “hit whilst in the car”.164 The Commander’s Action 
proforma also drew attention to problems caused by replacement of Hotchkiss 
machine-guns “The Lewis Gun mountings were bad, many targets were lost 
owing to the time it took to mount the gun, and finally we mounted the gun through 
the front flaps”. Army tactics did not assist tank operations since the scale of 
bombardment of enemy positions and heavy precipitation combined to create 
ground conditions conducive to ditching.165  As a result of a combination of 
factors, production delays, nature of construction and effectiveness of tactical 
measures, tanks did not achieve the degree of casualty limitation envisaged by 
Swinton and were only partially successful.166 Fuller considered the main tactical 
lessons were to use tanks in mass, to keep a reserve and to avoid wet, heavily 
shelled ground. He also believed the moral effect of tanks to be very great and 
counter-battery work and use of supply and signal tanks to be essential.167 Fuller 
recorded that: 
The general result of the tank operations was favourable, though the 
number of casualties exceeded expectations. The value of the work 
they accomplished was recognised by all the units with which they 
worked. The casualties they inflicted on the enemy were undoubtedly 
heavy; in most cases where they advanced the infantry 
succeeded….168 
Seventy-two Mark IV tanks were available to support the attack on Messines 
Ridge.169 Williams-Ellis recorded there were “as usual, a shortage of instructional 
machines” and that dummy tanks of wood and canvas were used for several 
practice attacks.170 Although a number of improvements had been made, in many 
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respects the Mark IV “did not differ very materially from its predecessor [Mark I] 
in design”. 171  So far as fighting capability was concerned, the essential 
differences were a heavier design of track roller, which improved reliability, a 
wider track, that reduced the range of conditions under which bellying would 
occur, and enhanced armour, resistant to AP bullets.172 In the event, the relatively 
small operation at Messines was so well planned and executed that tanks played 
a limited role. Williams-Ellis recorded that tanks proved useful in several phases 
of the battle, but the laurels belonged to the artillery, the infantry and the 
tunnelling companies, for whose work the battle is perhaps best remembered.173 
GHQ learned little new from the Battle of Messines. Tanks continued to perform 
well in patches and reliability was somewhat enhanced from the low standards 
exhibited in 1916. However, their slow speed and complex manoeuvring and gear 
changing remained severe disadvantages. They found difficulty keeping up with 
infantry, lacking the speed, reliability and manoeuvrability necessary to plant a 
more significant footprint on the battlefield. Supply tanks, converted Mark I 
models, were available for the first time: each battalion had six of these and two 
reserve tanks.174 By and large special hardened steel had overcome the problem 
of the armour-piercing bullet and, importantly, the enemy appeared to be 
unaware of this fact.175  
Messines represented the first, though minor stage, of Haig’s ambitious and 
controversial 1917 Flanders offensive. As this reached a successful conclusion 
in the middle of June, the return of Churchill to the government drew nearer. 
Neither he nor Lloyd George favoured the wastage of British strength in “bloody 
and indecisive siege operations” preferring to await the build-up of American 
forces.176  
Within military circles, the impact of the first use of tanks was limited.177 
Results were patchy. Many tanks simply did not rendezvous with their infantry, 
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others had ditched or broken down before contributing significantly to the 
battle. 178  The under-specification of the tracks resulting from d’Eyncourt’s 
inadequate brief to designers magnified their unreliability to the general military 
fraternity. This reputation may have contributed to missed opportunities in the 
only example of the use of tanks beyond the Western Front, since, following 
partial success at Flers, Robertson showed initiative in seeking to provide tank 
support for the EEF as they sought to advance towards Palestine. This request 
for tanks was not welcomed by Stern who expressed the view that, without a 
lengthy delay to change elements of their design, tanks were not suited to desert 
conditions. 179  However, Montagu was more receptive and Elles provided 
operational advice for Archibald Murray, Commander-in-Chief of the EEF.180 
Eight tanks and personnel arrived in Egypt in January 1917 and took part in 
familiarisation exercises near Gilban.181 
The War Cabinet entertained ambitious objectives for the EEF, but Murray did 
not use his tanks in the First Battle of Gaza on 26 March. Fuller, whose source of 
information was the 2i/c of the Tank Corps detachment, states that in February 
“orders were suddenly received one day for the detachment to move with all 
possible speed to the fighting zone”.182 The following day, the detachment arrived 
within fifteen miles of Gaza where it “remained for ten days”. During this period 
the First Battle of Gaza came to an end.183 
There is considerable interest and speculation concerning actions at First 
Gaza, with many holding the view that the attack was called off at a point when it 
had virtually succeeded.184 In these circumstances, it was possible the use of the 
tanks might have been decisive. It would appear Murray was influenced by others 
in his Command since Gullett revealed: 
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British officers on the front who had seen the tanks at work in France 
were emphatic that they would be ineffective on the exposed, hard 
country immediately north of Wady Ghuzze, and that the ground, cut up 
as it was with branches of the wady, would be in places too rough for 
their progress.185 
Murray’s Despatch is silent on this issue. He mentions tanks only twice in his 
twenty-four-page Despatch for the period covering First and Second Gaza.186 In 
a letter written on his behalf shortly after the tanks were used at Second Gaza 
the view was expressed that “Tanks have been put to a severe test owing to the 
distance over very difficult terrain.…to their objectives: nevertheless with a single 
exception all tanks succeeded in reaching the objectives allocated to them”. The 
conclusion, notwithstanding limitations, was that “these machines have already 
proved themselves of the greatest value in this theatre, and it is probable that, as 
my operations develop, their value will proportionately increase”.187 Murray was 
replaced by Allenby shortly after Second Gaza, his Despatch did not accurately 
reflect the serious defeats he had suffered. Clearly, he would not have wished to 
draw attention to the fact that, in March, he had not tabled a potentially winning 
card. The only redeeming factor for Murray’s decision not to use the tanks would 
appear to be that advice from Elles did not mention that the main weakness of 
the Mark I had been identified two months before the tanks sailed for Egypt. There 
is no record of tracks causing special problems when the tanks were used at 
Gaza in April.  
Fuller is critical of the use of tanks at Second and Third Gaza largely due to 
the extent to which the small force was subdivided and used for an excessive 
number of tasks.188 Allenby had replaced Murray as C-in-C by the time of the 
Third Battle and three Mark IV had been received to replace the losses of Mark 
I. Fuller’s conclusion for Third Gaza was that on the whole “tank 
operations…were of assistance to the infantry. All tanks reached their first 
objective; four reached second, third, and fourth and one reached its fifth 
objective”.189 
Notwithstanding the concerns of Stern and others, a pragmatic approach by 
those on the spot had shown that tanks could be employed in desert regions, 
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provided care was taken in greasing, design of sprockets and rollers and respect 
for the temperature: the EEF recorded mid-day temperatures “as high as 200oF” 
inside the machines, thereby restricting possible usage.190 
The key issue is that the opportunity to use the tanks to greatest effect had 
been lost by the apparent unwillingness of Murray to deploy his new, unfamiliar 
assets at First Gaza. Failure to capture Gaza on 26 March resulted in two further 
battles to take the settlement, the first, a heavy defeat, before success was 
secured in October. The episode appears to support criticisms by those holding 
the view that the army was slow or reluctant to adopt new technology. However, 
the general pattern of response to technological advancement cannot be judged 
by a single element in the broad gamut of issues faced by the army and it seems 
likely that the integration of tanks into the military repertoire posed specific 
problems. Furthermore, much depends on the human factor. Whereas the BEF 
enjoyed the presence of a C-in-C well-disposed to new technology, this does not 
appear to have applied to the same extent in the EEF early in 1917.191 
The source of certain elements of Fuller’s information is unreliable. Events 
relating to First and Second Gaza may have become confused, since the War 
Diary shows the tanks did not move forward before the first battle but remained 
at Gilban from 27 January until 28 March when part of the detachment moved 
forward to Khan Yunis.192 
In the Australian History, it is claimed “Murray appears to have attached great 
importance to the recent arrival of six tanks” and that great pains were taken “to 
keep their presence secret as they were smuggled up the line”. 193  These 
statements are inconsistent with the Detachment’s War Diary and accounts of 
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those involved. They provide no information on Murray’s reason for not using 
tanks in the attack.194  
Murray had not asked for tanks and it seems likely he was more comfortable 
fighting with resources with which he was familiar. Hadaway identifies 
“overconfidence” at the root of avoidable problems encountered during the 
battle.195 It seems quite possible that this explanation applied to Murray’s failure 
to deploy his tanks in March. The use of tanks during Second and Third Gaza 
was not outstandingly successful, but defences had been strengthened.196 
Although tanks did not impress all branches of the army, public perception of 
their achievements, magnified by the nature of press coverage and untainted by 
the spotlight of unreliability, was far greater. The advent of the tank afforded the 
British press the opportunity to cover a new element in the war. Being favourable 
to the nation, exploits of tanks, subject to an initial embargo on photographs or 
accurate descriptions, were unlikely to attract the censor’s red pen. 
Notwithstanding the continuing inclination/requirement for the press to paint a 
rosier picture than was justified by military achievements, the performance at 
Flers did represent an improvement in combat effectiveness when compared to 
earlier BEF efforts or those of other British forces elsewhere. A relative freedom 
therefore existed for the press to indulge in an enhanced level of jingoistic 
reporting.197 Despite the continued growth of the number of families in mourning, 
there was at last some positive news. Reports could be based on a tangible 
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element of success and cartoons could lampoon the discomfiture of the enemy 
in the face of British innovation.198 
There had been little to celebrate during the preceding two years. The press 
therefore took full advantage of the opportunity to herald a gratifying change in 
the course of the conflict.199  Despite press censorship, the experiences and 
disappointments of the first two years, particularly the disastrous first day of the 
Somme, had progressively become more deeply etched into the national 
psyche.200 Loss of life was no longer contained to the ranks of volunteers or those 
limited numbers of civilians who might fall victim to actions at sea, coastal shelling 
or air attack. Conscription had been introduced in January 1916 for single men 
aged 18-41: married men were drawn into the net four months later.201 In these 
circumstances it was not surprising that there were advocates for a negotiated 
conclusion to the struggle.202 Some might say that by offering a ray of hope, the 
manner in which the tank was portrayed in the press administered a form of 
vaccine to combat war weariness and to safeguard the nation from the virus of 
gloom and despair. Others would see tanks as a medium for prolonging the 
conflict and increasing loss of life and national wealth. 
On 16 September 1916 the first reports of the new weapon appeared in the 
press, “Splendid British gains”, “Surprise Cars”, “A New Fighting Machine”.203 
The fact that reports were somewhat vague would have heightened interest and 
expectations. Subsequent reports on achievements were exaggerated, but there 
was a kernel of truth and a basis for hope. The number and nature of the items 
and advertisements in newspapers and periodicals bore witness to the extent of 
national interest.204 By 15 January 1917, exactly four months following the first 
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appearance of the tank in combat, the public quest for information would result in 
111 picture houses in the London area showing a film based on the new 
weapon.205 The following week the film would be released in “the provinces” and 
later in the year tanks would form the basis of a major national fund-raising activity 
in which towns competed on a per capita basis to be top of the fund-raising 
league.206 According to the Director of Special Publicity for the National War 
Savings Committee, none of the many methods adopted to induce the public to 
invest in War Bonds was more successful than the “Tank Bank”, since “The Tanks 
captured the imagination of the man in the street like no other device of modern 
warfare”.207  
This boost to national morale was sorely needed. Not only had the military 
conflict been unsuccessful, but other key areas were also a cause for concern. 
Owing to U-boat successes and demands on shipping resources posed by the 
requirement for munitions and raw materials, the level of national reserves of 
foodstuffs, albeit perhaps unjustifiably, were of concern.208 The government was 
seen as unable to come to grips with the situation and Asquith was increasingly 
coming into focus as an explanatory factor for ineffective national government.209 
Churchill and Lloyd George might not have been unbiased commentators on the 
nation’s plight during 1916, but their observations, as two parliamentarians most 
energetically committed to a full-blooded form of national warfare, are worthy of 
special note. 
Churchill did not mince his words during parliamentary debate though it was 
only in private correspondence that he made personal attacks on Asquith. Thus, 
Churchill confided to C. P. Scott, the “numbing hand of Asquith is over everything, 
and all initiative and energy seem paralysed”.210 However, perhaps only to his 
wife did Churchill reveal the full extent of his feelings towards Asquith and 
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Kitchener since to her he expressed the venomous prediction that “the hour of 
Asquith’s punishment and K.’s exposure draws nearer. The wretched men have 
nearly wrecked our chances. It may fall to me to strike the blow. I shall do it 
without compunction.”211  
Churchill lacked the power to deliver a blow of any substance, but Lloyd 
George occupied a sharply contrasting position. His views on the manner in which 
the nation should conduct the war closely resembled those of Churchill. He made 
no secret of his quest for a more comprehensive approach to the conflict and 
possessed the advantage, when appealing to the nation, of talented oratory by 
one from a lower social background than many politicians of the period.212 Widely 
seen as anxious to pursue the war more energetically and having demonstrated 
he was, at least temporarily, prepared to slide to a less elevated position on the 
political greasy pole in order to contribute more directly to the war effort, he 
commanded a degree of cross-party support and national respect that Churchill 
lacked. In the event it was he who was capable and prepared to wield the political 
knife to move the nation more rapidly towards a form of “total war”, which he saw 
as essential if victory were to be achieved.213 
French tanks progressed on a schedule several months behind that of Britain. 
Two Medium French Tanks were developed. The larger St. Chamond, which, 
owing to production and design delays or errors, accounted for only thirty-two of 
the 240 strong tank-force available for the first French offensive in April 1917, and 
the Schneider. Development of French tanks followed a different course to that 
adopted in Britain. Development of the Schneider, based on the Holt Tractor, 
followed the lines advocated by Colonel Jean Estienne, the acknowledged 
“father” of the French force, but the St. Chamond was designed by the Société 
des Forges et Acieries de la Marine after communication with the government.214 
The production of two “Medium” tanks, at a time when resources and 
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manufacturing facilities were in short supply, appears inexcusable: it was a 
product of rivalries within French political circles.215  
The St. Chamond incorporated a 75mm gun, the most powerful tank gun used 
before the middle of the Second World War, but it lacked a robust drive. In the 
political and industrial circumstances surrounding its design and production the 
criticisms of the St. Chamond by Estienne and others might be judged as 
prejudiced, but its performance provided ample evidence that criticisms were 
valid. Nicknamed “the elephant on the legs of a gazelle” the St. Chamond’s limited 
track length and width resulted in ground loading approximately double the 
standard that should have been achieved. 216  The weaknesses of the St. 
Chamond suggest Estienne’s vision and experience would have been beneficial. 
They also appear to support the picture in post-war accounts of the Artilerie 
Speciale project as a struggle between a man of genius and narrow-minded 
bureaucrats, both military and civilian.217 Elements of this picture may have some 
validity, but the performance of the original Schneider tanks suggests Estienne’s 
abilities in tank design may have been overrated. Following liaison at Chamlieu 
in January 1918, Fuller recorded in his Private Journal that their “big tanks are 
like kitchen ranges on tracks – quite useless”.218 At a joint meeting of British and 
French representatives in Paris following the first attack by French tanks, Stern 
recorded that French representatives, including Estienne, “generally seemed 
highly dissatisfied with the French tank.”219  
In contrast, the later, light Renault was generally considered a success and 
formed part of an exchange due to have been completed with Britain had 
hostilities continued into 1919. In the event, both nations had difficulty producing 
sufficient tanks for their own purposes. Britain supplied a number of heavy tanks 
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to French and American forces, but no Renaults were received by Britain in time 
for active use.220  
From Estienne’s report of the opening day of the battle on the Chemin-des-
Dames and from subsequent reports, the principal weaknesses of the Schneider 
appear to have been its limited ability to cross obstacles, the location of fuel tanks 
and the lack of mechanical reliability.221 The effect of inappropriate tactical use in 
exposing advancing machines to indirect artillery fire, was perhaps the greatest 
cause of initial failings.222 The Schneider also had severe problems of command 
visibility, poor ventilation, ease with which it caught fire and difficulty of evacuation 
in an emergency.223  
Only two of the three tank groupements took part in the offensive on 16 April, 
Estienne’s reports showing that fifty-seven tanks were lost to German artillery, 
mostly indirect fire directed by ground and air OPs. The cause of this scale of 
losses came as a surprise. The AS had envisaged direct rather than indirect fire 
as the main threat. Gale assesses the loss of machines at just over 43%.224 
However, this represents an under-acknowledgement of the disaster since many 
of the remaining 57% were out of action for the whole or part of the 16 April battle. 
Neither the AS nor supporting or supported infantry were greatly impressed by 
the quality of the French tanks.225 One infantry unit witnessed four tanks catch 
fire with, on each occasion, the crews becoming living torches as they exited the 
machines.226  This same fate befell the CO of the larger Groupement, Major 
Bossut early in the action. Although Gale’s assessment is that some twenty-eight 
tanks were lost to artillery fire, in many cases the root cause of loss was 
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mechanical breakdown, since artillery fire against stationary targets minimised 
complexities for OPs in accurately ranging onto targets. One German artillery unit 
claimed seventeen knocked-out tanks for the expenditure of only 277 rounds.227 
Some criticisms of the Schneider were similar to criticisms of the Mark I. It 
would be inappropriate to assess the performance of the Schneider on the basis 
of percentage lost, since account should be taken of the way in which the force 
was used, the number of tanks that participated in the battle and their 
achievements. Many of the machines that were lost were victims of naïve 
planning which left the machines exposed to enemy observation for excessively 
long periods. Cooperation with supporting infantry frequently failed and, when a 
shell struck a Schneider, there was a high risk of most serious consequences 
owing to the location of petrol tanks. A significant difference between the 
Schneider and the Mark I was the limited ability of the Schneider to cross trenches 
and negotiate broken or pitted terrain. The Schneider resembled Little Willie, the 
prototype discarded by Tritton and Wilson in 1915. It was an armoured box on a 
set of tracks, lacking the climbing and trench-crossing ability of an all-round 
track.228 In consequence, the Schneider was dependent upon supporting infantry 
to help it cross all, except narrow, trenches. Such support was not forthcoming at 
certain stages of the advance on 16 April, therefore limiting progress.229  
On 5 May, a second action illustrated the ability of the French Army to learn 
from mistakes and make the most of sub-standard machines. The lengthy 
approach of 16 April was avoided by placing groupes close to the French lines to 
advance at the same time as infantry. Each groupe was allocated specific tasks 
thereby facilitating better integration with infantry. The units were allocated close 
air support to eliminate accurate adjustment of fire by air OPs and to bring down 
fire onto German anti-tank batteries.230 A section of infantry was placed under the 
control of the groupe technical officer in an attempt to secure better support for 
the tanks and each tank was provided with signal pistols to bring down smoke 
shells to mask their movements. In consequence, despite being under continuous 
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artillery fire, the first units of AS1 arrived at the German lines without losing any 
tanks to artillery fire and were able to assist the restoration of infantry progress 
and consolidation by destroying numerous machine guns and repelling 
counterattacks. Two tanks progressed some two miles before the lack of infantry 
support necessitated retirement.231  However, improvement in tactics was not 
matched by greater mechanical reliability. Four St. Chamonds failed to reach the 
assembly area. The loss of St. Chamonds was so great that their Commander 
sought a Schneider battery to act as reserve. Twelve St. Chamonds were 
operational at the start of the attack. A number contributed to the conduct of the 
battle, but they broke down successively. In total, the groupement sent thirty-one 
tanks into the attack, some twenty-five returned. Results were therefore much 
better than on 16 April, with only one tank falling victim to artillery fire.232 Although 
the second action represented an improvement, French machines possessed 
basic weaknesses unamenable to straightforward remedy. Towards the end of 
the war, they were relegated to a supply function.233 This was not surprising in 
the light of heavy losses, some thirty-seven of forty St. Chamonds were lost 
attacking Courcelles on 11 June 1918.234 
The reasoning underlying the lack of progress by Germany in the development 
of armoured vehicles, either before or in the early years of the war, has exercised 
many minds. Chamberlain and Ellis point out that, preceding the war, “German 
advocates of the use of armoured vehicles in the offensive role met the same sort 
of apathy as did the pioneers of the idea in Britain.”235 They have drawn attention 
to experiments with armoured cars by the German Army from 1905 onwards, 
including the use of such vehicles in military exercises, but consider a significant 
shortcoming to have been the fact that the potential roles of such vehicles were 
seen to be patrolling or haulage rather than combat.  
Firstly Goebel, then subsequently Burstyn, an Austrian, produced drawings 
and/or prototypes of armoured, non-wheeled machines. However, with an 
accompanying comment that they might be interested if a commercial firm could 
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build it, the Austrian War Office returned Burstyn’s drawings.236 Similarly, despite 
endorsement by a leading German military periodical, the German War 
Department was not enthusiastic, possibly, in part, for financial reasons. 237 
Having been rejected by Austria and Germany, the Daimler designers, led by 
Robert Wolf, were granted permission to sell his invention to France. The 4-wheel 
drive vehicle which had impressed in Austrian military manoeuvres was exhibited 
in Paris and subjected to trials by the French Ministry of War, (Photograph 42).238 
It is suggested that the main interest by France was a comparison with the French 
Charron. Although it had a reasonable off-road capability, being able to surmount 
a 60-degree slope (photograph 43) and was capable of 45mph on roads, the 
Panzerautomobile was rejected in a May 1909 report by the Commission d’Étude 
des Armes Portatives et de Petit Calibre, which concluded armoured cars were 
not yet fit for military service due to their bad off-road capabilities and high 
production price. The unreliability of French armoured cars early in the war would 
suggest that the Ministry made a poor decision. Amongst those who inspected 
the Panzerautomobile was the Archduke Ferdinand.239 
Early in the war the German Army made use of captured Belgian armoured 
cars, an expedient that may have stimulated the production of a number of their 
own.240  Their vehicles were deployed mainly to the Eastern Front since the 
establishment of a continuous trench line from Switzerland to the Channel limited 
participation in operations in the west. No action would appear to have been taken 
to support the design of a vehicle capable of penetrating entrenched positions 
until tanks were used by Britain. Various schemes were then put forward. The 
first vehicle to display tank characteristics was the Bremer Marien Wagen, 
essentially a Daimler truck with wheels replaced by tracks.241 A sizeable number 
of other designs were brought forward, with orders being placed for several, 
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including the LK2, resembling the Whippet in profile,242 the K-Wagen and the 
Stürmpanzerwagen A7V/U, which, in order to overcome the shortcomings of the 
A7V, was based on the design of the British Mark IV.243 None of these orders had 
yielded a single tank by the time the Armistice was signed.244 
In addition to fighting tanks, consideration was also being given to Personnel 
Carriers (Daimler Sturmwagen) and Supply Tanks (A7V Überlandwagen). By the 
date of the Armistice, a few Überlandwagen had been completed.245 
German thoughts were therefore running along many of the same lines as 
British developments, but Germany suffered from a late start and from the effects 
of naval blockade on availability of materials. The model most used by Germany 
during the war was the British Mark IV, large numbers of which were renovated 
at Charleroi following capture, particularly after the counterattack at Cambrai and 
the Spring Offensives.246 
Raths draws attention to problems caused by differences between relevant 
military and governmental agencies. 247  In summarising work by Albrecht, 
Kaufhold-Roll, Petter and Schneider and Strassheim, he demonstrated that 
development of armoured vehicles did not take place with the stereotypical 
methodical, unified progress that might have been anticipated. Rather, he 
believed disagreements and changes of policy that occurred were similar to 
differences that characterised British experiences.248 The essential difference 
was that German efforts achieved no significant benefits. 
Raths argues that “while the German military was certainly not technophobic 
nor resistant to change, the developments in ‘machine warfare’ were 
fundamentally inimical to the dominant cultural assumptions held by German 
officers.”249 There may be some validity in this statement but it seems more likely 
that events reflected the truth of the saying that necessity is the mother of 
invention. The necessity for the Allies to find a way of breaking the trench 
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stalemate was greater than German defensive requirements.250 The tank was an 
offensive “weapon”. It says little for the progressive characteristics or far-sighted 
qualities of all the national armies and governments involved that none saw fit to 
develop armoured vehicles on a significant scale either before the conflict or by 
way of early response to the nature of the war that developed. For those who had 
seen a prospective war as mobile in nature, it might have been expected that 
development of armoured cars would have been a logical accompaniment. That 
was not the case. Opportunities to secure advantages in unit dispositions prior to 
the Battle of the Marne and in the race to the sea were therefore missed.  
The German decision was to use motor vehicles for road-based logistics. This 
decision was reasonable, based on a set of priorities akin to those of Haig who 
in 1916 placed tanks as only fourth priority for supply, ranked behind motor 
transport and railway locomotives.251 The disadvantage for Germany was that the 
Allies’ resources were greater. However, the first use of British tanks acted as a 
catalyst for the development of German tanks, since, within little over a fortnight 
after the commencement of the Battle of Flers/Courcelette, HQ 1st Army had sent 
a report to OHL commenting that the new weapon was “potentially 
noteworthy”.252 There appears at this stage to have been no disagreement in 
principle between the various departments in the Ministry of War and OHL that 
urgent action was required.253  Differences soon arose, but a group brought 
together by department A7V progressed rapidly, producing a prototype for 
demonstration on 30 April 1917. The track used was a modified Holt design. 
Disagreement over design and priorities continued. The most notable issue was 
the demand by Ludendorff for “a vehicle similar to the British tank design”.254 This 
led to unsuccessful experimental work on an all-round track.255  
It can be seen therefore that administrative arrangements for decisions and 
production during 1917 did not run smoothly. Different groups were not working 
harmoniously and decisions on numbers and specification were in doubt.256 The 
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explanation for this situation is thought by Raths to lie in several factors - changes 
in the strategic direction of the war, success of anti-tank measures in the defence 
against British tanks, growing shortages of materials and manpower and the 
greater priority allocated by the army to the revision of tactical defence 
doctrine. 257  Germany was under pressure both in terms of manpower and 
materials. Ludendorff and Hindenburg, concerned by the growing Allied 
superiority in weapons, armaments, and manpower were securing increased 
production of existing weapons to counter this disadvantage and to substitute 
machines for manpower. 258  This new “Hindenburg programme” rendered 
1917/1918 an unpropitious time for the design and manufacture of new 
weapons.259 Others have emphasised the significance of rivalries and failure of 
German projects, “factual incompetence and the petty jealousies of government 
agencies and individuals contribute to a lamentable confusion of projects and 
designs”.260 
The Battle of Cambrai stimulated efforts and tanks were placed on the first 
priority list for resources. The number of proposed A7V machines increased, but 
remained very low, at thirty-eight. Further complications were introduced by 
commencement of a parallel scheme for light tanks. 
Three A7V units went into service between January and March 1918. 
Unfortunately, performance in training did not impress. The opinion of OHL was 
that the A7V met the demands of the specification, but battlefield conditions had 
changed. It was considered the A7V would not be able to master 1918 battlefield 
conditions since the nose was low and armour was mounted on the chassis, both 
issues being the product of its multi-role design. The machine was judged 
incapable of meeting the main fighting requirements of the army. Criticism of the 
design of the A7V was justified, though it may have been exaggerated by OHL in 
order to promote its own favoured projects, the K Wagen and LK Light Tank. The 
criticisms heralded the end of the A7V project, with production limited to three 
units of five tanks each plus a reserve of five.  
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A7V models saw action on a number of occasions, the first being on 21 March 
1918 at St. Quentin, when two broke down, but the other two reached their 
designated objective trenches causing the trench personnel to flee – over 150 of 
their number were captured later.261 The next attack was a failure owing to the 
tanks approaching the starting positions becoming stuck in a ravine, but on 24 
April at Villers-Bretonneux a successful attack was launched and the first tank-
versus-tank fight occurred, the machines of both sides leaving the battlefield 
severely damaged. According to Hundelby and Strasheim, there was, however, 
a clear victor at the next tank-versus-tank occurrence when they claim a single 
A7V destroyed one Whippet, immobilised two others and drove four more from 
the battlefield. 262  However, this assessment appears to be based on an 
incomplete picture since for this action Zaloga records that the Whippets and one 
Mark IV were also opposed on two sides by a battery of 77mm field guns.263 Of 
greater operational significance was the outcome of the German offensive on 24 
April in the vicinity of Villers Brettonneux, recorded in the terms that “Wherever 
tanks appeared the British line was broken”, but, “Wherever the enemy infantry 
attacked without tanks it was repulsed”.264 
A7Vs were also used in operations near Reims on 31 May and 9 and 15 July 
and near Cambrai on 31 August. Though capable of operating successfully in 
favourable conditions, Raths concluded that reliability was poor, particularly on 
rough terrain. However, he judged that the main problems were poor 
reconnaissance, dispersal of the force and the nature of their integration into 
operational plans, factors related to use rather than design.265 The disadvantages 
of the A7V are listed as limited trench crossing (2m.), poor battlefield crossing 
ability and a low nose, which aided supply carrying but represented a constraint 
on climbing ability. It is notable that in common with French tanks, the A7V 
needed the accompaniment of combat engineers if the ground was rough or 
trenches were wide.266 It is a tribute to British invention that both France, which 
sought to obtain British heavy tanks via an exchange, and Germany, which 
copied the Mark IV design for their A7V/U, were effectively recognising the 
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superiority of Wilson’s design in operating over rough ground.267  A range of 
obstacles, insurmountable by French and German tanks posed no difficulty for 
Wilson’s all-round track.268 
Work continued on alternative models during 1918 though rivalries dictated 
that knowledge of all work would not be disseminated between different parties. 
Ambitions for 1919 were similar to those of Churchill on the Allied side, with plans 
for 800 LKII by the spring of 1919 and 4000 Light Tanks and 400 Heavy Tanks 
by the end of 1919. Aspirations were completely unrealistic. Hindenburg and 
Ludendorff had identified extensive requirements for expansion of the armaments 
programme to compete with Allied advances, but Germany did not have the 
manpower and material resources required for its Hindenburg Programme.269 
Once again there is a form of parallel with British, or, more specifically, 
Churchillian aspirations. However, such ideas by Germany were even more 
unrealistic. By August, Germany was no longer on the offensive, was short of 
men and materials and was finding an increasing despondency within the ranks 
of its armed services. Plans that might have been invaluable in 1911 were too 
late and quite impractical in the military, industrial and political circumstances of 
1917-1918.  
The German venture into the field of armoured warfare had made no 
noticeable impact on the military struggle. Internal wrangling and machinations 
had not assisted a successful late entry into this type of warfare, but it is likely a 
larger more efficient force of armoured vehicles would similarly have had no 
appreciable effect on the bigger picture. In a sense, however, the venture may 
have been significant in providing directions for the future. The value of armour 
had been recognised: Germany would be neither a non-starter nor reluctant 
participant in mechanical preparations for the next major war. 
For Churchill the period covered by this chapter was one of utter frustration: “I 
am profoundly unsettled: & cannot use my gift…..I am faced with the problem of 
living through days of 24 hours each:& averting my mind from the intricate 
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business I had in hand - wh was my life [sic].”270 He had returned from France in 
the spring of 1916 gratified that tanks were under construction and anticipating a 
role in national war efforts.271 To this end he worked without respite to influence 
the findings of the Dardanelles Commission.272 The Commission’s conclusions 
may not have been exactly what he had sought but were not without benefit, their 
findings demonstrating that a significant share of responsibilities for the failure of 
the venture rightfully belonged to others.273 It was particularly convenient that 
Kitchener should have posed no obstacle to the drafting of fair, if timid, 
recommendations by boarding the doomed Hampshire in June 1916. Churchill 
would have welcomed the clear statement in a Supplementary Report by 
Commissioner Sir Thomas Mackenzie that the forcing of The Dardanelles was “a 
practicable proposition” given “recognition of the nature and extent of the 
difficulties”, the making of “adequate provision” and adoption of the “necessary 
strength of purpose”.274 
Yet when Asquith fell from power, the call to ministerial office still did not arrive. 
Eight months were to pass before Lloyd George considered it politically prudent 
to offer Churchill a ministerial post. Munitions was perhaps not among the “chief 
posts” that Churchill would ideally have sought. It was not of cabinet rank. 
Churchill had indicated to Scott that the War Office “would do very well”, but he 
appeared nevertheless to be delighted, commenting, “not allowed to make the 
plans, I was set to make the weapons”.275  
Churchill’s enthusiasm was therefore on course for recovery, but the nation 
approached the third anniversary of the conflict with a sense of resignation rather 
than enthusiasm, optimism or despair, wary lest Russia should exit the conflict 
and concerned about the escalating cost in human and material terms, but 
relieved America had become involved. So far as armoured vehicles were 
concerned, progress was being made but achievements were meeting neither 
the long-held aspirations of enthusiasts nor the aims of a limited element of the 
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army. It would not be unfair to judge that the Ministry belonged in Lloyd George’s 
“Too Late” camp both in the manufacture and design of armoured vehicles, since 
poor management seemed to be at the root of Ministerial problems. 
Notwithstanding these realities, the tank had rapidly become the darling of press 
and music halls and, at the Gaiety Theatre, the Palace Girls and Mlle. Regine 
Flory were joking as early as November 1916 that they “will teach the Kaiser & 
Co., we know how to win, when they see us dance the Tanko right into Berlin”.276  
Nevertheless, for many in the army, doubts persisted. 277  Although 
improvements to the heavy tank had been made, the moderate pace of 
achievements in 1916 had been continued through much of 1917. Furthermore, 
the army would have seen no likelihood of this situation changing in the 
immediate future, with the result that they were saddled with fighting machines 
that lacked speed and manoeuvrability and with unreliable supply machines 
adapted from early models. Efforts to secure a faster, lighter tank capable of 
exploiting a breakthrough had not yielded satisfactory results. 278  Relations 
between the army and Ministry had effectively broken down. This was the 
situation facing Churchill as his return to government approached.  
Britain had not made full use of the period since the Battle of Flers. Somewhat 
by chance, the ball was thrown back to the man who had foreseen in 1915 the 
prospect of an important future role for armoured vehicles. Albeit that, thirty 
months earlier, he had shown the vision, though not the management finesse to 
guide it to success, he found himself again in charge of the development of 
armoured vehicles. This time his authority would be official. His rhetorical ability 
was not in question, but would his management skills enable him to identify and 
resolve Ministry problems hampering progress of the armoured cause and would 
he appreciate that the warfare to be fought in the coming year was not the same 
warfare as had fuelled his armoured vision in December 1914? 
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Chapter Five - Churchill’s Management of Tank Production, July 1917/July 1918. 
 
The preceding chapter showed that Ministers and the DGMWD secured neither the 
quantity nor quality of tanks sought by the army for offensives in 1916/1917. 
Management expertise at the Ministry and in the army had been found wanting. The 
army had been denied an appropriate level of participation in tank design and the 
outstanding talents of Walter Wilson had not been utilised to secure the level of 
sophistication he was anxious and able to provide. Wilson would later state that the 
work he considered most important, the Mark V, had been stopped in July 1917 in 
favour of work on Medium and Universal tanks, though this only partially explained 
shortcomings.1 
The deficiencies had adversely affect military operations at Arras. One 
Commanding Officer stated that during this offensive, the behaviour of his officers and 
men might be summed up as “a triumph of moral over technical difficulties”.2 By July 
1917 future prospects were only marginally better. Provision of the Mark IV was in full 
flow, but its design remained rudimentary.3 Preparations for the introduction of a more 
sophisticated heavy tank and a purpose-designed supply tank had not been awarded 
the degree of priority they deserved in the light of experience and evolving military 
tactical thought. 
It is likely Lloyd George’s action in moving Addison to a less confrontational role in 
government was made with the objective of improving performance at Munitions, a 
Department critical to military success and a hive of military and industrial conflict. 
Addison’s lack of grip on the supply of tanks had been exposed by his inept 
performance at Cabinet when taken to task by the War Office over the pending 
shortage of tanks for Arras. 4  Additionally, his handling of union pressures and 
negotiations had attracted criticism.5 Depressed by the lack of optimism and talent of 
his Ministerial colleagues, Lloyd George felt it appropriate to offer Churchill a return to 
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government, though not to cabinet.6 Owing to his unpopularity, Churchill’s objective of 
a top seat, such as the War Office would have to wait.7 Munitions offered not only 
rescue from the quagmire in which he had been trapped since 1915, but a position on 
firm ground providing direct involvement in the planning of the conflict.8 Churchill 
would have recognised that, in wartime, Munitions offered opportunities to insert 
fingers into most government pies. However, he would also have been aware that his 
ability to secure the implementation of his advocated mechanical strategy would 
depend on several factors. His powers of persuasion were important, but events would 
also be influenced by the unfolding of experiences in the use of the new machines and 
by the appointment to key positions of those sympathetic to mechanical warfare. It is 
notable that Churchill’s suggestions for membership of the last wartime Tank 
Committee included only one member, Elles, Commander of the Tank Corps in 
France, who might have been expected to challenge Churchill’s views on armoured 
warfare in any fundamental way.9 
The clash between two competing desiderata, uninterrupted production lines to 
secure maximum output, and interruption to improve mechanical efficiency, was a key 
issue following the army’s first-hand experience of tanks. Assessment of the 
consequences of decisions on these matters is complicated by the subjective nature 
of the judgments involved, but, arguably, greater weight should have been placed on 
the views of military personnel at the sharp end rather than those at the Ministry 
occupying intermediate positions between manufacturers and end-users or in non-
operational posts at the War Office. At the time of Churchill’s arrival at the Ministry, 
Elles, keen to enhance the speed and manoeuvrability of fighting tanks, and Stern, 
anxious to produce the maximum possible number of tanks, represented the 
embodiment of the two disparate poles of quality versus maximum production. Yet 
even Elles, when detached in time and distance from the cauldron of the Western 
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Front, was prepared to acknowledge the difficulties faced by those who during the 
conflict had represented his “opposition” by placing quantity ahead of quality: 
principles of production and design represented a direct conflict of opposing 
policies……To stop or change this machinery [production process] results 
often in a loss of output which is in no way compensated by the 
improvements ultimately obtained”.10  
This post-war comment by Elles was, perhaps, excessively generous to his former 
“opponents”. Much depended on the benefit of enhancements set against loss of 
output from implementation of potential upgrades. Judgment was all important. 
Knowledge of engineering, industrial management and military operations were key to 
sound decisions. None of the personnel involved were expert in all these core 
disciplines. Stern possessed the valuable ingredient of drive and determination but 
was proficient in none of the disciplines. Haig knew what he wanted to achieve but 
appears not to have met the Ministry’s principal engineers. There is no evidence that 
Haig or GHQ generally were aware of the detailed relationship of potential design 
amendments and rate of tank production. It is recorded that Haig was impressed by 
the capabilities of the Mark V just before Amiens, but it is a matter of conjecture 
whether he would have spoken differently to Stern in November 1916 or April 1917 
had he then been aware of the nature of the changes that could have been 
introduced. 11  It would be a basic challenge for the management abilities of the 
incoming Minister to resolve these fundamental issues. Churchill needed to guide the 
army towards the most beneficial compromise that could reasonably be attained 
through a realistic assessment of engineering and industrial capabilities and 
operational consequences. 
Procedural requirements for a new Minister caused some delay before Churchill 
could take up the reins of his new job. In forming a judgment on his achievements in 
the development of tanks it is necessary to have regard to the fact that supply of 
armoured vehicles formed but a small part of his overall responsibilities, though one 
in which he had a particular and long-standing interest and which he regarded as key 
to breaking the Western Front deadlock. 12  Churchill faced many problems at 
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Munitions. He commented that “in the first period of the war….the resources of Britain 
far exceeded any organization that could employ them….now all was changed.” He 
found himself instead “in a world of ‘limiting factors’ and ‘priorities’.”13 Scholarship 
concentrates upon the difficulties the Ministry faced in meeting fluctuating military 
demands at a time of shortages of the main components required for industrial 
production - labour, steel and other materials. This focus results in inadequate 
attention being allocated to the management of production and to Churchill’s 
undervaluation of this consideration.14 It would not be until Churchill appointed his 
friend Jack Seely to a new post of Deputy Minister in July 1918 that key management 
weaknesses would be identified and measures undertaken to narrow the gap between 
production capabilities and the level of requirements for armoured vehicles for the 
strategy Churchill advocated. That appointment would be too late to influence wartime 
supply and the BEF would enter the Hundred Days, as it had its offensives in 1916 
and 1917, with “inadequate” numbers of tanks. Moreover, though of superior quality 
to the models of 1916 and 1917, the Mark V and Mark V* possessed significant 
weaknesses, particularly in the form of poor ventilation. 15 . Existing scholarship 
recognises the shortage of tanks throughout the Hundred Days but tends to attribute 
this to a shortage of labour and materials, perhaps unavoidable for a nation that had 
been at war for four years. This picture is neither complete nor accurate. 
There are two key points to consider in this chapter, which covers the period from 
Churchill’s return to government to the Amiens offensive. Firstly, the degree of 
Churchill’s success in managing his Department to secure a larger and more 
advanced force of heavy tanks for the BEF, its allies and associates. Secondly, 
progress in manufacturing other armoured vehicles to serve various tactical purposes, 
essentially, exploitation and logistical support.  
The scholarship concentrates upon the use of tanks in action, notably at Cambrai, 
rather than upon design or production issues. Studies generally see this as a 
successful period for Churchill in which he mastered the difficulties of munitions 
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production to provide materiel so advantageous to the recovery of the BEF and its 
capacity to undertake successful offensives in the summer and autumn of 1918. Haig 
praised Churchill for the supply of munitions early in 1918 following substantial losses 
during the Spring Offensives. 16  With false modesty, Churchill emphasised his 
achievements in munitions supply, “If in these pages I dwell with pride on the 
extraordinary achievements of the Munitions Council in the field of supply, it is not to 
appropriate the credit. That belongs in the first instance to Mr. Lloyd George”.17 
So far as munitions in general are concerned, no reason is seen to dispute the 
views of Haig and Churchill. However, the picture in respect of armoured vehicles is 
quite different. Yet, for Churchill, armoured vehicles represented the key that would 
unlock German defences in the west, firstly by assisting breakthrough then by 
exploitation, resupply and reinforcement. However, production of these vehicles failed 
to attain levels even close to those aspired and forecast. It will be shown that low 
production was in part Churchill’s fault, but that he avoided criticism by the way in 
which fighting on the Western Front developed and concluded. Haig saw the prospect 
of great strides in the progress of the war late in 1918, but this optimism was not 
shared by those in government or by society generally. If the prospect of a spring 
defeat had loomed uncomfortably large, it was surely not possible to achieve victory 
by autumn?18 
The period around Churchill’s reinstatement as a member of the government is 
regarded by some as the low point of the war for Britain and its Allies.19 The nation 
was perhaps less united than it had been during the early months of the war. Setting 
aside the sector of the population benefitting to a significant extent from economic 
activity generated by the conflict, such enthusiasm as there had been for the war had 
been diluted by the time Churchill was faced with the task of coming to grips with 
Munitions. The unprecedented loss of family members or friends affected a large 
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sector of the national population from the Prime Minister to typical civilian families in 
all social groups, though perhaps most significantly those in higher groups owing to 
the greater vulnerability of officers.  
After three years of war the results of the efforts of an enlarged army appeared to 
be ones of limited territorial gain at a heavy, disproportionate and unsustainable cost 
of life and health. Large-scale French offensives were proving no more successful in 
1917 than earlier in the conflict. Rumania had been defeated in May and events in 
Russia were the cause of grave concern. As a result of the resumption by Germany of 
unrestricted submarine warfare, losses of shipping, on which the ability of the nation 
to continue the war depended, were serious. The compensating consideration was 
that this had led to the entry of America into the conflict, a potentially decisive factor 
in the eventual outcome.20 Many of these concerns developed further in 1917, notably 
in the form of a second revolution in Russia that heralded retirement from the war. 
This development would enable the Central Powers to transfer substantial forces from 
east to west in preparation for a large-scale offensive to bring the conflict to a 
conclusion before any substantial introduction of American forces. Worryingly, the 
American President appeared to be pursuing the introduction of his forces on the 
Western Front at a more leisurely pace than demanded by the seriousness of the 
situation.21 Italy suffered a major defeat at Caporetto in October/November leading to 
the already stretched British and French forces sending eleven divisions to Italy for 
fear their ally would leave the war.22 The British summer offensive, the Third Battle of 
Ypres, appeared to have the same characteristics as the Battles of the Somme, 
namely heavy casualties for insubstantial gains. Shipping losses did however decline 
following the introduction of convoy and additional anti-submarine measures.23  
Morale did not benefit from the underlying belief that there would be no end to the 
conflict in the short-term. It will be shown in later chapters that the view of senior 
members of British and Dominion governments did not envisage military action leading 
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to a conclusion to hostilities before 1919-1920 and that some considered there could 
be no conclusion by force of arms. 
As the incoming Churchill was introduced to staff at the Ministry, preparations for 
Haig’s larger northern offensive were well under way.24 The offensive would start on 
31 July. Three Brigades of tanks were to be used, the full complement of tanks 
available at that time.25 Significantly, no special concession was granted to the tanks 
in that the lengthy, “standard”, preparatory bombardment was to be employed. 
Williams-Ellis lamented the misfortune of the offensive generally, and the 
consequences for the tanks specifically, in the deterioration of the weather on the first 
day of the offensive. Having on that day secured a good position for attack the 
following day, the army fought against counter-attacks ready for the blow it intended 
to land at daybreak. “That blow was destined never to be struck”.26 Haig’s despatch 
states “The weather had been threatening throughout the [first] day…..During the 
afternoon, while fighting was still in progress, rain began and fell steadily all night. 
Thereafter, for four days, the rain continued without cessation”.27 Throughout August 
rainfall was unusually heavy and, though September was drier, rains returned in 
October.28 The result, for most of the battle, was that conditions were ill-suited to tank 
operations.29 
Tanks were subjected to considerable criticism, notably in the report on his 
operations by Gough, Fifth Army Commander. They frequently failed to negotiate the 
muddy terrain or did so too late to participate fully in operations despite the assistance 
provided to the Mark IV by the attachment of unditching beams.30 Examples continued 
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to emerge of considerable assistance to the infantry, most noticeably on 16 August 
when, following a few days of “less wet weather”, twelve tanks were due to co-operate 
in a continuation of the offensive in the Langemarck-St. Julien area. None arrived in 
time and the offensive failed to take a position containing four concrete pillboxes, 
which were immune to field artillery and represented “almost impossible targets for 
heavy guns”.31 Maxse, Commander of 18th Corps and Lt.-Colonel Christopher Baker-
Carr, Tank Brigade Commander, set what may have been a sensible precedent for 
Cambrai and later tank actions, agreeing that the pillboxes should be subjected to a 
tank attack without any preparatory bombardment other than smoke. Maxse had been 
advised that an infantry attack on the pill-box stronghold might cost 600-1,000 
casualties. Infantry casualties following the successful tank attack numbered 15, with 
14 casualties among tank crew.32 
Notwithstanding criticism from Gough and others, actions such as that at St. Julien 
ensured the continued support of Haig and his agreement, despite heavy 
commitments caused by Ypres and Caporetto, to an attack late in 1917 in the vicinity 
of Cambrai. The attack took place without preparatory bombardment and utilised the 
full resources of the Tank Corps. British artillery concentrated on counter-battery work, 
utilising improved means of locating enemy batteries and ensuring accuracy of fire by 
improved mapping, sound ranging, flash spotting and calibration of each individual 
gun. These technical improvements facilitated dispensation with ranging and an 
accurate surprise effect at Z-Hour.33 
The Battle of Cambrai is generally held to represent the point at which tanks 
secured a broad consensus of support and began to exert an increasing influence on 
the tactics of future warfare. 34  Utilising surprise, some 378 fighting tanks were 
launched against an enemy not fully prepared for the form of attack it was to 
experience.35  This, combined with effective use of artillery helped Third Army to 
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achieve a magnitude of advance well beyond that achieved by earlier offensives. 
Arguably the initial degree of success surprised GHQ since the force available for the 
battle was inadequate to exploit the opportunities created. Fuller despaired that no 
reserve of tanks was maintained for the second day: he disapproved of staking the 
entire tank force on the first day of battle, “To fight without a reserve is similar to playing 
cards without capital – it is sheer gambling.”36 It was the norm throughout the war that 
the limited availability of tanks resulted in constant “gambling” of this kind. Fuller’s 
advice succeeded only in securing a somewhat lame and misleading response from 
Byng, the Army Commander: “I cannot go against the wishes of my Corps and 
Divisional commanders”.37 It has already been seen that Rawlinson failed to assert 
control of operations by the Fourth Army at High Wood. Byng similarly bowed to the 
wishes of his junior commanders at Cambrai. In Byng’s defence, the infantry forces at 
his disposal were insufficient to have taken advantage of opportunities that might have 
presented themselves had he used his forces more astutely early in the battle. The 
scale and consequences of his errors in the deployment of his tanks and instructions 
to his Corps/Divisional Commanders were thereby limited in magnitude.38 
The “breakthrough” at Cambrai was contained. Water obstacles posed difficulties 
and tanks lacked the speed to capitalise on their advance before the enemy could 
reposition forces or prepare defences to frustrate further advance. Additionally, 
cooperation and coordination with other arms left much to be desired. This resulted in 
a major set-back at Flesquières Ridge where enemy artillery took a heavy toll on tanks. 
There were lessons both for tank design and army tactics. A faster machine was 
needed for progressive advance or exploitation and tanks required close cooperation 
with other arms, infantry, artillery and aircraft. Additionally, the integration of cavalry, 
the only units capable of rapid movement on the battlefield was problematic owing to 
management weaknesses and communications limitations.39 
Following containment of the German counter-attack at Cambrai, British offensive 
operations on the Western Front were brought to a close until the summer of 1918. In 
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the meantime, the BEF prepared for the assault it knew would take place upon the 
transfer of German forces from the Eastern Front. This was to be the final German 
assault of the war, their effort for victory or achievement of a stranglehold before the 
deployment of large-scale American forces deprived them of any meaningful chance 
of success. It was the last throw of the dice, which events would show represented a 
rash gamble.40  
As with offensive operations, there were differences of opinion on how tank units 
should be deployed in defensive mode. GHQ issued tactical guidance.41 There was 
no timely renewed written doctrine on defence and this may explain why, shortly  
before the German attack was launched, Haig called a conference to discuss 
defensive tactics.42  Army Commanders were required to state how they proposed “to 
employ Tanks on their respective fronts”.43 The minutes show agreement with the 
“principle of the employment of tanks in the largest numbers possible for the purposes 
of counter-attack”.44 However, the principle was observed on paper rather than in 
practice since concentration was insufficient to provide a realistic prospect of 
meaningful counter-attack. The suggestion was also made that in certain special 
cases it might “be advisable to employ a few tanks from concealed positions ….. as 
mobile machine-gun units” (Savage Rabbits).45 This further reduced forces available 
for counter-attack. Fuller produced additional guidance shortly after the 
commencement of the German assault on 21 March emphasising the potentially 
sacrificial role of tanks in delaying the enemy “to gain time for our infantry to 
withdraw”.46 
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The initial days of the Spring Offensives left the BEF tank force sorely depleted.47 
IV Brigade lost all its tanks and by 28 March only twenty-seven of the establishment 
of ninety-eight tanks remained in II Brigade.48  The seriousness of the losses of 
personnel and armaments led to demands for reinforcements and resupply. Churchill, 
who had been close to the front when the battle began, returned to England and called 
for a special effort by munition workers. He sought and received a good response, 
though, for many armaments, he had already accumulated substantial reserves. 
Significantly, Haig praised Churchill for the rapid response to shortages.49 At the time 
of joining the Ministry Churchill had found himself embroiled in sensitive industrial 
disputes associated with the “skilled man’s grievance”. He had received criticism for 
acceding to wage demands which had spread more widely across industry than 
envisaged, though his decisions may have been part of government policy in relation 
to labour issues generally.50 In the light of losses resulting from extensive enemy 
advances in the Spring Offensives, it may however have been fortunate that the 
Ministry had been generous with payments to industrial workers. This may have 
helped minimise industrial disputes in the period before the offensives. 
During the German offensives, the Tank Corps was deployed and fought in 
accordance with a relaxed interpretation of the policy of concentration. Fuller was 
critical of the excessive number of concentration areas, nine in all, forming a 60-mile 
cordon with GHQ reserve to the rear of the First, Third and Fifth Armies.51 The total 
fighting strength at the time was only 320 Mark IV machines and fifty Whippets.52 The 
tanks suffered considerable losses during the German offensives but secured a 
number of successes against enemy concentrations. 53  “Savage Rabbits” also 
performed valuable checks on the German advance, twelve tanks of 4th Battalion 
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emerging from their forward concealed positions to restrain the local advance.54 
However, the scale of the breaches in the defence, notably of Fifth Army, rendered 
effective defence impossible, particularly since operational circumstances were ill-
suited to tank maintenance requirements and the operational radius of an offensive 
machine such as the Mark IV was limited.55 Consequently, on 13 April, when Fifth 
Army fell back across the Somme, many tanks had to be abandoned. Tank-less crews 
formed Lewis gun detachments and fought on foot.56 
Tank supply was not typical of that for munitions generally. There was no tank 
reserve. Resupply depended upon the availability of component parts and the rate at 
which tanks could be assembled. It was perhaps fortunate that the Spring Offensives 
occurred prior to re-equipment of units with Mark V, delivery of which was well behind 
forecasts.57 Had it not been that any tank was better than no tank, the Tank Corps 
might have shed few tears over the loss of Mark IVs, since they regarded the model 
as obsolete.58  
The efficient performance of the Ministry in supplying other munitions would appear 
to have spared Churchill criticism for the “delayed” production of tanks. It is notable 
that even a century later the official military view is that the rate of tank production 
accelerated in 1918: “Throughout 1918 the Mechanical Warfare Supply Department, 
under Churchill’s supervision as Minister of Munitions, saw growth in production”.59 
This was not the case. In the first three quarters of 1918 some 1,136 tanks were 
produced, a reduction of 41 from the figure for the last three quarters of 1917.60  
The production of other arms did increase. Pre-war production of Vickers machine-
guns was from a single factory at Erith, some fifty/annum. Upon the outbreak of war, 
efforts were made to increase this, but only 2,772 were produced between August 
1914 and December 1915. Government funding facilitated further expansion at Erith 
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and a new plant at Crayford and annual production increased to 7,488 in 1916. Other 
types of automatic guns were under development and British interest was revived in 
the Lewis gun: a small factory was already under construction for the production by 
BSA of some 10/week under license. In autumn 1914 BSE commenced construction 
of a new factory with a capacity for increasing production some fifteenfold, this was 
fully utilised after Lloyd George took control of procurement in May 1915. Amongst 
others, the British Cavalry and Tank Corps favoured use of the Hotchkiss, a factory 
for production being set up in Coventry, manufacturing some 40,000 between May 
1915 and the Armistice. Manufacture of machine-guns increased from 79,746 in 1917 
to 120,864 in 1918: it had been 287 in 1914.61 Home output of aircraft increased from 
14,748 in 1917 to 32,018 in 1918: it had been 1,993 in 1915.62 Disparity between the 
steady increase of other munitions generally and the production of tanks was 
undoubtedly due in large part to the complexity of the tank. It may also have been that 
management was more efficient for other weapons. The History identified some 4000 
contractors/sub-contractors for the 1918-19 tank programme. The total number of 
contracts was 6,000.63 The scope for delays and manufacturing or design problems 
was thus of an altogether greater magnitude than for guns, small arms or aircraft. 
Complexity called for the highest standard of management, but the standard achieved 
was low.64  Other factors such as labour supply and war priorities are frequently 
blamed for delay but there is little evidence that these were major factors. 
Before examining production, it is necessary to look at the army’s changing 
response to the need for tanks in consequence of experiences of offensive operations 
over the twelve months from the summer of 1917. Firstly, all elements in the army did 
not respond in the same way to the future role of tanks and did not hold identical views 
on the number and variety of machines required for future operations. The views of 
some parties are more easily determined than others. Notably Elles and Fuller in the 
Tank Corps in France frequently set out their views in the form of reports or letters, 
whereas many who were less convinced of the future role of tanks probably restricted 
 
61 Ministry of Munitions, The Official History of the Ministry of Munitions, vol. XI, The Supply of 
Munitions (Uckfield, Naval and Military Press, 2009), pp. 25-27; Paul Cornish, Machine Guns and the 
Great War (Barnsley, Pen and Sword, 2009), pp.48-49; Lloyd George, War Memoirs, p. 364. 
62 Ministry of Munitions, The Supply of Munitions, Vol. XII, part I, Aircraft (London, HMSO, 1922), p. 
173. 
63 Ibid, part III, Tanks, p. 78. 
64 Churchill Archives Cambridge, CHAR15/87, J. B. Maclean, ‘Report on Condition of Mechanical 
Warfare Supply Department at 1918, passim. 
 215 
themselves to adverse verbal comment to which indirect reference is made in certain 
memoirs.65 Official advice was issued by the General Staff.66 In September 1918, the 
fast moving conflict led to a review by the Chief of Staff, General Sir Herbert Lawrence, 
essentially responding to heavy losses of tanks as warfare became more mobile and 
German units became more proficient in anti-tank defence.67 
It has been shown that even before the Mark IV had been used in action, it was 
being written off by Elles, The gulf was widening between the army and the Ministry. 
Stern had played the Lloyd George card to have the 1,000-tank order reinstated, but 
in doing so had aggravated relations between the two Departments of State. The need 
for change and the criticism by army personnel of the MWSD were constant themes 
of correspondence or conferences during 1917 and represented issues that Churchill, 
as incoming Minister, could not ignore.68  
The army was inclined to associate its problems with Stern. Churchill was aware of 
this and subjected Stern to a severe grilling as part of a package of measures to 
assess and reorganise the Ministry in autumn 1917. Transcripts were kept of the 
interview of Stern and other senior figures at the Ministry and provide a valuable insight 
into Churchill’s management style.69  Churchill performed the main role at Stern’s 
interview although it was conducted by the full, newly-formed, Coordinating 
Committee. Stern comes across badly. His performance contrasts sharply with that of 
William Weir who had been interviewed the previous day and had been associated 
with the Ministry since his recruitment by Lloyd George in 1915.70  Weir provided 
instant, clear and unequivocal answers to Churchill’s questions on aircraft.71  His 
biographer has described Weir’s speech as “the fruits of long, logical and ordered 
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thought”. 72  Stern on the other hand was clearly nervous, hesitant and failed to 
demonstrate he was in command of events. To some extent Stern’s poor performance 
was a reflection of an unreasonable stance by Churchill and may also have been a 
consequence of swimming in shark-infested waters since Stern was not a popular 
figure among senior managers at the Ministry and he enjoyed little support from 
members of the Committee. 
Churchill’s approach to Stern is understandable. If a mechanised strategy for 
operations on the Western Front was to be adopted, Churchill needed to persuade the 
army to maintain substantial orders for tanks. He also needed to improve relations with 
the War Office, reduce delays in delivery and enhance quality. 73  Churchill’s 
appointment coincided with a particularly difficult period in relations with the War Office 
on the relative roles of the two Government Departments and responsibility for tank 
design/modification. Unwisely, earlier in the year, Stern and d'Eyncourt had 
discontinued participation in joint working arrangements with the War Office.74 
September’s transcript portrays Churchill as argumentative and needlessly fussy.75 
Stern comes across as uncertain, defensive and not up to the job.76 An adversarial 
relationship with the War Office was unacceptable. Three generals had asked for Stern 
to be removed from his post.77 After providing Lloyd George a veto opportunity, the 
outcome was that Churchill appointed Admiral Moore to replace Stern as Controller 
MWD.78 This was a move over which Churchill expressed regret since Stern was a 
keen advocate of the same strategy favoured by Churchill and Lloyd George. The 
principal reasons would appear to have been Stern’s lack of interpersonal skills and 
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army dissatisfaction with the tanks being delivered.79 Churchill accepted these factors 
in his criticism of Stern’s efficiency.80 However, in the light of subsequent events, two 
factors are relevant. Firstly, Stern was not dismissed from the Ministry, but, at the 
suggestion of Duckham, Head of Churchill’s new Directorate containing the MWD, was 
offered the leadership of a new department dealing with relations with Allies on tanks.81 
This was a sideways move.82 Secondly, remarks by Churchill to Lloyd George: “I am 
delighted with all these clever businessmen who are helping me to their utmost. It is 
very pleasant to work with competent people”.83 Churchill’s view of the competence of 
some of the businessmen may have been sincere but the receipt of a report from 
Maclean, who replaced Moore in August 1918, gave him reason to reassess the 
capabilities of senior management so far as tank production was concerned. In 
October 1918, having learned that annual tank production would be some 2000 fewer 
than forecast little more than two months earlier, Seely would describe Churchill’s staff 
at the Ministry in unflattering terms “Such an extraordinary miscalculation reflects 
gravely on those who were responsible early this year”.84 
Believing he had resolved the clash of personalities and impasse between the 
Ministry and War Office, Churchill may not have been unduly perturbed that in August 
1917 the War Office had clarified and, in the process, reduced its requirements for 
tanks.85 His thoughts therefore turned, firstly, to 1918 and then to 1919, the year he 
considered it should prove possible, subject, most significantly, to the combat-
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readiness of substantial American forces and further large-scale tank production, for 
a decisive campaign to be waged on the Western Front.86 
The problem for Churchill was that he had failed to identify the full range of problems 
at the MWD. He had addressed political issues but had failed to identify and resolve 
issues of professional ability. Dismissal of Stern should have been seen as necessary 
on both personal and professional grounds and should have been followed by 
appointment of a replacement possessing qualities previously absent. Arguably, 
professional ability was the essential ingredient for the cake, with charm or bonhomie 
the desirable, though perhaps inessential, icing. Stern’s successor, Moore, was also 
wanting in his knowledge and experience of industry. In addition to this failure, 
Churchill neglected to conduct precautionary supervision. To a large degree, 
Churchill’s actions and the consequences that flowed from those actions represented 
a re-run of the Landships Committee episode in 1915, namely the appointment of a 
manager lacking the range of abilities requisite for the success of the allotted task. 
Moore’s naval background provided experience in dealing with issues possessing 
limited similarities to aspects of tank construction or assembly. He had impressed 
Churchill during his time as First Lord by his backing of the fifteen-inch gun.87 There 
was, however, no direct relevance between Moore’s naval career and his role at the 
Ministry. Most significantly, his record, of which Churchill would have been fully aware, 
should have provided a warning of limitations of initiative and intelligence.88 Jellicoe 
had been less than complimentary over Moore’s judgment and decisions in the Battle 
of Dogger Bank in which Bennett considers Moore had chosen to “destroy one already 
crippled cruiser, instead of pursuing the main enemy force”. Bennett interprets 
Jellicoe’s remark to be directed at Moore when he wrote “He ought to have gone on, 
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had he the slightest Nelsonic temperament in him, regardless of signals. In war the 
first principle is to disobey orders. Any fool can obey.” 89  
The signal in question appears to be the flag signal made to Moore. Looking more 
widely at Jellicoe’s letter, his salvo might, in part, have been intended for Pelley, 
Captain of The Tiger.90 Jellicoe’s further ungrammatical comments do nevertheless 
suggest Moore was his number one target by recording “it is simply ABSOLUTELY 
INCOMPREHENSIBLE to me why Moore discontinued the action at NOON! When the 
Sedlitz and Derfflinger, both heavily on fire and badly damaged and they had to scuttle 
into dock with great urgency….”91 Beatty’s criticism of Moore is perfectly grammatical 
but equally unsympathetic “Moore had a chance which most fellows would have given 
the eyes in their head for, and did nothing.”92 
In accordance with his later evidence before the Royal Commission, Churchill 
appears to have approached the appointment of a new Controller on the basis of 
personality rather than knowledge, qualifications, drive and practical experience. 
Moore’s naval CV could hardly be described as outstanding and, most significantly, 
there is no evidence that he had any experience in the nitty-gritty of industrial 
management and production. Effectively, Moore himself confirmed his unsuitability for 
high office, when, in departing his post as Controller, he informed Churchill that: 
Subject to the existing policy control and priority of this Department 
remaining unchanged, it is believed that if nothing serious disturbs the labour 
and material supply, reliance may be placed upon the fact that the total 
number of Tanks as shown for production by March 31st 1919 may be relied 
upon. The monthly output, however, inevitably will fluctuate.93 
Within a month of Moore’s assurance, his replacement would produce a report 
providing a range of explanations for the Ministry’s poor tank construction record and 
an assessment that ran directly contrary to Moore’s claims. Maclean foresaw 
production continuing to decline and production facilities that were insufficient to meet 
the demands necessary to achieve Churchill’s targets.94 It is possible Moore knew the 
true position and was misleading Churchill, but the likelihood is that he was simply 
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unable to evaluate assurances received from others. Whatever the case, Churchill had 
appointed to a key Ministry post an individual lacking the expertise even to determine 
the rate of production that was possible. 
In later correspondence with Churchill, Fuller showed basic understanding that 
Churchill lacked, pointing out that this “problem is a twofold one, design and 
construction. Design requires a man who knows what we in France want. Production 
requires a man who is an expert in production.”95 This was sound advice, though, 
arguably, the problem was threefold. Design required engineering ability, production 
required knowledge of industry and industrial processes and both these disciplines 
required an input of military understanding and judgment. This was a holy trinity, in no 
element of which could Stern or Moore claim competence. The appointment of Seely 
and Maclean in July and August would add significantly to management capabilities, 
though the talent of Wilson was never fully harnessed to the Ministry machine. Upon 
the departure of Stern to Overseas Development, Wilson remained associated to a 
significant extent with Metropolitan. In his position, Wilson lacked complete integration 
into the efforts of the Ministry in controlling design and production. Nevertheless, his 
standing was such that, if he dug in his professional heels, senior managers would be 
disinclined to exercise their managerial authority. 96  Wilson therefore exercised a 
limiting role on decisions from a position managerially peripheral, though invaluable 
and powerful industrially, in the eyrie of Metropolitan’s design office and shop floor.97 
As Wilson’s son pointed out, despite their larger drawing office staff, “the drawings of 
not one single successful tank used in France were produced in the Government 
Drawing Office”.98 In contrast, Wilson designed “seven of the eight Marks which saw 
operational service, 2,545 of the 2,745 tanks built.”99 Of those Marks that he did not 
design, all but the Medium A incorporated his epicyclic transmission.100 
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Fuller advised Churchill of three main difficulties for mechanical warfare. He 
considered GHQ to be inert and would “lay down no policy”, “no efficient higher 
organisation” existed in the Tank Corps and “design and production are not assured”. 
He considered it “a waste of time to continue attempting to convince the 
Inconvincibles”. He advocated one Head for training, fighting and design and 
construction.101 Even this candid advice from Fuller, contained in a memorandum of 
career-ending dimensions, had it fallen into the wrong hands, failed to impart to 
Churchill a sufficient degree of alarm or caution. Apologetically, Churchill responded 
by acknowledging the spirit underlying Fuller’s critical remarks and outlining his own 
limitations in relation to those aspects of Fuller’s advice dealing with military matters. 
However, Churchill failed to recognise the significance of issues for which his Ministry 
was responsible. The possibility of shortcomings in his own backyard does not appear 
to have entered Churchill’s mind and his wildly optimistic prediction was “I think as the 
production develops – and during the next three months it will develop to a very large 
extent – it will carry all before it”.102  
The Mark V was coming on-stream as Churchill replied to Fuller and this did assist 
production figures over the following three months, but results were well short of 
Churchill’s predictions and of the aspirations of GHQ, America, France, and other 
allies seeking heavy tanks from Britain. 103  Following an increase to 227 Heavy, 
Medium and Supply tanks produced in April 1918, an increase likely to be explained 
by the Mark V coming fully on-stream and workers responding to the crisis of the 
German Spring Offensives, average production declined to just 137/month during 
May/July and 101 in August/September.104 It will later be shown that the deteriorating 
state of production should not have surprised appropriately experienced personnel 
familiar with the working practices of the Ministry and its contractors and with the data 
held by the Ministry. These shortcomings, that would have been identified by “an 
expert in production”, remained unidentified or unannounced by Churchill’s staff or his 
“clever businessmen”.  
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Churchill’s letter to Fuller is significant in that it betrays the extent to which he was 
out of touch with the running of a key Ministry Department.105 His understanding and 
sympathetic response to the risks run by Fuller in his criticisms of the army 
foreshadowed his relations with military whistle-blowers during his wilderness years, 
but he failed to utilise the advice Fuller had provided and did not therefore set the 
Ministry on an efficient path by appointing an expert in production.106 The two most 
pressing problems for Churchill should have been, firstly, to ensure that such contracts 
as were signed by the Ministry were fulfilled as quickly and efficiently as possible and, 
secondly, that an appropriate balance was struck between manufacturing efficiency 
and army operational objectives. By the time Churchill had settled into his new job and 
shuffled Stern into MWOAD, the issues surrounding the upgrading of the heavy tank 
had to some degree been resolved. However, the Mark V did not come on stream until 
February 1918: there is no evidence that Churchill took any steps to accelerate its 
introduction and it would appear to have been undertaken by Wilson when his authority 
to take design or experimentation decisions was enhanced by the replacement of 
Stern.107 
It is difficult to determine why Churchill should have been so confident of producing 
increasing numbers of tanks when expert opinion might have informed him otherwise. 
However, a clue is offered by Churchill’s evidence to the Royal Commission when, in 
response to cross-examination on a technical matter, he stated “I am not an engineer: 
I know nothing about these things: I have to judge by weighing one man’s opinion 
against another.”108 It suited Churchill’s objective, of protecting himself from cross-
examination before the Commission, to downplay his understanding of elementary 
scientific or mechanical issues, but his appointments and writings about tanks during 
the war show that his comments about lack of understanding of technical issues was 
not entirely without foundation. He had sufficient insight to appreciate that 
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technological innovation was of value but did not have the understanding to ensure it 
was soundly handled by those under his control.  
Some thirteen months of Churchill’s spell at Munitions would elapse before James 
Maclean, an experienced industrialist, replaced Moore as Controller MWD. Then, 
notwithstanding the opprobrium of staff generally, Maclean rapidly produced a critical 
report placing public interests ahead of his own peer popularity by revealing the scale 
and breadth of problems at the Ministry. However, by that late stage of the war, the 
weaknesses Maclean identified could not be rectified in time to contribute to the 
number or quality of tanks used by the BEF. Had an appropriate Controller been 
appointed when Churchill became Minister there is every reason to believe that a 
greater number of tanks would have been available in 1918. Furthermore, had Lloyd 
George appointed an experienced industrialist early in 1916, the scope for improved 
production would have been even greater. It is ironic that two figures so closely 
associated with military success in the 20th century should both have failed to grasp 
the importance of relevant industrial experience and/or qualifications for a key post in 
the production of armoured vehicles. 
So far as the army was concerned, its tactical ideas developed significantly during 
1917 and 1918. Progressively, the machine-gun destroyer was seen as the lead 
member of a family of tracked vehicles. The other significant family members were the 
faster medium or light tank and the supply tank, the demand for which, in the interests 
of simplicity and economy, was fulfilled by the conversion of surplus Mark IV tanks.109 
The army’s position was complicated by manpower shortages that were seen by some 
as rendering it difficult to expand the Tank Corps.110 At no stage did the army attempt 
to establish an effective control over design and production of armoured cars. 
By the end of June 1917, the Tank Committee had inspected mock-ups of two 
alternative replacements for the Mark IV. Initially, subject to modifications, the 
Committee preferred the lighter Mark VI and the War Office duly placed an order for a 
total of 1600, though later changed to Mark V based on forecasts of earlier delivery. 
On 24 August, following observations from Haig, the Army Council cancelled previous 
requirements and substituted an order for up to 800 Supply Tanks (conversion of 
 
109 National Archives, MUN4/902, Tanks, Position in the Field, 1918 and MUN4/3547, Tanks, 
Deliveries ex Makers’ Works; Glanfield, Devil’s Chariots, Appendix 3. 
110 National Archives, WO158/830, Haig to War Office, June 1918. 
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Marks I-III and towed sledges were acceptable within this category), 1600 Heavy 
Tanks, 1,200 Medium Tanks and 100 Gun-Carrying “Tanks”. 
Priorities and the limitations of the national economy were acknowledged by the 
proviso that the order was subject to reduction, if necessary, so that supply of 
aeroplanes, guns/ammunition, MT and locomotives “should not be jeopardised”. The 
letter repeated Haig’s view that “his needs in these four categories are of greater 
urgency than his need for Tanks”.111 Priority allocated to tanks was modified at various 
stages of the war, though there is no direct evidence that this hindered production, the 
impression being that it would have done so only had the rate of assembly been 
greater than the supply of component parts or the capacity of available labour. In his 
report in 1918 Maclean included two forecasts for tank production for 1918-1919, one 
related to existing levels of manpower, the other an enhanced level of production 
based on greater manpower.112 Maclean envisaged that labour would become the 
limiting factor once he had built up productive capacity. 
The month after Churchill’s arrival at Munitions, Stern outlined the production 
position. He explained that 565 of the 1,400 Mark IV order had been delivered and 
that production would continue until completion of the order early in 1918. He claimed 
that efforts had been made to convert Mark IV tanks to Mark V but that this “has not 
been practical owing to the disorganisation which would be created at Contractors’ 
Works, and consequent reduction in future output”.113 This was not a decision Stern 
should have taken alone. Rather the facts should have been presented to the Army 
Council or War Cabinet for decision, along with the views of engineers and 
industrialists. At this time, Stern’s position on Mark V production changed significantly. 
A month earlier he had confidently predicted the Mark V would be available by 
October, but his comment to Layton was no “production of this type can be anticipated 
before January next”.114 Furthermore, he stated that, whilst plans were for an output 
of 160/month, “it will not be possible to reach this figure for some time after the 
commencement of production”. Prospects for the Mark VI were similarly bleak with no 
production possible before July 1918. He forecast that the first ten Whippets would be 
 
111 National Archives, MUN5/394, War Office to MM, 24 August 1917. 
112 Churchill Archives Cambridge, CHAR15/87, report on ‘Condition of Mechanical Warfare Supply 
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produced in May 1917, subsequently rising to 100/month. In the event the first Whippet 
emerged in fourteen months and production at no time exceeded thirty-six in a “5-
week month”.115 It is not clear whether Stern’s revised position on the timing of the 
Mark V was caused by his recognition of production realities or to a policy decision on 
tank priorities. Gordon Wilson identified a specific decision that delayed work on the 
Mark V, namely in July 1917 when Stern and d’Eyncourt visited Metropolitan and 
inserted work into the design programme for two totally new tanks, the Medium B and 
Mark IX, at the expense of progress on the design of the Mark V. This vacillatory policy, 
Wilson claims, “not only delayed the introduction of a machine acceptable to the 
military authorities but also demoralised the design staff”.116 
Errors in forecasting are understandable, but Stern’s predictions were so 
consistently short of the mark that an explanation must be sought in his motivation or 
personality. His note to Layton, and a friendly note to Elles, confirm that he did 
appreciate it was “impossible to forecast with any degree of certainty the productive 
capacity of the contractors”, but this did not prevent him attempting to forecast not only 
supply dates, but also monthly rates of production. So far as the Mark V is concerned 
it would appear that, during July 1917 he either discontinued his pretence that Mark V 
production would be much earlier than was possible or intended or became aware of 
revised circumstances, since he switched to forecasts that showed a more reasonable 
relationship to what was actually achieved: he also expressed production rates in 
defensive, imprecise terms.117 Stern sought to excuse the length of time he quoted for 
supply, but it is difficult to see how scarcity of raw materials, shortage of labour or 
difficulty in obtaining tools could explain an extension from less than five weeks to 
twenty-one weeks. Bearing in mind the time required to assemble a tank from available 
components, a forecast of under five weeks should have been based on all 
components being available or their supply being imminent and guaranteed. The 
figures issued in the The History show an output of only fifty-five Whippets during 
1917.118 Although this shortfall is partially explained by the reduction in the army’s 
order from 400 to 200 machines, resulting in the Whippet being manufactured only in 
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Lincoln, this factor would not necessarily have affected the production schedule for 
the remaining 200 machines.119  
Meetings and correspondence continued between the army and Ministry.120 The 
dissatisfaction of the army over both the heavy Mark IV, and the medium Whippet 
featured on these occasions: 
There are sufficient Mark IV Tanks in France or nearing completion to 
provide all that were necessary of this type and that the further production of 
Mark IV Tank should be stopped at the earliest possible date” and “The 
improvements in engine-power and one-man-control now embodied in the 
experimental Mark V Tank should be introduced as soon as possible into the 
existing Mark IV Tank. 121 
The unhealthy relationship between Ministry and War Office is well illustrated by 
Stern placing contracts for 1400 Mark IV. The army insisted it had submitted orders 
for only 1,000. The army’s approach was modified by the adoption of Robertson’s 
pragmatic advice that it should accept Mark IV conversions for infantry supply 
purposes. The contract was also amended by the agreement of manufacturers to 
reduce the order to 1220, but this left the prospect of construction of eighty unwanted 
machines.122  
In an attempt to bring the warring factions together, Churchill arranged the 
establishment of  a “New Tank Committee, which first met a few days after Stern 
became Controller Overseas Tank Production. 123  Notes by Elles following a 
conference at the Ministry in October 1917, when the nature of revised arrangements 
were under consideration, illustrate the extent of his dissatisfaction, “technical 
objections have out-weighed practical suggestion, and the arbiter has been the 
supplier. As a commercial proposition the M.W.S.D. would never have got rid of a 
single machine after the first hundred.”124 
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Following Churchill’s appointment as Minister, the army’s further consideration of 
the type of tanks required and tactical use in 1918, such as could be assessed some 
six months in advance, was clarified at a conference attended by senior 
representatives of GHQ, War Office and Tank Corps. It was reported that Robertson’s 
view was that the Ministry should concentrate on fighting tanks and improvise for other 
purposes, using converted machines where possible. The conference sought to 
terminate Mark IV construction, introduce more powerful engines and one-man control 
into existing Mark IV machines, cease construction of Whippets as soon as possible 
(with a construction limit of 200), provide Tank Supply Tanks in the proportion of one 
per five fighting tanks, construct 200 Infantry Supply Tanks, each being capable of 
carrying infantry or half a day’s supplies for an Infantry Brigade and develop a new 
Medium Tank for exploitation. They expressed the view that production of any new 
tank should be on the basis of it being provided in “quantity” no later than 1 June 
1918.125 
In 1918, efforts were made to pass unwanted Mark IV machines onto American 
forces and the French AS, whose larger tanks were regarded as failures.126 However, 
understandably, neither nation was keen to accept machines judged to be second best 
and both sought a supply of Mark V.127 Eventually, they secured a number of Mark V* 
machines, though not as early or in the quantity they and Churchill had hoped.128 
Additionally, some flexibility of limited armoured forces was achieved following the 
appointment of Foch as Supreme Commander, with British units, including both tanks 
and armoured cars, operating under French control.129 Britain did receive a limited 
number of Renault tanks by November 1918, but there is no record of their use in 
action.130  
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There were undoubtedly faults on both sides, but it is difficult to reach a conclusion 
that does not contain an element of criticism of the Ministry for failing to provide a 
responsive service to the army. Neither The History nor other documents deal 
adequately with this issue or the reasons for it. Shortly an effort will be made to point 
to references that may provide an explanation. In the meantime, it is necessary to 
examine the response of the army to the new problems of mechanised warfare.  
The two dominant politicians of the war and/or subsequent period, namely Lloyd 
George and Churchill are critical of the army. It would be difficult to envisage two 
opponents possessing more effective oratorical or literary attributes. Lloyd George 
attacked the army on a wide range of issues.131 Specifically he emphasised that the 
concept of the tank was developed by the navy and that “the WO set up a Committee 
to investigate Colonel Swinton’s suggestion”, but “dropped the project after a few 
experiments and decided to take no further action”. He explained that he arranged to 
incorporate tank supply into his Ministry’s responsibilities as soon as the experiment 
was deemed a success.132 There is perhaps no reason up to that point to take issue 
with Lloyd George’s criticisms. However, he is on less firm ground when he continues 
by claiming: 
 the decision of the army chiefs to launch the first handful of these machines 
on a comparatively local operation in September, 1916, instead of waiting 
until a much larger number were available to carry out a great drive, has 
always appeared to me to have been a foolish blunder.133  
Churchill falsified his story of the development of the tank for reasons already 
explained. He fell, however, into the same trap as Lloyd George, expressing the view 
that the: 
first twenty tanks, in spite of my protests and the far more potent objections 
of Mr. Asquith and Mr. Lloyd George, were improvidently exposed to the 
enemy at the Battle of the Somme. The immense advantage of novelty and 
surprise was thus squandered”.134  
Both politicians therefore express views at odds with those supporters of armoured 
warfare within the army. In doing so they extend their original sound criticisms of the 
army’s shortcomings before and during the first year of the war by unreasonable 
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criticism of army tactics and priorities from 1916 to 1918. GHQ considered combat 
experience to be of fundamental value. Moreover, tanks were insufficiently reliable 
and too slow to achieve the breakthrough to which the politicians unwisely aspired.135 
Additionally, adequate means of logistical support for such a “breakthrough” did not 
exist. Despite claims that the army approached the integration of armoured vehicles 
into its offensive repertoire imprudently or unenthusiastically, it is considered that its 
approach was appropriate and reasonable in the circumstances. The groups of tanks 
which formed the essence of army tactics at Flers may have been shown in practice 
to have been too small, but the army was not to know that the machines had been 
built to a faulty specification which adversely affected their survival before and during 
the battle. 
Thoughts developed in 1917 from the 1915/16 wire/trench-crossing, machine-gun 
destroyer to machines capable of performing a range of other tasks, including 
exploitation, tank unit supply, gun-carrying, personnel carrying, and infantry/engineer 
supply. However, manufacturing capacity barely scratched the surface of 
requirements for effective implementation of cross-country armoured offensives. By 
the use of road and rail, defensive forces were always likely to be capable of 
assembling sufficient assets to thwart a limited-scale cross-country assault.  
As a perfectionist, intolerant of those holding different views to his own, Wilson had 
a reputation of being a difficult individual.136  However, the records show that he 
cooperated well with Tritton on the Mark I, with Tank Corps engineers in France 
following Flers and provided invaluable support to Metropolitan for over two and a half 
years. His harmonious working relationship with Metropolitan can be gauged by the 
fact that he worked jointly with Major John Greg, Technical Director at Metropolitan, to 
design a gun-carrying “tank”.137 It would appear that this key engineer, who designed 
virtually all British wartime tank models, cooperated impeccably with those able to 
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appreciate and utilise his outstanding engineering talent.138 It was unfortunate that he 
was not integrated more fully into discussions between Stern and America in the 
Chateauroux/Mark VIII project. Wilson accompanied Stern to France after the Arras 
offensives, but appears to have been kept out of key meetings, for which he and other 
technical officers were on hand simply “to answer questions”.139  Possibly, Stern 
wished to avoid the formation of an army/Wilson alliance to advocate technical 
advancement at the expense of production numbers. Wilson might have provided 
more realistic production forecasts. His exclusion from discussions with the Americans 
on the Mark VIII was particularly unfortunate: this denied the benefit of his work to the 
Anglo-American project which was therefore slower than it might have been and was 
not completed before the Armistice.140 
The degree of cooperation and understanding between engineers was not matched 
in the field of management. By the time Churchill interviewed Stern in September 
1917, it was not just War Office generals who were seeking his removal from his post 
as Head of Mechanical Warfare. Elles, who, apart from his misguided advocacy for 
the use of Lewis Guns in tanks, showed fine judgment in the development of armoured 
warfare, also concluded Stern should be replaced. Early in 1917 Elles had been 
singing Stern’s praises, “expecting Stern back again to-morrow. I think his visit was of 
the greatest value”.141 By October he held the opposite view.142  
Delayed progress in improving early design by the introduction of one-man driving 
and increased engine power would have been of greatest significance in explaining 
Wilson’s changed opinion.143 Although the Tank Corps did not determine or control 
the tactical use of tanks, Elles was responsible for the provision of the tank service to 
formation commanders and was aware that he was sending men into battle in 
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machines possessing basic weaknesses.144 The protective armoured mantle gave the 
impression of safety for the occupants of tanks compared to the exposed infantry they 
were assisting. The sense of safety was illusory, figures show their casualty rate to be 
similar to infantry and other arms.145 Elles quest for one-man control and more speed 
was entirely reasonable in that it would provide the tank’s main enemy, the German 
field gun, with a potentially more agile and elusive target.146 Slow movement rendered 
Marks I to IV vulnerable to an excessive extent to direct and indirect fire from field 
guns owing to the need to stop to change gear or undertake significant steering 
manoeuvres.  
Ludendorff’s view was clear, for defence against tanks “the 06 field-gun, which 
penetrated them was sufficient; all we had to do was turn it out in sufficient 
quantities.”147 It is surprising Ludendorff did not recognise the potential handicap of 
mist or fog in defending against tanks. Owing perhaps to his naval association, 
Churchill had instantly appreciated the benefit of smoke as a form of protection for 
tanks. 148  Subsequently, the army and Ministry were slow to develop this line of 
thought. In muddy conditions the risk of bellying increased the vulnerability of the tank, 
a vulnerability which, in the sight of a field gun or enemy OP was not greatly assisted 
by the addition of unditching beams. This was due to the length of time the tank was 
stationary before the unditching beam might render it mobile again and to the 
vulnerability of the crew to small arms fire and shrapnel when working to deploy the 
unditching beam from positions outside the tank. 
Although Stern and his successor, Admiral Moore, do not provide a detailed 
explanation of their reasons for continuing over a period of nearly two years with Mark 
IV contracts, it is difficult to see any explanation that does not include the issue of 
“performance criteria”, output level and cost. Transfixed by the rate of production and 
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concerns of manufacturers for production runs of length, there would appear to have 
been no attempt to employ shorter runs incorporating enhancements. In October 
1917, soon after taking over from Stern, Moore emphasised to Duckham that in: 
all cases [of new machines] it is desirable that a further fixed limit be given 
to whatever design is adopted, and for general convenience of 
manufacturers, rapidity and continuity of production, this limit ought not to be 
less than six months output.149  
A six-month run might have been acceptable for soundly designed machines, but the 
early tanks had many weaknesses.150 Furthermore, in wartime, endurance tests were 
not necessarily conducted prior to issue.151 Moore was indicating, in a different, less 
abrasive way than Stern, that he was nevertheless inclined to act as the 
manufacturers’ poodle rather than the army’s terrier. He exhibited traits conforming to 
Jellicoe’s judgment. Compared to the continuity of a large volume contract, regular or 
frequent switches in production would undoubtedly have incurred penalties, financial 
and numerical. Such changes would however have increased the efficiency of 
individual tanks in operations. The unpopularity of changes to production lines and 
Wilson’s actual, as opposed to his theoretical, authority are well illustrated by the 
reaction of Metropolitan to a large order for Mark V late in the war.152 The army 
required “as quickly as possible” a repeat order of 2,000 Mark V “of precisely the same 
design” as those previously constructed.153 Wilson had secured the agreement of 
Metropolitan “to lay themselves out for very rapid production….on the understanding 
that no alterations should be made.” However, GHQ subsequently sought sixty-two 
amendments to upgrade the Mark V as Mark X. Wilson, drawing upon the mutual 
respect between himself, the Chairman of Metropolitan, Dudley Docker, and senior 
management at Metropolitan, claimed it was: 
only due to my personally urging the necessity for certain of these changes 
and coming to a mutual agreement with them as to those which would really 
seriously affect production and those which could be put through without 
very serious delay that the majority of these changes have been adopted by 
them.154 
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The BEF then sought further changes. Wilson was not convinced of the need for these 
changes and asked “to be relieved of any responsibility for Metropolitan Co’s 
production of the Mark X [sic] if this is insisted on”.155 The Ministry and GHQ backed 
down.156 The episode and that negotiated by Duckham for elongation of the Mark V to 
V* demonstrate that it was possible to compromise over the vexed question of 
amendments to design, contracts and agreements. Wilson had endeavoured to 
dissuade the army from lengthening the Mark V. On that occasion he limited the 
severity of his criticism, seemingly because he had dissuaded the Ministry/army from 
abandoning production of the Mark V altogether, allowing 400 to be built before 
switching production to V*: 
While I quite appreciate that the wishes of those in France should have full 
consideration, I would here remind you that it was the express wish of France 
contrary to my technical advice that Mark V was converted to Mark V Star 
and that had I not strenuously opposed this alteration no Mark V would have 
been produced at all. 157 
Effectively, endorsing Wilson’s judgment, Elles later stated that the lengthened Mark 
V* was not a success, being unpopular in the army owing to increased weight and 
length which left it underpowered and difficult to steer.158 This was not simply the view 
of Elles but also of the War Office and Tank Corps as a whole since the War Office 
refused to part with any Mark V machines, requiring instead that V* should be supplied 
to French and US Armies: 
I am commanded by the Army Council to inform you that owing to the 
transportation difficulties of the British Army being now overcome, the whole 
of the 400 Mark V Tanks will be required for the Equipment of the British 
Tank Corps. The British Army prefers the Mark V Tanks or (sic) the present 
style of fighting to the Mark Vx type.159  
In reality, the Army Council realised it had made a mistake in requiring elongation of 
the Mark V to Mark V*. Reversion to Mark V was evidence of this. They were fortunate 
that Wilson had persuaded them to undertake a limited run of Mark V.160  
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It is known from various comments and reports that there were problems with the 
Ministry’s drawing office.161 However, it seems likely that the delay in developing the 
Mark V was largely the result of policy decisions by Stern. Wilson stated in October 
1918 “that practically the whole of 1917 was lost owing to vacillation of requirements 
from France, the E.M.E. Machine having run on the 3rd March. The drawings for Mark 
V were not put in hand until 5th October.”162 Wilson may have been correct that much 
time was lost in advancing design in 1917 but correspondence and notes of the various 
conferences do not support his statement that army vacillation was responsible for the 
delay. He may not have wished to blame Stern or may simply not have known the 
factors responsible. There is however no reason to doubt his comment about the 
running of the experimental machine. The March date fits with the winter period given 
by his son as the time he undertook his initial design work.163  
So far as the rate of construction is concerned, the lack of management ability at 
the Ministry appears to be at the root of the problem. Stern, Addison and Montagu 
appear not to have grasped the need to assess the capacity of plant and buildings for 
the manufacture of necessary components. Moore was aware of deficiences but did 
not expand productive capacity. Churchill must have appreciated that problems 
existed but failed to take any action until June 1918 and then seemingly because he 
was under pressure from Seely, d’Eyncourt and Lloyd George. There is no evidence 
that Churchill had any understanding of the steps that were necessary. He appeared 
to have been genuinely surprised upon receiving Maclean’s report on production and 
the underlying explanations for low output.164 
Haig may have been responsible for prolonging Stern’s preoccupation with 
numbers rather than quality, since in April 1917 he repeated the advice given in 
September the previous year.165 This extended the priority for quantity over quality 
until August. Stern claims he was told: 
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he [Haig] would do anything to help me; that a division of Tanks was worth 
ten divisions of infantry, and he probably underestimated it: told me to hurry 
up as many Tanks as I could, not to wait to perfect them, but to keep sending 
out imperfect ones as long as they came out in large quantities, especially 
up till August. He said that the Tanks, after aeroplanes, were the most 
important arm of the British Army, as they were such tremendous life-savers. 
He asked me who at the War Office did not believe in them. I replied that the 
A.G.’s department recruited my men. He agreed that it must be stopped.166 
These remarks, which may have greatly influenced Stern’s actions, were made when 
Haig was under pressure for short-term results. Greater consideration was required 
on the relationship of short-term needs to longer-term supply and design policy. It is 
interesting to note that the date selected by Haig appears to take into account reduced 
urgency in supply over the winter period, a factor not raised by any other 
representative of the Ministry or army. However, though Haig may have been 
conscious of fluctuations in seasonal utility of tanks, he may have been less aware of 
the nature of enhancement that could be made to the main fighting tank. He was most 
impressed by the enhanced capabiliy of the Mark V when it became available: 
Remarkable progress has been made since Cambrai, not only in the pattern 
of Tank, but also in the methods of using them. Tanks now go first, covered 
by shrapnel barrage, and break down all opposition. Enemy in strongpoints 
and machine gun nests are then flattened out by the Tanks….During 
consolidation Tanks zig-zag in front to cover the operation.167 
It was helpful that the C-in-C should observe the improved capability of the Mark V, 
but his remarks suggest he overrated their ability to evade incoming fire and may have 
over-assessed their tactical ability in the offensive. This will be examined in the 
following chapter. 
In the early part of the 20th century the army laboured under the handicap that it 
was poor form to advocate a different line to senior officers, yet Elles considered the 
matter of sufficient importance to depart from accepted practice when he pointed out 
that the underlying reason for the “any tank is better than no tank” policy was to obtain 
the maximum number for the Spring Offensive, i.e. “large production at an early date. 
This has failed.” He advocated either “large quantities produced in a short period” or 
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a “system whereby a lesser number is produced and maintained whilst continual 
modification and improvement in design is introduced”. He pointed out that the Mark 
IV design “is rudimentary and possesses defects which make it very expensive as 
regards personnel and material and very difficult to use tactically”. His handwritten 
alterations to the original draft letter toned down the suggestion that “design, output 
and maintenance” should be “extracted from the Ministry of Munitions”, but his 
campaign for change via a future joint conference was retained with the aspiration that 
“if necessary and expedient a new policy be laid down on a basis of facts”.168  
Aspirations by Elles were not to be achieved. His approach was possibly the 
opposite of that accepted by Stern. Whereas Stern does not appear to have 
challenged the industrial “necessities” advanced by Metropolitan, arguably, Elles 
attached insufficient weight to industrial requirements. In any event, the Mark IV was 
constructed in large numbers between May and October 1917 and smaller numbers 
continued to be manufactured for a further year.169  
Churchill should have had no difficulty in improving upon the performance of his 
predecessors. The organisational system Churchill introduced in August 1917, 
appears to have worked efficiently for the Ministry as a whole but the MWD did not 
operate along the same lines as other Departments. 170  The withdrawal of Lloyd 
George’s special Charter and replacement of Stern by Moore did not improve the 
running of the Department. Wilson stated that the replacement of Stern led to 
improvements, but he may have been influenced by the conclusion of large-scale Mark 
IV construction around that time and by his freedom to progress towards the 
introduction of the Mark V. There is no sign that the replacement of Stern by Moore 
provided any basic change of approach to the management of the MWD, indeed 
Moore seems to have been Stern’s equal both in kowtowing to the production runs 
favoured by industry and accepting unrealistic construction forecasts by industrialists. 
In February 1918, Moore suggested that, given the necessary steel, North British 
Locomotive Company and associated Manchester manufacturers might produce 
some 1,750 tanks between April and October 1918.171 In the event, North British 
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produced nineteen Medium B tanks mostly in October/November 1918 and eleven 
Mark VIII after the Armistice.172  
Preparations for the production of the Mark V may not have been assisted by 
contract disputes. In the summer of 1917, Addison’s cancellation of the autonomy 
Lloyd George had granted to the MWSD resulted in clashes between the Ministry’s 
Finance and Mechanical Warfare Departments. The Finance Department claimed a 
dispute over contract price had no influence on the timing of production, but Stern and 
Duckham felt otherwise.173 It may be telling that the matter was resolved as soon as 
the dispute was elevated to Director level. It would appear that “F”, Hambling, then 
conceded it was inappropriate to continue to delay the supply of a more effective tank 
to the army for the potential benefit of £100/machine.174 An inter-departmental dispute 
had developed under the jurisdiction of Addison, perhaps not an individual greatly 
feared by his subordinates. However, Hambling may not have relished the prospect of 
arguing the point with Duckham before the more imposing figure of Churchill, whose 
priorities and approach might have been altogether less understanding of “modest” 
financial savings compared to the value of the “bigger picture”. Contracts were finally 
agreed and signed after several months of wrangling.175 
Production of the Mark IV was well advanced when Churchill arrived at Munitions.176 
Some 400 machines had been released to the Ministry’s Transport Officer by 14 July 
and a further 238 by the end of August.177 Churchill was immediately dragged into the 
debate on the number of Mark IV ordered by the War Office. By the time he had 
reorganised his Department, been accepted by the electorate of Dundee and advised 
on the situation of the Mark IV, it is understandable he should have concluded there 
was little to be gained by cancelling the remainder of the order at such a late stage. 
Duckham pointed out “to stop manufacturing Mark IV. at once would not assist the 
output of Mark V.” As soon “as Mark V. was ready to come along the manufacture of 
Mark IV would cease”.178 Duckham’s claim was not entirely accurate. Commencement 
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of the Mark V was dependant not only on clearing industrial floorspace for a new range 
of components and manufacturing processes, but also on the availability of the 
components to be assembled to form a machine that differed in many respects from 
the Mark IV. There is no evidence that the necessary components were available to 
facilitate earlier construction of the Mark V. From comments in Portrait of an Inventor 
and on the weekly progress reports it appears that the true reason why construction 
of the Mark V could not start earlier was the lack of the necessary preparations which, 
bearing in mind the number of new components, would inevitably have taken several 
months.179 Limited productive capacity for Mark IV remained after production of Mark 
V commenced in earnest in February 1918. The residue of Stern’s over-ordering of 
Mark IVs, some seventy-seven tanks, were assembled between March/November 
1918.180  
It has already been demonstrated that Churchill anticipated a surge in output in 
1918. This, he would have believed, would result from the commencement of 
production of Mark V, increased output of Medium tanks and output of certain 
specialised machines for transporting artillery and supplies. Churchill appeared to 
have no reservations about improved rates of tank production in his advocacy of 
mechanised warfare. In October 1917, Churchill submitted a memorandum to the War 
Cabinet listing six principal forms of weaponry that could assist infantry in the 1918 
fighting season, namely artillery, air, rail, gas, trench mortars and tanks. So far as 
tanks were concerned, he claimed the original conception of the use of tanks was by 
night, by surprise, as a novelty, as an independent arm under specially planned 
operations in favourable weather and on ground not torn up by artillery. His 
memorandum was critical of the way they had been used. He believed: 
the resources of next year will for the first time make available numbers of 
Tanks with trained personnel sufficient not only to act as auxiliaries to the 
infantry in the main battle, but to provide the forces necessary for attacks of 
their own under the most favourable conditions and on a very large scale.181  
He added: 
the existing pattern of Tanks will be available in considerable numbers to 
support the main operations of the army during the spring and early summer, 
it should be possible by July to provide an ample force of a greatly improved 
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pattern, lighter, faster and with a far greater radius of action”.182 
Churchill deplored the priorities of the army, whereby only 18,000 men were allocated 
to the Tank Corps. It is not possible to compare the accuracy of Churchill’s forecast 
with the eventual outcome. He used imprecise terms - “ample”, “lighter, faster” and 
“far greater”. It appears he was referring to the Mark V though this was heavier than 
the Mark IV and possessed an advantage of speed that was significant for movement 
in disadvantageous conditions rather than theoretical top speed.183  It is possible 
Churchill intended the comparison to be between the Whippet and the Mark IV, in 
which case many of his points would have been justified. However, only 116 Whippets 
were produced by July. Marks V/V* were also available only in limited numbers, some 
518 by July 1918.184 It is clear he had no understanding of the limited productive 
capacity established by his Ministry. This undermined his ambitious future tactical 
plans. Furthermore, his objective to use tanks “for attacks of their own” shows that he 
had not shed his flawed appreciation of the tactical role and limitations of tanks and 
their mechanical reliability. 
Beiriger expressed the view that under Churchill, the Ministry “began an ambitious 
and extensive mechanical warfare programme that featured trench mortars, tanks and 
airplanes”. He recorded the qualification that “limited resources, competing 
government departments, entrenched military conditions and the exigencies of war all 
threatened the realisation of mechanical warfare”. 185  The generality of Beiriger’s 
comment is sound but it neglects to record that Churchill’s estimates represented a 
gross exaggeration of what could be achieved. The “existing pattern of Tanks” were 
not available in adequate numbers for operations in the early summer of 1918 and 
those available for the main British effort at Amiens in the late summer were still 
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insufficient to meet the perceived needs of all three attacking Corps.186 Furthermore, 
the “ample” force of lighter tanks of improved pattern did not materialise and 
exploitation at Amiens was entrusted to a relatively small number of the original, 
unimpressive Medium A, in conjunction with cavalry and a limited number of unreliable 
armoured cars.187  
The exploits of the Medium tank, Musical Box and 17 Armoured Car Battalion during 
the Battle of Amiens represented snapshots of the breakthrough and exploitation to 
which tank enthusiasts and Haig had aspired in mechanical or equine form.188 A 
number of factors limited the achievements of Fourth and Third Armies at this time. 
Firstly, armoured cars were handicapped by their unreliable mechanical condition, 
small number, need for towed assistance over rough ground and lack of effective 
resupply arrangements, essential to maintaining a continuing impact.189 Secondly, the 
use of Medium tanks was limited by their restricted number, deployment in association 
with cavalry units and limited firepower and speed.190  Edmonds also considered 
cavalry action to have been somewhat unadventurous, though initial enemy 
disorganisation on 8 August heralded a most successful period for cavalry offensive 
action, justifying Haig’s earlier efforts to retain a Corps of a size capable of effective 
action as the network of German defence buckled somewhat under the pressure of 
artillery and heavy tank assault.191  
For tanks, Fuller considered the outstanding lesson of Amiens to be the inadequate 
speed of Whippets for open warfare.192  It would be difficult to argue against the 
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importance of this factor, though Musical Box demonstrated that, provided defence 
was dislocated, access to enemy rear areas was possible. The problem of engine 
power for heavy tanks had been appreciated for some time but GHQ and the Ministry 
had not prioritised the development of a light tank.  Speed had been improved in the 
Mark V, but, for all British tanks, remained low and quite inadequate for exploitation 
and insufficiently elusive for German field artillery deployed in anti-tank locations. It 
was unfortunate that the tank exchange with France commenced too late to enable 
the BEF to launch a force of Renault FT at Amiens. The delay of the tank exchange 
would appear to have been a consequence of low levels of tank construction achieved 
by the Ministry in 1918. Furthermore, cavalry and tanks did not cooperate entirely 
amicably. Fuller had no wish to act as nursemaid to the cavalry, while Brigadier-
General Archibald Home, B.G.G.S., Cavalry Corps, felt that the best way of using 
Whippets was to keep them as a reserve under the hand of a Cavalry Brigade 
Commander.193 
As Haig prepared his forces for the Battle of Amiens, d’Eyncourt, upset by low tank 
production, by the unseating of Stern from his former post some nine months earlier 
and, undoubtedly, by keenness to hobnob with the “top brass”, was making 
representations to Lloyd George about tank production. Accordingly, it was announced 
that “The Prime Minister decided to hold a discussion on Friday afternoon next on the 
output of British Tanks, which was reported to be unsatisfactory. He invited any of his 
colleagues who were interested to attend” and informed members of the Imperial War 
Cabinet of his intention to call a meeting.194 In the event the meeting took place just 
before the IWC on 8 August and members arriving for this later meeting joined in the 
discussion on tanks.  
Outwardly, during the spring and early summer months, Churchill had remained 
optimistic about tank production.195 However, he did adjust his position to the extent 
that he became sensitive to the issue of labour difficulties. Notably on 12 July he 
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issued a warning to the War Cabinet on the serious consequences of “the continual 
drafting of skilled men into the army from the munitions industries.”196  
Thanks in part to their armoured elements, actions in July at Hamel and Soissons 
demonstrated the ability of British, French and American units to dominate enemy 
forces and to this extent the Allies had successfully put behind them the worrying 
period of the German Spring Offensives. However, few beyond GHQ contemplated 
the end of the war in 1918. Haig recorded his meeting on 7 August with the King and 
his views on the opinions of allied governments, expressing “the belief that the British 
front would be much further forward before winter arrived”. He recorded that he 
“explained in detail on the map in my study our forthcoming operations”.197 By the time 
of his meeting with Churchill, his optimism had increased: 
Mr Winston Churchill….came to see me about noon…He is most anxious to 
help us in every way….. His schemes are all for ‘completion next June!’ I told 
him we ought to do our utmost to get a decision this autumn….. If we allow 
the enemy a period of quiet he will recover…..In reply I was told the General 
Staff in London calculate that the decisive period of the war cannot arrive 
until next July.198  
In fairness to Churchill and the General Staff, it should be recorded that Haig and GHQ 
had a history of optimistic forecasts.199 Those present at the meeting on tanks on 8 
August would not have been considering the development of tanks in the context of 
an early end to hostilities. Rather, the general feeling was that victory could not be 
delivered until the second half of 1919 at the earliest and might not be deliverable at 
all. The pessimism of Milner is particularly notable when expressing his view about the 
prospect of Allied success in 1919, “On this he personally felt the gravest doubt. In his 
view the Western Front was a candle that burned all the moths that entered it”.200 
Smuts and Borden were equally pessimistic.  
Events would unfold differently. On 7 August, as politicians and civil servants 
prepared to defend their performance on tank production before the Prime Minister 
the following day, so at the same time, entirely coincidentally, the product of their 
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labours over the preceding months, Wilson’s Mark Vs and Tritton’s Whippets, together 
with a small number of armoured cars, took station to fulfil their role in the assault by 
Fourth Army at Amiens. Although the war had only a further three months to run, 
revelations and the outcome of events during that period were to present Churchill 
with a rollercoaster ride. Firstly, he would fear the exposure of shortcomings revealed 
by the appointment of a capable Controller to his MWSD. This would be followed by a 
sense of relief as the end to hostilities ensured that the weaknesses he had failed to 
identify and resolve would remain unknown to the general political world. The loyalty 
and discretion of his colleagues and staff at the Ministry, the euphoria of victory, the 
transfer of the spotlight from war issues to those of peace and the veil cast over past 
events by an embracing cloak of national security, sheltered his weaknesses from 
public gaze. The problems of judging who was “Too Late”, who was motivated by 
personal vanity or benefit rather than the common good and the identification of the 
“weakest links” would generally be overshadowed by the problems of peace and the 
treatment of former enemies. Erstwhile key military issues would in general be pushed 
to one side, other than when occasionally surfacing as fuel in battles of the memoirs.  
The proceedings of the Royal Commission would be a notable exception to this 
general picture and would provide ample incentive for Churchill to participate in 
proceedings in order to protect or burnish his wartime image. Regrettably, Churchill 
would not be entering the lists on the side of those most deserving praise but on behalf 
of those who had been “Too Late”. He would brazenly deny any knowledge of Tritton 
during his time at the Admiralty, would downplay the role of Tritton and Wilson and 
would relegate Swinton’s early vision into second place behind a fabricated picture of 
his own vision of the need for tracked vehicles.201 D’Eyncourt would benefit from his 
status as Churchill’s appointee, his contribution being transformed from the reality of 
slow, indeterminate action into an illusory model of astute leadership.202 The special 
meeting at Downing Street on 8 August, the report submitted shortly thereafter by 
Maclean and evidence given the following year to the Royal Commission would reveal 
much of the nature of or lack of abilities of many of the key personnel involved in the 
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development of armoured vehicles. The findings of the Royal Commission, released 
immediately into the public domain, would go some way to rectifying the earlier 
inadequate recognition of the engineers responsible for “invention” of the tank. The 
issues reported by Maclean and the performance of individuals at the meeting on 8 
August would not be revealed for many years. By the time of their release it would be 
the events of a further war between Germany and its European neighbours and their 
allies that would be uppermost in the public mind.
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Chapter Six – Management Limitations are Revealed. 
This chapter covers the final four months of the war, a crucial but neglected period 
in the history of the production of armoured vehicles. Though brief, events in this 
concluding period reveal much about the management of wartime tank production and 
the robustness of tank supply. 
As the summer of 1918 arrived it was appreciated by those in senior military and 
political positions that the production of tanks was neither achieving forecast levels nor 
the standards set by other departments at Munitions. Churchill was not prepared to 
admit to the scale of failure: 
General Harington said that the original intent had been for 8,400 Tanks [for 
1919], but General Seely had lately informed him that we could not produce 
much more than half that number. Mr. Churchill’s latest information on the 
subject, however, was that he hoped to produce within 1,500 of the original 
intent. At present we had 400 Mark IV. Tanks, which we would have to use 
as best we could….The Prime Minister expressed his intention of 
summoning a Meeting of all those concerned in the output of Tanks.1 
Extensive scholarship places the role of the tank in the context of all-arms operations 
in a successful period for the BEF, emphasising its contribution at Amiens but also 
immediately before and after that battle. However, it gives little attention to the rate of 
tank production. John Bourne hints at the significance of production over the preceding 
months of 1918 and the implications for fighting by the BEF by drawing attention to 
two associated key facts “we can never produce enough tanks to really convert to 
proper armoured warfare, but where we do use tanks in the Hundred Days we always 
prevail – always”.2 
It is the intention in this chapter to examine events taking place in the shadows at 
the Ministry rather than those in the spotlight in France and Belgium where the BEF 
took the eye, moving to the centre of the ring in what was to be the final round with, 
as Bourne describes, the punching power of a heavyweight but the dexterity of a 
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lightweight.3 Primarily, the punching power lay with the Royal Artillery, but it might 
have been greater and more flexible, and the casualties fewer, had it been 
supplemented by more tanks and had earlier advice on their use been heeded. 
Furthermore, there is a shortage of comment on absence of light tanks and the small 
number of armoured cars, so much cheaper to construct and easier to concentrate at 
“hot-spots” or opportunity locations in mobile warfare than heavy tanks, and less 
demanding on spares and servicing. These issues suggest a lack of appropriate and 
timely planning and innovative tactical thought both in London and at GHQ, though 
difficulties caused by shortages of resources and manpower need to be 
acknowledged.4  
As soon as he heard of the offensive at Amiens, Churchill took a few days “holiday” 
to close up to the fighting. He sent back his impressions to Lloyd George and 
Clementine. His letters show no signs that he recognised the battle might have been 
more successful had he managed the MWD more skilfully, producing perhaps a 
greater number of heavy tanks for III Corps, a meaningful reserve for the 
Canadian/Australian Corps, light tanks or armoured cars to exploit breaches in enemy 
defences and, in accordance with his initial advice in January 1915, protective smoke-
generating devices. Shortcomings in production had implications for operations 
throughout the Hundred Days. In this chapter the assessment by Ian Jacob of 
Churchill’s characteristics as PM during World War II should be borne in mind: 
The Prime Minister was intensely loyal to his friends and supporters and to 
those who had served him. He always liked to fit them into jobs if possible 
near him, or else offering special opportunities for exercising what he thought 
were their talents or qualifications. At the same time he was a poor judge of 
character and had little understanding of organization, so that he sometimes 
insisted on unsuitable appointments.5 
Churchill did not admit the fact, but he must have become increasingly concerned as 
the months of 1918 passed. Output of armoured vehicles was failing to scale the 
heights he believed necessary to spearhead a decisive assault on the Western Front 
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in 1919. This deficit was not marginal, but approximately half that required.6 Moreover, 
France also was failing to achieve the levels of production of light tanks, which he had 
hoped would form the basis of an exchange for British heavy tanks.7 Despite his 
practice of placing the best gloss on situations, the calling of a meeting of 
manufacturers in June and the appointment of Seely in July represent evidence of 
Churchill’s concern.8  
By mid 1918 armoured warfare enjoyed support not just politically but also at senior 
levels in the army, notably by Henry Wilson, the new CIGS, and Tim Harington his 
deputy. Wilson expressed his concern to Churchill two days before Amiens: 
I am a little worried as to the prospects for next year both as regards the 
output of Tanks and Mechanical Traction. As regards the former you have 
our programme which I know is formidable….What I feel is that though our 
numerical superiority next year will not be very great, yet we can add 
materially to that by our lead in mechanical means.9 
Haig did not call for the scale of growth of the Tank Corps that Churchill sought, 
nevertheless, over the preceding two years, he had appreciated and encouraged the 
value and potential of the new arm. The senior officers in the Tank Corps were 
enthusiastic and dedicated to their roles and, in Fuller, Churchill would have 
recognised a like spirit, whose aspirations, along the lines of Plan 1919, were largely 
in accord with his own.10  
Plan 1919 was a “bold” concept incorporating a force of faster light/medium tanks 
to strike deep into enemy territory and attack enemy headquarters.11 Such proposals 
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Thinker, (London, Macmillan, 1987), pp. 48-55; A J Trythall, J F C Fuller: Staff Officer Extraordinary in 
The British General Staff: Reform and Innovation c.1890-1939, ed. by David French and Brian Holden 
Reid (London, Routledge, 2014) [2002], p. 149. 
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were compatible with Churchill’s aspirations to graft the means of exploitation onto the 
strike power of British artillery and heavy tanks. He envisaged French light tanks and 
20,000 cross-country Newton Tractors to add to British exploitation potential. 12 
Although often condemned as impractical, owing to the limitations of the tanks of the 
period and to unsophisticated or unreliable communications, it should be recalled that 
a Medium tank, Musical Box, and 17th Armoured Car Battalion did operate along such 
lines at Amiens.13 On 8 August, penetration was deep enough to surprise and scatter 
German Corps HQ troops at Foucaucourt. 14  The exploits of Musical Box were 
eventually stopped only by a combination of artillery strikes and adverse 
consequences from additional petrol carried on the roof of the tank, in contravention 
of Tank Corps Standing Battle Orders.15 
Stern and d’Eyncourt had disagreed with managerial changes at the Ministry 
following Churchill’s 1917 reorganisation that had transferred Stern from the MWD’s 
Home Production to Overseas Production. In July 1918 they judged it opportune to 
seek changes that incorporated a degree of reversion to former management 
arrangements: d’Eyncourt duly lobbied Lloyd George. Undoubtedly conscious of 
Addison’s failure to solve the problems of tank production, Lloyd George had called a 
meeting in March, at which he had received an assurance from Churchill: 
Mr Churchill circulated a tank programme for the period between 1st 
February 1918 and the 31st March 1919….it was a programme which 
indicated development towards the beginning of July next, but extending 
more rapidly in the later months of 1918 and the earlier months of 1919.”16  
 
12 National Archives, MUN5/211, report by Percival Perry, Director of Traction, MWD, on charter and 
history for design and supply of 20,000 military tractors based upon a model designed and built by 
Col. Newton of the Trench Warfare Department. Treasury grants for supply from America had been 
authorized ($35,000,000 in August 1918). The report is undated but appears to have been written 
shortly after the Armistice as part of the winding-up of the tractor programme. Specification for the 
tractor was – weight 5 tons tare, speed 5mph, minimum of 40hp. The rate of supply was envisaged as 
10,000 by end January 1919, (8,000 from Buick and Studebaker); J. F. C. Fuller, Tanks in the Great 
War 1914-1918 (New York, E. P. Dutton, 1920), pp. 291. 
13 Imperial War Museum, Doc. 10086, War Experience and Practical Notes of the 17th Armoured Car 
(Tank) Battalion in France from April to November 1918. 
14 National Archives, CAB24/89/6, memorandum by Churchill to War Cabinet, 23 September 1919; 
Fuller, Tanks, pp. 291-292; William Henry Lowe Watson, With the Tanks 1916-1918: Memoirs of a 
British Tank Commander in the Great War (Barnsley, 2014), p. 205. 
15 Fuller, Tanks, p. 233; Clough and Amabel Williams-Ellis, The Tank Corps (New York, George H 
Doran, 1919), p. 306, despite Standing Orders, Lt. C. B. Arnold, commanding Musical Box, claimed 
that he had been ordered to carry the petrol cans on his Whippet. 
16 National Archives, CAB24/4/51, minutes of meeting at 10 Downing Street to consider the Question 
of the Output of Tanks. In the interests of security, the programme was not reproduced in the minutes, 
but it would almost certainly have been that listed in National Archives, MUN5/211, minutes of 
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By July, production had fallen well below the level envisaged in Churchill’s 
programme and Lloyd George wisely convened a further meeting. Since the Cabinet 
was not kept informed of the details of operations in France, that meeting was 
arranged, quite coincidentally, for 8 August, a significant day for tanks and for the 
prospects of the war as a whole. The meeting, attended by Ministers, Ministry staff 
and army personnel, commenced at 1030 hours, by which time the Battle of Amiens 
had been in progress for over six hours and many of the tanks produced by the Ministry 
had been put out of action.17 Due to attend an IWC meeting scheduled for 1130 hours, 
the Prime Ministers of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Newfoundland and Lt.-
General Jan Smuts representing South Africa, joined during the later stages of the 
meeting. It seems likely the tank meeting overran. Possibly as a result of the noon 
report on the Battle Situation, the IWC was informed by the CIGS of the offensive at 
Amiens.18 However, the meeting on tanks would appear to have been conducted in 
ignorance of such events.  
In opening the meeting, Lloyd George invited d’Eyncourt to “state frankly and freely 
such criticisms as he had to offer”.19 D’Eyncourt read a prepared text, which included: 
A reorganisation took place about a year ago, but instead of making an 
improvement, things have grown steadily worse. Mr. Churchill spoke to me 
then, and I told him it was a mistake to upset the former organisation....I 
pointed out that Tanks were an entirely new development, and to discard the 
men who had successfully designed and produced them was a mistake. 
There was no field of choice of men who knew about Tanks. The intricacies 
of their manufacture are very great (there are over 2,000 standardised parts 
in each Tank, not counting the engines and guns), and all this requires a 
long training and most careful study.20 
D’Eyncourt continued by criticising the appointment of Admiral Moore as DGMWD, 
since, at the time, he knew nothing of tanks. He also criticised the Tank Committee “I 
confess to being rather tired of sitting on committees and listening to all sorts of 
proposals, none of which the committee has authority to carry out”.21 He claimed:  
 
Ministry of Munitions Committee 57, 7 March 1918. This envisaged the production of 4,438 tanks in 
the thirteen months March 1918/March 1919. It was forecast that production would rise from 106 in 
March 1918 to approximately 400/month from August onwards. 
17 See for example, National Archives, CAB/23/44A/8, minutes of Imperial War Cabinet 27B, 1 August 
1918, p. 18. 
18 National Archives, CAB23/44A/10, minutes of Imperial War Cabinet 29A, 8 August 1918 and 
CAB24/60/47, Battle Situation-Noon-8th August 1918. 
19 National Archives, CAB24/5/20, minutes of Prime Minister’s meeting on Tanks, 8 August 1918, 
20 Ibid, Statement by d’Eyncourt included within the minutes. 
21 Ibid. 
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About three months ago I told Lord Milner my views, and said it was 
necessary to have a Tank Board or Council with authority somewhat similar 
to the Air Board, and he generally agreed and asked me to co-operate….I 
also spoke to General Seely, and submitted, together with Colonel Stern and 
Admiral Moore, a scheme of reorganisation….. If such a Board is formed 
with the necessary authority, I am sure the output can be steadily and 
continuously increased.22 
D’Eyncourt had been associated with tanks since his appointment to preside over the 
Landships Committee three and a half years earlier. He had failed to launch that 
project in the manner Churchill had intended, had failed to direct the designers of 
Mother in line with army requirements (leading to a near fatal rate of track failures), 
had misdirected the army about the length of time it would take to supply the first tanks 
and, following the action on 15 September, had craftily and unjustifiably garnered unto 
himself much of the praise and acknowledgments that should have been awarded to 
Tritton and Wilson.23 In 1919 he would appear before the Royal Commission seeking 
to deprive Wilson of awards for aspects of the design of Mother. 24  In these 
circumstances it would be easy to write off his lobbying of Lloyd George as further 
evidence of his cynical efforts to advance his reputation and position. It can be seen 
that elements of this were present: 
I should propose to make use of practically all the Tank talent available, 
including Admiral Moore, who now knows a lot about it….I have been 
proposed as Vice-Chairman under General Seely, and shall be very glad to 
serve, if it is so desired, and, having this possibility in view, I have obtained 
the permission of the Third Sea Lord….to devote more time to tanks.25 
However, this intervention by d’Eyncourt was mixed in content. Some comments were 
false and misleading, but he also made valuable proposals. The powers he proposed 
for the Tank Board promised an end to the earlier disagreements over Ministry 
responsibilities and a medium through which, subject to details of membership, the 
army might have a greater say in tank design. Yet d’Eyncourt’s proposals for 
 
22 Ibid. 
23 National Archives, ADM116/1339, d’Eyncourt to Third Sea Lord, 18 September 1916. 
24 National Archives, T173/776, Royal Commission on Awards to Inventors, 10 October 1919. The 
clash of evidence can be seen in the following sections of the transcript:- examination of d’Eyncourt 
by Greene, answers to questions 1944-1954, cross-examination by the Solicitor-General, answers to 
questions 2017-2035, cross-examination of Frederick Skeens, Senior Draughtsman at the Admiralty, 
answers to questions 2080-2085, examination of Tritton by Russell, answers to questions 2592-2602, 
cross-examination by Gray, answers to questions 2930-2933 and examination of Wilson by Russell, 
answers to questions 3090-3093. The evidence of Skeens was particularly damaging to the false 
evidence given by d’Eyncourt. 
25 National Archives, CAB24/5/20, minutes of Prime Minister’s meeting on Tanks, 8 August 1918. 
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membership did not match the wisdom of his terms of reference. He proposed that he 
himself, in addition to vice-chairmanship, should be Controller-General of Design and 
that Moore, Perry and Stern, who had all failed in different ways to distinguish 
themselves in earlier Ministry supply roles, should be included to take charge of 
experimentation, supply and production respectively. In directing his case to Lloyd 
George, d’Eyncourt was conscious of where the power resided and the likelihood of 
his representations bearing fruit. Nevertheless, his criticisms of Churchill generated 
the need for an apologetic letter to limit the offence to his benefactor. His letter to 
Churchill was respectful and honest though included a distasteful element of flattery: 
You know well my admiration and respect for you & how I have always 
worked loyally under you both at the Admiralty and indirectly at 
Munitions….The Tanks have more than justified themselves in the last 
week’s operations & it will always be remembered that you started the whole 
thing & that they only became a possibility owing to your original action.26 
Churchill accepted the grovelling apology but administered a deserved reprimand “I 
had a right to your advice before it was offered to anyone else”.27 
D’Eyncourt’s criticism of the Ministry’s poor tank production record under Moore’s 
leadership was justified, but, as Maclean’s report would later show, his identification 
of the reasons for failure were fallacious. It was knowledge of industrial production, or 
management ability to assemble and lead a team possessing all relevant skills, that 
were lacking, rather than knowledge of tanks. In appointing Seely, Churchill had, 
belatedly, and perhaps inadvertently, initiated a process that would rectify the errors 
that handicapped earlier administrations. Within three weeks, a capable industrialist 
would be transferred within the Ministry to head the MWD and a knowledgeable and 
cooperative group of military and engineering members would be assembled to form 
a new Tank Board. 
D’Eyncourt was also correct to identify the need for firm control over design 
modifications.28 However, he failed to mention or appreciate the significance of the 
fact that production delays were not new phenomena and he failed to strike an 
appropriate balance in the quality/quantity argument, stating “to the production of any 
war machine in considerable numbers all improvements were an enemy, and that if 
 
26 Churchill Archives Cambridge, CHAR15/87, d’Eyncourt to Churchill, 12 August 1918. 
27 Ibid, Churchill to d’Eyncourt, 16 August 1918. 
28 National Archives, MUN 5/211/1940/37, J. B. Maclean, ‘Report on Condition of Mechanical Warfare 
Department at August 1918’, pp. 8-9. 
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such improvements were not kept within reasonable bounds the production must be 
very seriously reduced”.29 D’Eyncourt possessed insufficient knowledge of the details 
of tank construction or of military requirements to advise on such matters. As Wilson 
illustrated when the army sought some sixty-two alterations to the Mark V some two 
months later, the true position was more complex: many alterations could be made 
without significant time consequences.30 Delays had occurred under Stern. Stern’s 
limited technical knowledge, impatience, lack of tact and establishment of a somewhat 
independent fiefdom within the Ministry, were at the root of many of the problems of 
inspection and production inherited firstly by Moore then by Maclean.31 The arm of the 
Ministry dealing with tanks had never conformed to Ministry standards, a legacy from 
Stern’s agreement with Lloyd George in February 1916.32 
The most significant flaw in d’Eyncourt’s argument was his assurance that tank 
output could be steadily and continuously increased under a Board with the necessary 
authority. His contention that designs were pulled about and standardisation was 
disturbed by Churchill’s reorganisation appear to have lacked foundation in fact. At the 
time of Moore’s appointment, large-scale production of Mark IV was drawing to a 
close. Designs and standardisation were changing but this was to enable the Mark V 
and other models to be constructed and was not related directly to the Head of 
Department. D’Eyncourt, who in January 1916 had assured Kitchener that the first 
tanks could be provided by May, did not have the knowledge and skills necessary to 
determine whether or not production could attain particular levels. 
Stern supported d’Eyncourt by producing figures showing decline in production 
during 1918. He observed that on 8 March 1918, the MWD put forward a programme 
giving the number of tanks to be produced monthly from April to July, some 1,065. Yet 
output had been only 555. He pointed out that at a time when all other munitions of 
war showed continuous increases, the MWD had not reached the record 200 
tanks/month attained in 1917 under his control. He understood a further re-
organisation was contemplated and it was again suggested that men totally new to 
 
29 National Archives, CAB24/5/20, minutes of Prime Minister’s meeting on Tanks, 8 August 1918. 
30 National Archives, MUN4/1591, Wilson to Maclean, 31 October 1918. 
31 Ministry of Munitions, History of the Ministry of Munitions, vol. XII, The Supply of Munitions,part III 
Tanks (London, HMSO, 1922), pp. 38-40; John Glanfield, The Devil’s Chariots: The Birth and Secret 
Battles of the First Tanks, (Stroud, Sutton Publishing, 2001), pp. 195-196. 
32 Ministry of Munitions, History vol. II, pp. 32-33; Glanfield, Devil’s Chariots, pp. 130-132; Albert 
Stern, Tanks 1914-1918: The Log-Book of a Pioneer (London, Forgotten Books, 2012), pp. 63-65. 
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mechanical warfare should be put in charge. In his opinion the Tank programme had 
failed because, firstly, at a critical period, the management was changed, secondly, 
production had been broken by continual changes of design and, thirdly, a deciding 
authority to determine production had been lacking. 
The ability of Perry, the Deputy Controller, to determine future output was no greater 
than that of Moore. He considered it highly undesirable to attempt to "swap horses" in 
the middle of the tank programme and “believed” the Ministry programme would be 
realised by April 1919. From his experience of the time taken to get into the methods 
of a Government Department, he could not contemplate any change being made 
without results disadvantageous to output, and therefore, if the changes proposed on 
the Cabinet papers were made, he could not “guarantee” meeting the programme. 
These comments were devoid of any relevant substance. The facts raised by Stern 
were relevant but demonstrated no understanding of practical industrial realities. Perry 
was undoubtedly numbered among those identified by Seely as responsible for the 
“extraordinary miscalculation” earlier in the year.33 Both Stern and Perry spoke as if 
output depended solely on personal qualities and integrity. When assessed against 
Maclean’s later analysis, both can be seen to lack the knowledge and understanding 
required to explain the shortfall in production and the ability to implement appropriate 
remedial measures. Their observations confirmed their inappropriate occupation of 
senior managerial positions. Additionally, they were casting a shadow over Churchill’s 
managerial abilities since he had appointed individuals lacking appropriate qualities to 
both posts of Controller, home and abroad. 
The confidential note Churchill had received from Fuller in March 1918 had 
pinpointed the key problem, namely that “production requires a man who is an expert 
in production”. This seemingly obvious point was not recognised by Churchill until 
Seely had supported Maclean’s analysis of the problems and had maintained criticism 
of earlier management, notwithstanding Churchill’s opposition. At no point did 
Churchill concede that the criticisms of Seely and Maclean were well founded. 
However, they were allowed to continue their modifications to the establishment, 
production capacity and procedures of the Supply Department without adverse 
comment, showing that Churchill had swallowed what must have been a bitter pill. 
 
33 Churchill Archives Cambridge, CHAR 15/92, Seely to Churchill, 9 October 1918. 
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Thereafter, he would have been concerned lest insufficient tanks should find their way 
to France to facilitate adventurous plans for 1919. Significantly, in terms of the 
development of the tank and availability for army operations, the consequence of 
Churchill’s faulty management was that a further six to twelve months’ production had 
passed at ceremonial pace when light infantry pace was required.34 
The fact that Moore had assisted d’Eyncourt with the production of his statement 
and appendix suggests he was content with proposals that might have enabled him to 
drop anchor in less turbulent waters.35 He did not, however, accept all d’Eyncourt’s 
arguments and, following the Cabinet’s consideration of actual and forecast production 
for the five preceding months, 724 as against 1,466, he postulated different 
explanations for poor performance, namely cancellation of a particular model without 
a new design to take its place, the influenza epidemic and strikes which had affected 
production in July.36 Moore had led the Ministry’s efforts to produce tanks for nearly a 
year. During that time, he had made many estimates of future production levels, 
seemingly relying on manufacturers’ schedules, all of which had proved optimistic.37 
Whilst some of the points he mentioned at Lloyd George’s meeting might have been 
relevant, he showed no appreciation of the facts and practical industrial realities that 
his successor would shortly be putting into print. His performance and excuses at the 
Munitions Council Tank Committee the previous week, when he had denied 
responsibility for the figures, had been equally inept and misplaced:  
The Minister considered that these estimates [March and July] showed a 
lack of touch with the realities of production on the part of the M.W.D. Admiral 
Moore was then called in. He disclaimed any responsibility for the estimates, 
which it was understood were manufacturers’ anticipated deliveries, 
discounted by a fixed percentage.38  
 
34 Churchill Archives Cambridge, CHAR 15/86A, Fuller to Churchill, 2 March 1918 and National 
Archives, CAB 24/5/20, minutes of meeting dated 8 August 1918, Appendix A. 
35 Ministry of Munitions, History of the Ministry of Munitions, vol. II, General Organisation for Munitions 
Supply, part II Organisation for Munitions Supply (London, HMSO, 1922). 
36 National Archives, MUN 4/5168, commentary on Weekly Output Statistics for July 1918. 
37 Churchill Archives Cambridge, CHAR 15/87, minutes of meeting of Council Committee on the 
Production of Tanks, 1 August 1918, memorandum from Moore to Churchill, 12 July, 1918, undated 
note of February, 1918, giving production figures for October 1917 to January, 1918, and forecasts to 
July, 1918; National Archives, MUN 4/2801, Moore to Duckham, 27 February 1918 and MUN 
5/211/1940/37, Moore to Churchill, 4 May 1918 and agenda of meeting with Tank Contractors, 20 
June 1918. 
38 Churchill Archives Cambridge, CHAR 15/87, minutes of Munitions Council Committee on Tanks, 1 
August 1918. 
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To Moore’s credit, he did not seek to shift responsibility for a key element underlying 
his failure onto his Minister. Yet Churchill had railroaded through the high targets early 
in the year.39 Moore had expressed certain reservation at the time, particularly on the 
supply of gearboxes and want of broaches from Armstrong Whitworth for the Medium 
B.40 He also stated that no check had been undertaken of the adequacy of national 
capacity, of steel plate, engines, steel casting and gearboxes, to meet the expansion 
in output demanded by Churchill.41 Moore described his note on output as merely “an 
arithmetical one”.42 Moore’s note to Leake (Ministry Administration), appended to the 
Minutes of Committee 57, suggests he would have been well suited to a political 
career: 
These estimates, constituting a minimum production, were made before the 
meeting of tank contractors….on Thursday August 1st. The freedom of action 
given verbally….may have an effect upon the output that cannot now be 
estimated. C.M.W.D. cannot therefore accept responsibility for the accuracy 
of these figures, but can only say that it is thought they ought certainly to be 
met.43 
Under pressure, and about to resign or be dismissed, Moore clearly felt the need to 
respond to Seely’s examination of the MWD and to questions at the meeting to be 
convened by Lloyd George. It would have been better had he remained silent. His note 
to Leake validated Jellicoe’s analysis of his character and abilities. During much of 
1918 he had taken no action to plug the gaps he recognised existed in productive 
capacity and was unable to mount a plausible defence of his position.44 
Moore’s comments undermined his credibility together with that of Churchill who 
had appointed him to a post to which he was ill-suited. Churchill attempted to pass the 
responsibility for low tank output onto the War Office for taking men away from tank 
production. He then made the standard but meaningless comment that the 
 
39 National Archives, MUN 5/211/1940/37, instruction by Churchill, 20 February 1918 and minutes of 
‘Conference on Tank Programme’, 11 February 1918. 
40 National Archives, MUN5/394, Perry to Layton (recipient not specified but statistical reports would 
be directed to ‘R’), report for w/e 27th inst. (month not specified but can be identified as April 1918 by 
comparison with production total of 255 for the Mark V). A broach is a tapered, serrated tool used to 
shape or enlarge a hole. 
41 National Archives, MUN4/2799, Moore to Duckham, 27 February 1918. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Churchill Archives Cambridge, CHAR15/87, minutes of Council Committee on the Production of 
Tanks, Appendix A (memorandum from Moore to Leake), 1 August 1918. Committee 57 was the 
shorthand title of the Committee established with responsibility for overseeing tank production. 
44 For example, Churchill Archives Cambridge, CHAR15/86, Moore to Duckham, 21 February 1918, 
Allied Programme, includes comment that “production and machining facilities for armour plate in this 
country are distinctly limited.” 
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reorganisation of August 1917 had been arrived at after “the most careful 
consideration”.45 Churchill avoided any attempt to explain why he had considered the 
Admiral a suitable appointment as Controller in October 1917, but reassured the 
meeting that the full complement of tanks “as set out until the end of April 1919 would 
be obtained provided they had the support of the Government and received the proper 
quotas of men necessary for production”. It must have been clear to the assembled 
meeting that such a promise was valueless, indeed, the minutes show Lloyd George 
was not deceived by Churchill seeking to allocate responsibility for poor output to the 
loss of labour earlier in the year since he commented “the taking away of men from 
tank production did not explain the falling off in the numbers during May and June”.46  
Perhaps conscious of the fact that the comments he had made were unconvincing, 
Churchill concluded his contribution by seeking to play down the significance of low 
tank output, claiming the army had “as many tanks as it could handle at the moment”. 
It is assumed this statement was seeking to make capital of the fact that Haig had 
been reluctant to expand the Tank Corps.47 However, the comment was particularly 
ill-timed. As he spoke, the army was well into the process, albeit largely temporarily, 
of losing most of its tanks during the Amiens offensive. Only 145 of the 415 tanks that 
had advanced early that morning remained fit for duty by the end of the day, a figure 
further reduced to just 38 by 11 August.48 The low rate of production had deprived 
Rawlinson of a significant reserve.49 Whilst most were capable of repair, spares were 
in short supply and it would require time to build up a large force.50 Not only had 
reserves been lacking, but, to its detriment, III Corps had been only lightly equipped 
 
45 Ministry of Munitions, History, vol. II, p. 274, Stern remained as DGMWD until 26 October 1917. 
46 National Archives, CAB/24/5/20, War Cabinet, minutes of Conference to consider the Question of 
Tanks, 8 August 1918, p. 6. 
47 National Archives, MUN 5/210/1940/21, notes of conference at GHQ, 10 June 1918; Glanfield, 
Devil’s Chariots, p. 234. 
48 Douglas Orgill, The Tank: Studies in the Development and Use of a Weapon, (London, Heinemann, 
1970), pp. 68 and 80; Edmonds, Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1918, vol. IV, p. 517, 
records that of 582 tanks handed over to salvage between 8 August and 27 September, “only 14 were 
struck off the strength as irrepairable (sic)”. 
49 Edmonds, Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1918, vol. IV, Appendix III, Fourth Army 
Operation Order, 31 July 1918, p. 525. 
50 Churchill Archives Cambridge, CHAR 15/91, minutes of Seventh, Ninth and Eleventh Meetings of 
Tank Board, 26 September, 10 October and 24 October 1918. 
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with tanks, priority allocation of the limited supply being given to the stronger Canadian 
and Australian Corps operating on the most suitable tank-terrain to the south.51 
It may have been because he had personally been responsible for reorganising the 
Ministry and appointing senior staff in 1917 that Churchill was careful not to elaborate 
on his reasons for appointing Jack Seely as Deputy Minister. However, it is difficult to 
envisage a set of reasons that did not include the need for a fresh pair of eyes to 
assess Ministry shortcomings in tank production and improve relations with the army. 
It was significant that Seely’s responsibilities included control of a new group, ‘W’ 
(Warfare), which included tank supply.52  
The meeting with tank producers on 20 June would have increased Churchill’s 
awareness of difficulties for Ministry tank production. Firms had given a range of 
reasons for failing to meet their predicted outputs. Metropolitan claimed the withdrawal 
of the Tank Corps contingent, that had been assisting with assembly, and call-up of 
1898 and 1899 men, accounted for under-performance and that “the quality of the men 
now being supplied was not good and consequently there were larger rejections for 
bad workmanship.”53 Churchill’s intention had been to stimulate output, yet the tank 
producers placed the responsibility for delays on the Ministry. Fosters forecast the 
output of only fifty-seven Medium A by the end of June as opposed to their earlier 
forecast of seventy-seven: they claimed the only limiting factor was the supply of 
gearboxes: “they had tanks waiting for them”.54 Beardmore (Cardonald) “explained 
that they had not made a start with their order for Mk. VIII Machines owing to the 
absence of jigs” and Reid (North British) reported “they were losing labour through 
inability to start work on Mark VIII Tanks.”55  
 
51 Orgill, The Tank, p.72; Edmonds, Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1918, vol. IV, p. 77 – 
only the 10th Tank Battalion was attached to III Corps - (36 Mark V and 12 Supply tanks). 
52 Ministry of Munitions, History, vol. II, Appendices II to V show the Departmental Organisation of the 
Ministry at 1 July each year from 1915 to 1918. However, the chart for 1918 provides a misleading 
impression, since it represented a snapshot of a developing position. The following week Seely’s 
position was changed or clarified. Although his appointment was announced in June, he did not, 
according to the list of Principal Officers in Appendix VIII, join the Ministry as Member of Munitions 
Council (W) until 13 July, and was appointed Parliamentary Under-Secretary and Deputy Minister on 
22 July. 
53 National Archives, MUN5/211/1940/37, minutes of Meeting with Tank Contractors, 20 June 1918, 
observations of Dudley Docker, pp. 1-2. “1898-1899 men” refers to those born in those years, 
employed by Metropolitan but called to the colours in accordance with conscription policies. 
54 Ibid, observations of Tritton, p. 3. 
55 Ibid, p. 3. Jigs, devices used to maintain, mechanically, the correct positional relationship 
between a piece of work and a tool or between parts of work during assembly, were of particular 
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Churchill expressed surprise at Metropolitan’s claim that “the withdrawal of 200 men 
should account for the loss of 200 tanks” but gave commitments that Beardmore 
should receive the first set of available jigs and North British should have a set without 
delay. Day (Engine Manufacturers) complained about delays in settling contracts and 
there was general criticism that American Liberty engines had not been received. 
Churchill found the gearbox situation “very unsatisfactory” and “expressed surprise 
that the problem with the Liberty engines had not been “brought to his notice as a 
matter of utmost urgency”.56 In this respect, Churchill’s combative style may have 
worked against him in that staff may have been reluctant to give him news they knew 
he would not want to hear. Moore had expressed reservations about gearbox capacity 
in February, but Churchill’s management structure had been insufficiently responsive 
to act: that task awaited the attention of “an expert in production”, six months later.57 
Moore attempted to explain the contractors’ comments in terms of priorities, but 
Churchill would have gained an unfavourable impression of the general state of tank 
supply. There is no direct evidence that this meeting represented the point at which 
Churchill lost faith in the ability of Moore and Duckham to run the Department 
efficiently, but his confidence in the future level of output must have been shaken and 
it may well have been the time at which he decided to appoint Seely. Seely’s 
availability was fortuitous, attributable to disabling medical consequences from gas 
shortly after the cavalry charge at Moreuil Wood, three months earlier.58 It may also 
be relevant to acknowledge that Churchill would have welcomed the appointment of a 
like-minded manager to supervise warfare issues and improve relations with the army, 
since this fitted well with the need for a senior colleague to tend shop while he 
redirected his attentions to wider strategy and government affairs that Lloyd George 
had begun to entrust to him.59  Churchill’s responsibilities and interests extended 
beyond armoured warfare from his desk at the Ministry. The magnetic pull for Churchill 
was France and the BEF, where he could assess the military situation, debate required 
 
importance in the assembly of tanks. A firm would seek to recover the cost of jigs and other 
mechanical requirements over a prolonged run of the same work. Expenditure on these types of 
manufacturing preparations were probably a significant factor in the reluctance of firms to 
undertake short production runs. 
56 National Archives, MUN5/211/1940/37, minutes of meeting with Tank Contractors, 20 June 1918, 
observations of Mr C. Day representing the engine manufacturers, p. 3. 
57 National Archives, MUN4/2799, Moore to Duckham, 27 February 1918. 
58 J. E. B. Seely, Adventure (London, Heinemann, 1932), pp 310-312. 
59 Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, vol. IV. 1917-1922, (London, Heinemann, 1973), pp. 85-104. 
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munitions and strategy and work within sound of the guns.60 Nevertheless, since he 
saw armoured strategy as a key or determining factor in the formula for military 
success, the welfare of the MWD was of special importance. 
Seely was appointed about the time the issue of tank output was coming to a head. 
In July 1918 the BEF’s stock of tanks in running order was just 925 with a further 176 
in workshops in France.61 Of those in running order at this time, only 592 were Heavy 
Fighting tanks, Marks IV and V. An attack in 1919 as outlined to the War Cabinet by 
Henry Wilson called for some 8,000 tanks of all types. Wilson advised the War Cabinet 
that output for the 1919 programme would be 4,500 and that a further 1,500 would be 
provided by the “Americans” (by which it is assumed he meant Anglo-American 
assembly at Chateauroux). Estimating that 500 existing machines would survive any 
1918 actions, this left a deficit of 1,500 that he proposed should be met by requesting 
the doubling of “American” provision.62  
Existing scholarship draws attention to Lloyd George’s dissatisfaction with Haig’s 
command of the BEF, mutual distrust and lack of respect.63  The development of 
armoured vehicles emphasises the lack of coordination between events in France and 
London. Haig was grateful for the arms supplied by the Ministry. Aircraft, artillery, 
tanks, machine-guns and other equipment enabled him to fight a “rich man’s war”. 
However, there is no evidence of the integration of preparations in England with 
proposals in France. GHQ was keen to pursue the war in 1918, whereas Lloyd George 
and the War Cabinet generally were concerned about high casualties and pessimistic 
about the likely outcome of offensives. The PM “did not believe that we could obtain a 
decision on the Western front next year” and Smuts “was inclined to agree with Sir 
Robert Borden that a purely military decision was not possible in this war.”64 In the 
period before the Battle of Amiens, the War Cabinet had no firm information on 
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pending events. On 1 August, Borden, Prime Minister of Canada, informed the War 
Cabinet that: 
on the previous evening he had been told in confidence and great secrecy 
that the Canadian Army Corps….was now being moved forward into 
another region and he had some reason to believe that the intention was to 
employ them offensively. This looked as if the operations for improving our 
front might be about to commence.65  
Henry Wilson, CIGS, “knew nothing of any forthcoming operation”. 66  The IWC 
assumed this to be a minor line-improving operation and there followed a long and 
inconclusive debate on Wilson’s paper, tanks and war policy generally.67 Members 
were aware that tank production might be only half the 8400 previously forecast but 
that Churchill remained of the opinion that any shortfall might be “within 1500 of the 
original intent.”68 
Seely did not elaborate on his reasons for sensing that all was not well with tank 
production at the Ministry when he arrived in July.69 However, he quickly reached 
decisions about tank supply and the management capabilities of those involved. By 
early August, Moore, Controller of Mechanical Warfare, had departed, to be replaced 
by James Maclean, an experienced industrialist, previously in charge of the Ministry’s 
Gun Production then its Engineering Department.70  Churchill’s comment to Lloyd 
George on Moore was simply that the “Admiral has not been a success, and further 
very great efforts are required”.71 On the face of it, Moore appears to have fallen on 
his sword on 4 August. 72  However, Churchill’s letter to Lloyd George and his 
imperative to keep criticism at arm’s length suggest that Seely provided a helping 
hand. 
The lack of understanding of the realities of tank production by Churchill and other 
key players can be determined from a comparison of a report prepared by Maclean 
with comments expressed at the special Tank Meeting on 8 August.73 A plentiful 
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supply of tanks was fundamental to Churchill’s strategy for success on the Western 
Front. It is therefore proposed to consider in detail the report prepared by Maclean on 
taking up his new appointment and to compare his findings, as an experienced 
industrialist, with the observations of those “on trial” at the Prime Minister’s meeting. 
Bearing in mind the complexities of production and sensitivity of the subject, 
Maclean’s report was admirably brief and produced with commendable speed. There 
is no evidence that Maclean was tasked with preparing a report on the state of his new 
Department, but, from his introductory paragraph, it appears he had received criticism 
for his censorious assessment of the Ministry’s ability to organise tank production. 
Maclean may have been seen as “disloyal” and may therefore have considered the 
facts and reasoning leading to his conclusions should be set down by way of rebuttal 
of criticism.74 He was wise to do so, since, on receiving a copy of the report, Churchill 
responded aggressively to Maclean’s findings and the implications for strategy in 
1919. Notwithstanding the earlier alarm bells he should have heeded from his meeting 
with tank constructors, Churchill at first refused to believe Maclean’s figures and 
questioned his sincerity: 
Maclean’s latest figures are utterly at variance with all the previous 
expectations and estimates with which I have been furnished. It is, of course, 
quite easy and very prudent on taking over a new Department, to write down 
the previous estimates to the lowest possible level. I am not, however, 
prepared to believe that the discrepancies are in fact so great as is 
represented ….I am not prepared to accept these figures now proposed as 
satisfactory, having regard to the existing resources and facilities placed at 
the disposal of the Controller….75 
Churchill sought a report showing in detail the causes why in each class of tank “there 
is this falling off from the previous estimates.”76  He also postulated linking spare 
engines and gearboxes in France to incomplete tanks in England. His justification for 
downgrading the importance of spares is in part based on the needs of the French and 
American Armies: 
It appears to me utterly impossible for us to claim a reserve of 100 per cent 
of completed tanks by the 1st June, each tank made practically twice over in 
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spares, while, at the same time, the French and American armies will be 
almost destitute of these weapons.77 
Churchill does not appear to have appreciated the rate at which tanks devoured 
spares. The Tank Corps maintained a list of the anticipated frequency of replacing 
parts most prone to wear. For example, the life of Mark V Driving Wheels was only 
200 miles and Engine Replacement was estimated at 350 hours run-time (300 for a 
V*).78 The unreasonable nature of the points raised by Churchill reflects the serious 
nature of the blow to the strategy he envisaged for success and the acute 
embarrassment that would be experienced over the coming months if the validity of 
Maclean’s report were to be confirmed by production figures. In reality there was no 
point in questioning certain aspects of Maclean’s figures since the limited availability 
of components rendered earlier Ministry short-term forecasts unattainable. 
Furthermore, Churchill had not researched the suitability of salvaged parts for 
installation in new fighting tanks. Salvage operations by the Tank Corps were highly 
developed and enquiries could have shown that the condition of salvaged engines was 
not generally suitable for fighting machines: 
Colonel Fuller asked that 24 engines might be sent to Woolwich for 
instructional purposes. Mr Maclean stated that he had already sent 12 of 
those engines, but it was difficult to provide the remainder. Colonel Searle 
stated that he thought France could assist in this matter with repaired 
engines, which though not capable of being used in Tanks were yet suitable 
for instructional purposes.79 
It seems unlikely that salvaged or spare parts in France could have provided any 
significant boost to tank numbers. Indeed, on occasions, dismemberment of a new 
tank was undertaken in order to provide parts to repair several damaged tanks.  
Official statistics show there to have been 527 heavy tanks in France in running 
order at the end of October 1918, with 125 in workshops and 286 salvaged: 492 had 
been written off.80 The number of machines in running order is surprising, particularly 
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in the light of comments by Elles that “On the 5th Nov. 1918 all I could put in the field 
was one composite company out of 18 battalions!”.81 Either the passage of time had 
warped Elles’s recollections or he was referring to a particular Mark of tank, or the 
statistics are unreliable. 
Maclean’s report gave monthly estimates of tank output to 30 April 1919. He 
compared his estimates to those of Moore and to the revisions produced only a few 
weeks earlier by Perry. It seems likely Churchill would have been in possession of 
Perry’s revised estimates when writing to Lloyd George and these, together with 
Moore’s “assurance”, may have represented the basis of his comment that they would 
realise “the full programme which I promised you at the beginning of the year”.82 Moore 
considered some 4,334 tanks could be produced between 1 September 1918, and 30 
April 1919. Perry’s forecast was 4,370. However, Maclean’s estimate was only 
2,320.83 
Methodologies underlying earlier estimates by Stern, Moore and Perry were not 
recorded. However, Maclean’s report related production estimates to stocks of main 
components, time required by companies to assemble tanks from individual 
components and an assessment of whether component deliveries were rising, static 
or falling. He concluded it to be an “elementary deduction” that estimates by both 
Moore and Perry for September were unachievable, simply because insufficient 
components were available within the timescale required for assembly by 30 
September. Furthermore, bearing in mind monthly deliveries of all main components 
were static or falling, predictions by Moore and Perry, that production would rise from 
October onwards, were “unduly and considerably optimistic”.84 
Maclean next dealt with components by type of tank, bringing to light results he 
described as “astonishing”.85 He found no complete set of components existed for the 
Mark V**, 900 of which had been ordered eleven months earlier. The position was the 
same for 450 Medium B and C tanks ordered at the same time. Despite an order in 
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March for 1500 hulls for tank assembly at Chateauroux, there were no hulls or other 
components in existence to facilitate that assembly.86 Maclean considered sets of 
components “should be coming through not later than five months from date of 
order”.87  
Having demolished the credibility of Moore and Perry, Maclean turned to the main 
underlying criteria governing output. Maclean’s list of relevant elements of production 
included efficient works management, adequate labour, materials and machining 
capacity, production of fixed working drawings, continuity of orders and satisfactory 
financial arrangements with contractors. In explaining how these factors could result 
in low levels of production, Maclean gave examples of such matters being handled 
satisfactorily in other Ministry Departments.88 
So far as works management was concerned, Maclean identified two “glaring 
cases” where bad management was letting the Ministry down.89 Two firms had been 
allowed to undertake their own machining of armour plate when their machining 
capacity was inadequate for the quantity of work contracted. In consequence some 
5,000 tons of armour plate was “lying around the country” unused. Maclean was aware 
that every other Ministry Department used Outside Production Officers to prevent such 
problems. This type of post had not been created in the MWD.90 Maclean judged that 
works to increase production capacity to the required level would take some months.  
It should be noted that Addison considered labour questions to be the most difficult 
issues at the Ministry, “Nothing else during the whole period of the war in my 
experience was comparable in its abundance of perplexity and anxiety.”91 Various 
comments by Stern and Churchill provide support for Addison’s view. However, none 
provide statistical or methodological justification for their conclusions. Maclean on the 
other hand advanced explanations for labour difficulties which showed it was a factor 
not totally beyond the control of the Ministry, since performance in resolving elements 
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of supply influenced movement of the workforce. His explanation for labour shortages 
exhibited a greater understanding of the response of the British workforce to the 
complex web of controls that developed during the war. In essence, Maclean attributed 
much of the labour difficulty to the fact that workers would be inclined to leave if they 
could see levels of materials dropping. In this way he was placing the responsibility for 
a declining workforce on the Ministry itself for not ensuring proper steps were taken to 
keep up supplies. “Without material the men are either paid off or leave immediately”.92  
Maclean found the only problems with the supply of armour plate were those 
attributable to lack of machining facilities. This was known to his predecessors in 
February, but was not resolved: 
we have investigated the facilities of the Country in respect of the Machining 
and erection facilities available for that portion of the Tank Production….for 
which our Government has assumed responsibility….When considering the 
proposed extension of the Allied programme and the existing commitment 
of 1500 Tanks, we desire to draw your attention to the fact that the production 
and machining facilities for armour plate in this country are distinctly 
limited.93  
There is no evidence of Moore being asked for greater precision on this issue. 
Maclean’s report some seven months later showed that measures had not been 
undertaken by Moore and Duckham to increase machining capacity to the level 
required. 
Stampings, castings and forgings for engines and transmissions involved inefficient 
procedures imposed on the Department in April 1918 by the Controller of Stampings. 
The introduction of an elaborate procedure had created delays in placing fresh orders, 
resulting in a hand-to-mouth supply. Without adequate reserves of materials, the effect 
on production and labour had been detrimental. Maclean pointed out that with low 
stocks, the workforce would keep the output low. If stocks became exhausted, workers 
would “drift to other centres or industries”. He quoted an example of labour for tank 
processes on the Clyde being seriously reduced by the voluntary departure of men to 
the shipyards. 94  In addition to increasing machining capacity, Maclean found it 
necessary to take steps to extend buildings at four of the largest and best engine 
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makers and to install new plant to increase capacity for producing transmission 
gears.95 
Maclean accepted that national stamping and die sinking capacity was insufficient 
in 1918 to meet all government demands and the introduction of controls was 
necessary. Management’s task should therefore have been identification of the most 
efficient working practice within a controlled system. The new procedure for stampings 
was elaborate and prone to result in inefficient production: orders could be delayed by 
a month.96 Rather than challenging the form of the incoming requirements with the 
Director of Stampings, Moore appears simply to have distributed instructions to put 
the system into effect.97 This lack of initiative and recognition of priorities is similar to 
the behaviour Jellicoe found so unacceptable at Dogger Bank: its impact on tank 
production would appear to have been significant.98 The only mitigating factor for 
Moore was that, as a sailor, he might be excused a lack of familiarity with industrial 
issues on land. The responsibility might therefore justifiably be placed on Churchill, 
who appointed him. The problem was resolved shortly after Maclean took charge: 
Since taking over the Department I have been able to make new 
arrangements with the Controller of Stampings whereby the procedure is 
much simplified (see appendix “B”). I cannot suggest that the Control should 
be eliminated entirely, because it is clear that stamping and die sinking 
capacity is not sufficient at present to meet all Government demands.99 
Delay caused by the introduction of controls over stampings illustrates most clearly 
the errors of politicians in appointing personnel lacking familiarity with industrial issues 
to manage tank supply and to frame and execute working procedures. Maclean was 
able to find a satisfactory way of working within a new control system imposed on 
industry by the rigours of war. Maclean’s explanation of the consequences of the new 
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system for tank construction demonstrate that a poorly drafted system of control could 
have broad effects on the engineering industry nationally: 
as much as four weeks could be taken to get continual re-allocation of 
stamping resources before supply was assured. The Engine and Gear 
Makers unite in condemning this system, and it cannot be mere coincidence 
that the stamping supply became irregular and “hand-to-mouth” as from the 
institution of control. In fact the situation became so grave that a detailed 
protest against a continuation of this system of control was forwarded to the 
Controller of Castings and Forgings on 26 July”.100  
Maclean also found problems that prevented achievement of the full potential from the 
inadequate limited capacity available. Firstly, drawings for all tanks were in a state of 
flux, with a variety of bodies responsible for preparation. Prolonged discussion with 
GHQ on design details led to delays and abortive work. Standard designs were not 
available or complete and accurate preliminary drawings were not available early 
enough to meet the programme. Some 1,755 alterations had been sent to contractors 
between February and July 1918. By the time he had completed his report, Maclean 
had already prohibited alterations to drawings, other than for those containing errors 
due to inadequate checking.101  
The History recognised the problems caused by the overloading of the drawing 
office but painted this as resulting from pressure of work under the strong demands 
for production. It failed to mention the change introduced by Maclean, to accept only 
alterations due to errors, and does not quote figures which Maclean used to show how 
alterations to designs notified to contractors had mushroomed, rising from 50-
60/month in January/February 1918 to an average of over 400/month in April/July.102  
Maclean endorsed the views earlier expressed by Stern and Moore that the small 
number of tanks ordered and time between orders seriously affected supply and that 
there was “a distinct ratio as between total order given and maximum periodic output, 
which is fixed by commercial considerations.” Maclean did not specify the length of 
the period over which producers would seek to spread their output under a particular 
order, but The History defines this as twenty weeks.103 Maclean also found the practice 
of the Contracts Department in authorising the issue of “letters to proceed”, with a 
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statement that prices would be settled later, represented a source of friction.104 . 
Churchill’s request that contract delays be avoided appears to have generated no 
enthusiasm for revised, pragmatic action by accountants.105 
Maclean’s report and The History shed light on the key issue of enhancement to 
tank specification. He identified continuous orders over an extended period as having  
“a splendid effect in arousing enthusiasm” and enabling “the material supply to be 
maintained much more easily”.106 The History did not pick up on these comments, but 
did state that the spreading of orders over a large number of firms could not be put 
into effect while the number of tanks on order remained limited “since the 
manufacturers required to spread their output under any order over twenty weeks”.107 
The key words in this section of Maclean’s report are “commercial considerations”. 
This suggest that finance was a major factor in the response to proposed modifications 
to models in line with military aspirations. Although financial matters are not mentioned 
in meetings between the War Office and Ministry, the occasional surfacing of the issue 
does suggest it was more significant than acknowledged by the Ministry. It has been 
shown that after a lengthy period of inconclusive negotiations over the price of the 
Mark V in 1917, the Ministry’s Finance Department backed down, probably to prevent 
differences with the MWD reaching Churchill for a decision. Disagreement or conflict 
between the two Departments also seems to have been close to the surface late in 
1918, Seely commenting: 
There is a new adverse factor in Tank production, namely the insistence on 
negotiations of cost by Sir John Mann and his department. This may be, and 
possibly is, good electioneering, but it is bad for production. If you want a 
thing badly and want it in a hurry, in ordinary life you have to pay more for it 
– generally a great deal more…… It is so with these tanks and their 
engines”.108  
Seely revealed to Churchill his views on the state of industry generally, “If you want to 
get greatly increased production of tanks, I am sure you must renew confidence with 
contractors as well as workmen. I am quite sure you have not got that confidence 
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now.” He referred to unspecified measures adopted at the Admiralty with contractors 
early in 1916 and suggested something similar might be done. He saw the problem as 
a general one, “The difficulty is not so much with Dudley Docker (Metropolitan) as with 
the many other and smaller contractors. I am seeing Garnsey tomorrow on this 
subject, as also on the difficulty that has arisen with Ricardo”.109 Seely advanced a 
line of argument relevant to the efficient supply of components for tanks not contained 
in the section on tanks within The History, yet it must have been significant bearing in 
mind the number of firms securing work through contracts. Seely estimated there were 
6,000 contracts material to the production of tanks: the estimate of the number of 
contractors and sub-contractors given by The History is 4,000.110 These figures are 
probably compatible since some firms would have won a number of contracts.111 
Seely’s later comments supported Maclean’s statement that “The methods adopted 
by the Contracts Department have produced a chorus of protests from Contractors”. 
Unless the Controller of Mechanical Warfare could receive some discretionary power 
with regard to contracts and prices, he saw “no great hope of removing this 
difficulty”.112 Both Seely and Maclean were in effect seeking restoration of some of the 
independent powers removed from Stern by Addison early in 1917.  
Problems over financial arrangements and drawing office procedures had been 
identified in a report obtained by Addison in May 1917. Relations between Stern and 
Addison were disharmonious and measures taken or envisaged by Addison shortly 
before his departure from Munitions appear to have been designed with a view to 
clipping Stern’s wings rather than simply achieving more consistent procedures within 
the Ministry. It is hard to believe that Churchill, Montagu or Lloyd George would have 
surrendered the independent powers for tank contracts to be negotiated direct by the 
MWD with Metropolitan and other contractors, yet Addison did so in May 1917. He 
had further restrictions in mind, but it would appear his plans were frustrated by 
reference of the matter to Lloyd George, with whom Stern was friendly socially.113 
When coupled to Maclean’s report and Seely’s adverse comments, the 1917 report to 
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Addison completes a substantial body of critical comment on the finance of MWD 
supply.114 
Maclean’s criticisms of estimates of tank output, his assessment of MWD 
management and judgment of the consequences for the immediate future represented 
a condemnation of the work of the MWD over the preceding two and a half years. The 
issues he raised would have affected the supply of tanks throughout that period. 
Bearing in mind the political capital Churchill had invested in alternative means of 
waging offensives on the Western Front, the leaking of Maclean’s report would have 
caused acute embarrassment. Churchill had failed to recognise organisational 
problems and in 1917 had appointed a new, unqualified Controller to replace his 
equally unqualified predecessor.  
During the time necessary to increase capacity to meet military operational 
requirements, a period of low productivity was unavoidable. It was likely that only 800-
900 tanks could be constructed in the remaining four months of 1918.115 Moreover, 
Maclean emphasised the degree of incompetence or wilful suppression by senior 
managers of the true state of the production process. He twice remarked that previous 
output estimates were prepared without consultation with the department’s supply 
officers, notwithstanding their request to participate in the exercise.116 In so doing 
Maclean was setting a timer that, many years later, upon the release of appropriate 
documents into the public domain, would expose the myth Churchill sought to 
establish in The World Crisis that “once the whole organisation was in motion it never 
required change” and “here were gathered the finest business brains of the country 
working with might and main and with disinterested loyalty for the common cause”.117  
Maclean had identified weaknesses that could not be explained by impersonal 
external considerations, such as availability of materials and labour, but involved 
management practices and preservation of reputations and positions.118 Clearly some 
within the Ministry did not work exclusively for “the common cause”. Maclean was also 
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critical of the practice of the production workforce in prolonging employment at the 
expense of speed of output. Neither group could claim to be “working with 
disinterested loyalty”, though conclusions on the extent of this problem within the 
management of the Ministry are limited by the somewhat unique circumstances of the 
MWD consequent on the nature of its establishment in February 1916. 
Arguably, Churchill’s remarks to Cabinet in 1917 indicate how inefficient procedures 
for the MWD may have been remained throughout much of his spell at Munitions: 
It is indispensable that persons near the heads of very large organisations 
should not be smothered by detail, or consume themselves in ordinary day-
to-day business, but that they should have the opportunity to take wide and 
general views, and to search resolutely and anxiously amid the incident of 
business for the dominant truths”.119 
Churchill painted only a partial picture. Unless senior managers had a degree of 
knowledge of detail and an understanding of relationships between issues and the 
implications of changes, they could not manage effectively. For example, Moore had 
known of problems with Medium A gearboxes but lacked the knowledge, ability and 
drive to rectify the position. Elles described this gearbox as:  
a beast, perhaps something can be done, though it looks to me as if the only 
remedy here is a large supply of spare gearboxes. The matter is rather 
serious now, as we found after some 8-10 miles running the 3rd gear keeps 
slipping out, so that the unfortunate driver is deprived of the use of one of 
his two already busy hands.120  
It is not known whether the Medium A and Medium C gearboxes were constructed to 
a similar design, but Moore should have taken measures to ensure that the 
construction of gearboxes for later models received special treatment. Yet seven 
months later Maclean found it necessary to take steps to remedy serious problems 
with the Medium C gearbox.121 Similarly, in 1917, Stern had been aware of the need 
to improve the transmission system of the Mark IV but lacked the detailed knowledge 
and management skills required to quickly select a suitable new system for Mark V.122 
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It is difficult to identify flaws in Maclean’s approach. He justified his conclusions with 
facts and understanding of the approach of the industrial worker. In reality, the 
detection of faults in some departmental working practices and reports did not require 
the services of an exceptional sleuth. Errors in short-term output forecasts should have 
been obvious to anyone in a management position. Similarly, little expertise would 
have been required to reveal the unreliability of medium-term projections by Moore 
and Perry bearing in mind the state of component supply and the lack of the necessary 
infrastructure to deliver the number of engines and gearboxes required.  
The “successful” muzzling of the Supply Officers, whose involvement would have 
exposed true supply prospects, represented perhaps the most discreditable practice 
unearthed by Maclean. In The World Crisis, Churchill does not consider these aspects 
of the Ministry’s history. This cannot have been because he was unaware of the 
seriousness of the issues, underlined with apparently naive sincerity by Seely, that by 
1919 there would be a shortfall of almost 2000 tanks: “such an extraordinary 
miscalculation reflects gravely on those who were responsible early this year”.123 
Prominent among those responsible, albeit indirectly, was Churchill, who, as Maclean 
was demonstrating, was in charge but had not checked the work of those whom he 
had appointed and who had accepted figures that lacked sound foundations. Equally 
serious was the fact that those aware the Minister was being fed inflated figures had 
been barred from contributing to the exercise. Maclean’s report makes it clear that 
there existed at a relatively senior level within the MWD a number of individuals intent 
upon providing a false picture of the efficiency of the department. 
Short-term forecasts should be more accurate than those for 12 months ahead, but 
no reason is seen to criticise Maclean’s approach for the period to July 1919. His 
estimates for the remaining three-month period of the war, August to October, proved 
to be close to the actual production level.124 In September 1918 home tank production 
was declining and averaged only some twenty-seven/week, twenty of which were 
Mark V*.125  Chateauroux had secured neither the buildings nor component parts 
necessary to provide the heavy tanks upon which America and France were relying 
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for 1919 offensives.126 The importance attached by France to the role of heavy tanks 
is apparent from the request for allocation to their army of the full planned output of 
1500 Mark VIII from Chateauroux.127 
In order to limit delays and secure the rapid supply of components, Maclean sought 
to reassure suppliers of fair treatment: 
I have been able to consult with the Assistant Financial Secretary, and am 
able to give you official assurance that fair and reasonable prices will be paid 
for all work done on the Tank Hulls….The urgency of the Anglo-American 
Programme becomes of increasing importance as time goes along, and I am 
glad to have Mr. West’s assurance that everything will be done to facilitate 
delivery.128  
Churchill must have been conscious that, notwithstanding his strategic vision, he 
possessed neither the practical knowledge of Maclean nor, perhaps, the management 
qualities or intuition of Seely, either of which might have enabled him to construct a 
more adequate supply system to underpin his strategy. Churchill’s management 
system at Munitions had been explained to Weir in May 1918, when Weir was seeking 
the reorganisation of the Ministry’s Aircraft department in a way Churchill believed 
would place an excessive burden on himself as Minister: 
The function would be much too direct for that of a Minister. It would also be 
contrary to the whole organisation of the Ministry of Munitions, which is 
based throughout on the principle of the delegation by the Minister to the 
Members of his Council of definite spheres of supervision.129  
Churchill had placed excessive faith in the men of push-and-go. As he confessed to 
Clementine, to make matters worse, he had not dismissed “that foolish Colonel Stern”, 
who, unsurprisingly, proved equally adept at failing in France as he had in England.130 
In the case of Chateauroux, it was again Seely who instigated measures to accelerate 
progress.131 
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Churchill’s lack of management ability, particularly through misplaced trust in 
others, was at the root of his dilemma. It can be seen that Churchill’s weaknesses, 
later identified by Jacob, were apparent during his earlier experiences in government. 
Moore’s inter-personal skills may have been superior to those of Stern, but his 
appointment to a key position was ill-judged. His successor highlighted the fact that 
Moore’s knowledge and grasp of the essentials of industrial production and 
engineering details rendered him no more effective than Stern.132 Notwithstanding 
previous experience of the supply of naval armament, he was equally incapable of 
running his Department effectively and establishing a system that would have provided 
an opportunity to produce tanks in the numbers and within the timescale Churchill 
sought.133 This applied not just to 1918, but also to 1919, when Churchill anticipated 
the climax to the war with the launching of a force against the enemy in greatly 
enlarged numbers of armoured and other cross-country vehicles.134 
The timing of the Armistice prevented full confirmation of Maclean’s forecast of 
output. Forecasts by Moore, Perry and Maclean may be compared to actual production 
only for the last full two months of the war. The figures are not directly comparable 
since forecasts are by calendar months and output by complete weeks. However, 
comparing the forecasts for September and October, Moore 518, Perry 438 and 
Maclean 317, with Layton’s recorded output of 298 for the nine weeks ending 7 
November (an extra 2 days), it can be seen that Maclean was quite accurate, with the 
others grossly optimistic.135 Maclean did subsequently increase the number of tanks 
he considered might be supplied by March 1919: 
It was decided that Colonel Fuller….should report early to the Minister what 
offer might be made to supply America with heavy tanks by 1st December 
 
discussion either on the train or in Messrs. Foster’s Board Room at Lincoln”. The minutes of the fourth 
meeting confirmed that as no decisions were taken at Lincoln and all items discussed were on the 
agenda for the Fourth Meeting, no formal minutes of the Third Meeting would be circulated. It seems 
likely that the Second Meeting was held on 21 or 22 August. 
132 J. P. Harris, Men, Ideas and Tanks: British Military Thought and Armoured Forces, 1903-1939, 
(Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1995), pp. 160-161; Ministry of Munitions, History, vol. XII, 
p. 56. 
133 National Archives, MUN 5/211/1940/37, memorandum from Moore to Duckham, 27 February 1918 
and notes of meeting. 
134 National Archives, CAB 24/4/51 minutes of War Cabinet, 8 March 1918, CAB 24/45, memorandum 
by Henry Wilson, War Cabinet, 19 March 1918, and Winston Churchill, The World Crisis: The 
Aftermath, (London, Butterworth, 1929), p. 481. 
135 Churchill Archives Cambridge, CHAR15/87, J. B. Maclean, ‘Report on Condition of Mechanical 
Warfare Department at August 1918’, p. 1; National Archives, MUN 4/5168, Weekly Output Statistics 
for September and October 1918. 
 275 
1918. In making enquiry into this these points to be borne in mind:- (a) That 
Mr. Maclean hoped to produce 400 tanks in excess of his programme before 
February 28th 1919.136 
In many respects, Lloyd George had reason to be pleased with Churchill’s efforts 
since his return to government. Most munitions were flowing freely. He was proving a 
valuable confidant and sounding board, undertaking additional duties with his 
customary energy.137 However, Lloyd George was aware Churchill had not mastered 
tank production difficulties. His compliments to Churchill ignore the point.138 However, 
it is clear from the fact that he called a special meeting to consider low production and 
that by relating Churchill’s defence of labour shortage to the actual dates of War Office 
actions and conscription initiatives, he realised Churchill was floundering. 139  He 
appeared to favour d’Eyncourt’s proposal to bring back Stern, but accepted the 
proposals for further reorganisation by Churchill and Seely in somewhat lukewarm 
fashion, but with veiled though firm advice which would surely have assured the end 
of Moore’s role as Controller had he not, seemingly, already resigned.140 
Some of the figures in the preceding paragraphs incorporate the anticipated 
outcome of efforts by the British and American governments to provide an additional 
joint source of heavy tanks, largely with the objective of supplying American forces. 
The Mechanical Warfare (Overseas and Allies) Department was set up in November 
1917 to put into effect a partnership between Britain and America for the production of 
at least 1500 tanks in a factory to be erected at Chateauroux. Initially, Britain, through 
Stern as Controller MWOAD, was responsible for the delivery of all material other than 
armament and equipment.141 The History outlines problems in the supply of adequate 
6-pounder guns and track links in meeting the obligations. It also deals in a less 
specific way with factors identified by Maclean as responsible for low home output of 
tanks. 142  However, Maclean’s report suggested that difficulties went further than 
admitted by The History, since none of the hulls and other components for the model 
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to be erected in France had been produced by Maclean’s August components survey. 
Initially, it had been forecast that delivery would commence March/April 1918, and the 
order would be completed by October, but output from Chateauroux had not 
commenced by the Armistice.143 
Churchill’s comments to Clementine showed a more candid approach than he had 
displayed at the Prime Minister’s Tank meeting the previous week, “Chateauroux for 
wh [sic] I was let in by that foolish Colonel Stern is a fair way to become an international 
scandal. I cannot secure either the labour or the organisation necessary for its 
completion”. His private letter also revealed his true view that “the Tanks are badly 
wanted” and showed an ignorance of preparations for assembling the 1500 tanks at 
Chateauroux, since he believed “the material for the Tanks is nearly ready”.144 
Seely sought to limit the adverse consequences of failure at Chateauroux by 
changing the management of the project. 145  He offered the prospect of 
commencement of production in the autumn, subject to satisfactory receipt of 
American components and engines. In the event, the British effort in erecting the 
buildings and preparing to supply its agreed share of components improved 
considerably.146 It was reported that the site was ready to commence assembly in 
November and provision of the British share of components would commence the 
same month, with maximum volumes from March to May and completion of the order 
in June, 1919.147 However, delays in American contributions were confirmed firstly by 
a cable from Perry which described the American effort to be in a “hopeless” condition 
and secondly by reports to the Tank Board, which foreshadowed delivery of minimal 
sets of American components commencing in December, with no supply in bulk before 
May, 1919. 148  Although Perry did later admit that his criticism of American 
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preparations was over-stated, these reports cast considerable doubt over the number 
of tanks the scheme could have contributed to construction totals by summer 1919.149 
Churchill’s reaction to Maclean’s report was neither logical nor charitable. He should 
have appreciated that some of the criticisms had been touched upon at his meeting 
with producers in June but, initially, he ignored Maclean’s assessment of industrial 
factors and the underlying reasoning. Seely’s response to Churchill revealed that he 
rather than Churchill was responsible for the appointment of Maclean. Observing 
Churchill’s inclination to turn his guns on the messenger, Seely pleaded for the new 
team to be given a chance. He stated that, on arrival at Munitions, “instinct told me 
something was radically wrong with tank production”, “I begged you to get a new 
production man and give him a free hand”. He considered Maclean’s report vindicated 
his assessment of pending failure and that the choice of Maclean “to try and retrieve 
the situation was a wise one”.150 
Inevitably, organisation of the MWD does not portray Churchill favourably. 
Furthermore, notwithstanding unrelieved failure to achieve production forecasts from 
mid-1917 to mid-1918 and the falling off of production in the summer of 1918 to about 
a third of that forecast, Churchill does not appear to have modified the strategy he 
advocated.151 In June, Churchill “informed” Harington that working “on present lines 
and existing programmes, we should have produced by April 1 1919, 3,629 tanks of 
the Mark V and later varieties of heavy and medium.”152 He continued by adding 975 
from Chateauroux. In September from his chateau at Verchocq, he informed Lloyd 
George that output was “about half” what he expected, but that the Tank Corps should 
be raised not from 18,000 to 50,000 men, as had already been agreed, but to 
100,000.153  
It is therefore not difficult to imagine Churchill’s dismay when a copy of Maclean’s 
report arrived on his desk shortly after despatch of his upbeat letter to Lloyd George: 
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four new circumstances which will tend to make the tank an invaluable 
weapon next year. Here they are: (1) Greatly increased numbers. They will 
be able to afford to have a considerable proportion knocked out in each 
battle and yet have enough left at every point to secure success….154 
Churchill had maintained his advocacy of a large-scale tank offensive in 1919 
notwithstanding disappointingly low spring/summer production at home and advice 
that Chateauroux was in a sorry state.155 The last remaining prop to his envisaged 
upturn in home production had been removed. He had also been promised a high and 
rapid rate of supply of the Newton Tractor, a small cross-country vehicle, preparations 
for the manufacture of which were being undertaken in America and Britain: these also 
were not expected to achieve production targets.156  
 The role of the tractor was quite separate from that of light/medium tanks. It was 
neither armoured nor armed, though it has been suggested that arrangements were 
being made for the addition of a machine-gun cupola.157. The purpose of the Newton 
was to facilitate rapid exploitation by Allied forces in conjunction with Heavy and Light 
armour. A number of machines were supplied by manufacturers though not until after 
the Armistice.158 Only three were retained by the army.159 No reference is made in 
official correspondence, or specification, to armament by machine-guns.160  
Although the above comments represent a criticism of Churchill’s management of 
the Ministry over the preceding year, they should not be taken as criticism of his 
response to the potentially difficult situation revealed by Seely and Maclean. The 
wisdom of his early recognition of armour had been vindicated at Cambrai, Hamel, 
Soissons and Amiens and it would have been inappropriate for him to have sown 
seeds of doubt and relax the pressure on GHQ and the Army Council to build up the 
Tank Corps. Provided Maclean and Seely could deliver the “realistic” levels of 
production that Maclean considered possible, and supply to Allies could be limited, it 
would remain likely that by April 1919 the BEF might put into the field at least three 
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times the number of tanks as had hitherto been deployed in any single action. A further 
2000 were likely to become available by July.  
Nevertheless, Churchill’s decisions and actions had succeeded in placing the 
Ministry and army he served in a considerably less advantageous or flexible position 
than would have been possible under more competent management. As he made his 
defensive response, that limited manpower meant the army would continue to have 
more tanks than it could handle, his argument was in the process of being dismantled 
by losses at Amiens. Churchill was correct to identify tank crew shortages and 
vulnerability as limiting factors in the number of machines that could be put into the 
field, but he placed insufficient importance on the time taken to manufacture or repair 
new or damaged tanks. Following the losses in action at Amiens from 8 to 11 August, 
even “obsolete” Mark IVs became prized possessions.161 
It was shown in the preceding chapter that the army had not been well served either 
in terms of the enhancement of the heavy fighting tank or the design and production 
of an efficient medium/light tank. As the German defence against tanks improved, the 
need for protection of the slow-moving and slow-manoeuvring machines and the need 
to take full advantage of disruption and shock to German defenders were paramount. 
The cooperation of infantry and ground-attack aircraft and rapid exploitation of any 
temporary loss of defensive organisation were essential if tanks were to be used to 
best effect and incidents such as Flesquières were to be avoided.162 Communication 
was key, as illustrated during the battle of Cambrai. However, flaws in the integration 
of forces and avoidable delay could resulted in loss of momentum, as at Flesquières 
and could cause or contribute to the loss of numerous tanks. Rapid progress and 
correct timing in the use of aircraft, artillery and infantry were necessary to reduce risk 
from German artillery.163  Problems existed in communications between individual 
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tanks, between tanks and infantry and between tanks and higher command.164 The 
limited visibility and level of noise within tanks accentuated their communication 
problems, though they were better able to carry heavier communication equipment, 
such as the Aldis Lamp, than were other arms. By late 1917, army communications 
had improved, but technology was in its infancy, for longer distances the pigeon often 
remained as king. 
The new technologies of telegraph, telephone and wireless, were fragile, 
insecure and cumbersome. Runners and dispatch riders were physically 
vulnerable. Opportunities for visual signalling were inevitably limited in a war 
largely conducted in trenches and shell holes. The pigeon was not suitable 
to mobile operations and struggled in extreme meteorological conditions. Yet 
all these ‘means’ had their place. When available in sufficient numbers, 
pigeons particularly proved their worth during offensive operations, as 
advancing troops advanced beyond their cable networks. In such 
circumstances, they were not a mere supplementary method of 
communications; they were the principle means by which the firing line 
communicated rearward.165  
Over short distances the waving of shovels with attached equipment was a frequently 
used method of communication between infantry and tanks:  
The infantry was to follow on either side of the roads….and was not to 
attempt to occupy the objectives until the tanks signalled that all was clear, 
or that they wanted help. The signal in either case was a shovel waved out 
of the manhole in the roof.166 
Hall also places the importance of lights, waved implements, pigeons, wireless tanks 
and other developing systems in context. His conclusion is similar to that of Phillips: 
although the BEF did achieve a properly organised system of 
communications for tanks by the end of the war, the limitations of the 
communications technology at the time, together with the inadequacies of 
the tanks themselves, continued to impose profound restrictions on the 
tactical and operational effectiveness of tanks in battle.167 
In the more mobile phase of the war in 1918, communications options were reduced 
since the relocation of homing pigeons as their lofts were moved forward required a 
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training period.168 The alternative tactic of leaving lofts in rear areas increased delivery 
time, a tactic which led to Butler, at that time GOC, III Corps, describing such delayed 
messages “as absolutely valueless”.169 At the same time the equipping of a few tanks 
for communications represented a significant advance. 
Tanks and artillery were not the only changing and challenging technological 
problems for the German Army. As the war progressed, German units became 
increasingly anxious about the effect of Allied air power.170 However, the Allies did not 
always utilise their advantages in materiel to the full. At Flesquières, aircraft that 
attacked German artillery units early in the morning had not returned when the ground 
attack was taking place. This was the time their presence was needed as tanks 
appeared silhouetted on the ridge on their approach to the village. The tanks provided 
an easy target for well-trained German artillery.171  All arms tactics were far from 
perfected in 1917, indeed the necessary preparations had not been undertaken as 
ground attack aircraft remained unarmoured and pilots therefore did not relish the 
prospect of flying into a storm of small arms fire from their far-from-defenceless prey. 
More aircraft were lost to ground fire at Amiens on 8 August than to German aircraft.172 
Planners should have heeded the advice of Swinton, prepared in February 1916:  
The weapon by which the tanks are most likely to be put out of action are 
the enemy’s guns. The only means by which we can at the earlier stages of 
an attack reduce the activity of the enemy’s guns are by our own artillery fire 
or by dropping bombs on them from the air.173  
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Swinton did not mention strafing since, at the time, no British aircraft was fitted with 
an interrupter. It was not until the autumn of 1916 that the Sopworth 1½ Strutter 
became “the first British aircraft to reach France equipped with a machine gun 
synchronized to fire forward”. 174  In 1918, as Wilson’s Mark V added worthwhile 
enhancements in reliability and flexibility to the tactical use of tanks, and other arms 
raised their game, it required an enhanced level of generalship to take advantage of 
opportunities at the Front. The contribution of Monash is identified by both Sheffield 
and Mead as significant in the emergence of the battlefield maestro. 175  Monash 
argued: 
A perfected modern battle plan is like nothing so much as a score for an 
orchestral composition, where the various arms and units are the 
instruments, and the tasks they perform are their respective musical 
phrases. Each individual unit must make its entry precisely at the proper 
moment and play its phrase in the general harmony.176 
This was a fine analogy, though musicians did not face the communications problems 
of military units and the analogy is therefore limited in its application. Furthermore, 
whereas extrovert musicians might relish the conductor’s cue to exhibit their talents, 
military units could be more reticent, mindful of the consequences of pushing 
themselves forward. Pilots were not at all keen to stir up the wasp’s nest of small arms 
groundfire in their slow-moving aircraft. 177  Infantry, mindful of vulnerability to 
counterattack prior to the forward movement of artillery, might station tanks in forward 
defensive positions. Tank crews were well aware of their vulnerability in such 
positions: 
Imagine our poor tanks crawling along the brow of a slope for an indefinite 
period, in full daylight, in full view of the enemy’s gunners! It seemed to us 
as if we were to be deliberately offered up as a sacrifice to appease the 
anger of certain infantry commanders.178 
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 Maestros were therefore particularly important to the welfare of tanks which might, 
ill-advisedly, be asked to lead the advance into territory that had not been risk-
assessed for camouflaged anti-tank defences, or to patrol forward of captured 
positions during consolidation, unsupported.179 The debacle at Flesquières was not 
unique. Following experiences in the French counter-attack in July and experience at 
Amiens, the German Army recognised more fully the value of siting field guns in 
forward positions.180 Thereafter, losses of tanks to such defences represented a major 
threat and explained the high rate of tank casualties during much of the Hundred 
Days.181  Following experiences at Amiens, Elles was prominent in the quest for 
improved coordination of air support for offensive operations. 182  Efforts were 
reasonably successful.183 However, results tended to be better at the commencement 
of a battle than in the later stages when coordination became more difficult to organise 
and ground attack became more costly for aircraft to execute.184 
Both infantry and tanks sought protection. The maestro’s role was not an easy one. 
Just before Amiens, Haig had been impressed by training tactics for attacks led by 
tanks.185 Nevertheless, the low speed of tanks rendered zigzags of limited value and 
it was not always possible to provide air cover or a rolling shrapnel barrage. Too late 
did the army appreciate the value of advice by Churchill and Swinton and seek to 
provide additional protection for tanks in exposed locations by the attachment of 
devices to generate smoke. 186  The value of smoke had become more widely 
appreciated after Ypres and various measures were subsequently adopted by the 
Tank Corps, but the first references that have been identified of action to remedy this 
shortcoming at source, through the Ministry and manufacturers, are in the Tank Corps 
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“Tank Notes” for 10 August 1918 in which it was stated “It has been decided that all 
fighting types of tanks will be fitted with Commander Brock’s Smoke Generating 
device”.187 The War Office sought the provision of smoke generating equipment on 
new tanks on 13 June 1918, though by 22 August the necessary drawings had not 
been completed.188 According to a hand-written note on a reminder, the Ministry was 
to take no action until the Tank Board had considered the request.189 Unbeknown to 
the writer, the Tank Board had already considered the matter: 
General Elles reported that smoke had been used with great success by 
Tanks, but that the device took up room. The question was raised as to 
whether or not a simple device could be produced for projecting smoke in 
front of the Tanks.190 
Admiral Bacon had been experimenting with smoke grenades. The Tank Board 
arranged for him to send a man to France with samples for testing.191 No record of the 
results of trials of the grenades appears to have been reported to the Tank Board, but 
an effective, acid-based solution via tank exhaust systems was agreed in 
November.192 Some forty-six months after Churchill first made the suggestion, the 
army had recognised the benefit and secured the agreement of the Ministry to a means 
of generating smoke. Hostilities would end three days later, an unfortunate illustration 
of failure to foresee tactical consequences and to respond in timely fashion to 
innovative suggestions. 
Elles had identified early in 1917 that Mark I-IV tanks “will not do what we want”, 
with 90% of casualties resulting from bellying or from stopping “to swing or turn’.193 
Despite initial statements that a radically improved machine would be delivered around 
August 1917, it was a further six months before output of the Mark V commenced.194 
Owing to the combination of conditions at the front and the timing of deliveries, the 
army was not in a position to test the Mark V in action until July. The operation, a 
relatively small attack to secure tactically advantageous ground at Hamel, was highly 
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successful.195 This was encouraging both to units that had been unimpressed by the 
performance of tanks in spring 1917 and to GHQ whose analysis of the battle detected 
a lowering of the level of performance of the enemy.196 Buoyed by the results at Hamel 
and by the impression that enemy morale and capability were diminishing, Allied 
forces prepared to take the offensive.197 In the remainder of July armoured assistance 
was provided to French forces, with the main British effort early in August. 198 
Operations conducted under French command on 23 July achieved their objectives 
but revealed difficulties in joint working. Some crews experienced difficulty in 
distinguishing French from German troops and fourteen of the thirty-five Mark V tanks 
participating were knocked out.199  Losses included six that were struck by shells 
during a period when their advance was delayed owing to problems with the rate of 
advance of the French creeping barrage and an inability to locate the French infantry 
whom they were supporting.200 Notwithstanding these problems, Allied actions in July 
magnified effects on the morale of German forces following their failure in the Spring 
Offensives.201 
Assisted by early morning mist, the organisation and execution of the Amiens 
offensive on 8 August demonstrated that the army had made considerable progress 
in the planning and conduct of operations. Furthermore, the offensive confirmed the 
limited resolve of parts of the German Army observed at Hamel.202 While many units 
retained the capability and level of resistance of earlier periods in the war, others, 
deprived of adequate artillery support by the deployment of units further back, 
therefore less likely to be overrun by tank-based attacks, appeared more than willing 
to surrender, particularly when confronted by the threat of tanks. Hammond considers 
some large-scale surrenders to have been the consequence of weak forward units 
feeling deserted. If Hammond is correct, the tank was securing benefits without the 
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need for intense fighting. Churchill flew to France in the afternoon of 8 August at the 
conclusion of the Prime Minister’s meeting on Tanks and noted this situation.203 He 
recorded “I do not think there can have been much slaughter, as the enemy seems to 
have yielded very readily.” 204  Yet other German units proved to be difficult and 
determined adversaries, particularly when aided by thoughtless British offensive 
tactics: 
It [the tank] is as yet mechanically imperfect, and the tactical handling of the 
tank is in course of evolution….As to the tactical handling of tanks, I am 
persuaded that we cannot sit down and allow the tank people to dictate the 
tactical use of the tank, except in so far as its mechanical capabilities are 
concerned….At Parvillers, tank after tank went up against an impossible 
situation and [was] lost to the use of the attacking infantry. This was 
magnificent but it was not war.205 
Churchill must have reappraised the situation, since only four weeks later he reported 
to the War Cabinet: 
No doubt it is right to exploit to the full the present favourable situation, and 
we need not exclude the possibility of results being achieved of a very far-
reaching character. On the assumption, however, that these results are not 
decisive.…we ought now to have reached definite conclusions as to the 
character of next year’s campaign”.206 
Churchill continued by considering the pros and cons of trying for “a decisive victory 
next year as the Chief of Staff advises” or “reserving the climax of the war till 1920.”207 
 On 21 August, Haig had noted Churchill’s lack of confidence of victory in 1918: 
I told him we ought to do our utmost to get a decision this autumn. We are 
engaged in a ‘wearing-out battle’ and are outlasting the Enemy. If we have 
a period of quiet he will recover, and the ‘wearing-out process’ must be 
recommenced.208  
The Battle of Amiens was a key event both for GHQ and the Ministry. So far as GHQ 
was concerned, Amiens would continue the 1918 attrition of the German Army that 
Ludendorff had initiated by launching the Spring Offensives. Staff efforts to withhold 
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from the enemy the location of the offensive were elaborate and effective.209 To the 
Tank Corps this was the opportunity they had long sought, namely a concentration of 
tanks possessing greater mobility than early models and taking place on ground not 
suffering from excessive bombardment or extensive accumulations of mud. Preston 
records “Thanks to a dry summer and to the fact that it had been very little shelled, the 
ground was hard and provided good “going” both for tanks and cavalry.”210 The night 
of 7/8 August was fine and a ground mist formed.211 The mist was to play an important 
role in the battle, in some areas seemingly either unnerving forward German units or, 
through poor disposition of artillery, rendering their positions impossible to defend.212 
However, the emergence of the sun in mid-morning appears to have marked the 
commencement of a more determined defence against which gung-ho tactics could 
render tanks extremely vulnerable.213 Hart concludes: 
The tank like the infantry and the artillery, was not a stand-alone weapon 
and had clear weaknesses as well as strengths. It could not operate alone 
and when bereft of the right kind of support it was all but useless.214 
When the concept of the tank was endorsed by Churchill in January 1915, he had 
envisaged operations at night or under cover of smoke, yet in the ensuing years these 
means of protecting tanks from direct artillery fire had neither been sought by the army 
nor examined by the Ministry. In 1918 the Tank Corps became interested in such 
techniques. A trial night raid was undertaken near Bucquoy. From this it was 
concluded that “The raid showed the possibility of manoeuvring Tanks in the dark 
through the enemy’s lines, and also the great security to personnel afforded by a Tank 
during the night”.215  
For some time the army had seen the Mark IV as “obsolete” and unwanted: 
The Conference considered what was to happen to the Mark 4 Tanks of 
which there are 400 now available, and which it was recognised are of no 
value for big operations. Mr. Churchill suggested that they should be 
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withdrawn behind the Army areas and be used for raids for deceiving the 
enemy as “dummies”, and for use in training but deprecated their being 
broken up, as we gained nothing by this and they might yet play some part.216  
To a degree Churchill would be proved right. Following the extent of Mark V losses at 
Amiens, Mark IVs regained value.217 
Owing to Churchill’s objective of extracting the maximum possible personal benefit 
from his association with the design and construction of tanks, his observations about 
early development are suspect. This is well illustrated by his misleading response to 
a draft of the Official History: 
Once the idea of a land battleship was mooted, I turned to Tennyson 
d’Eyncourt, and appealed to him to give his full aid, as a result of which I 
appointed the Landship Committee in February 1915. D’Eyncourt’s 
Committee designed the mother tank in spite of the military obstructions you 
mention.218 
The Landships Committee did not design any vehicle. Much of the scholarship fails to 
recognise the extent Churchill endeavoured to distort events and switch the credit for 
designing the first tank from Tritton and Wilson to his Landships Committee. Likewise, 
Churchill’s efforts to conceal the limited production of tanks during his stewardship of 
the Ministry are also not fully appreciated. Beiriger does not recognise Churchill’s 
tactics and raises no questions about his ability to repair and produce tanks on “an 
unprecedented scale for 1919”.219 Beiriger also quotes from Dewar who envisaged the 
despatch to the front of large numbers of Mark VIII tanks by early spring 1919.220 
Having regard to the time taken to assemble, test and deliver tanks, the state of the 
Chateauroux venture on both sides of the Atlantic, the limitations revealed by 
Maclean’s survey and the time required for his development programme to come to 
fruition, it seems unlikely that any Mark VIII would have reached the front by March 
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1919, other than perhaps some 150 under special contract in Glasgow.221 Just one 
Mark VIII was produced in the final quarter of 1918.222 
It is surprising there has been so little criticism of Churchill’s performance at 
Munitions. Setting aside contemporaries with axes to grind, there are few critics of 
Churchill’s spell as Minister. Beiriger does blandly state that Churchill’s reorganisation 
of the MWD in October 1917, adversely affected output.223 However, Beiriger did not 
attempt to justify this view and would appear to have fallen into the trap of assuming 
there to have been a simple relationship between relevant issues when relationships 
were complex. Notably, Beiriger makes no reference to Maclean’s report. Perhaps he 
saw the issues raised by Maclean as unrelated to the subject of his work, i.e. the 
politics of supply and strategy, though some analysis of supply difficulties would have 
served a useful purpose to balance his excessive praise for Churchill. 
Beiringer is not alone: scholarship generally fails to address the points raised by 
Maclean or comments only superficially on limited issues. Only Prior and Childs have 
commented meaningfully on Maclean’s report. Prior shows clearly that he appreciated 
the validity of many of the criticisms raised by Maclean.224 However, as the title of his 
book suggests, Prior’s objective was to take Churchill to task over the validity of his 
approach in The World Crisis as a whole. This he does effectively but he does not 
identify the full significance of Maclean’s report, which is not considered in conjunction 
with other documents. No reference is made to the correspondence between Seely 
and Churchill early in October 1918 or to the fact that Churchill makes no mention of 
Maclean or his report in books or correspondence. By restricting his target to what 
Churchill wrote and excluding consideration of what he did not mention, Prior does not 
identify the full significance of problems identified by Maclean’s. Nevertheless, his 
book, shows a balanced picture of the factors material to the low rate of tank 
production.  
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Both in his thesis at Glasgow University and in his book, Childs leaves the reader 
in no doubt about the limitations of the Ministry’s efforts to produce tanks, but he does 
not seek to analyse available evidence to assess responsibility for faulty management. 
Rather, he explains the problems as being rooted in the limitations of Stern and the 
on-going conflict between the Ministry and War Office for control of tank design and 
production.225 Notably, Childs fails to follow through with an examination of Maclean’s 
findings or what those findings reveal about Churchill as a manager, about the general 
efficiency of the MWD or the consequences for the army, particularly had the war 
extended into 1919. Instead, he makes a number of claims that are not referenced.226 
The significance of faults in the tank supply system revealed by Maclean are not 
therefore addressed adequately. Similarly, possible consequences for military 
operations, during the war or its envisaged extension into 1919, are not considered. 
There is no reason to conclude that organisational shortcomings arrived with Churchill 
and Moore. They seem likely to have existed throughout the life of the MWD. Matters 
would appear to have taken a wrong turn at the outset, under Lloyd George in 
February 1916, when membership of the Tank Supply Committee was determined. 
The selection for membership of this Committee was to a substantial degree based 
on retaining the services of those who had served on the Admiralty Committee, yet 
that Committee had no meaningful involvement in the design and construction of the 
first tank, which had been undertaken by Tritton and Wilson in Lincoln. Furthermore, 
most members of the Committee do not appear to have possessed any special skills 
in industrial production, a basic requirement as the project moved from the completion 
of a prototype to production in bulk. Wilson became a member of the Committee, but 
was not in an influential position, being subordinate to Stern who had no background 
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in engineering or manufacturing.227 The History described the immediate work of this 
Committee as “the speedy construction of the hundred tanks for which the formal War 
Office demand had been received”: it failed to mention that the supply was only 
sufficiently speedy to enable half the first order to participate in the conflict at Flers, 
did not explain that the order was extended, firstly in April then again in July and did 
not mention that Stern had forecast the completion of the first 150 tanks by July.228 
Achievements in 1916 did not auger well for the following years. 
And so it proved. For two years, output estimates were not simply wrong but were 
normally substantially overestimated. As the importance of supply issues increased 
during the summer of 1918, Percival Perry, Moore’s deputy, provided revised 
estimates.229 Perry maintained the pretence of unachievable forecasts that Maclean, 
Moore’s successor, would expose as completely unrealistic. The gulf between Perry’s 
forecasts and those of Maclean increased monthly to January 1919 by which time 
Perry considered some 720/month might be constructed. Maclean’s estimate for 
January 1919 was 228.230 The History failed to criticise Perry for this but it is notable 
that Seely moved Perry from his role as Deputy DCMWD to a specific, limited role 
obtaining tractors from America.231 Maclean’s revelation that Supply Officers had been 
excluded from the estimates exercise, represented perhaps clear evidence of the lack 
of ability or integrity of certain managers.232  
These weaknesses are not widely reflected in the scholarship, which fails to 
challenge adequately the concluding picture presented by The History. This was 
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falsely simplistic, comprising successful war-time efforts embroidered by the prediction 
that, had the war continued, there would have been a rosy future, “A complex and 
entirely novel engine of war had been created in a single year…..Manufacture in 
thousands was undertaken during the next two years [1916-1917] under enormous 
difficulties”. 233  The History stressed the shortages of labour, materials and 
manufacturing capacity, but omitted any reference to matters which could have been 
handled more satisfactorily, concluding its review of the section on tanks by the 
observation that “over 2500 machines had been made and issued, the original tank 
had been developed and improved with experience, and there was a clear prospect of 
still more successful production upon an enormously increased scale”.234 The facts 
paint an entirely different picture, with limited and falling production in Britain, problems 
in commencing production at Chateauroux and, belatedly, somewhat desperate efforts 
by a new team in the last three months of the war to undertake measures to facilitate 
increased output for operations in 1919.235 
The absence of debate and explanation for the issues raised in Maclean’s report 
represents a weakness in the assessment of preparations for armoured warfare. Even 
Glanfield fails to mention that Maclean produced a report critical of the handling of 
various issues by the Ministry. He fails to identify and answer some of the issues 
covered by Maclean and deals only superficially with others. In particular, Glanfield 
ignores Maclean’s point that considerable responsibility for the problems of 
manufacturers in securing adequate labour was due to failure to ensure an adequate 
supply of components.236 
The files show a detailed monitoring of tank output, particularly under Churchill’s 
leadership of the Ministry.237 However, considerably less is said about steps taken to 
forestall delays caused by shortages of particular components. For example, in 
February 1918 there was a problem with the supply of gearboxes for Mark V/V*.238 On 
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11 February, following enquiries, Perry estimated that deliveries of Mark V gearboxes 
would commence in about three weeks and would increase to 65/week, sufficient for 
the Minister’s programme of 700 tanks between April and July.239 In August, Maclean 
found the available plant to be insufficient to meet the production programme and 
demands for Mark V variants. As this was not anticipated to exceed sixty-five/week, it 
would appear that Perry had not checked the source of his information.  
In August, Maclean found the monthly production of gearboxes to be only 177 and 
falling. He recorded that, prior to his appointment as Controller, an eleventh-hour effort 
had been set on foot to remedy the shortage of capacity for transmission gears. The 
effort would appear to have been ineffective as well as late, since Maclean recorded 
he “had to order large quantities of new plant to cope even with the amended (reduced) 
figures I have now put forward”.240 It would appear from the number of references to 
gearbox shortages, that this component posed general problems for the Ministry. It 
seems surprising that in some instances no single firm was responsible for the 
construction of the gearbox as a whole. On 5 September Maclean reported that the 
gearbox for the Medium C needed to be redesigned and “he had an expert on the work 
at present”.241 At the Board’s next meeting Maclean discounted the possibility of this 
gearbox being available “in any numbers” before January.242 Maclean also informed 
the Board that, owing to “the possibility of gearbox trouble with the Mark V** Tank, 
Metropolitan were to revert to producing Mark V tanks “in about two months time”.243 
All Medium C were to be equipped with the new gearbox by March. 
The vision, enterprise and skill of a number of individuals had provided weapons 
that eventually contributed to success in France and in other theatres. Yet the 
obstacles that had been encountered both within its own ranks and within political and 
naval circles had deprived Expeditionary Forces of the degree of benefit they might 
have enjoyed by the earlier and more efficient production of armoured vehicles. 
 
239 Ibid. 
240 Churchill College Archives, CHAR15/87, J. B. Maclean, ‘Report on Condition of Mechanical 
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241 National Maritime Museum, d’Eyncourt Papers, DEY57, minutes of Fourth Meeting of Tank Board, 
5 September 1918, Item 3, ‘Tank Production Position’. 
242 National Maritime Museum, d’Eyncourt Papers, DEY57, minutes of Fifth Meeting of Tank Board, 
12 September 1918, Item 3, ‘Mark VIII Tank’ (sic). 
243 Ibid. It seems likely that the potential shortage of gearboxes represented a convenient face-saving 
reason for reverting to the Mark V – in reality the army did not want further production of the 
unpopular Mark V*, preferring instead to obtain additional deliveries of the more efficient Mark V. 
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Maclean’s report highlighted management shortcomings. After listing the problems of 
inadequate machining facilities for armour plate and inadequate output of engines and 
transmission gears, Maclean had lamented that, “As I turn from one important 
component to another I find the same conditions prevailing.”244 The nature of the errors 
showed the lack of an adequate system of checks by senior management. Errors were 
occurring such as the ordering of outsized ball bearings for the Whippet, without a 
check on the availability of that particular size, and the incorrect specification of jigs 
for the Mark VIII.245  
It has been shown that delays affecting tank invention and production were present 
during each stage of the war. Churchill’s tenure of the Ministry is no exception. 
Notwithstanding his drive and willingness to embrace change, Churchill failed to stamp 
his presence on the management of tank supply. Although he could not have 
conducted detailed supervision over his Ministry as a whole, tanks had a special 
significance for Churchill’s strategy and he should have been aware from a range of 
sources, particularly Layton’s monitoring, that all was not well with supply. His 
appointment of Seely in July 1918 might be interpreted as a willingness to consider 
change, but by then Churchill had been Minister for a full year. Army dissatisfaction 
should have led to an earlier, closer examination of performance. Bearing in mind 
military aspirations and his own support for armoured warfare, it was quite 
inappropriate for Churchill to tolerate such a lengthy period of failure to achieve results 
needed for his advocated military policy. Had the war been lost, undoubtedly there 
would have been in-depth studies of all relevant issues. In the event, victory spared 
Churchill and others from close scrutiny that would have revealed limitations in the 
standard of their efforts. However, despite favourable, chance events and Churchill’s 
best journalistic labours to hide the truth, indefinite subterfuge was not possible. 
Notwithstanding Churchill’s efforts, too many documents existed to prevent the 
surfacing of uncomfortable facts. Even Churchill was not fully in command of history.246 
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CONCLUSION 
The preceding chapters have shown that, despite significant problems, by the end 
of the war armoured vehicles had become useful components in British military 
operations: 
Since the opening of our offensive on 8th August, tanks have been employed 
in every battle, and the importance of the part played by them in breaking the 
resistance of the German infantry can scarcely be exaggerated. The whole 
scheme of the attack of 8th August was dependent upon tanks, and ever since 
that date on numberless occasions the success of our infantry has been 
powerfully assisted or confirmed by their timely arrival.1 
It is standard courteous practice for a C-in-C to recognise the contribution of all 
branches of his command in formal Despatches. For a balanced assessment of Haig’s 
view of the value and role of tanks it is therefore advisable to supplement observations 
relating to a particular sector of the conflict with wider assessments. Haig’s Final 
Despatch provides an opportunity to undertake such a check. The Despatch 
summarises the relative roles of different arms. 2  Tellingly, Haig stresses the 
interdependency of the specialised arms and the requirement that they should work to 
assist the infantry, who alone can occupy ground. He makes specific mention of the 
role of tanks for large-scale attacks such as Amiens:  
As an instance of the interdependence of artillery and tanks, we may take 
the actions fought east of Amiens….A very large number of tanks were 
employed in these operations, and they carried out tasks in the most brilliant 
manner. Yet a scrutiny of the artillery ammunition returns….discloses the fact 
that in no action of similar dimensions had the expenditure of ammunition 
been so great. Immense as the influence of mechanical devices may be, they 
cannot by themselves decide a campaign. 
The length of Haig’s explanation of the role of artillery shows that he considers this 
to have been the bedrock of his army’s success. Yet account needs to be taken of the 
fact that there were certain key differences between the Allies and the Central Powers. 
The lack of a meaningful number of tanks within the ranks of the Central Powers 
represented one such difference which limited the tactical options open to enemy 
forces and provided Haig and Petain with powerful second blows following initial 
artillery bombardments. In assessing the significances of changes in military affairs, 
 
1 John Herbert Boraston (ed.), Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatches, December 1915-April 1919 (London, J. 
M. Dent and Sons, 1919), Seventh Despatch, Advance to Victory, p. 302. 
2 Ibid, The Final Despatch, Part 2, Features of the War, para. 15, pp. 328-330. 
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Jonathan Bailey emphasises the changes that developed during the First World War, 
the indirect fire revolution with artillery, aircraft and radio communication providing the 
means of locating, relaying information and dominating enemy forces.3 The importance 
of this combination of forces and services and their impact on warfare is beyond 
question, but a feature they share is their inability to occupy ground. Following the 
impressive, dominating role of artillery at the commencement of a major set-piece 
battle such as Amiens and their continuing efforts to provide a protective umbrella, it 
was still necessary for the infantry, supported by tanks and cavalry to move forward to 
tackle any remaining effective enemy forces, or perhaps simply to accept their 
surrender. This was the stage at which the value of the tank was felt, a reassuring and 
demoralising asset capable of extending the momentum provided by the initial artillery 
strike. At Amiens, the two blows by artillery then tanks reduced defensive capabilities 
thereby paving the way for penetration by cavalry, armoured cars and Whippets. It was 
unfortunate that progress was constrained by the deployment of so few armoured cars, 
the reliability of which limited the scope of progression, and Medium tanks which lacked 
speed and were not allocated a role of exploitation.4 This may have been frustrating 
for Fuller, but the somewhat cautious approach to the handling of the Whippets may 
well have been the correct tactical decision at Amiens.  
Most significantly, tanks proved vulnerable when exposed to effective defensive 
measures by the German Army, a “fantastically good army tactically”.5 Tanks were far 
from the all-conquering indestructible chariots envisaged for the war of 1914/1915 by 
 
3 Jonathan Bailey, The Birth of the Modern Style of Warfare, Defence Viewpoints from the UK Defence 
Forum, https://www.defenceviewpoints.co.uk/military-operations/the-birth-of-the-modern-style-of-
warfare-in-the-great-war, accessed 14 June 2021. 
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(notably thicker armour plate), see https://tanks-encyclopedia.com/ww1/gb/Austin_Armoured_Car.php, 
accessed 25 January 2021 (BEF priorities required Rolls Royce to concentrate on engine production 
by 1916, capacity did not therefore exist for the company to manufacture armoured cars for much of 
the war). Arguably, the problem of lack of quality of other makes was due to the failure of government 
to impose an adequate checks on manufacturers’ products, thus throughout the war the construction 
of Austin armoured cars was of an unsatisfactory standard; for further details of weaknesses of Austin 
Armoured Cars see Imperial War Museum, Doc. 10086, War Experience and Practical Notes of the 
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British Armoured Cars in the First World War (London, HMSO, 1987), pp. 45-52 and National 
Archives, WO95/116, War Diary of 17 (Armoured Car) Tank Battalion, operations 10-15 June 1918 
and recommendations of commanding officer, Lt.-Colonel E. J. Carter following operations on 27 
August 1918. 
5 Western Front Association Lecture, Gary Sheffield, Douglas Haig: The ‘Accidental Victor’ of World 
War One?, 13 June 2013, observations by John Bourne during question session, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K3jRcdQMkWc, accessed 20 May 2020. 
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Churchill and early enthusiasts. In common with other arms and weapons they had 
weaknesses which necessitated appropriate conditions for deployment and usage.6 It 
was to protect his limited numbers of tanks that Lawrence deemed it prudent to 
constrain the scope of their utilisation to limited types of operations and Elles sought 
measures to track down and eliminate or neutralise their would-be predators. 7 
Furthermore, British tanks were insufficiently mobile for rapid concentration that might 
prove necessary in a war to which movement had been restored. In consequence, 
unable on all occasions to keep up with the battle, they became more difficult to use.8 
This was less of a problem with armoured cars, but there were few armoured cars on 
the Western Front. 
In this chapter it is proposed to summarise the main findings from the research, to 
comment on the significance of those findings for numbers and sophistication of 
armoured vehicles and to assess Churchill’s contribution in a period of rapid 
technological and tactical change underpinning military operations. From the outset to 
the final months of the war, the supply of armoured vehicles to British forces suffered 
from a lack of vision and poor management of production. This had consequences - 
qualitative, numerical and chronological. 
Scholarship recognises that in February 1915 military personnel and politicians 
failed to accept and develop the potential of tracked vehicles to address problems of 
entrenched conditions. What does not appear to have been appreciated is the element 
of prejudice and misrepresentation underpinning the rejection of the Holt system. 
Colonel Holden, the War Office mechanical transport “expert”, utilised his influence to 
pigeon-hole the development of a tracked solution to the conundrum of Western Front 
entrenchment. Among senior staff, there was a considerable element of support for the 
 
6 Giffard Le Quesne Martel, In the Wake of the Tank: The First Fifteen Years of Mechanization in the 
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development of a vehicle more powerful than the Holt tractor. Nevertheless, seemingly 
owing to a misplaced sense of professional pride, Holden oversaw the testing of the 
Holt tractor through inappropriate trials then declined to respond helpfully to “a request” 
by senior officers for assistance in devising measures for exploring the concept further. 
His inactivity in response to assistance sought by the MGO represented a form of 
misconduct, but the lack of firm management qualities by senior officers and a lack of 
vision and determination at a senior political level enabled the ADMT not only to avoid 
criticism or pressure, but to bring army examination of tracked fighting vehicles to a 
conclusion. 
Through his low opinion of senior army personnel, recognition of innovative ideas 
and appreciation that armoured vehicles offered a potential key to unlock stalemate on 
the Western Front, Churchill was neither surprised by the lack of War Office interest 
nor slow to form his own “Committee of experts” to develop the concept.9 It is likely he 
also saw personal political advantage, the opportunity to put his own stamp on the 
solution to a national military problem. Accordingly, Churchill had already established 
his Landships Committee before trials of the Holt had been undertaken. 
Unfortunately, Churchill lacked judgment, managerial ability and a sound 
appreciation of military tactics. He bestowed chairmanship of the Landships 
Committee to an individual lacking the drive, belief and commitment required for 
success. Mechanically, d’Eyncourt’s Landship Committee achieved nothing.10 It was 
not until the project was passed to a private company that progress was made.11 The 
scholarship fails to recognise d’Eyncourt’s character defects. Glanfield refers to him as 
“the dependable d’Eyncourt”.12 He was certainly not that. D’Eyncourt was saved by the 
efforts of Sueter and Stern from the stigma of presiding over and retaining an 
ineffective team. By good fortune, he received undeserved laurels through a purely 
hierarchical relationship with the designers and builders of a successful new weapon, 
the credit for which belonged entirely to the skill of the designers. He demonstrated his 
gratitude in September 1916 by successful underhand measures to deprive the 
 
9 National Archives, MUN5/394, Churchill to Asquith, 5 January 1915 and Statement to Royal 
Commission on Awards to Inventors, 1 September 1919, paras. 16-17 and 21-22. 
10 See photograph 34. 
11 See photographs 36 and 37. 
12 John Glanfield, The Devil’s Chariots: The Birth and Secret Battles of the First Tanks (Stroud, Sutton 
Publishing, 2006), p. 215. 
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designers of appropriate national acclaim. 13  His later attempt, before the Royal 
Commission, to claim recognition for aspects of inventive work and accompanying 
financial benefits was unsuccessful. D’Eyncourt claimed £100,000 for “the control and 
approval of all design and construction of the first tank”. This was rejected by the 
Commission, though, for reasons that are not entirely clear, they did award him 
£1,000.14 Tritton countered d’Eyncourt’s financial claim by stating that he “contributed 
nothing to the tank’s design” and “never approved his (Tritton’s) drawings in any 
meaningful sense, though it was standard naval practice to do so, and gave no expert 
criticism or assistance when shown drawings.”15 
In August 1915, freed from the shackles of poor management by the Landships 
Committee, it might have been anticipated that the supply of tanks would have 
flourished. That was not the case. Despite the engineering progress by Tritton and 
Wilson and the organisation of Swinton, no attempt was made by the Landships 
Committee or Army Council to ensure the project proceeded at the maximum possible 
speed, with the object of providing the new machines for the coming offensives in 1916. 
It was not the War Office but Haig who in February and April 1916 attempted to link 
tank progress to the rapidly approaching Somme offensives. In February Haig informed 
the War Office “these tanks can be usefully employed in offensive operations”.16 He 
understood “that 30-40 at least could be supplied by May”.17 Haig’s mention of supply 
by May appears to reflect the false schedule outlined by d’Eyncourt to Kitchener in 
January 1916. In April, his diary recorded “I was told (by Swinton) that 150 would be 
provided by the 31 July. I said that was too late. 50 were urgently required for 1 June.”18 
Haig’s order and comments were themselves too late. Such demands should have 
been made by the Army Council in 1915.  
 
13 National Maritime Museum, DEY42, d’Eyncourt to Tudor, 18 September 1916. 
14 National Archives, MUN5/394, d’Eyncourt response to Commission standard claim form, question 3, 
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15 National Archives, MUN5/211, Tritton Counter Statement to Royal Commission. 
16 National Archives, WO158/833, 9 February 1916, Haig handwritten response to cipher cablegram 
12959. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Gary Sheffield and John Bourne (eds.), Douglas Haig: War Diaries and Letters 1914-1918 (London, 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2005), 14 April 1916, p. 184; Ernest D. Swinton, Eyewitness: Being 
Personal Reminiscences of Certain Phases of the Great War including the Genesis of the Tank 
(London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1932), p. 234; National Archives, WO158/833, Swinton to Butler, 26 
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Perhaps most significantly, the tentacles of d’Eyncourt’s irresolute management 
stretched even further back. In July 1915 when appointing Fosters to construct an 
experimental landship, he had not updated the company on the role of the machines. 
Tritton and Wilson’s understanding therefore remained founded on earlier ideas for 
trench-taking machines that would enjoy a brief fifty-mile life.19 However, after GHQ 
became involved in the project in June 1915, the role was changed. Infantry-carrying 
capability was dropped in favour of maximising armament and reducing size. Upon the 
transfer of design and construction to Fosters, d’Eyncourt neglected to appraise 
Fosters of the changed role for the proposed machine, which would no longer be 
required simply to break through enemy’s defences but would need to perform an on-
going and structurally more demanding role as machine-gun destroyer. In 
consequence, the track was not redesigned for a more extensive mileage.20 It had 
been d’Eyncourt’s intention that Fosters would construct one “half” of Crompton’s 
articulated machine as a prototype, but the design was not sufficiently advanced. 
Neither d’Eyncourt nor Crompton saw fit to update the engineers’ understanding of the 
purpose of the machine.21 The consequence of this management failure was that the 
first tanks were built to an inappropriate specification. Furthermore, the implications of 
training were not taken into account in determining the mileage to be travelled.22 The 
failure of many of the tanks during the Battle of Flers and preparations for that battle 
was therefore entirely predictable. As the three Army Corps awaited Z-Hour on 15 
September they were unaware that their success depended to a certain degree on 
whether they were supported by older tanks from C Company, or newer tanks from D 
Company or GHQ’s reserve pool. 
Management of tank manufacture was a problem from the date Churchill formed the 
Landships Committee in February 1915 until the appointment in August 1918 of a 
capable manager and Tank Board. During this period, the value of the technical 
creativity of engineers was undermined by poor management. As ill-prepared tank 
crews arrived in France in August 1916 for action some three weeks later, they faced 
 
19 National Archives, Royal Commission on Awards to Inventors, 21 October 1919, examination of 
Wilson by Russell, answer to question 3102. 
20 National Archives, Royal Commission on Awards to Inventors, 21 October 1919, cross-examination 
of Tritton by Gray, answers to question 2817-2833. 
21 National Archives, ADM116/1339, Crompton to Tritton, 5 August 1915. 
22 National Archives, Royal Commission on Awards to Inventors, 21 October 1919, examination of 
Wilson by Russell, answer to question 3102. 
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not only the handicaps of shellfire, treacherous ground conditions and an unnecessary 
and unreliable climbing/steering tail unit, but tracks that, for approximately half the 
machines, were well past their use-by date. Poor management caused or accentuated 
the adverse effects of each of these disadvantages. The scholarship has not noted the 
most serious of these disadvantages, the avoidable specification problem. It has 
therefore neither taken the “dependable d’Eyncourt” to task for failure to apply 
reasonable professional standards nor has it acknowledged the level of recognition 
due to Wilson and Tritton. 
Furthermore, in addition to these initial errors, Ministers were guilty of placing tank 
production under unskilled management from February 1916 to August 1918. It is not 
possible to provide reliable estimates of the consequences of mismanagement but it 
is reasonable to conclude that the opportunity to provide a greater number of more 
reliable tanks at an earlier date was missed as was the opportunity to secure more 
efficient, more effective and better protected tanks. Considering the level of daily 
casualties and daily financial cost of the war, it can be seen that the consequences 
could have been substantial.23  
To a degree, the failure to extract maximum benefits from engineering abilities 
represented a characteristic of British society, which did not rank engineers sufficiently 
highly to secure their integration into determination of policy. Discussions between the 
army as users and the Ministry as suppliers failed to include those most aware of 
possible engineering and production difficulties. It was not until June 1918 that 
Churchill, faced by sharply declining production, saw fit to arrange a meeting with tank 
producers and not until August 1918 that Seely persuaded Churchill and Lloyd George 
to appoint Maclean, a man who understood the nuts and bolts of production, to manage 
the Ministry’s Supply Department. Maclean succeeded those who, perhaps from a 
higher social plane, had hitherto occupied the position but, though well-intentioned, 
had not ensured the best possible output. Indeed, the report prepared by Maclean 
demonstrated basic deficiencies in the infrastructure and techniques required to 
produce the number of tanks sought plus an unwillingness by personnel within the 
 
23 War Office, Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire in the Great War (London, HMSO, 
1922), p. 237, records British Empire military deaths just over 900,000, a figure since increased to 
nearly 1.25 million from other sources; Spartacus Educational, https://spartacus-
educational.com/FWWcosts.htm, accessed 06 December 2020, estimates the cost to Britain alone as 
approximately £35 billion. 
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Ministry to allow shortcomings to be revealed. It is not possible to quantify the shortfall, 
but poor management undoubtedly deprived the army of a proportion of the output of 
tanks that should have been supplied. Furthermore, closer involvement of the design 
engineers and manufacturers would have provided a firmer base for decisions on the 
upgrade of tank models. 
The consequences of management weaknesses were that fewer tanks were 
available for use at all stages of the war from 1916 to the Armistice and that those 
available were of inferior design compared to the standard that was possible given an 
earlier start and utilisation of best engineering advice. In addition to numerical 
consequences and mechanical capability, the tank was not user-friendly. It lacked a 
springed suspension system, was prone to bullet splash and was poorly ventilated, 
resulting in crews suffering danger to sight, debilitating working temperatures and 
dangerous levels of carbon monoxide. “As a working environment the inside of a Mark 
V tank was simply atrocious”24. 
The view for any member of crew was confined to what could be picked up 
through pin-holes or through the sights of their guns. As the tank came under 
small arms fire, bullet splash penetrated….often causing temporary 
blindness….noise was deafening whenever the engine ran, and speech next 
to impossible, and when under small arms fire it was like an inferno.25 
Endurance of such conditions for a short journey across no-man’s-land might have 
been acceptable but they could not be endured for long hours without operational 
penalty. Following prolonged exposure to hazardous conditions within tanks, it was not 
unknown for personnel to be taken by stretcher from the machine to a dressing 
station.26  Nevertheless, it was only late in the war that these problems attracted 
appropriate attention, despite the consequences of fighting in such conditions having 
been apparent since Flers.27 It was short-sighted in the extreme to disregard the health 
and fighting-fitness of the limited, specialised crew: 
 
24 Hart: 1918: A Very British Victory (Chatham, Viking, 2008), p. 326. 
25 Captain Gerald Brooks, 15th Battalion, Tank Corps, in Hart, 1918, pp. 327-328. 
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(Barnsley, Pen and Sword, 2014), pp. 204-205. 
27 National Archives, T173/776, Royal Commission on Awards to Inventors, 21 October 1919, 
examination  of Elles by Solicitor-General, answer to question 3300 reveals Elles view that “the reason 
why they [tanks] could not go to a large extent on the second and succeeding days [of Flers] was 
more a question of exhaustion of personnel as much as anything else”. The position remained 
unsatisfactory, see National Archives, MUN4/5207, Elles to Tank Board, 22 October 1918, “We 
require to reach finality on this question at the earliest moment.” 
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The men were often nauseous, felt faint, suffered blinding headaches and 
were thoroughly deafened by the relentless noise. Lieutenant Mould’s men 
alternated between tasks….pushing themselves to the extreme limits of 
human physical endurance….As they rested there was an unpleasant scene. 
Many officers did not appreciate that just a few hours fighting in a tank made 
a man unfit for duty for several days afterwards.28  
Private Charles Rowland recalled that the “scene” was caused when: 
Captain Gilmour came up to congratulate us and asked if he (sic) would take 
the ‘bus’ down into the valley….After a heated argument, Mould told him 
straight, ‘We are not going another bloody inch: my crew are absolutely 
exhausted being in nearly ten to twelve hours and we are not capable of 
doing any more.29 
The design of a tank involved compromise between different capabilities and speed of 
production. Pressures for output did not encourage modifications to improve working 
conditions for crew. Compartmentalisation of duties did not assist the achievement of 
balanced decisions on design. This is well illustrated by modifications to the Mark V, 
recognised as their best model by the Tank Corps, but the performance of which was 
downgraded by elongation to enable crossing of wider trenches. Wilson had warned 
against this change. In the late summer/autumn of 1918, the Tank Corps and infantry 
to be transported to their objectives, would have been relieved that the army was in 
the process of halting production of the cumbersome, unpopular Mark V* in favour of 
an upgraded Mark V.30  
Tanks were far from a war-winning machines.31 However, they should be seen on a 
sliding scale of usefulness rather than in terms of the extremes of dominance or 
uselessness. Had the tank been developed sooner, it might have progressed further 
during the conflict, both mechanically and tactically. From a more advanced position 
on its development curve, it might then have played a more effective role. Within the 
limited timeframe of the First World War, it is unlikely the end product would have been 
transformed. Nevertheless, useful strides might have been made, enhancing longevity, 
safety and the effectiveness of machine, crew and passengers by improvements to 
ventilation, communications, smoke producing defensive capability, buoyancy and, 
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through managerial efficiency, greater numbers. 32  As the war came to an end, 
diminution of most of these handicaps lay tantalisingly close.33 
Scholarship tends to concentrate on the iconic heavy, tracked machine. This is 
understandable in view of its imposing presence and armament, its psychological 
effect on the enemy, its deployment on the main wartime Front and veneration by 
press and public.34 The army allocated little priority to armoured cars, yet they 
possessed advantages which, in terms of tactical potential might have provided a 
more valuable complementary asset to heavy tanks than was secured from lighter 
tanks. Such armoured cars as were used on the Western Front were largely donated 
by the navy, Canada and a Russian, pre-Bolshevik order, delivery which was 
withheld and redirected to British forces. Rather than placing its eggs mostly in one 
basket by planning for exploitation by lighter, faster tanks, the BEF might have been 
better advised to have sought a substantial element of less technologically 
challenging wheeled vehicles. The tactical advantages of armoured cars became 
increasingly apparent as the prospects of a more mobile conflict were raised 
following experiences at Cambrai and the Spring Offensives.35 In January 1918 an 
order for armoured cars was placed by the Army Council, though it would not appear 
to have been allocated high priority and it is not clear whether the vehicles were for 
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Edmonds, Military Operations France and Belgium, 1918, vol. II (London, Macmillan, 1937), p. 23. 
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delivery to the BEF or to other fronts. Haig’s appreciation of the value of armoured 
cars on the Western Front appears to have been sparked by the demonstration of 
their utility during the Spring Offensives.36 Haig’s support assisted Brutinel in 
securing a second CMMG Brigade and in all probability was the determining factor in 
the diversion of part of Russia’s third Austin order to the Western Front rather than 
Mesopotamia.37 It was just four weeks before the Armistice that the Army Council 
sought priority for the BEF when it informed the Ministry of “the urgent need of the 
British Forces operating in France for Armoured Cars.”38  
In certain respects, the problems of the armoured car mirrored those of the tank. 
The navy had liaised diligently with the manufacturer to produce the Rolls Royce 
turreted-type, but the Army Council and Ministry of Munitions appear to have 
neglected the design of Austin and other armoured cars. Although ordered by 
Russia, the Austin’s design should have been of concern to Britain since Russia was 
an ally. No evidence has been found of any War Office or Ministry participation in the 
design of armoured cars. It is revealing to compare the criticisms of those tasked with 
the maintenance of Austin armoured cars in France in 1918 with those using Rolls-
Royce armoured cars in more challenging conditions in Arabia. Third Army 
concluded that Austin armoured cars were constantly breaking down and that their 
operational use was constrained through fear of mechanical unreliability.39 On the 
other hand, following a broken element in the suspension of his Rolls-Royce, 
Lawrence wrote: 
Though we had been driving in these [Rolls-Royce] for eighteen months, 
not upon the polished roads of their makers’ intentions, but across country 
of the vilest, at speed, day or night, carrying a ton of goods and four or five 
men up, yet this was our first structural accident in the team of nine.40 
 
 
36 “Amiens will not fall into German Hands: How the Canadians saved the City from Advance Guard”, , 
Daily Mirror, 4 April 1918; Juliette Champagne and John Matthews, Raymond Brutinel and the 
Genesis of Modern Mechanized Warfare in The Frontier of Patriotism: Alberta and the First World War 
ed. by Adriana A. Davies and Jeff Keshen, (Calgary, 2016), pp. 24-25. 
37 Bryan Perrett, British Armoured Car Operations in World War One (Barnsley, Pen and Sword, 
2016), p. 105. 
38 National Archives, MUN4/3454, War Office to MM, 12 October 1918. 
39 Imperial War Museum, Doc. 10086, War Experience and Practical Notes of the 17th Armoured Car 
(Tank) Battalion in France from April to November 1918), passim. 
40 James Stejskal, Masters of Mayhem: Lawrence of Arabia and the British Military Mission to the 
Hejaz (Oxford, Casemate, 2018), p. 166. 
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In the event the BEF would suffer, since the last production run of Austins was 
diverted for British use and proved to be exceptionally unreliable. Notes by 17th 
Armoured Car (Tank) Battalion are strongly critical: 
The chassis on which the Body is mounted is too light to carry the weight 
on good roads, and is most unsuitable for fighting under War conditions. It 
is not a sound proposition to strengthen the present Chassis, because if 
one detail was strengthened, a fresh weakness would develop at another 
point. The chief replacements have been. Axles both front and rear. 
Springs, Dowel Bolts. Clutches. Dumb Irons and Steering Gears.41 
The severe weakness was a handicap in operations: 
The Cars of this Battalion were so unreliable that it was rarely possible to get 
more than 50% of those that started into action to return without mechanical 
breakdown….knowing the weakness of their cars prevented many 
opportunities from being fully exploited because of the risk of mechanical 
breakdown in the enemy’s lines.42 
Lloyd George’s “Too Late” speech in December 1915 had been correct in two key 
respects.43 So far as armoured vehicles were concerned, by the time of his speech 
there were already a number of participants from whom a greater or more rapid 
contribution might have been expected. Such management failings would continue, 
with others demonstrating a lack of urgency or judgment throughout the remainder of 
the war. On the other hand, there were some whose contributions had been greater or 
had been delivered more expeditiously than might reasonably have been anticipated.44 
Actions or delay by those who were “Too Late” could act as a brake on progress. 
That was the case with the tank, the project for which should, logically, have been 
given top priority to ensure delivery to the expanding BEF in the best possible condition 
for approaching 1916 offensives. What should have been a carefully monitored priority 
development programme, was delayed, firstly, by a lack of foresight and personal or 
professional interests, then left to proceed at its own pace. The design engineers pulled 
out all the stops to provide a workable, though of necessity, somewhat crude 
 
41 Imperial War Museum, Doc. 10086, War Experience and Practical Notes of the 17th Armoured Car 
(Tank) Battalion in France from April to November 1918, p. 2. A dumb Iron is a rigid connecting piece 
between the frame of an automotive vehicle and the spring shackle. 
42 Ibid, p. 6, from May to September, with an average use of 12 of the 16 cars, there were 164 axle 
breakdowns alone; cf. details of praise and reliability record of Rolls Royce in  Peter Pugh, Rolls 
Royce, The Magic of a Name: The First Forty Years of Britain’s most Prestigious Company (London, 
Icon Books, 2015), pp. 90-92. 
43 Hansard, HoC debates, statement by Mr. Lloyd George, 20 December 1915, 96-165. 
44 David Lloyd George, Memoirs of David Lloyd George (London, Odhams, 1938), p. 381. 
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machine. 45  By contrast, earlier in the year, the professional pride and 
misrepresentation of Holden and the self-interest and inertia of d’Eyncourt had resulted 
in significant delays. Additionally, even after GHQ had accepted the potential of the 
landship to break the deadlock on the Western Front, an ineffective Army Council did 
little more than observe, allowing the Naval Committee and Swinton to make the 
running, unsupervised and unpressurised.  
The lack of recognition of benefits and the need for urgency by politicians and the 
War Office ensured that the tank arrived late to the 1916 battlefields. Furthermore, 
owing to understandable shortcomings, expected in new technologically complicated 
machines, but also to inexcusable faulty and lacklustre management by the Heads of 
the Naval and Landships Committees, the tank was not only late but also incorrectly 
prepared. Spencer Jones identifies the significance of 1 July 1916, “That battle would 
define Britain’s experience throughout 1916 and I would argue for, in the historical 
memory, it still defines much of what we think about Britain in the First World War”.46  
This memory resulted from an unprecedented day of disaster for Britain. Trafalgar 
and Waterloo are celebrated by London edifices, but 1 July cast such a funereal cloak 
over the war that there is no celebration of the eventual outcome that the nation’s 
efforts did so much to secure. Effectively, 1 July 1916 was a major factor in robbing 
the BEF of appropriate recognition of its “victory” in 1918.47 Churchill’s prediction for 
Britain and Germany, “neither side would find in a war with the other a prize worth 
fighting for”, duly came to pass, at least in the short/medium term.48 It would be far-
fetched to contemplate that the first handful of tanks might have turned the Somme 
into the black day of the German Army, but it is not inconceivable that, on part of the 
battlefield, a larger force of more reliable machine-gun destroyers might have adjusted 
 
45 National Archives, T173/776, Royal Commission on Awards to Inventors, 21 October 1919, 
examination of Tritton by Russell, answers to questions 2605-2626 and 2637-2703 and cross-
examination of Wilson by Gray, answers to questions 3134-3143. 
46 Spencer Jones, Western Front Association Podcast on his book, At all Costs: The British Army on 
the Western Front 1916, https://www.westernfrontassociation.com/the-latest-wwi-podcast/ep-84-the-
british-army-on-the-western-front-in-1916-dr-spencer-jones/, accessed 29 April 2020. 
47 Gary Sheffield, Hello to all that, Western Front Association lecture, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y8BgQLhRpuA, accessed 29 April 2020. 
48 John H Maurer (ed.), Churchill and Strategic Dilemmas before the World Wars: Essays in Honor of 
Michael I Handel (Portland, Routledge, 2003), pp. 44-45; Robert Rhodes James, Winston S. Churchill: 
His Complete Speeches 1897-1963, vol. II, (New York, Chelsea House Publishers, 1974), speech at 
Swansea, 14 August 1908, Government Policy and the Foreign Situation, p. 1085. 
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the balance of advantage and bequeathed a less doleful assessment of the battle or 
of the war generally.  
There had been adequate time to develop armoured cars before 1914 and tanks 
before September 1916. Haig instantly recognised the potential of the tank, not simply 
after 15 September, but upon reading Churchill’s “Variants” shortly after becoming 
Commander-in-Chief. 49  However, recognition of potential was needed before the 
arrival of circumstances rendering it fairly obvious. Haig had spent some time in 1907-
1909 writing and supervising the preparation of Field Service Regulations. He was 
aware well before 1914 that war with Germany was likely. 50  German firepower, 
quantity of trained manpower and Anglophobia were known to British politicians and 
military leaders. Even Grierson, formerly pro-German, became convinced that war was 
likely.51  That was the time to have appreciated the advantages of protection and 
mobility of firepower. Whereas it might have required prior acceptance of Bloch’s 
prediction of stalemate to secure the visualisation of tracked armoured vehicles as 
advantageous, the same requirement did not apply to armoured cars which should 
have been seen as a logical evolutionary step in the development of warfare. Badsey 
puts his finger on the issue, stating, “It is both noteworthy and disappointing that there 
was no major advocate of motorised troops among the British Army’s senior officers in 
the period 1908–1914, which must be considered a blind-spot in military thinking”.52 It 
was not necessarily an abundance of mobile troops that was required, but mobile 
firepower.53 Furthermore, armoured cars were potentially valuable in many locations, 
particularly in the NWFP, Egypt and Mesopotamia, as well as in mobile warfare in 
Europe.54 
 
49 National Archives, CAB42/7/3, ‘Variants of the Offensive’, Winston Churchill, 3 December 1915, 
produced as CID Paper attributed to Churchill with comments by Cavan, 7 January 1916. According to 
Swinton, (Eyewitness, p. 189) Haig read Churchill’s paper on Christmas Day 1915 and early in 
January sent Elles to London “to ascertain what progress had been made in the matter of machines 
for attacking trenches”. 
50  Gary Sheffield, The Chief: Douglas Haig and the British Army (London, Aurum Press, 2011), pp. 58-
59. 
51 D.S.Macdiarmid, The Life of Lieutenant-General Sir James Moncrieff Grierson (London, Constable, 
1923, pp. 115, 130-134. Grierson was a former DMO and GOC-in-C Eastern Command. Commander 
of 2 Corps, he died on the way to his command in France in August 1914. 
52 Stephen Badsey, Doctrine and Reform in the British Cavalry 1880–1918 (London, Routledge, 
2008), pp. 236. 
53 Some of the clues missed by military planners are itemised at Appendix 1. 
54 T R Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of Frontier Warfare 1849-1947 (London, 
Macmillan, 1998), p. 128, quoting from Brigadier-General Montagu, Report on Mechanical Transport 
and Armoured Cars in India (Simla 1917), p. 12 and Notes on Armoured Cars (Simla, 1915), p. 4, 
“Armoured cars had demonstrated their versatility in India during the First World War, when their 
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In the event, the need for armoured vehicles was not appreciated and the 
consequences of continental commitments were not given due consideration. Many 
improvements to military capability were secured but those improvements did not 
render the BEF fit for participation in the heavyweight division.55 Even after six months’ 
experience of war, the combination of military ineffectiveness and the prejudice and 
lack of vision by Holden combined to secure the relegation of Swinton’s valuable 
assessment of the tactical problem, and a possible solution, to longer-term storage. In 
that location, Swinton’s assessment joined the papers of de Mole, H G Wells and 
others, who had in their different ways, by accident or intent, pointed to a change in 
the nature of land warfare that would be wrought by automotive technology.56 
Once given responsibilities for aspects of land warfare, the navy rapidly developed 
armoured cars and, in response to changing conditions, their thoughts soon graduated 
from wheels to tracked systems.57 It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the army 
did not attract recruits of sufficient calibre to secure desirable innovative change, 
though such a conclusion needs to be tempered by recognition that in many of its 
duties the navy also exhibited a lack of thorough innovative planning.58  
David Edgerton advances the theory of opposition between the order and progress 
of civil influences in society against the romanticism of the military. He draws support 
for this theory from George Orwell’s identification of the “key oppositions running 
through H. G. Wells’s work”.59 Edgerton notes the significant developments of aircraft 
and the atomic bomb in support of his theory of civil-led warfare in the 20th century. So 
far as the army is concerned, Edgerton considers the military to have been backward 
 
mobility, firepower and relative invulnerability to rifle fire had made them ideal in the NWFP for 
reconnaissance, patrolling, the pursuit of raiding gangs, escort duties and the support of beleaguered 
outposts in areas where roads or open ground existed; Fletcher, War Cars, pp. 74-80; T. A. 
Heathcote, The Afghan Wars 1839-1919 (London, Osprey, 1980), pp. 176-177; Perrett, British 
Armoured Car Operations, pp. 103-116: E Bartholomew, Early Armoured Cars (Princes Risborough, 
Shire, 1988), pp. 28-29. 
55  Hew Strachan, The British Army, Its General Staff, and the Continental Commitment, 1904-1914, in 
The British General Staff: Reform and Innovation, 1890-1939, ed. by David French and Brian Holden 
Reid (London, Routledge, 2014) [2002], p. 66. 
56 National Archives, T173/34B, Recommendations to the Treasury by the Royal Commission on 
Awards to Inventors, 17 November 1919, describing de Mole’s proposals as a “brilliant invention” for a 
tank that was dismissed by the War Office in 1912; Fletcher, The British Tanks, pp. 15-16. 
57 Murray Sueter, The Evolution of the Tank: A Record of Royal Naval Air Service Caterpillar 
Experiments (London, Hutchinson, 1937), pp. 29 and 46-50. 
58 Arthur Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, vol. I: The 
Road to War 1904-1914 (Barnsley, Seaforth Publishing, 2013), pp. 395-435, naval weaknesses 
included elements of gunnery technique, quality of torpedoes, shells and mines and tactical training. 
59 David Edgerton The Shock of the Old: Technology and Global History since 1900 (London, Profile, 
2008), pp. 139-141. 
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when compared to civil influences, “the great innovations in arms in the twentieth 
century were in essentially civilian technologies applied to war, and that they 
transformed twentieth-century war”. 60  When examining the early development of 
armoured vehicles, Edgerton has a point, though, adopting the wider, alternative 
meaning of “military”, i.e. all armed forces, his theory carries less weight since 
elements of naval innovation and invention need to be taken into account. 
The outcome of the social or educational straitjacket was that Britain was 
condemned to commence the war, long and widely recognised to be just over the 
horizon, with weapons familiar to participants in former conflicts. The definition of 
“innovation” can vary, but, in essence, it involves the introduction of something new, 
an idea, method or device. So far as wheeled vehicles were concerned, the 
combination of armoured protection, firepower and the internal combustion engine was 
a novel idea around the turn of the century but was not pursued by the British Army.  
Armoured trains had been used both on rail and road during the Boer War but the 
scholarship does not take the service to task for failing to experiment with or develop 
armoured cars between 1902 and 1914. The consequences were particularly 
damaging bearing in mind the increasing possibility from about 1904 that it would be 
called upon to face large, well-armed German forces. Recent work on this period 
makes no reference to armoured vehicles.61 Nevertheless, some would look back later 
and conclude that failure to develop armoured vehicles was a mistake.62 Undoubtedly, 
judged against the attributes of armoured cars, the army was guilty of dismissing an 
innovative development. Tactical advantages from the use of such vehicles would have 
been invaluable to the BEF during the early months of the war when conditions were 
mobile.63 So far as tracked vehicles are concerned, these would have provided an 
additional dimension to the offensive when the war became entrenched, but proposals 
for such machines were dismissed before the war and experimentation was rejected 
 
60 Ibid, pp. 138-139. 
61 Spencer Jones, From Boer War to World War: Tactical Reform of the British Army, 1902-1914 
(Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 2012). The tactical reforms described proved valuable to the 
cavalry in 1914, but there is no mention of the threat or benefit of armoured vehicles. German cavalry 
was alerted to the value of armoured cars very shortly after the outbreak of war.  
62 National Archives, WO32/11357, DSD to President, Reorganisation Committee, 18 June 1919 and 
CAB/24/89/6, Churchill memorandum to War Cabinet, ‘Proposed Provision of Armoured Cars’, 25 July 
1919. 
63 National Archives, WO32/11357, Director of Staff Duties to President, Reorganisation Committee, 
18 June 1919. 
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early in 1915. The army had the navy to thank for the supply of armoured vehicles that 
commenced in 1915 for cars and 1916 for tanks.  
In respect of armoured vehicles, claims that the Army Council embraced innovation 
cannot therefore be accepted without qualification. There was no early welcome for 
the opportunity to use automotive technology to participate in fighting and thereby to 
enhance military capability. Fox concludes that: 
The army was not an insular organisation, nor was it averse to change or 
new knowledge. It could not afford such attitudes when fighting a war against 
a rival military-industrial system. Chemical warfare, military mining, signals 
technology, and inland water transport all resulted from the army's decision 
to listen to outsiders, whether civilians or individuals from allied nations.64 
These points are valid, but elements of learning connected to the innovative technology 
of AFVs are not analysed. With the benefit of hindsight, the application of a more 
innovative stance towards the use of vehicles can be seen as a missed opportunity. In 
the light of change in foreign policy, this can be seen as particularly unfortunate. 
Similarly, some opportunities for innovation in other areas were not fully grasped, most 
significantly in amending artillery practice and techniques.65 Suggestions before the 
war by members of the Garrison Artillery that allowance should be calculated for the 
effect of climatic conditions on the fall of shot were derided by their Field Artillery 
colleagues: 
The RFA was renowned for its unscientific approach….By comparison the 
Royal Garrison Artillery approach was relatively scientific. By 1914, it was 
firing from cover….on calculated data. It shot from maps and corrected for 
weather before firing.66 
Following trials in North Wales of horses versus caterpillar tractors for hauling guns, 
the conclusion to reject mechanical tracked drive was based on the assessment that 
horsed guns “were on every occasion in action a long time before the gun drawn by 
 
64 Aimée Fox, Learning to Fight: Military Innovation and Change in the British Army, 1914–1918, 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2018), passim, the form of innovation considered is not 
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65 Timothy Bowman and Mark Connelly, The Edwardian Army: Manning, Training, and Deploying the 
British Army, 1902-1914 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 79-85. 
66 Jonathan B. A. Bailey, ‘British Artillery in the Great War’ in British Fighting Methods in the Great 
War, ed. by Paddy Griffith (London, Frank Cass, 1996), Bailey points out that at a lecture in May 1914 
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the tractor”.67 The misfortune for the nation was that such limited vision resulted in 
heavy penalties in the foothills of eventual military learning experiences. 
Lest it should be argued that the use of aircraft shows matters in a different light, it 
should be borne in mind that aircraft were initially military eyes and ears and for some 
time lacked any means of joining the battle as “weapons”. In 1916 Hankey’s suggestion 
that aircraft should be used aggressively in conjunction with tanks, was dismissed by 
Major-General David Henderson, at that time “aeronautics specialist” on the Army 
Council, as impractical.68 
Bourne commends the army’s system of senior appointments towards the end of 
the war, “you could characterise the entire system as gradually evolving, putting square 
pegs in square holes and round pegs in round holes”.69 He acknowledges that some 
units remained less efficient than others, “Even in the 100 days there are some 
divisions that are more cutting edge and up-to-date state of the art”.70 His analysis is 
supported by Boff.71 Generally, British forces were capable and innovative by the 
Hundred Days.72 This had not been the case in earlier years.73 This is confirmed by 
experiences with tanks, such as Pulteney’s misuse of tanks at High Wood, excessive 
faith in mechanical reliability at Flers and a lack of caution which would appear to have 
characterised the action at Flesquières and had not been eliminated by the Hundred 
 
67 National Archives, WO107/283, Annual Report of War Office Mechanical Transport Committee, 
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Days.74 Murray was found even more wanting by events at First Gaza, when he failed 
to use his tanks.75  
The British Army did, to a large degree, successfully adapt to make good use of new 
technologies and of civilian expertise. By the manner of their utilisation of the 
equipment at their disposal, some did become the “battlefield maestros” described by 
Monash. Furthermore, it could be argued that some units progressed beyond the stage 
of innovation into the realms of invention as evidenced by alterations by Tank Corps 
engineers to aspects of the design of AFVs or the weapons or equipment they 
carried.76 However, this does not justify the claim that the nettle of innovation was fully 
grasped. Rather, so far as an important ingredient of 20th century military progress is 
concerned, the army was slow off the mark, at first ignoring armoured vehicles, then 
needing a helping hand from a small group of “enthusiasts” and a burgeoning casualty 
list, to accept the benefit of mechanical assistance. 
Furthermore, in mid-1915 when the potential value of armour began its journey of 
acceptance in military minds, senior officers should have thrown their full weight behind 
the efforts of the Landships Committee, design engineers and Swinton to secure early 
manufacture, training of operatives and the appearance of tanks in 1916’s “Big Push”. 
The entire team needed to join the maul to force the ball over the line, but it was left to 
the “enthusiasts” to do so on their own. Although they eventually succeeded, they were 
unable to advance at the pace required to enable tanks to make an earlier battlefield 
debut. The opportunity to bequeath a less morose war memory had passed without 
any serious attempt to prepare the nation’s “secret weapon” for use on 1 July 1916, a 
key moment in British history. 
Delays in design and manufacture had a significant continuing effect on the value 
of tanks during the war. The exact consequences are a matter of speculation, but it is 
logical to conclude that the earlier appearance of tanks in 1916 would have had some 
beneficial results. In the event, the autumnal debut of the tank had adverse 
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consequences for 1917, since by the time the army and Ministry had absorbed the 
lessons from the Somme, there proved to be insufficient time to implement changes 
and deliver improved tanks for participation in the Arras offensives. The Mark IV 
appeared in large numbers shortly after the Battles of Arras and a substantial force 
was assembled for use at Ypres. Unfortunately, this coincided with a prolonged period 
of wet weather on ground lacking intact or efficient drainage and the machines were of 
limited value.77  
In terms of the national “grand picture”, armoured vehicles can be seen to have 
been confronted by an obstacle course. Firstly, they faced a failure by the Army Council 
to recognise their value in possible future scenarios of continental warfare or Empire 
policing. Secondly, they needed to overcome the failure in London and at GHQ to 
identify or to act upon a clearer view of their value provided by events in the initial 
stages of the war. Thirdly, upon the eventual recognition of their value, tanks 
encountered a production timescale that seemed intent upon restricting supply when 
their services were most needed. Having overcome these initial obstacles, both tanks 
and armoured cars found further substantial obstacles in the form of unskilled 
management of production. 
In the light of this catalogue of misfortune or failure, it is no surprise that Churchill’s 
historical writings do not mention Maclean. In reality, Maclean’s report, completed 
some two months before the Armistice, revealed the consequences of appointing 
inexperienced individuals to key industrial positions. Effectively Lloyd George and 
Churchill had placed square pegs into round holes. A banker and a sailor had run the 
MWD for two and a half years. Maclean identified many aspects of MWD procedures 
that, lacking knowledgeable supervision, were inefficient. 
Churchill’s initial involvement with the development of the tank had coincided with a 
difficult period in his political career. In 1915, following demotion to the Duchy and 
subsequent resignation from government, he was at a low ebb in political circles and 
general public esteem. The tank represented an iconic but hybrid creature capable of 
assisting his progress but, if handled badly, a threat to his career. It is to be anticipated 
that politicians will seek to gild the lily, to write a version of events unduly favourable 
 
77 National Archives, CAB45/200, Elles to Edmonds, 4 September 1934. 
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to their legacy.78 Notwithstanding this, and allowance for the fact that the stakes were 
high, Churchill’s treatment of those who played important roles in the development of 
the tank, crossed the line of reasonable or understandable distortion: it was not a 
matter that should have given him any sense of pride. 
 The scholarship fails to recognise the level of Churchill’s deceit and its duration. It 
commenced on his return to government in 1917, continued through the remainder of 
the war, extended to his appearance before the Royal Commission, into the writing of 
The World Crisis and then into attempts to influence the authors of the Official 
History.79 Twenty years after the war, in disregard of the findings of the Royal 
Commission, Churchill was still falsely claiming he had directed work on caterpillar 
tractors in September/October 1914 and that the Landships Committee had designed 
the Mother tank.80 His object throughout was the direction of credit for the tank to his 
protégé, d”Eyncourt, as opposed to those who deserved to have been lauded as 
national heroes. His falsified version of events reflected, more beneficially than 
justified, upon himself, exaggerated claims maintained throughout his life to burnish 
his own reputation: “For my part, I consider that it will be found much better by all 
Parties to leave the past to history, especially as I propose to write that history 
myself”.81 This quotation, often misrepresented, more directly, as “History will be kind 
to me, for I intend to write it”, represents a fine example of Churchill’s opportunistic 
use of his literary talents to protect and burnish his reputation and legacy. 
 Although he did not correctly foresee the initial tactical roles of tanks, Churchill was 
aware of their potential and, alone among senior politicians, backed his horse to the 
hilt, innovatively, since he used money entrusted to his Department for other more 
routine, naval purposes.82 For this reason Churchill thoroughly deserves a place on 
the podium. Notwithstanding this, his reputation is tarnished by his shameful treatment 
of those who had first foreseen the need for tanks, had designed them and supervised 
their construction. It is perhaps fair to say that Churchill’s achievements in delivering 
large quantities of most munitions, in recognising the value of mechanical warfare and 
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in establishing the Committee that, indirectly, gave rise to the combination of Tritton 
and Wilson, have taken the eye from his weaknesses and unchivalrous behaviour. 
Elements of the scholarship lean toward the view of the tank as icing on the all-arms 
cake rather than an essential ingredient for victory. This view appears to attach 
insufficient weight to the opinions of many in the lower ranks, but also of Rawlinson, 
Haig and many senior German generals.83 The indelible impression from this research 
is that of a sense of missed opportunity, a more generous layer of icing. Some, whether 
in khaki or civvies failed to show the qualities that would have enabled the nation to 
realise a greater element of the potential of armoured vehicles, wheeled and tracked. 
For tracked AFVs, the relatively damp squib of 15 September was not inevitable. The 
opportunity existed for a larger number of more reliable and better protected machines 
to make a greater impact when first used, but it was not grasped. The technological 
innovation was present, but the organisational receptivity and adaptation were not and 
in any event the means to create and maintain an effective breakthrough did not exist. 
The advantages of the defence in deploying reinforcements would surely soon have 
contained any threatened breahthrough.  
General Sir John Shea identifies the explanation for the legacy of the missed 
opportunity of more substantial achievements by armoured vehicles at all stages of the 
war, though particularly on 1 July 1916: 
I would like to emphasise how to study history. The real value is not a 
remembrance of dates or numbers or details, but first and foremost the study 
of human nature. For successful war depends on a knowledge of human 
nature and how to handle it.84 
The contribution of armoured vehicles in the First World War resulted from and was 
limited by the calibre of those most closely involved. The commendable efforts of 
Tritton, Wilson and Swinton achieved a great deal. To a degree, their work was 
secured through the vision of Churchill, but he failed to recognise, most tellingly, the 
weaknesses and limitations of d’Eyncourt and Moore. Furthermore, the general 
standard of ability of those in senior military positions and political office, particularly in 
 
83 Boraston, Haig’s Despatches, The Final Despatch, para. 15, pp. 329-330; Erich von Ludendorff, My 
War Memories (London, Hutchinson, 1919), pp. 679-680: General Sir Henry Rawlinson, Special 
Order, 16 August 1918, reproduced in J. F. C. Fuller, Tanks in the Great War 1914-1918 (New York, 
E. P. Dutton and Company, 1920), p. 227. 
84 Fox, Learning to Fight, p. 240, quoting from LHCMA, Shea Papers, 6/3a, ‘The Study of Military 
History as Exemplified by the Palestine Campaign 1917–18’, n.d. 
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the years before 1914, ensured that the potential of armoured vehicles was not more 
appreciated sooner. Fortunately, Germany also failed to develop fighting vehicles for 
military operations during this period, otherwise, it is difficult to see how the limited 
resources of the BEF could have resisted early offensives. Such a view is of course 
based on the assumption that it was in Britain’s long-term interest to succeed militarily. 





Appendix A – Extract from David Fletcher, “War Cars” showing Research by 





Appendix B - Tanks by Age, Unit and Outcome on 15 September 1916 
 
Corps  Division Army No. Coy No. Commander Outcome  
Res.Army 2 Can  701   C5   Clarke    Ditched/Steering 
Res.Army 2 Can  503   C4   Campbell   Track 
Res.Army 2 Can  504   C6   Allen     OK 
III    47 Div  705   C23   Henderson  Track/Ditched 
XIV   6 Div   705   C19   Holford-Walker Tail Unit 
XIV   Guards  507   D    Hiscocks   Ditched 
XIV   Guards  508   C18   Smith    Ditched 
XIV   56 Div  509   C14    Arnold    Ditched 
XIV   56 Div  510   C16   Purdy    Arty. Strike (FF) 
III    50 Div  511   D25   Colle    OK - Petrol 
III    47 Div  512   D21   Sharp    Ditched 
XIV   Guards  512   L    Cole     Track 
XIV   6 Div   513   F    Murphy    Track 
XIV   Guards  714   G    Bates    Ditched/Track 
XV   14 Div  516   D4(New) Storey    Ditched 
XV   NZ   719   D12   Nixon    OK then Arty. Strike 
Res.Army 2 Can  721   C5   Inglis    OK 
Res.Army 2 Can  721   C1   Wheeler   Ditched 
XV   NZ   720   D8   Bown    Arty. Strike 
XIV   Guards  722   E    Arnaud    Ditched 
Res.Army 2 Can  522   C2   Bluemel   Track 
XIV   56Div  523   C13   Dashwood  Track 
XIV   6Div   523   C20   MacPherson  Engine 
III    15Div  528   D23   Mann    Arty. Strike 
XV   14Div  728   D3   Head    OK then Arty. Strike 
XIV   6Div   533   C22   Henriques   AP Rounds 
XV   14Div  534   D14   Court    Locked Sponson 
XV   NZ   535   D10   Darby    Arty. Strike 
XV   14Div  537   D15   Bagshaw   Arty. Strike 
XV   14Div  538   D16   Arnold    OK 
XV   14Div  539   D2   Bell     Ditched 
XV   14Div  540   D5   Blowers   Ditched/Arty Strike 
XIV   6Div   740   C21   Vincent    Ditched 
XIV   Guards  741   C15   Tull     Tail/Engine 
XV   14Div  742   D7   Enoch    Tail/Ditched 
XV   14Div  743   D18   Bond    OK 
III    15Div  744   D20   Drader    OK 
III    15Div  745   D22   Robinson   Ditched 
XV   14Div  546   D9   Huffham   Locked Sponson 
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XIV   Guards  746   B    Clarke    OK/Petrol/Ditched 
XV   NZ   547   D11   Pearsall   OK 
XV   41Div  747   D6   Legge    OK/ Arty. Strike 
III    47Div  548   D13   Sampson   OK/Ditched/Arty. Strike 
III    50Div  751   D24   Stones    Arty. Strike 
XV   14Div  753   D19   Sellick    Ditched 
XIV   Guards  554   K    Ambrose   Tail/Engine 
XV   14Div  759   D17   Hastie    OK/Tail/Engine 
XIV   Guards  760   H (C7)  Elliot     OK 
XV   14Div  765   D1   Mortimore   OK/Arty. Strike (FF) 
 
This appendix lists tanks deployed on 15 September 1916 by age of machines 
(judged by their Army delivery numbers) It illustrates: 
1. In the final column (highlighted), the presence of track problems only in the 
older machines in the upper half of the list. 
2. In the fourth column (highlighted), replacement machines drawn by members 
of C Company, primarily owing to track problems (Their war diary shows only 
one replacement machine drawn by D Company – not track related). 
3. The greater loss of machines to artillery strikes by D Company is likely to 
reflect the fact that their greater mechanical reliability led to longer spells of 
participation in the battle. 
4. It is not difficult to visualise a much greater rate of success on 15 September 
had the machines been fitted with more durable track units and the more 
robust tail units that Wilson had ordered but which Stern cancelled. 
Additionally, bearing in mind the known risk of artillery fire, special measures 
to suppress enemy fire and restrict observation by enemy OPs might have 
yielded a substantial benefit. 
5. For some machines a combination of experiences is indicated. 
 
More details of the outcome for the machines is given in Appendix C. 
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Appendix C – Summary, by Company, of Outcome for Tanks on 15 
September 1916 
 
1. Two tanks from C Company and twelve from D Company were destroyed or 
put out of action by artillery or small arms fire. Four machines from D 
Company were hit following relatively successful action. Greater loss from 
artillery strikes would be expected for machines participating longer in the 
battle. It is difficult to categorise certain tanks, since they may have ditched 
because of tail damage and may have been destroyed by artillery if ditched in 
sight of enemy OPs or located by air OPs. Two machines were damaged 
primarily by small arms fire rather than shellfire, causing loss of all 
periscopes/prisms and/or penetration by AP rounds. The AS suffered heavy 
losses in their first use of tanks on the Chemin des Dames in April 1917 – their 
measures to suppress artillery fire in their second action in May 1917 were 
particularly effective. 
2. Three tanks from C Company and one from D Company are recorded as 
suffering tail damage, Seven tanks from C Company ditched, eight from D 
Company. It is likely that the replacement of the weak tail units as arranged by 
Wilson but cancelled by Stern would have reduced these figures. 
3. Two tanks from C Company suffered non-track or tail-unit mechanical 
problems. A further tank suffered engine failure but this occurred late in the 
day and was attributable to steering damage. The tank was Hastie’s D17, 
reported famously to have “been seen marching through the High Street of 
Flers followed by large numbers of infantry”.1 The problem with his engine was 
explained by the way in which it was used to steer the tank consequent upon 
damage to the tail unit. 
4. Seven tanks appeared to suffer track failure – all older tanks from C Company. 
5. Four tanks from each Company suffered no major faults, including two that 
locked sponsons. Three of these, 1 from D Company and two from C 








1 National Archives, WO158/325, Fourth Army Daily Reports, September 1916 to 15 October 1917; 
Chris McCarthy, The Somme: The Day-by-Day Account (London, Arms and Armour, 1995) p. 104. 
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Appendix D – Operations involving Tanks – 8 August to Armistice 
 Bearing in mind the temptation, when lecturing, to simplify or exaggerate for effect, 
tank actions identified in the OH have been checked to confirm claims of success for 
tanks in the Hundred Days. It is difficult to categorise such actions which vary from 
unqualified success to complete failure. To further complicate matters, the degree to 
which tanks deserve credit for the outcome of individual actions also varies – in many 
cases their contribution is worthy of acknowledgment by the Official History, but there 
are also a number of instances of tanks being knocked out early in the offensive but 
the offensive nevertheless succeeding.  
 It would appear there are only five instances of failed offensive actions when tanks 
were involved, thus there is a high level of support for Professor Bourne’s claim:- 
Vol. IV 
p.241 At the Battle of Albert on 24 August, at the left of 47 Div., an attack supported 
by three tanks on two strongpoints failed when two tanks were disabled and the guns 
of the third jammed. Rawlinson called off the attack that was to have been made by 
III Corps and the Australian Corps. 
p.277 On 25 August, after initially making good progress 1st Grenadier Guards lost 
two of three supporting tanks when the mist cleared. Under machine-gun fire from 
front and both flanks, they were required to retire. Other Guards units also 
encountered problems. The OH raises the possibility of problems of communications 
security/confusion being the cause of strong opposition.1 
p.328 An attack by 9th Brigade of the 3rd Canadian Division was heavily shelled 
resulting in all eight supporting tanks being knocked out or incapacitated. Attempts to 
advance with artillery support alone were unsuccessful. 
Vol. V 
p.106 American 27 Div. at the Battle of St. Quentin Canal. Of first 34 tanks, twelve 
received direct hits and seven ditched – others (five?) fell foul of an old British 
minefield – as did four of a further six machines deployed later. The Americans 
suffered problems owing to failure to “mop-up” and unwise, unsupported infantry 
advances beyond objectives. 
 




p.117 110th and 62nd Brigades of 21 Div., 29 September. Each Brigade supported 
by 2 tanks. One tank failed to reach the start point and another was knocked out in 
Gonnelieu. In light of difficulties and poor progress by adjoining units, the attack was 
called off. 
 Three of these five failures involved the use of very small numbers of tanks – 
unwise given the high probability of loss from enemy artillery or mechanical failure. 
The American case involved a large number of tanks, but inexperience may have 
played a role in the failure of the offensive. Perhaps the most significant factors to 
flow from the examination are ones related to the justification for and degree of 
compliance with Lawrence’s instructions of 1 September in which he sought to limit 
tank actions.2  
The proper use of the tank is not the reduction of the outpost line of the 
defence, but the breaking of the organised line of resistance- by surprise. A 
success of this kind can be usefully exploited by pushing tanks through with 
supporting infantry. All available tanks should be reserved with this object in 
view.3  
Despite heavy tank losses, limited attention appears to have been paid to Lawrence’s 
tactical aspirations: 
The units and formations of the Tank Corps have been so organized in order 
to facilitate their handling (offensive battles) both tactically and 
administratively. This organization has been frequently departed from in 
order to meet local conditions. Although at times this may be unavoidable, it 
should be borne in mind that such a departure from the normal organization 
must result in a loss of fighting efficiency.4 
 Observance of the parsimonious approach envisaged by Lawrence would appear 
to have been somewhat relaxed by those responsible for deployment decisions on 
the mobile front. As a result many tank actions involved only small numbers of tanks 
during the advance between initial assaults by Fourth and Third Armies in August to 
the date of the Armistice. Bearing in mind the unreliability of tanks, vulnerability to 
field artillery deployed in camouflaged forward locations, the small number available, 
 
2 James E. Edmonds, Military Operations France and Belgium, 1918, vol. IV (London, HMSO, 1947), 
p. 384. 
3 National Archives, WO158/832, Lawrence to all armies, 1 September 1918, para. 6. 
4 Edmonds, Military Operations France and Belgium, 1918, vol. IV , p. 384. 
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the difficulty in their transportation across the Front and the concern of commanders 
to limit the inevitably high level of casualties, some continued use beyond that sought 
by Lawrence was perhaps inevitable. British losses during the Hundred Days, were 
some 66,475 killed, 279,861 wounded and 37,738 missing/prisoners.5 
 
 
5 War Office, Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire in the Great War (London, HMSO, 
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